This is a general point about meaning and classification so it doesn't really matter where plus-ing came from.

I'm not sure what your reference to meaning and classification seeks to highlight, but my point is that intuition does matter when it comes to rule-following. If we had no basic intuitions, then each rule would require further rules setting out how it is to be followed—infinite regress follows.

Perhaps I'm in the wrong thread—what exactly do you think is the problem this thread has been trying to address?

If we had no basic intuitions, then each rule would require further rules setting out how it is to be followed—infinite regress follows. — Janus

Yes, we can say the same for all word meaning, I mean!

:up:

If we had no basic intuitions, then each rule would require further rules setting out how it is to be followed—infinite regress follows.
— Janus

Yes, we can say the same for all word meaning, I mean! — Apustimelogist

How do we use a basic intuition to avoid an infinite regress of rules? Is an intuition a robustly persistent interpretive content of meaning that we can consult again and again to tell us how to follow a rule? Is an intuition an internal cognition as opposed to a socially discursive practice? How is consulting an intuition different from consulting a reliably stable internal picture of meaning, the use of Kantian reason to make sense of sensuous intuition?

As I understand it, Kripke’s argument begins with the skepticism that ensues from rejecting a classical realist approach to the factual justification of meaning interpretation. There is no fact of the matter that can determine whether the meaning for me of a rule like the plus sign is the same as I apply it now as when I applied it last year.

I also am not a huge fan of Kripke's Wittgenstein. For one, the skeptical challenge seems too strong here. It seems like it should just as well apply to all memories and all sense experience, resulting in exactly the sort of all encompassing skepticism Wittgenstein was trying to avoid.

Obviously, each utterance of a word and each thought is different. I think the difficulty is identifying what stays the same between these.




:up:

Yes, I think this is a good point. The understanding of rules happens "by nature," and it's a mistake to conflate abstract explanations of this process with the process being abstract itself.

How do we use a basic intuition to avoid an infinite regress of rules? — Joshs

Because its just acting blindly, and "social discursive practise" is just an extension of that involving many individuals.

A picture of meaning would present a determinate , "objective" view of things; but the point is that no such thing can be presented to us. Indeterminacy is always possible.

It seems like it should just as well apply to all memories and all sense experience, resulting in exactly the sort of all encompassing skepticism Wittgenstein was trying to avoid. — Count Timothy von Icarus

If it applies to those things then surely, the skeptical solution also applies.

Is an intuition a robustly persistent interpretive content of meaning that we can consult again and again to tell us how to follow a rule? Is an intuition an internal cognition as opposed to a socially discursive practice? — Joshs

Because its just acting blindly, and "social discursive practise" is just an extension of that involving many individuals. — Apustimelogist

You both seem to me to have got this the wrong way round. You are positing the individual's interpretation of the rule as primary. But we can only interpret rules because we have learnt to do so - from other people. No doubt it is a complex process, but it seems overwhelmingly likely that it is develops by trial (responses of whatever kind) and error, coupled with positive and negative reinforcement. Once we have learnt, we can do it on our own. Our intuitions are, if you like, a kind of summary of what we have learnt - not purely in words, but in actions.

A picture of meaning would present a determinate , "objective" view of things; but the point is that no such thing can be presented to us. — Apustimelogist

I have no idea what a determinate objective view might be. But I thought the impossibility of a picture of meaning (or even an explanation of it) was quite different from that. I thought the point was that there could not be a picture of how a picture relates to the world. If you can't grasp the relationship between a picture and what it is a picture of, it will be no good presenting you with another picture to explain. You'll have to do something different. Similarly, when someone doesn't "get" the idea of explanation of meaning, there's no point in trying to explain what it is, for the same reason. It's like not "getting" a joke.

If it applies to those things then surely, the skeptical solution also applies.

So not only can Tarzan not follow rules, but he has no memory and no sense experiences. Seems hard to believe.

Reminds me of Davidson's Swamp Man.

