Fair enough, but that sound less like philosophy and more just basic neuroscience and physics. — Hanover

Yes, I mentioned that in an earlier post.

But what should be noted is that those who claim that colours are mind-independent clearly believe that there is a mind-independent world with mind-independent properties, and that sometimes experience is "veridicial", i.e. presents to us the mind-independent nature of the world. Such people should be scientific realists, and accept what physics and neuroscience tell us about the world and perception – and physics and neuroscience tell us that colours are percepts like pain, not mind-independent properties of pens.

To quote Bertrand Russell "naive realism leads to physics, and physics, if true, shows that naive realism is false".

Perhaps there's a place for idealism (which can reject science), but there's just no place for naive (colour) realism given our modern scientific understanding of the world.

To quote Bertrand Russell "naive realism leads to physics, and physics, if true, shows that naive realism is false". — Michael

Russell conflates the colour (seen under ordinary conditions) and what that colour may look like (seen under other conditions). Hilary Putnam writes about that in his blog here.

He doesn't conflate. He recognises, as I have been arguing, that colours as ordinarily understood and talked about are the appearances/percepts, not an object's disposition to reflect certain wavelengths of light. When I ordinarily think and talk about the color red I am thinking and talking about the former, not the latter.

The naive realist gets it even more wrong than the dispositionalist, thinking the appearance itself to be (or in some supposed veridical case “resemble”) a mind-independent property of material surfaces, often denying the existence of percepts entirely. Modern science shows this view to be wrong.

If we've established an unreliability of the mind as to how it correlates with reality, I just don't see how you can call an end to that unreliability at a certain level and then feel safe to claim that what you know about your perceptions are accurate and not blurred, manipulated, altered, and corrupted by the mind. — Hanover

Right. When "science" undermines realism it undermines itself, and those who do not notice this live in an alternate reality where their perceptions are good enough when it comes to "science" and untrustworthy otherwise.* There is never a clear answer as to where the "science" ends and the "otherwise" begins.

* At times they even seem to labor under the idea that "science" makes no use of basic perceptions at all. "Trust the 'science', not your lying eyes!," as if science has no use for vision.

But what should be noted is that those who claim that colours are mind-independent clearly believe that there is a mind-independent world with mind-independent properties, and that sometimes experience is "veridicial", i.e. presents to us the mind-independent nature of the world. Such people should be scientific realists, and accept what physics and neuroscience tell us about the world and perception – and physics and neuroscience tell us that colours are percepts like pain, not mind-independent properties of pens. — Michael

Who, me? But I have been at pains to point out that colour is not mind-independent; nor is it all in the mind. The error here is in thinking things must be one or the other.

The word "red" can be used to refer to an object's disposition to cause certain colour experiences, but they ordinarily refer to those certain colour experiences. Those colour experiences are what we ordinarily understand by colours, especially before we have any understanding of an object having a surface layer of atoms that reflects certain wavelengths of light. — Michael

A pretty clear explanation, showing the underpinning assumption that there must be a "something" to which "red' refers. Why should this be so? Look to the use of the word, to pick out red pens and red faces. That's what counts.

He doesn't conflate. ... — Michael

He conflates (1) an "apparent distribution of colors" and (2) a "distribution of colors" that appears in various ways when he moves, or when other people see it.

That's two different senses of 'distribution of colours' of which 2 is not apparent but a distribution of colours that appears in various ways. Russell conflates these senses as if both were apparent, and concludes that none of them is better or more real than any other. That's a fallacy of ambiguity.

He makes the same mistake in his analysis of shapes. As if the recognizable physical shape of an object is not "better" than what it looks like from odd angles, or through a microscope or as a dot seen from far away etc.

A pretty clear explanation, showing the underpinning assumption that there must be a "something" to which "red' refers. Why should this be so? Look to the use of the word, to pick out red pens and red faces. That's what counts. — Banno

Does talk about pens and faces refer to "somethings"? Does talk about circles and squares refer to "somethings"?

