Then insofar as we talk about our colour percepts they are not private; — Michael

Yep.

but they are nonetheless percepts and not mind-independent properties of pens. — Michael

Nuh. If it were nothing but a percept, how do you explain our agreement? Perhaps by something like "intersubjective agreement"? Which is just to say that colour also has a public aspect.

And if we agree that stubbing one’s toe is painful and that hugs are not then we agree to something about stubbing one’s toe; but pain is still a mental percept. — Michael

But not only... and so on.

Pens may have atoms that reflect light, but this physical phenomenon simply isn’t what we think or talk about when we think and talk about colours. — Michael

Yep; no more than we are talking about neurological phenomena when we talk about colour. Again, the neurological phenomena in my mind is not the neurological phenomena in yours. Yet we both see the red in the pen.

There is no external red. — Hanover

And yet we agree that the pen is red. So it's not an "internal" red either. The problem then is the demand that it must be one of the other.

We may mistakenly believe that colours are properties of pens, and talk about them as if they are, but we would simply be wrong. The science is clear on this, and no deferment to Wittgenstein can show otherwise. — Michael

Folk would be in error to insist that colours are not properties of pens, too. There are red pens. "The pen is red" is sometimes true. "Property" is itself a problematic term, especially since some folk think all properties are physical.

And yet we agree that the pen is red. — Banno

No, that is our disagreement. We agree we perceive the pen as red. Maybe you think the pen is actually red, but I don't.

We agree the pin causes us to perceive pain. Maybe someone thinks the pin is painful. I don't, but that would follow if one insists upon imbuing physical objects with mental interpretations.

I guess it has to be pointed out that "internal" and "external" are not the very same as "subjective" and "objective", and neither is the same as "private" and "public".

No, that is our disagreement. We agree we perceive the pen as red. Maybe you think the pen is actually red, but I don't. — Hanover

Ok. So for Hanover, "the pen is red" is not true. I think it is.

So for Hanover, "the pen is red" is not true. I think it is. — Banno

So Umwelt realism? But even this doesn't work epistemically as we have access to more than the way we talk about than just "how it all is for us". We have neurobiological talk. We have physics talk.

As linguistic communities – or rather that more general thing of semiotic communities – we can talk "objectively" not just about our socially-constructed notions of being "selves" with "experiences", but as selves that are part of larger metaphysical and scientific communities of inquiry.

Dumbing things down to beetle in a box, private vs public reference, is fine for lumpen everyday chatter in communities that are in fact rooted in the Cartesian division of "self and world". You can thank a couple of millennia of Christian scholarship for the fact you find such a socially ingrained habit of thought to be your constant default ontology.

But if we are being serious about the issue the OP raises, a more sophisticated and less sophistic metaphysics would prevent what matters from dropping out of the conversation.

I guess it has to be pointed out that "internal" and "external" are not the very same as "subjective" and "objective", and neither is the same as "private" and "public". — Banno

That's a nice little collection of dialectical distinctions. So what is general to them all? Have you thought about that or did you immediately stop right there for some reason?

No, that is our disagreement. We agree we perceive the pen as red. Maybe you think the pen is actually red, but I don't.
— Hanover

Ok. So for Hanover, "the pen is red" is not true. I think it is. — Banno

This is insanity. No wonder Wittgenstein saw this as an illness.

Ok. So for Hanover, "the pen is red" is not true. I think it is. — Banno

If "the pen is red" means the pen looks red to me, I agree with that.

If "the pen is red" means the pen contains redness, I don't.

If "the pen is red" means the pen looks red to me, I agree with that. — Hanover

But the pen looks red to me, too. And given the right filter we might make the red pen look blue... which pen? The red pen. The red pen looks blue. Not Hanover's "The pen that looks red to me looks blue to me".

So what is general to them all? — apokrisis

That there are circumstances in with each fails.

Yep.

But the pen looks red to me, too. And given the right filter we might make the red pen look blue... which pen? The red pen. The red pen looks blue. Not Hanover's "The pen that looks red to me looks blue to me". — Banno

But this ignores my disambiguation.

The constitution of the pen is disputed, not the appearance.

If by "red pen" you mean to define a pen as comprised of redness, whatever that means, then sure, your red pen can look blue if you filter it.

