Why should I think "spirtual" refers to something that exists?What about matter creating the spiritual — Gregory
I assume my car has an individual identity. Suppose my neighbor has a identical make and model, and we gradually start swapping parts. Eventually, the car in my driveway has none of its original parts and all of my neighbors parts. Is it now the neighbor's car? If so, how many parts had to be replaced to constitute the transformation? — Relativist
Leibniz's law:
if, for every property F, object x has F if and only if object y has F, then x is identical to y.
This means identity implies identical in every way. — Relativist
Any other definition of identity depends on an arbitary set of necessary and sufficient properties that persist over time - or the assumption that identity is some metaphysical thing that could take on any form (your identity could exist as a cat, a stone, a quark, or a gust of wind.) — Relativist
Under strict identity, the car in my driveway today is causally connected to the car that was there yesterday so I can claim it as my car from day to day. — Relativist
Object-oriented ontology holds that objects are independent not only of other objects but also from the qualities they animate at any specific spatiotemporal location. Accordingly, objects cannot be exhausted by their relations with humans or other objects in theory or practice, meaning that the reality of objects is always ready-to-hand.[10] The retention by an object of reality in excess of any relation is known as withdrawal.[25] And since all objects are, in their fullness, partially withdrawn from one another, every relation is said to be an act of translation, meaning that no object can perfectly translate another object into its own nomenclature; Harman has referred to this as the "problem with paraphrase". — https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Object-oriented_ontology
If you asked everyone to classify a set of objects into chairs and not chairs, there would be disagreements precisely for this reason. "chair" has no single definition and so refering to it is not referring to a universal. — Ourora Aureis
If a definition has no particular reason to apply to a word, then by definition its arbitrary — Ourora Aureis
Also, be careful not to make a circular argument for universals — Ourora Aureis
Jacques Derrida introduced the concept of deconstruction, which is an interesting idea opposing these ideas if your interested and havent heard about it. — Ourora Aureis
Can I make up new Chinese words even though I don't speak Chinese? — Count Timothy von Icarus
I partially disagree: the parts of the car are still things, and can be a subject of discussion. I can refer to "my car's engine/steering wheel/tires" etc. I think your issues are a tangent, because states of affairs do not have a mereological composition: a part can be a constituent in multiple states of affairs.When you speak of the identity of a part, then you are not talking about the identity of the whole, and vise versa. So, I think you have produced an example which shows that these two are incompatible. If "my car" is the object referred to, then the supposed individual parts cannot have a distinct identity, because the part's identity is subsumed as it is "a part" of the whole. — Metaphysician Undercover
My point is that it's arbitrary, and not of much ontological signficance- it's more of a semantic convention. Consider this snapshot from one day to the next:This can be understood as a matter of what is our subject here, the part or the whole. If the car (the whole) is the subject, then the part is a property of that subject. When the part is removed, that property is negated from that subject, and the subject maintains its status as the subject, without that property. So it's just a matter of affirming and negating properties It really does not matter which properties come and go. — Metaphysician Undercover
Two problems with this:The important thing to notice is that whether a thing is a "part of" something else, is never an essential property, — Metaphysician Undercover
I am referring to the conjunction of:Lebniz' law is not the same as the law of identity. — Metaphysician Undercover
The temporal continuity of the car depends on each version of the car being a material cause of the next version. That is warranted. Compare the completed process of gradually swapping car parts to simply swapping complete cars on day 1. The latter provides no basis for claiming the car I now possess is the same car as before.I believe that "causally connected" is an unwarranted assumption here, which only complicates things. We can simply say that there is temporal continuity between the thing in your driveway yesterday, and the thing in your driveway today, which would allow us to represent it as a subject for predications, and "causation" is left as a distinct and unnecessary conception. — Metaphysician Undercover
You need to distinguish between parts as understood philosophically and parts of an object seen as geometry. In the latter an object has infinite parts. In the former, well it is debatable. That is why Aristotle failed to refute Zeno. Zeno made a mathematical point with philosophical implications,and Aristotle responded simply with his philosophy — Gregory
Ooh this feels very much in the discussions of the Speculative Realists like Graham Harmon’s Object-Oriented Ontology: — schopenhauer1
I partially disagree: the parts of the car are still things, and can be a subject of discussion. I can refer to "my car's engine/steering wheel/tires" etc. — Relativist
I was only trying to show that "enduring indentity" is a problematic concept - one that depends on essentialism: the notion that there is something that is both necessary and sufficient to an individual identity. — Relativist