Can you run this argument in some way that is consistent across all examples of perceptual discriminations and object recognitions so that is sounds less like a closet idealist speaking, more like an actual pragmatist.

The language game approach fails to engage with what folk are actually interested in when it comes to perception. And so it fails to give them a better way to think about the cognitive realities of what are going on.

An enactive or ecological approach to perception speaks to what really matters. How mental experience is a modelling relation or Umwelt.

The account that works for the redness of red has to work just as well as that for the roundness of round, or the pencilness of pencils.

No one ever seems to have a problem with shape perception, yet they do with hue perception. If they can see how each ought to be equally troubling, and hence equally untroubling, then something has been achieved.

So show how your approach does that.

"Visual percepts" is standard terminology in the neuroscience of perception. — Michael

Sure, and in the context of the paper that's fine. But the farther claim that what "red" refers to is a mental percept is fraught with issues.

I've mentioned the implication that when you and I talk about something's being red, we would be talking about quite different things - you of your percept, and me of mine.

But moreover, if "red" refers to something purely mental, how could you be sure that you are using the word correctly? How could you ensure that your use of "red" now matched your use of "red" previously? How could you be sure that your memory is not deceiving you, and what you are now calling "red" is what you previously called "green"?

All the rigmarole of private languages would come in to play. And the answer here is that you can only be sure you are using "red" correctly if other folk agree with your use - if it works to pick out the right pen. Indeed, that is what "using the word correctly" consists in.

It's been 12 minutes for God's sake. How much time do you need? — Hanover

I got a robot lawnmower. If you get one, don't get the cheapest one. It gets stuck in the mulch, so I have to watch it. Other than that, it does a good job. Sort of.

The language game approach fails to engage with what folk are actually interested in when it comes to perception. — apokrisis

If you wish to talk about something else, go right ahead. But don't presume to be talking for everybody.

Does the color “red” exist outside of the subjective mind that conceptually designates the concept of “red?” — Mp202020

This question is at least in part about the use of the word "red".

Right. When "science" undermines realism it undermines itself, and those who do not notice this live in an alternate reality where their perceptions are good enough when it comes to "science" and untrustworthy otherwise.* — Leontiskos

:up: 'Real' refers to whatever we all reliably experience in common ways via the senses. including (internal) bodily sensations. Hence colours, just as shapes and objects, are not imaginary, but real.

Whether the word 'colour' refers to experiences or to the dispositions of objects to cause more or less reliable colour experiences, is a matter of stipulation, Both usages are intelligible. And yet @Michael seems to believe that there is some determinate fact of the matter that could enable us to declare one usage "true" and the other "false".

It is a fact that I see white and gold — Michael

You are seeing it wrong. Look closer, it is clearly black and blue. :shade:

This question is at least in part about the use of the word "red". — Banno

But I just asked you to show how your answer on that applies consistently across the board in terms of perceptual discrimination and object recognition. Why for instance do people think redness speaks to a qualitative difference while roundness speaks to more a quantitative difference.

In their speech, people show that they find the redness of red some kind of deep puzzle – a Hard Problem – yet the ballness of balls is taken to be an Easy Problem. How is this accounted for in your language games approach ... or whatever your approach is meant to be.

I don't find folk being able to reliably hand you red objects or round objects a particularly enlightening fact here. It indeed seems quite irrelevant to the sense of mystification that OPs such as this express.

That is why I say first there is an actual issue. And second, the proper way to start deflating it is not to divert the discussion into the pragmatics of language use but to dig into the neurobiology that could show how hue discrimination is really just another tool in the armoury of shape perception. So if you have a problem with one, you would have to feel that it is equal to any problem you might have with the other.

It's the right start. You are only offering a cheap way to handwave the problem away.

But you have a chance to refute me by showing how folk ought to just shut up and be satisfied by having it pointed out to them they can reliably pick out red objects or round objects or whatever else gets asked for. Metaphysically, this is all there is to know on the matter.