Is an intuition a robustly persistent interpretive content of meaning that we can consult again and again to tell us how to follow a rule? Is an intuition an internal cognition as opposed to a socially discursive practice?
— Joshs
Because its just acting blindly, and "social discursive practise" is just an extension of that involving many individuals.
— Apustimelogist
You both seem to me to have got this the wrong way round. You are positing the individual's interpretation of the rule as primary. But we can only interpret rules because we have learnt to do so - from other people. No doubt it is a complex process, but it seems overwhelmingly likely that it is develops by trial (responses of whatever kind) and error, coupled with positive and negative reinforcement — Ludwig V

No, I’m not positing individual intuition, I’m trying to show how Wittgenstein deconstructs the idea. I should add that Wittgenstein was no behaviorist, and training into following a rule involves more than reinforcement contingencies, it requires understanding the relevance of the rule, what is at stake in following it.

On a side note, Grayling's book has a funny story vis-á-vis Wittgenstein's influence on logical positivism (which Grayling suggests is greatly overestimated). Apparently the Vienna Circle read TLP aloud to one another and members got so fed up with it that they began screaming "metaphysics!" at certain lines. Which, given their views, amounted to yelling out "bullshit!"

This is of course only an indictment if one thinks the Circle had things right, which I imagine very few people would agree with these days.

So, while there was influence, they weren't particularly hot on all of it. It's a funny scene to picture though.

How do we use a basic intuition to avoid an infinite regress of rules? — Joshs

We simply "get it" without having to rely on a set of rules. Sets of rules are formalizations of "getting it".

You are positing the individual's interpretation of the rule as primary. — Ludwig V

Not at all. Acting blindly is primary.

I have no idea what a determinate objective view might be — Ludwig V

I just mean a view where there was no underdetermination, which is also related to this picture problem you talk about. There is no good presenting another picture because prior assumptions are required, without which we couls not determine action or interpretation or whatever.

So not only can Tarzan not follow rules, but he has no memory and no sense experiences. Seems hard to believe. — Count Timothy von Icarus

No; because like I said, the skeptical solution would apply.

No, I’m not positing individual intuition, I’m trying to show how Wittgenstein deconstructs the idea. I should add that Wittgenstein was no behaviorist, and training into following a rule involves more than reinforcement contingencies, it requires understanding the relevance of the rule, what is at stake in following it. — Joshs

I'm afraid I couldn't detect how what you said was a deconstruction. There must be something earlier that I missed or have forgotten. Can you explain or refer to your explanation?
I know that Wittgenstein was no behaviourist. I know that he walks a perilous path between behaviourism and traditional dualism. I was trying to gesture at a very rough idea of how we might acquire understanding in terms of learning skills.

Apparently the Vienna Circle read TLP aloud to one another and members got so fed up with it that they began screaming "metaphysics!" at certain lines. Which, given their views, amounted to yelling out "bullshit!" — Count Timothy von Icarus

If they were so fed up with it, why did they read it to each other? The obvious answer must be that they enjoyed hearing the text and jeering at the lines they didn't like - as a community.
Doesn't he say somewhere that the question how you establish truth and falsity is an important one, but not the only one? It's more like putting logical positivism in its place than outright rejection.

Not at all. Acting blindly is primary. — Apustimelogist

I guess you mean "This is what I do!", and that's fine. I'm just not happy with describing that as "acting blindly". That phrase suggests that it is possible that I could act not blindly. I think that "This is what I do!" is, essentially, an ostensive definition, so neither blind nor not blind.

There is no good presenting another picture because prior assumptions are required, — Apustimelogist

That's how a philosopher pursuing theory would put it. I think that Wittgenstein does not posit assumptions, but skills - practices.

If it applies to those things then surely, the skeptical solution also applies. — Apustimelogist

Sorry - what is the sceptical solution?

