In his mind ;-)

:halo:

A question I have is, what is 'truth' as distinct from 'perceived reality'? — Wayfarer

Truth only applies to propositions. Most of what we perceive and know about reality doesn't fit comfortably into propositions. If I have 1,000 data points generated by measurements, what can I say about them that is true? If my understanding of reality is based on thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of informal observations, where is the truth in that if I can't or don't want to put it in the form of thousands, tens of thousands, or hundreds of thousands of propositions?

In this framework, 'objective truth' represents the underlying reality that exists independently of observers, akin to Kant's noumenal realm or things in themselves. Our perceptual reality, on the other hand, is the subjective experience generated by our sensory systems, tailored by evolutionary pressures to help us navigate our environment effectively rather than to accurately reflect this objective truth. — Wayfarer

It is a respectable metaphysical position that there is no underlying reality that exists independently of observers. This is Verse 40 from Gia-Fu Feng's translation of the Tao Te Ching.

Returning is the motion of the Tao.
Yielding is the way of the Tao.
The ten thousand things are born of being.
Being is born of not being. — Lao Tzu - Tao Te Ching Verse 40

The ten thousand things are the multiplicity of things existing in the world. Not being refers to the Tao, the inconceivable, unspeakable unity.

It is a respectable metaphysical position that there is no underlying reality that exists independently of observers. — T Clark

It's called 'scepticism'.

It's called 'scepticism'. — Wayfarer

We don't cotton to your gol'darned metric "scepticism" here in the USofA. We'll stick with our good old American customary units skepticism.

:rofl:

A quote from Chapter 4 - the Interface Theory of Perception (ITP), which compares our perception of objects to the icons on a computer interface. The icons are operative, and useful to us, in a way the underlying code and electronics of a computer could not be.

If you look and see a spoon, then there is a spoon. But as soon as you look away, the spoon ceases to exist. Something continues to exist, but it is not a spoon and is not in space and time. The spoon is a data structure that you create when you interact with that something. It is your description of fitness payoffs and how to get them.

This may seem preposterous. After all, if I put a spoon on the table then everyone in the room will agree that there is a spoon. Surely the only way to explain such consensus is to accept the obvious—that there is a real spoon, which everyone sees.

But there is another way to explain our consensus: we all construct our icons in similar ways. As members of one species, we share an interface (which varies a bit from person to person). Whatever reality might be, when we interact with it we all construct similar icons, because we all have similar needs, and similar methods for acquiring fitness payoffs.

Excerpt from The Case Against Reality, Donald Hoffman, Kindle Edition

Very similar argument to 'mind-created world'.

he has to see reality in order to come to this conclusion (that, he has to prove evolution and his own theory). Hoffman is not a philosopher and doesn't seem to like philosophers. What he doesn't understand: you can't have a first premise (reality exists) and then from this premise prove that the premise is wrong. That's not a valid argument. How can he even ever say again "evolution is true" if all the research into it is based on illusions. His is a self-defeating thesis. — Gregory

All of those types of objections are addressed in the book, with references to papers that make such arguments. Besides, saying that we don’t perceive reality as it is, is a far cry from saying that ‘reality doesn’t exist’. Really the book should be called 'the case against realism' or something like that.

However, saw Phillip Goff's and Keith Frankish's Mindchat episode with him and was just basically spewing unintelligible garbage. — Apustimelogist

Having seen a blurb from Deepak Chopra on the Amazon page, I can't say I'm surprised.

Deepak Chopra :scream: And not even any need to argue!

A quote from Chapter 4 - the Interface Theory of Perception (ITP), which compares our perception of objects to the icons on a computer interface. — Wayfarer

I hadn't heard of Hoffman before this thread, so I looked him up. Sounds like what you are describing is multimodal user interface theory, which makes some sense to me. That's sort of like how I thought about this issue originally. Now I find myself questioning whether that is the clearest way to think about it.

If you look and see a spoon, then there is a spoon. But as soon as you look away, the spoon ceases to exist. Something continues to exist, but it is not a spoon and is not in space and time. The spoon is a data structure that you create when you interact with that something. It is your description of fitness payoffs and how to get them.

This may seem preposterous. After all, if I put a spoon on the table then everyone in the room will agree that there is a spoon. Surely the only way to explain such consensus is to accept the obvious—that there is a real spoon, which everyone sees.

But there is another way to explain our consensus: we all construct our icons in similar ways. As members of one species, we share an interface (which varies a bit from person to person). Whatever reality might be, when we interact with it we all construct similar icons, because we all have similar needs, and similar methods for acquiring fitness payoffs.