Why for instance do people think redness speaks to a qualitative difference while roundness speaks to more a quantitative difference. — apokrisis

They do?

I'm not at all sure what that could mean. I, and I think most folks, do not attach numbers to roundness in any intrinsic way.

But sure, as Austin pointed out, limiting our considerations to sight alone will limit the account. Touch, smell and taste are more "direct" than sight.

And as a general point, philosophers don't know anything not known to other folk. We pretty much agree as to the physiology of sight. So far as we are addressing a philosophical question, it's not an issue of mere physiology.

It's not at all clear how a "dig into the neurobiology that could show how hue discrimination is really just another tool in the armoury of shape perception" answers 'Does the color “red” exist outside of the subjective mind that conceptually designates the concept of “red?”'. But showing that the word "red" is public, not private, does show that there is more to "red" than what has here been called "mental percepts".

I'm not at all sure what that could mean. I, and I think most folks, do not attach numbers to roundness in any intrinsic way. — Banno

Shapes appear to take up a quantity of space and time and materiality in a way that colours don't. Yet both are constructs of our neurobiology. Hence why hue discrimination is what gets rolled out as the mystifying topic and not shape discrimination.

Touch, smell and taste are more "direct" than sight. — Banno

Why the scare quotes? Did you want to make the neurobiogical point here?

If perception is essentially indirect, and yet also pragmatic, then we have to defend that as a way of speaking in terms of some intelligible spectrum that covers both the more "direct" and the more "indirect" poles of this dialectic.

I have argued that this nuance is what your approach lacks. It doesn't even begin to recognise it. And when reminded of it, starts looking for reasons to look past it.

So far as we are addressing a philosophical question, it's not an issue of mere physiology. — Banno

So the Hard Problem is not thrown down as a challenge to the metaphysics of physicalism? You want to pretend that somehow idealism or epistemology in general are somehow "not philosophical topics"?

How much more bullshit do you intend to produce?

But showing that the word "red" is public, not private, does show that there is more to "red" than what has here been called "mental percepts". — Banno

And once again, my question to you. Why might this need to be shown for redness as a quality and not ballness?

As a space and time occupying shape, folk usually find it unproblematic that "the ball" refers to a real thing rather than a private qualia. But for "redness", they become all suddenly twisted about whether it is something that exists "out there" in the world, or something that exists "in here" within the privacy of their minds.

So something is up and your language games story doesn't generalise very well. But perhaps you might have a go at showing otherwise?

I'm not holding my breath of course. Time has taught me only to expect further evasion.

And once again, my question to you. Why might this need to be shown for redness as a quality and not ballness? — apokrisis

Why isn't "ballness" (?) a quality? What's a quality, here, anyway? A thing in the world? A concept? It's hard to address a term that has so much baggage attached, but it is not obvious that the case with red is different to the case with "ballness" - the scare quotes are there to note the unusual usage.

More questions answered by questions. So more evasion as you dare not risk a good faith reply in a public forum. :up:

I'm not evading. I'm attempting to have you articulate whatever is troubling you in a way that is clear to me. "Quality" is a somewhat archaic word in philosophy, sitting somewhat ambiguously between predicate and property. You seem to think redness and "ballness" differ in an important way. What is the nature of the difference you wish to draw attention to?

I'm not evading. — Banno

Yes you are. Have been for years. It's the language game you've developed to protect your language games. :up:

, are you able to set out the salient way in which "Redness" differs from "ballness"?

How have I not done so?

(This answering a question with a question is just so handy. Always be evading. :up: )

How have I not done so? — apokrisis

I don't know. You asserted that there was a difference, first insisting that the "...account that works for the redness of red has to work just as well as that for the roundness of round, or the pencilness of pencils". Doesn't it? You then said that red was in some way qualitative, while round was quantitative, a contrast I wasn't able to follow. You next said redness was hard, but ballness easy. I'm not so sure of that, not having a clear notion of what "ballness" is. Then you said "Shapes appear to take up a quantity of space and time and materiality in a way that colours don't." I'm not sure about that, since colours do tend to occur together with shapes, and things that are coloured tend to have shape. You then said something about perception being indirect, which Austin showed to be an overgeneralisation.