I probably clouded the matter by referring to "my car"; the real question is whether it can be considered the "same car" (an enduring identity). — Relativist
My point is that it's arbitrary, and not of much ontological signficance- it's more of a semantic convention, that is justifiable under this ontology. Consider this snapshot from one day to the next:
Day 1: I purchase a car and park it in my driveway (=Car1)
Day 2: I replace a tire on that car (=Car2)
Car1 is not strictly identical to Car2, but there is a temporal/causal link between Car1 and Car2: Car1 is a material cause of Car2. — Relativist
There is no identifiable set of necessary & sufficient conditions that you share with infant-you - so what would your basis be for claiming you're the same person as infant-you? This is the problem with endurantism: it requires essentialism, the notion that there is some core of you that endures throughout your existence. If you're a theist, you might consider this your "soul", a substance that is assumed to never change -but good luck on proving such a thing exists. — Relativist
2) you're referring to something being "essential", while seemingly ignoring the fact that nothing can be identified as essential (both necessary and sufficient). — Relativist
I am referring to the conjunction of:
(the identity of indiscernibles) & (the indiscernibility of identicals). Some refer to this conjunction as "Leibniz law" (see this). But whether or not it's a correct label is moot. The point is that strict identity entails an identical set of properties. — Relativist
The temporal continuity of the car depends on each version of the car being a material cause of the next version. That is warranted. Compare the completed process of gradually swapping car parts to simply swapping complete cars on day 1. The latter provides no basis for claiming the car I now possess is the same car as before. — Relativist
I don't see the relevance, we were talking about identity, which refers to things, not geometrical conceptions. — Metaphysician Undercover
But in logic the object is represented as a subject, and we predicate. The predication is made of the subject, not the object, and there remains a separation between the subject with its predications, and any possible object which is represented in this way. This separation, makes the object completely separate from anything we say about it, even spatial-temporal location, it's reality is a possibility. — Metaphysician Undercover
Therefore at sometime your car may not have any tires, then afterwards it might have tires which are different from the tires before. The swap in parts makes no difference to the identity of the car. — Metaphysician Undercover
The point though is that there is nothing necessary and sufficient, because identity is the thing itself. — Metaphysician Undercover
I think the important point of the law of identity is that it makes identity distinct from anything we say about a thing, making it the thing itself. — Metaphysician Undercover
You have just taken different time frames, saying that the thing does not have the same properties at one time as it does at another, so you want to designate them as two distinct things. — Metaphysician Undercover
That is the temporal continuity which we assume the reality of, because we've observed it. This allows us to say that a thing has an identity. — Metaphysician Undercover
I think your association of the law of identity with "essentialism", and "the notion that there is some "core of you" that endures throughout your existence" is mistaken. — Metaphysician Undercover
In Armstrong's metaphysics, properties actually exist - they are not *just* what we attribute to things (and we often attribute characteristics to things that aren't actually properties). You seem focused on semantics, whereas Armstrong is focused on ontology. So I wonder if you're just treating individual identity as some semantical convention. That seems a defensible position, but it's not ontology - and it is ontology that Armstrong is dealing with.Properties are what we attribute, what we say about things. But in logic the object is represented as a subject, and we predicate. The predication is made of the subject, not the object, and there remains a separation between the subject with its predications, and any possible object which is represented in this way. This separation, makes the object completely separate from anything we say about it, even spatial-temporal location, it's reality is a possibility. This is what allows for the reality of mistake. — Metaphysician Undercover
(*edit* - the above reinforces my thought that you're dealing with semantic convention)I partially disagree: the parts of the car are still things, and can be a subject of discussion. I can refer to "my car's engine/steering wheel/tires" etc. — Relativist
These are predications though, your car is the subject, and you are saying that it has these things, as properties. At any time, such predications may be true or false. Therefore at sometime your car may not have any tires, then afterwards it might have tires which are different from the tires before. The swap in parts makes no difference to the identity of the car. — Metaphysician Undercover
This statement doesn't account for identity over time. What makes the car (or you) the same identity from one day to the next, or from one decade to the next? If you aren't accounting for it through essentialism, then how DO you account for it?The point though is that there is nothing necessary and sufficient, because identity is the thing itself. — Metaphysician Undercover
