I can find at least one person in a professional setting who will go to bat for anything. The only thing that matters is the soundness of their evidence and the logic of their argument. — Philosophim

I raised Pim Van Lommel's book because it is a source of evidence and argument. It's not something I have first-hand experience of, but if you claim that all NDE's are 'merely hallucination' then the evidence of a cardiovascular doctor who has amassed considerable data to the contrary is salient, because you're writing as if there is no such evidence.

The philosophical point is, what is the significance of such claims? If you believe they're hallucinatory, then they're not significant. But, your objections illustrate my point, as they're based on the conviction that it's all superstition and pseudo-science. I'm not going to try and persuade you otherwise, but I have an open mind about the question.

Where is your evidence that people's perceptions that they are real, means they are real?

Remember the sun circling around the Earth? Feeling like things are real is not the same as it actually being real. Even if a lot of people feel that it is. 

The problem again, is you keep presenting information that definitely shows that NDEs are real subjective experiences, but does not have enough weight to argue that the interpretation of these subjective experiences match reality. — Philosophim

Are you paying attention to someone patient enough to spoon-feed criticisms I and others have made countless times of your non-philosophical non-arguments, @Sam26? :eyes:

I have an open mind ... — Wayfarer

Not so "open", I hope, that your brain falls out. :smirk:

I would love for there to be life after death. Only weird people who cut themselves in the dark while crying to death metal don't. — Philosophim

It is obviously true that ‘the next life’ is a fertile ground for wish-fulfilment and fantasies of living forever, but in cultures which believe in the reality of the afterlife, not all Near Death Experiences are roses and sunshine. Buddhist sacred art depicts an elaborate hierarchy of hell-realms in which beings remain enmeshed for ‘aeons of kalpas’ as a consequence of their actions in this life. There’s a publisher, Sam Bercholz, founder of Shambhala Books, which is a large American publisher of Buddhist literature. He suffered an NDE after undergoing heart surgery which he recounts in an illustrated book, A Guided Tour of Hell:

This true account of Sam Bercholz’s near-death experience has more in common with Dante’s Inferno than it does with any of the popular feel-good stories of what happens when we die. In the aftermath of heart surgery, Sam, a longtime Buddhist practitioner and teacher, is surprised to find himself in the lowest realms of karmic rebirth, where he is sent to gain insight into human suffering. Under the guidance of a luminous being, Sam’s encounters with a series of hell-beings trapped in repetitious rounds of misery and delusion reveal to him how an individual’s own habits of fiery hatred and icy disdain, of grasping desire and nihilistic ennui, are the source of horrific agonies that pound consciousness for seemingly endless cycles of time. Comforted by the compassion of a winged goddess and sustained by the kindness of his Buddhist teachers, Sam eventually emerges from his ordeal with renewed faith that even the worst hell contains the seed of wakefulness. His story is offered, along with the modernist illustrations of a master of Tibetan sacred arts, in order to share what can be learned about awakening from our own self-created hells and helping others to find relief and liberation from theirs.

So, it’s not all just ‘wake up and smell the roses’. Worse things can happen.

if you claim that all NDE's are 'merely hallucination' then the evidence of a cardiovascular doctor who has amassed considerable data to the contrary is salient, because you're writing as if there is no such evidence. — Wayfarer

No, that's an appeal to authority fallacy. Lets see what actual argument he gives and the evidence he provides for it.

The philosophical point is, what is the significance of such claims? If you believe they're hallucinatory, then they're not significant. But, your objections illustrate my point, as they're based on the conviction that it's all superstition and pseudo-science. — Wayfarer

Its not a conviction, its a conclusion based on the arguments and evidence presented. If you have specific arguments and evidence that would show that it is not superstition and/or pseudo-science, we can explore those. That is what separates superstition from meaningful ideas. Meaningful ideas can provide sound arguments and evidence for their existence, while superstition fail to provide anything more than a desire for wish fulfillment or, "But maybe" argument.

So, it’s not all just ‘wake up and smell the roses’. Worse things can happen. — Wayfarer

Agreed. My Aunt had a terrible NDE before she died. I've mentioned it to Sam in an earlier post. This happened during an operation they had to make on her to save her life prior to cancer eventually taking her.