Not preposterous maybe, but I think it's misleading. Yes, I know Hoffman is a cognitive scientist. Of course the spoon doesn't cease to exist. It seems to me it exists in the same sense it does while I'm looking at it - at the interface between my mind and the external world. The quote also seems to ignore the extent to which reality is a social phenomena. Even if I'm not looking at the spoon, somebody else is or might be.

Very similar argument to 'mind-created world'. — Wayfarer

Seems to me any philosophy other than strict materialism/physicalism/realism could be described as concerning a "mind-created world." I wasn't sure what you meant by that, so I looked it up. You'll be interested to know that the first link on the Google page was from a thread you started eight months ago.

One point Hoffman makes very well is that we have made no progress whatever in explaining how it is that a particular neural event is (or causes or realises) a sensation of the smell of coffee rather than, say, the taste of chocolate. And this problem applies regardless of one's view about consciousness - dualists and panpsychists are no further forward on this than physicalists.

The consequences of being run over by a bus on Main Street if we are not looking while we cross remains an ontological danger. It just isn't what we think it is. — Tom Storm

So what do we think it is, that it isn't?

I cn tell you some things I don't think it is; it isn't; neurons, perceptions, thoughts, imaginings, qualia, hallucination, noumena, electro magnetic radiationin fact I think it's most likely a bus on main street. Am I wrong?

One point Hoffman makes very well is that we have made no progress whatever in explaining how it is that a particular neural event is (or causes or realises) a sensation of the smell of coffee rather than, say, the taste of chocolate. — bert1

On the other hand, a lot of progress is being made, in understanding that things like the smell of coffee are a function of coordinated activity in arrays of neurons, and that expecting to find a "particular neural event" accounting for the smell of coffee evinces a lack of sophistication in considering the subject.

One point Hoffman makes very well is that we have made no progress whatever in explaining how it is that a particular neural event is (or causes or realises) a sensation of the smell of coffee rather than, say, the taste of chocolate. And this problem applies regardless of one's view about consciousness - dualists and panpsychists are no further forward on this than physicalists. — bert1

As @Wayfarer can attest, I find the fact that the "hard problem" of consciousness takes up so much attention infuriating. Yes, I know many disagree. This is one of the reasons I had a knee-jerk negative reaction to Hoffman.

The problem of why such-and-such function is correlated with this experience rather than that is not the hard problem.

On the other hand, a lot of progress is being made, in understanding that things like the smell of coffee are a function of coordinated activity in arrays of neurons, and that expecting to find a "particular neural event" accounting for the smell of coffee evinces a lack of sophistication in considering the subject. — wonderer1

Sure, but that doesn't make the problem any easier does it? If it does, please do explain.

Sure, but that doesn't make the problem any easier does it? If it does, please do explain. — bert1

No, it doesn't make the problem any easier. Still physicalism is where progress in understanding is being made, whereas dualism and panpsychism seem to dismiss the possibility of progress being made altogether.

Have you made it to the last chapter? He sort of turns everything he has said on his head. His point is that a common way of looking at the relationship between mind and nature is self-refuting. Plantinga has previously made a similar argument. I don't think this is a bad argument, although the way it is framed it does seem like he is refuting himself as well. But I take it that this is exactly the point, his position is self-refuting because it's situated in popular assumptions that are self-refuting.

IMO, much modern philosophy ends up in a sort of Kantian dualism because it's unwilling to challenge dogmatic assumptions stemming for Lockean objectivity and the primacy of "primary properties," reductionism, and the division of the word into subject and object, phenomenal/noumenal.

Still physicalism is where progress in understanding is being made, whereas dualism and panpsychism seem to dismiss the possibility of progress being made altogether. — wonderer1

Panpsychists and dualists probably do typically dismiss the possibility of explaining consciousness (in general terms that would constitute an answer to the hard problem) in terms of complex systems. But this dismissal for many is exactly what motivates them to place consciousness elsewhere in nature than just an emergent characteristic of some complex systems. For my money, the fact that a growing number of philosophers take panpsychism seriously is progress. Bypassing the hard problem instead of trying to solve it is progress. Not that I object to physicalists continuing to theorise, they come up with interesting stuff. Just not a solution to the hard problem. (And before Galen Strawson tells me off, he insists he is a physicalist and a panpsychist at the same time, which last time I read it made sense to me but I've forgotten much of his reasoning.) I personally think the problem of what consciousness is is not hard, I think we know what it is, and we only have to introspect to find out. But the problem of the relationship between consciousness and systems is very obscure for the reasons Hoffman mentions, and I do think science can play a useful role in that.

The consequences of being run over by a bus on Main Street if we are not looking while we cross remains an ontological danger. It just isn't what we think it is.
— Tom Storm

So what do we think it is, that it isn't? — unenlightened

Well it is a bus, as far as basic human experience is concerned. But is the common sense answer the right one, or the only one?