My point is there no such thing as external red, so your hypothesized "red pen" isn't a thing. Yes, the pen looks red. If you want to reclaim the ambiguity and say "yet we say 'the pen is red' and refuse to distinguish between reality and perception, have at it.

That there are circumstances in with each fails. — Banno

Fail in what way exactly? Less glibness and more precision please.

If by "red pen" you mean to define a pen as comprised of redness, whatever that means, then sure, your red pen can look blue if you filter it. — Hanover

Ah - define... so what, setting out essence-of-pen? "Comprised" of redness? Nothing so sophisticated. Just one red pen amongst others, red and not so red.

My point is there no such thing as external red — Hanover

Then if you also think that there is no such thing as internal red, we might well agree.

If by "red pen" you mean to define a pen as comprised of redness, whatever that means, then sure, your red pen can look blue if you filter it. — Hanover

Just one red pen amongst others, red and not so red. — Banno

As I said in previous pages of this thread, asking for a red or blue pen is picky. The main point of a pen is writing on paper. It is an object that helps us to put the words of our language written on a piece of paper. Back in the day, there was only black ink available and folks used to write with feathers. Never mind Egyptians or Greeks writing directly on the stone table with a pictogram.

Why are we that complex and choosy? If I ask for a red pen and there are no red pens at that specific moment, does it mean my ability to write is restricted?

One possibility would be to recreate the neural pattern in the hand of the victim in your hand. But that could be described as copying the pain from one hand to another - making a new pain. Another possibility might be to connect your nervous system to that of the victim in such a way that you felt the pain in their hand. But consider this carefully. How would you know that you had connected the neurones correctly, so that the level of pain you felt was the same as the level of pain felt by the victim? How could you know you had dialled the pain up or down sufficiently to match their pain? Even if you exactly matched the "neural firings", how could you be sure that the "subjective" result was the same? — Banno

I'd say my argument is that I cannot be sure that the subjective color people see is the same either.

I think a problem in this conversation is that for colour, we're using really big obvious differences: green, red, blue. And sure people will generally agree about the big categories. But that's the same with pain. Tell someone you stubbed your toe and they'll know the general outlines of what you felt.

But what about a collection of different reds all next to each other. What if the question isn't "is this pen red" but "which of these pens is cherry red"? Don't we get all of the same problems you outline for pain above?

Even if we got the same neuron firings from the eye, we couldn't be sure that this results in the same answer.

What I think salient is that the way we talk about pain (pleasure, joy...) is different to the way we talk about colour. You can buy a chair of a particular colour but not a chair of a particular pleasure. — Banno

This is a good point, but again are we comparing colour and pleasure at the same level of precision here? Comfortable chairs don't usually have widely differing shapes. If I read positive reviews about a particularly comfortable chair, it'll probably be pleasurable to sit in. You can argue that there are some very particular tastes, but there are also people who are colourblind.

If we get into more finely grained colour scales, agreement gets more complicated. We can agree on what colour we see if we both have an external reference to agree on. But without prior calibration, could we actually pick out a "walnut brown" from a collection of brown sofas reliably?

Yet we both see the red in the pen. — Banno

There is no red "in" the pen. The pen just has a surface layer of atoms that reflects light with a wavelength of ~700nm. When light stimulates the eyes it causes the neurological activity responsible for colour percepts, and we name the colour percept ordinarily caused by 700nm light "red".

You are being deceived by the brain's ability to make it seem as if the qualities of visual experience extend beyond itself, like being convinced that your phantom limb is real. Physics and the neuroscience of perception have proven this naive realism false.

We're talking past one another. You're focusing on physics. Philosophy aims deeper.

Think about the domain of the red percept. It's you, right? Red dwells in you. Lacan says that you are a product of language use. Language sets out the whole framework of physics.

Language sets out the whole framework of physics. — frank

Prior to language, was there physics?

Prior to language, was there physics? — Hanover

No, you need language for physics, don't you?

No, you need language for physics, don't you? — frank

How did the planets move before Adam looked up and saw it go from evening to the morning?

He is talking about the field of physics, not the laws of physics.

He is talking about the field of physics, not the laws of physics. — Lionino

We both know what each other are talking about.