No, that's an appeal to authority fallacy. — Philosophim

Appealing to data in response to a claim is not a fallacy. If you claim that near death experiences must be hallucinatory, then evidence to the contrary ought to be considered also, and Pim Van Lommel's books are a source of that evidence. I've gone back and looked at the first page again - after 7 years :yikes: - Sam presents his arguments carefully enough, and of course it is right and proper that they're challenged, but there is testimonial evidence - and what other kind could there be for this subject?

What I'm getting at, is not the belief that these experiences have no basis in reality, but why they can't have any basis in reality. I think there's a mindset to disprove or deny any possibility of them being real. I think that's the question that ought to be explored. But your responses are underwritten by the conviction that they could not be real. Let's discuss why they couldn't be, what would have to be the case for such experiences to be real.

So, I disagree with your carte blanche dismissal of what Sam has been presenting. I think it's more likely that it concerns something that is so at odds with your worldview that it couldn't be admitted. That was the point of the Richard Lewontin quote I provided.

But if you just figured out that some observed phenomenon is not possible to explain; then you'd need to believe in dualism. — god must be atheist

Physicalism could be falsified by clear evidence of something nonphysical existing. — Relativist

Ed Feser gives the example of the metal detector. Defenders of physicalism will say:

1. The predictive power and technological applications of physics are unparalleled by those of any other purported source of knowledge.

2. Therefore what physics reveals to us is all that is real.

Which can be compared with:

1. Metal detectors have had far greater success in finding coins and other metallic objects in more places than any other method has.

2. Therefore what metal detectors reveal to us (coins and other metallic objects) is all that is real.

Now metal detectors are specifically adapted to those aspects of the natural world susceptible of detection via electromagnetic means. But however well they perform this task -- indeed, even if they succeeded on every single occasion they were deployed -- it simply wouldn’t follow for a moment that there are no aspects of the natural world other than the ones they are sensitive to - - that there are no things other than metal objects.

Similarly, what physics does -- and there is no doubt that it does it brilliantly -- is to capture just those aspects of the natural world susceptible of the mathematical modeling and detection that makes precise prediction and technological application possible. But here too, it simply doesn’t follow for a moment that there are no other aspects of the natural world. (And it might also be noted that despite the spectacular success of mathematical physics, there are many profound anomalies and conundrums thrown up by it.)

As I mentioned above, until the middle of the 19thc nobody knew that there were electromagnetic fields. Since the discovery of Maxwell's field equations and its integration with physics, these are now understood to be even more basic than sub-atomic particles- before then, they weren't even considered.

But what if there were biological fields, which could only be detected by organisms? No matter how sensitive and how accurate your metal detection or particle-accelerator instruments were, these would be invisible to them, outside the scope (the 'boundary conditions') of your instrumentation.

Furthermore, all this is taking place in a cultural context which has inherited the dualism of 'mind and matter' from early modern science. So against that backdrop, to demonstrate the existence of something which was not physical, would presumably to identify and isolate the mysterious 'res cogitans', the 'thinking substance' which Descartes identified as 'consciousness'. But this gives rise to a whole set of interlocking problems, starting with the so-called 'interaction problem'. And that's maybe because the whole model, which again is foundational to the modern world, has radical deficiencies.

So once these kinds of factors are considered, different perspectives become available. It means going back and re-examining the pathway by which the conclusion that 'the universe is solely physical' was arrived at. It sounds daunting, but it's eminently achievable.

And that's maybe because the whole model, which again is foundational to the modern world, has radical deficiencies. — Wayfarer

I'm unsure it matters what came before this suggestion. It is clearly true, and leaves us with quite a bit to catch up on.

Defenders of physicalism will say:

1. The predictive [& explanatory] power and technological applications of physics are unparalleled by those of any other purported source of knowledge.

2. Therefore what physics reveals to us is all that is real. — Wayfarer

Your second statement does not follow from the first statement which is why physicalists do not – I do not – make such a claim. Sadly, Wayf, you're still shadowboxing with strawmen rather than making actual valid arguments.

I have an issue with the expression 'consciousness surviving the body'. I think it's inherently self-contradictory insofar as consciousness is generally understood to be an attribute of physical organisms and is generally not perceived in any other context. But then, I also think the tendency to see this question in these terms is due to the framework in which this is understood.

There was an opinion piece published in Scientific American, by physicist Sean Carroll, called Physics and the Immortality of the Soul. Carroll argues that belief in any kind of life after death is equivalent to the belief that the Moon is made from green cheese - that is to say, a ridiculous idea.