Given the metaphysics of idealism, the true nature of our reality isn't readily described. Just as the nature of god is said to be ineffable. Wayfarer has certainly gone into this in many threads. He quotes some clues provided by Hoffman himself.

But what does 'not taking it literally' mean? That the train is not really' 'a train'?

He answers:

Q: If snakes aren’t snakes and trains aren’t trains, what are they?

A: Snakes and trains, like the particles of physics, have no objective, observer-independent features. The snake I see is a description created by my sensory system to inform me of the fitness consequences of my actions. Evolution shapes acceptable solutions, not optimal ones. A snake is an acceptable solution to the problem of telling me how to act in a situation. My snakes and trains are my mental representations; your snakes and trains are your mental representations. — Wayfarer

I am not convinced by this model but I do think I would need to do some deeper study before rejecting or accepting it. Could it be that our reality is fundamentally rooted in consciousness alone, with the physical world manifesting as a perceptual construct designed to help us comprehend our existence? Who knows? The big question remains - how does it change anything in my day-to-day life?

IMO, much modern philosophy ends up in a sort of Kantian dualism because it's unwilling to challenge dogmatic assumptions stemming for Lockean objectivity and the primacy of "primary properties," reductionism, and the division of the word into subject and object, phenomenal/noumenal. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, that seems to be right. Do you see a way out of this?

The problem of why such-and-such function is correlated with this experience rather than that is not the hard problem. — bert1

David Chalmers, who coined the phrase “hard problem of consciousness,” wrote this:

“. . .even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions in the vicinity of experience—perceptual discrimination, categorization, internal access, verbal report—there may still remain a further unanswered question: Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience?”

— David Chalmers, Facing up to the problem of consciousness

Yes, that's the hard problem. It's the general question: "How is it exactly that experience is caused by/realised by/is identical with the functions of complex systems? Why can't all these things happen without experience?" A robust theory on consciousness will be able to reliably predict which systems have experience of some kind or another.

OK, lets assume we've answered that question. There is now a further question: "Why is it that such-and-such function causes/realises/is the taste of chocolate instead of the smell of coffee?" A really robust theory of experience should be able to predict in a principled way what a particular function feels like to be instantiated. And this problem remains for everyone, including dualists, panpsychists, and new-agers, because no one denies the correlation between physical systems and what in particular we experience.

I've just tried to explain panpsychism to someone IRL. They said 'A treehugger?'

Given the metaphysics of idealism, the true nature of our reality isn't readily described. — Tom Storm

So much the worse for idealism! Don't come crying to me about it! The true nature of reality is that it is naturally real, and what one can say about it can sometimes be really true, and the result of saying really true things about the nature of reality is that it is truth-telling.

Bada-bing, bada-boom.

The true nature of reality is that it is naturally real, and what one can say about it can sometimes be really true, and the result of saying really true things about the nature of reality is that it is truth-telling. — unenlightened

Do you understand the true natural of reality and all that is naturally real? Let's hear about it...

Ring-a-ding-ding,

Do you understand the true natural of reality and all that is naturally real? Let's hear abotu it... — Tom Storm

Use your eyes and your ears when crossing the road, and don't step in front of a bus! And proof read before posting.

Use your eyes and your ears when crossing the road, and don't step in front of a bus! — unenlightened

Donald Hoffman and I intend to do just that. :wink:

Of course the spoon doesn't cease to exist. It seems to me it exists in the same sense it does while I'm looking at it - at the interface between my mind and the external world. The quote also seems to ignore the extent to which reality is a social phenomena. Even if I'm not looking at the spoon, somebody else is or might be. — T Clark

As soon as you’re talking about ‘the sense in which the spoon “exists”’ then you’re already in the territory of philosophy, you’re qualifying its existence with respect to its’ being observed. And, as noted, ‘like minds see like things’, so there’s no question of solipsism.

You'll be interested to know that the first link on the Google page was from a thread you started eight months ago. — T Clark

:clap: Nice to know. Posts from this forum do often come up on top of the search results in questions about philosophy. (Depressing fact: the biggest audience I’ve ever had for a piece of writing was on productreviews.com about a domestic appliance.)

physicalism is where progress in understanding is being made, whereas dualism and panpsychism seem to dismiss the possibility of progress being made altogether. — wonderer1

It’s not a problem in search of a solution. It’s pointing out that a third-party (objective) description cannot be equated with the first-person (subjective) experience, as the latter possesses a qualitative dimension which cannot be reduced to, or represented in, symbolic terminology. It’s not a failure on the part of scientific psychology, but a limitation inherent in the objective method.

(Depressing fact: the biggest audience I’ve ever had for a piece of writing was on productreviews.com about a domestic appliance.) — Wayfarer

I laughed a lot when I read this. I hear you.