No, I’m not positing individual intuition, I’m trying to show how Wittgenstein deconstructs the idea. I should add that Wittgenstein was no behaviorist, and training into following a rule involves more than reinforcement contingencies, it requires understanding the relevance of the rule, what is at stake in following it.
— Joshs
I'm afraid I couldn't detect how what you said was a deconstruction. There must be something earlier that I missed or have forgotten. Can you explain or refer to your explanation? — Ludwig V

I discussed it here:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/923347

Sorry - what is the sceptical solution? — Ludwig V

That people act blindly regardless of indeterminacy.

That phrase suggests that it is possible that I could act not blindly. — Ludwig V

Yes but then there is the opposite perspective on these things where someone might say that we do not act blindly.

I think that "This is what I do!" is, essentially, an ostensive definition, so neither blind nor not blind. — Ludwig V

And the reference in ostensive definition is equally indeterminate!?

Yes but then there is the opposite perspective on these things where someone might say that we do not act blindly. — Apustimelogist

I suppose so. But "act blindly" suggests that you think that it is possible for them not to act blindly, which I think is incompatible with Wittgenstein's arguments.

And the reference in ostensive definition is equally indeterminate!? — Apustimelogist

I suppose you are referring to Wittgenstein's point that many algorithms are compatible with any finite series of numbers. That sounds like indeterminacy or at least underdeterminacy. But that doesn't mean there is no criterion for correct and incorrect applications (and for which cases are problematic). That's what the practice is for. So the rule is determined as it is applied.

I'm afraid I couldn't detect how what you said was a deconstruction. There must be something earlier that I missed or have forgotten. Can you explain or refer to your explanation?
— Ludwig V
I discussed it here: — Joshs

I read your discussion. I think I agree with it. It doesn't mention (or use) the word "intuition", so I'm no further forward in understanding how that concept comes to be a part of Wittgenstein's deconstruction. I must have missed something.

which I think is incompatible with Wittgenstein's arguments. — Ludwig V

Well he uses the word himself!

I suppose you are referring to Wittgenstein's point that many algorithms are compatible with any finite series of numbers. — Ludwig V

That may be a good example; but I was more thinking that with "pointing" at something, it is similarly somewhat underdetermined what is being pointed at, so pointing is also "blind" in that sense.

But that doesn't mean there is no criterion for correct and incorrect applications (and for which cases are problematic). That's what the practice is for. So the rule is determined as it is applied. — Ludwig V

Yes, this is part of the skeptical solution albeit I would say it doesn't actually solve indeterminacy, just is used as a way of explaining how coherent word-use emerges.

Well he uses the word himself! — Apustimelogist

So he does. I had forgotten. I'll have to take it up with him directly.

That may be a good example; but I was more thinking that with "pointing" at something, it is similarly somewhat underdetermined what is being pointed at, so pointing is also "blind" in that sense. — Apustimelogist

That's also a bit of a problem. I think part of what's confusing me is that there are several issues here. At first sight, you seem to be referring to the point that Wittgenstein concedes and solves when he points out that my audience needs to know the "station" of the word in the language-game - whether I'm pointing at the colour, the shape, etc. I agree that my intention is not a solution, since the definition can only work if there is agreement about that. Then there's the complexity about applying the definition in practice, which is resolved if I have learnt how to play the language game. Ostensive definition can only work if both I and my audience have learnt the skills/practices that are needed. Even then, there can be disagreements. But we know how to detect and how to work with those.

Yes, this is part of the skeptical solution albeit I would say it doesn't actually solve indeterminacy, just is used as a way of explaining how coherent word-use emerges. — Apustimelogist

Well, if your idea of a solution is a magic bullet that abolishes indeterminacy, there can't be one. But being able to use the words (and deal with what they refer to or are true of) is all the solution that matters, isn't it. (Scepticism as bogey-man.)

I read your discussion. I think I agree with it. It doesn't mention (or use) the word "intuition", so I'm no further forward in understanding how that concept comes to be a part of Wittgenstein's deconstruction. I must have missed something. — Ludwig V

I wrote that for Wittgenstein “the meaning of a word doesn’t function like a picture. Words aren’t first created and then used. They only exist in their use. Furthermore, to use a word is always to change the sense of its meaning, and this is a social process. Meaning something is a social enactment, the production of something new rather than the referring back to a picture.”