Considering "types of things" actually strikes close to Armstrong's account of identity over time, so I'll describe it now.When you say "same car", you are designating a type of thing, "car", and that causes a problem because we might think that there are necessary and sufficient conditions for being "a car". I think the important point of the law of identity is that it makes identity distinct from anything we say about a thing, making it the thing itself. — Metaphysician Undercover
You've indicated that personal identity is not identified by a set of necessary and sufficient properties. OK, then what does identify a specific personal identity, if it's not some subset of its properties that it holds throughout its existence? Are you, perhaps, referring to haecceity - treating identity as a primitive? *edit* or are you just treating individual identity as a semantic convention?As I said, changing parts does not change the thing's identity, that's a matter of properties coming and going, what we express by having one subject with different predications at different times. Clearly two distinct things in the same place at different times, does not provide the temporal continuity required that it be one subject. — Metaphysician Undercover
I think we need to be careful when applying mathematics to reality. It may be less of a problem when applying reality to mathematics -because there are obvious mathematical relations between objects.The principle of infinity seems suspended within the concept of "the finite". It's like they are two sides of each other. The number 1 can be divided to infinity, but it's much more odd when doing this with spatial objects (because space has size). So we say "real spatial objects have much more to them then mathematical relationships to themselves. These other aspects make the mathematical sides appear distorted". — Gregory
Huh? A subject in the philosophy I read is a conscious observer. You are saying that the subject is the object observed, and then use those words in the same way. I can't make sense of this. Are you saying the predication is made "of" the subject or "by" the subject? — Gregory
predication, in logic, the attributing of characteristics to a subject to produce a meaningful statement combining verbal and nominal elements. Thus, a characteristic such as “warm” (conventionally symbolized by a capital letter W) may be predicated of some singular subject, for example, a dish—symbolized by a small letter d, often called the “argument.” The resulting statement is “This dish is warm”; i.e., Wd. Using ∼ to symbolize “not,” the denial ∼Wd can also be predicated.
He was saying necessary and sufficient refers to what makes a thing a thing in itself. — Gregory
You seem focused on semantics, whereas Armstrong is focused on ontology. So I wonder if you're just treating individual identity as some semantical convention. That seems a defensible position, but it's not ontology - and it is ontology that Armstrong is dealing with. — Relativist
Again, I have not said the car has "things" as "properties". Rather, at a point in time, the car has a specific set of components. A swap in parts absolutely implies the resulting vehicle is not strictly identical to the car before the swap. I hope that is clear. — Relativist
You claim that it makes no difference to the car's identity if some parts are replaced, but you haven't explained how that car's identity endures despite a change of parts. — Relativist
This statement doesn't account for identity over time. What makes the car (or you) the same identity from one day to the next, or from one decade to the next? If you aren't accounting for it through essentialism, then how DO you account for it? — Relativist
Remember that every thing that exists (i.e. a particular) is a State of Affairs (SOA), and every SOA has 3 types of constituents: a (thin) particular*, (intrinsic) properties, and relations to other SOAs (AKA extrinsic properties). Properties, relations, and "thin particulars"* do not exist independently; they exist only as constituents in a state of affairs. Strict identity means the exact same set of constituents. — Relativist
*Thin particular: Armstrong denies that SOAs (AKA existents; AKA particulars) are nothing more than bundles of properties. There is also particularity to which properties attach in a SOA. When we abstractly consider the constituents of an SOA, we therefore need to include "particular" as one of these constituents (the particular considered without the attached properties & relations). To distinguish the SOA's constituent particular from an SOA (also called a particular), he labels the constituent as a "thin" particular. — Relativist
Armstrong next defines a "State of Affairs Type (SOAT) - SOAs that have one of more properties/relations in common are the same SOAT. Electron is a SOAT. A specific electron located at some exact location is an SOA. Every SOAT is a universal: it can be instantiated multiple times. An SOAT can be a single property, or a set of properties+relations. As in the case of an electron, all electrons have the same exact properties (excluding location) - but they are different particulars (with distinct "thin particulars"). — Relativist
Identity over time is a loose identity (as opposed to the strict identity I've been discussing): it is a SOAT; it is a universal. An individual identity has "temporal parts": the actual SOA at each point of time. Each of these SOAs is temporally/causally connected to each other (directly or indirectly). — Relativist
OK, then what does identify a specific personal identity, if it's not some subset of its properties that it holds throughout its existence? — Relativist
Are you, perhaps, referring to haecceity - treating identity as a primitive? *edit* or are you just treating individual identity as a semantic convention? — Relativist