But such an assertion is made because of the presuppositions that he brings to the question, the perspective through which he views it. In other words, he depicts the issue in such a way that it would indeed be ridiculous to believe it.

Carroll says:

Claims that some form of consciousness persists after our bodies die and decay into their constituent atoms face one huge, insuperable obstacle: the laws of physics underlying everyday life are completely understood, and there’s no way within those laws to allow for the information stored in our brains to persist after we die. If you claim that some form of soul persists beyond death, what particles is that soul made of? What forces are holding it together? How does it interact with ordinary matter?

I can think of an answer to this question, which is that the soul is not 'made of particles' and that the idea that the soul is 'made of particles' is not at all characteristic of what is meant by the term 'soul'. (Some of the ancient Stoics and Hindus did believe in a form of subtle matter, but I'll leave that aside. And I'll also leave aside the implicit hubris.)

First recall that the Greek term interpreted as 'soul' was 'psuche' or 'psyche' which is of course still with us as a form of a word for 'mind' (preserved in 'psychology'). But I think the soul could be better conceived in terms of a field that acts as an organising principle - analogous to the physical and magnetic fields that were discovered during the 19th century, that were found to be fundamental in the behaviour of particles. This is not to say that the soul is a field, but that the field analogy might be a better metaphor than particulate matter. (And bearing in mind, in Aristotle, the soul is given as 'the form of the body', where 'form' is akin to 'animating principle'. It is not 'the shape' nor is it conceived of as a separable entity.)

Morphic Fields

So - just as magnetic fields organise iron filings into predictable shapes, so too might a biological field effect be responsible for the general form and the persistence of particular attributes of an organism. The question is, is there any evidence of such 'biological fields'?

Well, the existence of 'morphic fields' is the brainchild of Rupert Sheldrake, the 'scientific heretic' who claims that:

Morphic resonance is the influence of previous structures of activity on subsequent similar structures of activity organized by morphic fields. It enables memories to pass across both space and time from the past. The greater the similarity, the greater the influence of morphic resonance. What this means is that all self-organizing systems, such as molecules, crystals, cells, plants, animals and animal societies, have a collective memory on which each individual draws and to which it contributes. In its most general sense this hypothesis implies that the so-called laws of nature are more like habits.

As the morphic field is capable of storing and transmitting remembered information, then 'the soul' could be conceived in such terms. The morphic field does, at the very least, provide an explanatory metaphor for such persistence. (This also resonates with the idea of the collective unconscious (Jung) and the alayavijnana, the ‘storehouse consciousness’ of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Meaning that the soul or psyche is analogous to a standing wave or whirlpool structure in such a medium, the 'cittasantana' or mind-stream of Mahāyāna Buddhism. )

Children with Past-Life Memories

But what, then, is the evidence for such effects in respect to 'life after death'? As mentioned previously a researcher by the name of Ian Stevenson assembled a body of data on children with recall of previous lives. Stevenson's data collection method comprised the methodical documentation arising from the seeking out and recording of a child’s purported past-life recollections. Then he identified from journals, birth-and-death records, and witness accounts, the deceased person the child supposedly remembered, and attempted to validate the facts from those sources that matched the child’s memory. Another Scientific American opinion piece notes that Stevenson even matched birthmarks and birth defects on his child subjects with wounds on the remembered deceased that could be verified by medical records.

On the back of the head of a little boy in Thailand was a small, round puckered birthmark, and at the front was a larger, irregular birthmark, resembling the entry and exit wounds of a bullet; Stevenson had already confirmed the details of the boy’s statements about the life of a man who’d been shot in the head from behind with a rifle, so that seemed to fit. And a child in India who said he remembered the life of boy who’d lost the fingers of his right hand in a fodder-chopping machine mishap was born with boneless stubs for fingers on his right hand only. This type of “unilateral brachydactyly” is so rare, Stevenson pointed out, that he couldn’t find a single medical publication of another case. — Are We Sceptics Just Cynics?

Carroll goes on in his essay to say that 'Everything we know about quantum field theory (QFT) says that there aren’t any sensible answers to these questions (about the persistence of consciousness)'. However, that springs from his starting assumption that 'the soul' must be something physical, which, again, arises from the presumption that everything is physical, or reducible to physics. In other words, it is directly entailed by his belief in the exhaustiveness of physics with respect to the description of what is real.