In PI, Wittgenstein treats intuition as an inner picture one consults:

186. "What you are saying, then, comes to this: a new insight — intuition — is needed at every step to carry out the order '-f-n' cor-rectly." — To carry it out correctly! How is it decided what is the right step to take at any particular stage? — "The right step is the one that accords with the order — as it was meant" — So when you gave the order -\-z you meant that he was to write 1002 after 1000 — and did you also mean that he should write 1868 after 1866, and 100036 after 100034, and so on — an infinite number of such propositions? — "No: what I meant was, that he should write the next but one number after every number that he wrote; and from this all those propositions follow in turn." — But that is just what is in question: what, at any stage, does follow from that sentence. Or, again, what, at any stage we are to call "being in accord" with that sentence (and with the mean-ing you then put into the sentence — whatever that may have consisted in). It would almost be more correct to say, not that an intuition was needed at every stage, but that a new decision was needed at every stage.

213. "But this initial segment of a series obviously admitted of various interpretations (e.g. by means of algebraic expressions) and so you must first have chosen one such interpretation."—Not at all. A doubt was possible in certain circumstances. But that is not to say that I did doubt, or even could doubt. (There is something to be said, which is connected with this, about the psychological 'atmosphere' of a process.) So it must have been intuition that removed this doubt?—If intuition is an inner voice—how do 1 know how I am to obey it? And how do I know that it doesn't mislead me? For if it can guide me right, it can also guide me wrong. ((Intuition an unnecessary shuffle.))

In PI, Wittgenstein treats intuition as an inner picture one consults: — Joshs

Ok. Thanks for coming back to me and providing the quotations.

However, I understand what's going on here as Wittgenstein considering the idea that intuition is an inner picture that one consults - but rejecting it.

So it must have been intuition that removed this doubt?—If intuition is an inner voice—how do 1 know how I am to obey it? And how do I know that it doesn't mislead me? For if it can guide me right, it can also guide me wrong. ((Intuition an unnecessary shuffle.)) — Wittgenstein Phil. Inv. 213

I think "unnecessary shuffle" dismisses intuition as unhelpful.

I think, however, that he may be a bit harsh. Intuition, for me, is a name for whatever it is that enables us to get things right when we have nothing to go on. If we had to think about continuing from 1000 to 1002, we would get as confused as WIttgenstein outlines in 186. But that doesn't happen. Why? Intuition explains nothing. Drill (learning what to do by repetition) is the explanation. That's the basis of practices.

A side-note. Wittgenstein here seems to me very reminiscent of Hume. You'll remember that, having knocked the traditional idea of hidden "powers" as the explanation for causal chains on the head, he explains that we associate ideas as a result of repetition in our experience and infer from cause to effect, not by rationality, but by "custom" or "habit". In other words, this is what we do and we shall go on doing it even if there is no justification for it. Wittgenstein is subtler than that, because, for him, "This is what I do" defines what is right (and wrong).

Intuition explains nothing. Drill (learning what to do by repetition) is the explanation. That's the basis of practices. — Ludwig V

Do we learn what to do by repetition, and then just do it? Doesn’t the habit then become a picture we consult, albeit reflexively or unconsciously? At one point Wittgenstein described following a rule as a crossing of pictures. I think this captures what using a rule (or a word) consists in better than being trained in a habit that then dictates what we do. A crossing of pictures is not the consulting of an inner intuition, or an already structured habitual way of proceeding. It’s a creative invention that melds previous training and experience with novel circumstances to produce something new, not the repetition of a habit.

Yes, I think we are basically in agreement, as far as I can tell!

I forget the authors but one of the more famous Wittgensteinian rebuttals of Kripkenstein points out the Kripke is not even advancing a skeptical position but a nihilist one. He isn't saying facts about meaning are impossible to pin down with certainty, but rather that they don't exist. But conceptual nihilism is self-refuting in a way skepticism isn't, because it implies that the position doesn't even mean anything in the first place.