Armstring's ontology accounts for it.How a thing remains the thing which it is through all sorts of changes as time passes, is unknown, as a mystery of the universe. — Metaphysician Undercover
Perhaps, but it's not the ontology I've been trying to explain.The principal alternative ontology. which you seem to be promoting, holds that every time a thing changes, it cannot still be the same thing because it is no longer 'identical" to the way it was before. From this perspective, each object must be created anew at each moment of passing time, ...This is a fine ontology, — Metaphysician Undercover
I did explain it, right here:You say first, that every particular is an SOA. But then you say that an SOA consists of 3 type of things, and a particular is one of the three. So which is the true particular, the SOA, or the part of the SOA — Metaphysician Undercover
You then responded:*Thin particular: Armstrong denies that SOAs (AKA existents; AKA particulars) are nothing more than bundles of properties. There is also particularity to which properties attach in a SOA. When we abstractly consider the constituents of an SOA, we therefore need to include "particular" as one of these constituents (the particular considered without the attached properties & relations). To distinguish the SOA's constituent particular from an SOA (also called a particular), he labels the constituent as a "thin" particular. — Relativist
Then we haven't succeeded in communicating. I'll try this:This does not resolve the issue of which is the true particular, it simply creates an infinite regress. — Metaphysician Undercover
There's a distinction between "strict identity" and an "individual, perduring identity" (IPI, for short; my term, not Armstrong's, but corresponds to his usage). An IPI corresponds to our everday view of identity.The problem though, is that when you get to the base particulars (particles), which are necessary to assume to avoid infinite regress, identity is completely lost. One cannot be distinguished from another, and they are moving as time passes, so location is of not help. At this point, "strict identity" turns into no identity, and the entire ontology falls apart by proposing a fundamentally unintelligible universe. — Metaphysician Undercover
A "thin particular" is not a "true particular" - it isn't a thing that can exist wholly and independently. Here's how to conceive of a "thin particular": think about an object. Like all objects, it has intrinsic properties, and relations to other things. Now mentally subtract those properties and relations. What's left is the "thin particular". — Relativist
A "base particular" is an "Atomic State of Affairs". It's analogous to an elematary particle in physics. It exists at a specific set of spatio-temporal coordinates with it's specific set of properties and relations. — Relativist
I was trying to clear up your confusion about what a "true particular" (your term) is, and how a SOA could both BE a particular, and yet have a (thin) particular as a constituent in a SOA.This doesn't make sense, because you said an SOA is made of (thin) particulars, their intrinsic properties and their extrinsic properties. Now you say that I have to subtract those properties to understand what a thin particular is. A particular without any intrinsic or extrinsic properties is not a particular at all, nor is it a constituent of an SOA, which is made up of thin particulars which have intrinsic and extrinsic properties. It's not a real thing. So your description makes no sense. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't think that's true. Can you point me at a source that says this?But quantum physics shows that elementary particles do not exist at any specific spatio-temporal coordinates. — Metaphysician Undercover
But it's also part of.this theory that a particular (i.e. an SOA) has 3 types of constuents: thin particular, intrinsic properties, and relations (AKA extrinsic properties). None of these constituents exist in the real world independently of the others. — Relativist
I don't think that's true. Can you point me at a source that says this? — Relativist
The SOA model could be applied to quantum fields, directly. Each field exists at every point in space, so each point could be treated as an SOA. — Relativist
So, how does Armstrong avoid the infinite regress I referred to? A particular (SOA) is made up of thin particulars. A thin particular, having intrinsic properties, is made up of thinner particulars. — Metaphysician Undercover
That doesn't imply particles don't have a location. That article links to an article on complementarity:I suppose it may be a matter of interpretation, but according to The Copenhagen Interpretation, quantum mechanics is indeterministic, meaning that elementary particles have no determinable location — Metaphysician Undercover
The probabilities are a consequence of a wave function. The wave itself is an entity that actually exists at every point in space:A "quantum field" does not represent particulars with intrinsic and extrinsic properties, it represent probabilities of particulars. — Metaphysician Undercover
Thin particulars do not have properties. Rather, a "thin particular" is a constituent of a state of affairs. Everything that exists in the world(as opposed to mental abstractions) is a SOA. Every SOA has 3 constituents (thin particular, a set of intrinsic properties, a set of relations). — Relativist
Thin particulars are not composed of thinner particulars. Refer back to the mental exercise of conceptualizing the term: ignore the properties and relations and consider what remains. What remains is not further decomposable. — Relativist
The wave itself is an entity that actually exists at every point in space: — Relativist
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