He then says 'Believing in life after death, to put it mildly, requires physics beyond the Standard Model. Most importantly, we need some way for that "new physics" to interact with the atoms that we do have.' However, even in ordinary accounts of 'mind-body' medicine, it is clear that mind can have physical consequences and effects on the body. This is the case with, for example, psychosomatic medicine and the placebo effect, but there are other examples.

He finishes by observing:

Very roughly speaking, when most people think about an immaterial soul that persists after death, they have in mind some sort of blob of spirit energy that takes up residence near our brain, and drives around our body like a soccer mom driving an SUV.

But that is not what 'most people have in mind'. As mentioned above, the idea of a self that transmigrates life to life is condemned in no uncertain terms in Buddhist scriptures, which do otherwise accept the reality of re-birth. But that is what physicalism ‘has in mind’ because it's the only way to conceive of something if you think that all that is real is matter.. If you start from the understanding that 'everything is physical', then this will indeed dictate the way you think about it. And while it may be true that there is no such 'blob' as Carroll describes, that is not what the 'soul' is; but what it might be, is something that can't be understood in the terms of Carroll's ontological presuppositions.

So, I myself don’t much like the terminology of ‘consciousness surviving death’, especially when ‘consciousness’ is defined in terms of an attribute of conscious beings. The fact that we feel compelled to conceive it that way is a consequence of the ‘objectifying’ tendency which is deeply rooted in the way we think about it. But very subtle questions of identify, metaphysics and epistemology underlie this issue.

Physicalism is, in slogan form, the thesis that everything is physical.... The general idea is that the nature of the actual world (i.e. the universe and everything in it) conforms to a certain condition, the condition of being physical. — Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy, Physicalism

Physicalism is, in slogan form, the thesis that everything is physical....
—Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy — Wayfarer

Yeah, of course, you"re making my point again: you traffic in slogans – strawmen – rather than informed, valid arguments. :smirk:

Defenders of physicalism will say:

1. The predictive power and technological applications of physics are unparalleled by those of any other purported source of knowledge.

2. Therefore what physics reveals to us is all that is real. — Wayfarer

That's not phyicalism, it's scientism, which is:

... the view that science and the scientific method are the best or only way to render truth about the world and reality.

While the term was defined originally to mean "methods and attitudes typical of or attributed to natural scientists", some scholars, as well as political and religious leaders, have also adopted it as a pejorative term with the meaning "an exaggerated trust in the efficacy of the methods of natural science applied to all areas of investigation (as in philosophy, the social sciences, and the humanities)".

Physicalism doesn't entail believing physics necessarily reveals all that is real, or that science is the sole source of knowledge. Like any metaphysical theory, physicalism endeavors to provide a model that accounts for everything we know about the world. While that includes what we know about physics, it would be a poor metaphysical theory that depended on the prevailing scientific paradigms of the day. It's also fair game for a physicalist to account for things physics can't account for: e.g. foundations of knowledge; modal truths; or pretty much anything that a critic of scientism (like Feser) might raise.

Appealing to data in response to a claim is not a fallacy. — Wayfarer

You didn't post any data, only that some scientist had written a book. You appealing to that without indicating what the argument or evidence is, is the definition of the fallacy.

If you claim that near death experiences must be hallucinatory, then evidence to the contrary ought to be considered also, and Pim Van Lommel's books are a source of that evidence. — Wayfarer

Must they be hallucinatory? I don't know. I never claimed that. Did you read our discussion and my points, or are you only taking a later post? As for Lommel, again, you never posted any of his evidence or argumentation. For all I know, he's a quack. I'm not going to take time out of my day to read an entire book, as I'm not arguing for consciousness existing outside of the body. If he has good arguments, post them. If not, the reference is as good as me referencing Billy Bob Johnson's book on gator wraslin'. He might have some great points, or he could be missing some fingers and toes and his book is widely suggested to be avoided. Just because someone is a 'scientist' and has a 'book' does not mean anything they've written is worthwhile to consider.

but there is testimonial evidence - and what other kind could there be for this subject? — Wayfarer

The tests I've noted?