I remember also thinking that the Robinson Caruso argument should also apply to all learning, but the idea that it is impossible for an isolated feral human being to learn anything or to ever be wrong about what they think they've learned seems implausible to me.

At any rate, I think one can rebut Kripke straightforwardly by using Wittgenstein himself, and pointing out that his bar for "certainty" and ideas about truth/facts are simply what are leading to the nihilism problem. Behind the "truth of correspondence" or Husserl's "truth of correctness" lies the more basic Hiedeggerian idea of "revealedness." As Gadamer points out, some prejudices are needed for making any inferences at all, and so I think Kripke's work, while interesting, is mostly showing the flaws of a certain sort of focus on "certainty."

So, the "skeptical solution" might work (that's a whole different question), but I think we might question if it's even required.

It's been a while since I've read him, but IIRC he didn't really deal with metaphysical realism. This would seem to offer another way out of the meaning dilemma, since meaning is grounded in the mind's access to the intelligibility of being.

Yes, I think we are basically in agreement, as far as I can tell! — Apustimelogist

Yes. As Wittgenstein points out, an agreement can break down at any moment!

I remember also thinking that the Robinson Caruso argument should also apply to all learning, but the idea that it is impossible for an isolated feral human being to learn anything or to ever be wrong about what they think they've learned seems implausible to me. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The versions of Robinson Crusoe that I've seen have all failed to recognize that he does not have to learn any of the skills of West European society. He arrives with a tool-chest, which he is fully equipped to use. So he knows the rules he needs and what is correct and what is not. Defoe's novel is irrelevant.

Kripke is not even advancing a skeptical position but a nihilist one. He isn't saying facts about meaning are impossible to pin down with certainty, but rather that they don't exist. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It's a while since I've read Kripke's text, but that seems to be right. But it's a bit more complicated than that. If the thesis is that meaning is established by practices, then it does not seem to be wrong to say that there is no fact of the matter that determines it. However, given that the sky is blue, it is true to say that there is a fact of the matter that makes the statement "the sky is blue" true. IMO.

This would seem to offer another way out of the meaning dilemma, since meaning is grounded in the mind's access to the intelligibility of being. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm always uncomfortable with those grand philosophical concepts. But I would agree in many cases that our access to - no, better, our practices in - a world "outside" language does ground meaning. I think the game may be differently played in fields like mathematics and logic - though even there, there are facts that kick us in the face; we are not simply in control.

and pointing out that his bar for "certainty" — Count Timothy von Icarus

But you just said his view wasn't about certainty?

Imo, I don't think you are offering any solution that is inherently different from the sceptical solution since what you are saying seems to come down to just ignoring indeterminacy, which then brings up the question of "how are you doing what you are doing?" which comes to be the same kind of acting "blindly".

However, given that the sky is blue, it is true to say that there is a fact of the matter that makes the statement "the sky is blue" true… our access to - no, better, our practices in - a world "outside" language does ground meaning. I think the game may be differently played in fields like mathematics and logic - though even there, there are facts that kick us in the face; we are not simply in control. IMO — Ludwig V

The question isn’t whether the sky is blue , as though there were such things as neutral facts whose meaning could be isolated from contexts of use, motive and purpose that define their sense, but why it matters to us and in what context it becomes an issue. Is it a declaration, an observation, a response to question? I dont believe that for Wittgenstein we ever have access to a world outside discursive practices, which is not the same thing as saying that our discursive practices are hermetically sealed within themselves and closed off to an outside. As Joseph Rouse remarks:

There is no determinate scheme or context that can fix the content of utterances, and hence no way to get outside of language. How a theory or practice interprets the world is itself inescapably open to further interpretation, with no authority beyond what gets said by whom, when…. we can never get outside our language, experience, or methods to assess how well they correspond to a transcendent reality.“