How did the planets move before Adam looked up and saw it go from evening to the morning? — Hanover

The human viewpoint is that gravity did it. The view beyond human ideas is not available to me. That's a favored interpretation of the Tractatus: there are answers that lie beyond what we can know. When you realize that, you take a pause, sigh, and start asking again, knowing that you're reaching for something you can't have.

If both know what each other are talking about, why is one talking as if he takes 'physics' to mean the facts of physics and the other as if he takes 'physics' to mean the academic field? Is it a performance that is going over my head?

The human viewpoint is that gravity did it. The view beyond human ideas is not available to me. — frank

Assuming it possible the planets moved differently prior to human perspective, it does not follow they moved differently prior to human language.

I can accept that language offers us a tool to understand the world and that it shapes some of our understanding, but the idea that non-liguistic organisms have no understanding of the world or that all that I touch and all that I feel and all that I know is language mediated is a concocted theory to sustain a Wittgensteinian model that is likely based upon a misunderstanding of Wittgenstein.

I say "likely" because Wittgenstein's communication skills were lacking. Ironically.

Assuming it possible the planets moved differently prior to human perspective, it does not follow they moved differently prior to human language. — Hanover

There's a profound paradox about motion: Xeno's Paradox. A paradox is a sign that we've butted up against the boundaries of the mind. Stay away from the boundaries and everything is fine. In other words, stop trying to be God and be happy with your lot as a tiny human, with limited understanding.

I can accept that language offers us a tool to understand the world and that it shapes some of our understanding, but the idea that non-liguistic organisms have no understanding of the world or that all that I touch and all that I feel and all that I know is language mediated is a concocted theory to sustain a Wittgensteinian model that is likely based upon a misunderstanding of Wittgenstein. — Hanover

I understand what you're saying.

I say "likely" because Wittgenstein's communication skills were lacking. Ironically. — Hanover

He was echoing Plato, who has Socrates claim that every philosopher wants to die because it seems that that's the only way to get a vantage point on life: to sit outside it. As long as you're inside it, you have to be happy with the shadows on the wall.

In other words, stop trying to be God and be happy with your lot as a tiny human, with limited understanding. — frank

That we can't know everything doesn't mean we can't know anything.

We still landed a man on the moon even if we've not figured out Xeno's paradox.

That we can't know everything doesn't mean we can't know anything.

We still landed a man on the moon even if we've not figured out Xeno's paradox. — Hanover

True. We still can't go beyond our limitations. That's what I thought you were trying to do with talk of what came before Adam's planets.

- define... so what, setting out essence-of-pen? "Comprised" of redness? Nothing so sophisticated. Just one red pen amongst others, red and not so red. — Banno

You're forever caught up in language games and not metaphysics, and so you ask these sorts of questions. I'll give you props for consistency, but your comments fail to appreciate perhaps my rejection of linguistic analysis as a meaningful way to fully address metaphysics.

So, no, I'm not in search of the essence, suggesting the redness is an accidental property and not a necessary one. I'm saying the pen has no red in it at all. It is not a property of the pen itself

The property of the pen itself is noumenal. The redness is phenomenal.

Then if you also think that there is no such thing as internal red, we might well agree. — Banno

How could there not be internal red? I see red, and it's not even necessary that external stimuli exist for sensations to exist.

There is no red "in" the pen. The pen just has a surface layer of atoms that reflects light with a wavelength of ~700nm. When light stimulates the eyes it causes the neurological activity responsible for colour percepts, and we name the colour percept ordinarily caused by 700nm light "red".

Say that a coloring agent is added to a clear pen in order to make it red. Different agents can be added to different pens in order to add different color to the plastic of the pen. Pigments and coloring agents exist out there, in the pen, independent of the mind. I can’t see the color anywhere else, whether beside it, in front of it, or somewhere behind my eyes.

This leads me to believe the color, which is the coloring agent itself, mixed as it is in the plastic in order to produce a singular result, a red pen, is why the color is in the pen.

In scientific terms: the properties of the material in the pen determine the wavelength and efficiency of light absorption, and therefor the color. My question is: what properties in the “color percept”, whether added, removed, or changed, can explain why the pen is red?

The constitution of the pen is disputed, not the appearance. — Hanover

What is the purpose of saying "The pen is red"? Why is that useful to say?

Does a red apple and red pen have the same constitution? Could we mean more than one thing in saying "the apple is red" vs. "the pen is red"?