What I'm getting at, is not the belief that these experiences have no basis in reality, but why they can't have any basis in reality. — Wayfarer

I never said they couldn't. If you've been reading my discussion, you'll note that this has been a discussion of his lack of evidence and cogent arguments for NDEs being more than mere subjective experiences, and me providing counter arguments and evidence that more strongly indicate that NDEs are only subjective experiences, and fail objective tests in lab settings.

Let's discuss why they couldn't be, what would have to be the case for such experiences to be real. — Wayfarer

Feel free to read through our discussion and you should have everything I've provided. Quote and make some counter-arguments if you think you see any issues with what I've noted.

So, I disagree with your carte blanche dismissal of what Sam has been presenting. — Wayfarer

If you read our discussion in its entirety, I think you'll see why I disagree with him, the problems his arguments has, and why they are good arguments for his conclusion. If you have issues with any of those specifics, again, feel free to post them and we can discuss. Otherwise it seems you're making a judgement without fully understanding my arguments to Sam.

There was an opinion piece published in Scientific American, by physicist Sean Carroll — Wayfarer

Let's say these two sources are not ones I would go to for discussions on anything remotely philosophically interesting.

How does it interact with ordinary matter?

This is his only question that doesn't carry all his suppositions. And it's been a live one for a long, long time.

But that is not what 'most people have in mind'. — Wayfarer

Agreed.

So, I myself don’t much like the terminology of ‘consciousness surviving death’ — Wayfarer

Thanks for explaining. I guess i Ignore stupid self-restricting positions like Carroll's. Obviously, he's an authority on what he does know - which is physics after the free miracle :P

physics after the free miracle — AmadeusD

I.e. mygoddidit-of-the-gaps :sparkle:

To some degree, sure, but framing it that way is some extremely bad interpretation. That there are gaps in knowledge doesn't require invoking God. But it does require some novel thinking, at times. That's all I'm indicating. It's not Carroll's field... If God comes out of that exercise, i'd be a surprised as you.

Okay if not "god", then what do you mean by "free miracle"?

Ah, fair, that was very much insufficiently clear. Where i put that, I just mean to indicate that we don't know (which ironically, is Carroll's view, elsewhere) and 'miracle' is a placeholder for whatever the answer is...could think here of the breathe-in-breathe-out view of the big bang, but we don't know whether or not that's the case. It would solve the 'miracle' is my point. Anything that answers the question is the 'miracle' until it's found.

Must they be hallucinatory? I don't know. I never claimed that. Did you read our discussion and my points, or are you only taking a later post? — Philosophim

Never?

If a bunch of people have a hallucination, no one doubts they have a hallucination. But the fact that multiple people have a hallucination is not an argument for that hallucination being real. — Philosophim

The point about Van Lommel and Ian Stephenson is simply to indicate that large data sets exist, that researches have wrestled with the question as to whether nde’s and past-life memories have any basis in reality. I could take the time to reproduce some of their examples for discussion, but I have a fair idea of what the response would be, so I’m not going to bother.

If you prefer; for lucidity's sake I prefer unknown to the loaded, anti-scientific term "miracle".

Fair enough. If you find a glib use of a clearly inapt term "anti-scientific" rather than a bit of fun, I'm unsure where to go :P

That's not phyicalism, it's scientism — Relativist

They’re nearly always joined at the hip. Are there any advocates for ‘scientism’ who do not hold to physicalism? We look to science as the arbiter of what is real, and science is best equipped to deal with the objectively measurable and inferences grounded against objective measurement. So I think Feser’s metal-detector analogy is perfectly apt, especially in a discussion such as this one. We are pre-disposed to a metaphysical view that is in concordance with science, hence the constant eye-rolling and exasperation when mention is made of researchers who question physicalism.

They’re nearly always joined at the hip. Are there any advocates for ‘scientism’ who do not hold to physicalism? — Wayfarer

Both believe the physical world is all that exists, but Feser's objections to scientism do not apply to metaphysical physicalism. Someone who embraces scientism without a grasp of physicalism as a metaphysical system will be stumped by his assertions. So I can see them sort of joined at the hip, as long as we recognize that physicalism, but not scientism, is a metaphysical system.