You didn't lose me, since i couldn't follow you from the getgo.

Evade away. :up:

Qualities are a queer notion. The idea is something like that there is a something had by, say, all balls, such that being a ball involves having the quality ballness. So we have that this is a ball, that is a ball, one red, the other green, one spherical, the other ovoid, and it's not obvious what these all have in common. So what is it that is had by all balls, and only balls, in virtue of which we might call them "balls"? And the answer is forthcoming - Ballness.

But as such it's pretty vapid.

Family resemblances pretty much put paid to this idea. There need be nothing in common to all balls; rather they might resemble one another in various ways. Like threads in a rope, no individual thread running the full length, yet together they make one rope.

To this we can add Austin's point that there is no reason to supose that the word for red (he used grey) must refer to the very same thing in all instances - why shouldn't we use the same word to refer to different things? The red of a sports car and of a rose and of a face are all very different.

The red of a sports car and of a rose and of a face are all very different. — Banno

Sure, some are red while others are not red yet look red or turn red temporarily. Being red is different from looking red.

Being red is possession of the quality plus reference to the word 'red'. The quality is for example a pigment that systematically reflects or scatters wavelength components around 700 nm under ordinary conditions.

A red looking rose leaf or a face however may not possess such pigments, yet they can look red because of coloured lights from the environment or behaviour of blood vessels that temporarily make a face turn red etc.

You are seeing it wrong. — Lionino

If I am seeing the wrong colours then the colours I see are not mind-independent properties of the computer screen. So what are these colours I see? Percepts.

I've mentioned the implication that when you and I talk about something's being red, we would be talking about quite different things - you of your percept, and me of mine. — Banno

You are back to using the adjective "red". I am talking about the nouns "red" and "colour". Do you understand the distinction between an adjective and a noun?

But moreover, if "red" refers to something purely mental, how could you be sure that you are using the word correctly? How could you ensure that your use of "red" now matched your use of "red" previously? How could you be sure that your memory is not deceiving you, and what you are now calling "red" is what you previously called "green"? — Banno

Ask the same questions about the words "pain" and "pleasure". Regardless of what you or Wittgenstein think about language, pain and pleasure are mental percepts, not mind-independent properties of whatever objects or events cause pain and pleasure.

Ask also the same questions about the words "mind", "mental", "thought", "sensation", "belief", and so on.

But I have been at pains to point out that colour is not mind-independent; nor is it all in the mind. — Banno

It's unclear what you mean here. You seem to be using the singular noun "colour", which presumably refers to a singlular thing. So there's some singular thing that is in part mind-dependent and part mind-independent, as if half of it is in my head and half of it outside?

That certainly doesn't make much sense at all.

Perhaps what you mean to say is that the noun "colour" can be used to refer to (at least) two different things; one of those things is a mental percept and one of those things is something else? I've already agreed with this. My point is only that when we ordinarily think and talk about colours we are thinking and talking about the mental percept, not a surface layer of atoms that reflects certain wavelengths of light.

I don't think the OP, for example, is asking if atoms reflecting light is mind-independent. He's referring to the mental percept and asking if it's a mental percept or (as the naive colour primitivist believes) something mind-independent.

My point is only that when we ordinarily think about and talk about colours we are thinking about and talking about the mental percept, not a surface layer of atoms that reflects various wavelengths of light. — Michael

We don't ordinarily use neurology when we want to change or add a new colour to the kitchen wall etc. Ordinarily we use paint that reflects the desired wavelengths of light. Neither paint nor light is located inside the head.

What's inside the head when we perceive colours and shapes is the perceiving, i.e. a biological phenomenon that is constitutive for perceiving things, while the things that we perceive are located outside the head.

One does not perceive the neurological event of one's own perception (nor radiation, nor word use) but the colour or shape.