Here's an example Feser gives (this was from the first "here" in the article you linked):

"Despite its adherents’ pose of rationality, scientism has a serious problem: it is either self-refuting or trivial. Take the first horn of this dilemma. The claim that scientism is true is not itself a scientific claim, not something that can be established using scientific methods. Indeed, that science is even a rational form of inquiry (let alone the only rational form of inquiry) is not something that can be established scientifically. For scientific inquiry itself rests on a number of philosophical assumptions: that there is an objective world external to the minds of scientists; that this world is governed by causal regularities; that the human intellect can uncover and accurately describe these regularities; and so forth. Since science presupposes these things, it cannot attempt to justify them without arguing in a circle."

A physicalist metaphysician has no problem addressing the philosophical questions he raises every bit as well as a Thomist like Feser. That science is a rational form of inquiry doesn't require a supernaturalist metaphysics to justify; the "causal regularities" he refers to can be accounted for as laws of nature (relations between universals).

I suspect Feser (who is prone to polemics) is being a bit disingenous with his criticism. Scientism isn't a metaphysical system, and that's why I bring up physicalism. No metaphysical theory (Thomist, Aristotelian, Physicalist...) is provably true, such that it can properly be labelled "knowledge" in the strict sense Physicalism is no less justifiable than Feser's Thomism ( physicalism is arguable MORE justified because it entails fewer ad hoc assumptions). So Feser is in no better position to claim actual knowledge than a physicalist.

A physicalist metaphysician has no problem addressing the philosophical questions he raises every bit as well as a Thomist like Feser. That science is a rational form of inquiry doesn't require a supernaturalist metaphysics to justify; the "causal regularities" he refers to can be accounted for as laws of nature (relations between universals). — Relativist

(not in pursuit of the greater discussion here - I am just motivated to ask prima facie..)
I am unsure these answers can be given as readily as you're putting forward. "Laws of Nature" just refer back to those causal regularities. They aren't actually 'accounted' for beyond that we regularly see stuff happen under certain conditions. It may well be that this is what you're getting at and I'm misreading... Because both we seem to have a similar reaction to THomism, and I agree with your final point there; I am just not seeing how you are actually answering the questions old mate put forward.. (but, that supports your conclusion, so that's fine, im just curious).

That science is a rational form of inquiry doesn't require a supernaturalist metaphysics to justify; the "causal regularities" he refers to can be accounted for as laws of nature (relations between universals). — Relativist

But, are universals themselves physical? I know David Armstrong says they are, but I think his is a revisionist account of universals shoehorned into a materialist framework and undermined by science itself. (For example, the Copenhagen interpretation suggests that quantum entities do not have definite properties until they are observed, which conflicts with Armstrong's view that properties (or universals) exist independently of perception and measurement). And the ontological status of 'the laws of nature', and why the Universe has just these laws and not some other, is also neither a scientific question nor something that can be adjuticated by physics.

In the SEP entry on Physicalism, cited above, there is a section on 'the problem of abstracta' which is precisely that numbers and the like are not material in nature - and yet they are also basic to the success of the mathematical physics which underpins a great deal of science. There is still controversy in philosophy of mathematics as to whether the Platonist view is the correct one, and Platonism maintains that number is real but immaterial (which is why it is controversial.) So the ontological status of universals and abstracta is far from a settled question.

So:

"For scientific inquiry itself rests on a number of philosophical assumptions: that there is an objective world external to the minds of scientists; that this world is governed by causal regularities; that the human intellect can uncover and accurately describe these regularities; and so forth. Since science presupposes these things, it cannot attempt to justify them without arguing in a circle." ~ Edward Feser — Relativist

I think this is quite true, and will often defend this argument. The succinct way of expressing it is that 'naturalism assumes nature' - it starts with the apparently self-evident fact of the existence of the empirical world, to be studied by science. But again, that apparently innocuous assumption always entails an implicit metaphysics and epistemology. An example is the status of objectivity: I've argued at length in another thread that objectivity is itself reliant on there being a subject to whom objects appear (per Kant). The fact that communities of subjects see the same sets of objects doesn't undermine that. And then, there's the observer problem in physics, already noted, concerning the objects of physics itself which are essentially abstractions in the first place.

So I think Feser is quite justified in that claim.

Must they be hallucinatory? I don't know. I never claimed that. Did you read our discussion and my points, or are you only taking a later post?
— Philosophim

Never? — Wayfarer

No, we're talking about hallucinatory as the more likely inductive possibility. You obviously did not read our full conversation over the life of this thread.

The point about Van Lommel and Ian Stephenson is simply to indicate that large data sets exist, that researches have wrestled with the question as to whether nde’s and past-life memories have any basis in reality. — Wayfarer

And my point, again, is that it is irrelevant, and a logical fallacy to site that these have any value without you having read them. Kind of like your criticisms of my conversation when you haven't read it in full either.

I could take the time to reproduce some of their examples for discussion, but I have a fair idea of what the response would be, so I’m not going to bother. — Wayfarer

We have this weird dichotomy Wayfarer. I keep taking the time to treat you like you're not an idiot, and you keep proving me wrong. You keep taking the time to treat me like I'm an idiot, and I keep proving you wrong. Is this ever going to change? Maybe realize some of your arguments aren't very good, and have a humble conversation?

I believe somewhere in that insecure mess of a brain of yours, is an actual intellectual who has curiosity, wonder at thinking about things, and the potential to both learn and contribute. But once again, when your points have been countered or shown to be faulty in an argument, you break down into this passive aggressive conversation style where I can practically see you sulking as you type the words out. If you got over yourself, you might be surprised at what you could do. Or at the very least, learn to quit before I have to call you out on your behavior.

But, are universals themselves physical? I know David Armstrong says they are, but I think his is a revisionist account of universals shoehorned into a materialist framework and undermined by science itself — Wayfarer

Universals aren't "shoehorned". Armstrong wrote a book ("Universals: An Opinionated Introduction") where he lays out the case for his treatment of them. It's a stepping stone toward his comprehensive metaphysics (universals are integral), but it stands on its own.

For example, the Copenhagen interpretation suggests that quantum entities do not have definite properties until they are observed, which conflicts with Armstrong's view that properties (or universals) exist independently of perception and measurement) — Wayfarer

Quantum "entities" are quantum systems, and they evolve deterministically (per a Schroedinger equation)- irrespective of interpretation.

Measurements entail an interaction between the non-quantum (classical) world and a quantum system. The result of the interaction is probabilistic - repeated measurement will fit an expected probability distribution. Armstrong accounts for this as "probabilistic causation" (consistent with his account of laws of nature). As far as I can tell, this is consistent with any of the interpretations of QM.

In the SEP entry on Physicalism, cited above, there is a section on 'the problem of abstracta' ... So it's far from a settled question. — Wayfarer

There aren't many settled questions in philosophy. But Armstrong argues that the notion that abstractions have objective, independent existence seems unparsimonious - they are unnecessary additions to the "furniture of the world" (as he puts it).

Armstrong takes his case further: if objects depend on these abstract universals for their form, it entails a relation between the object and the the abstraction - so not only do abstractions add to the "furniture of the world", it also creates a the need for this relation. Immanent universals (universals existing exclusively in their instantiations) is more parsimonious and simpler.

As far as the abstractions that we mentally contemplate, Armstrong points to the "way of abstraction" (see this SEP article) which makes sense to me.

naturalism assumes nature' - it starts with the apparently self-evident fact of the existence of the empirical world, to be studied by science. But again, that apparently innocuous assumption always entails an implicit metaphysics and epistemology. — Wayfarer

I'd say that scientism (not science, per se) has to depend on the assumption that there is a compatible metaphysics underlying it all. I'm not aware of Feser ever acknowledging that. Instead, he criticizes scientism for its absence of accounting for a foundation of knowlege. Of COURSE it lacks that! But the physicalist metaphysics you consider entailed by it doesn't lack it.

His criticism also seems disingenuous by pointing out that the principle of scientism excludes the possibility of "knowledge" of some foundation for knowledge. If he's using "knowledge" in the strict sense, then the same thing applies to him and the Thomist metaphysics he embraces. It may be coherent, but it's not provably true.

I have no problem with his pointing out the fact scientism can't explain itself, but it would be more reasonable to point toward the need for a metaphysical model that fills the gap he identified. This ought to be accompanied with the observation that it is not actually possible to have "knowledge" of any metaphysical model.

An example is the status of objectivity: I've argued at length in another thread that objectivity is itself reliant on there being a subject to whom objects appear (per Kant). The fact that communities of subjects see the same sets of objects doesn't undermine that.

IMO, true epistemic objectivity is an unobtainable ideal, but we can pursue intersubjectivity.

And then, there's the observer problem in physics, already noted. And the objects of physics itself are essentially abstractions.

I addressed both points.

You keep taking the time to treat me like I'm an idiot, and I keep proving you wrong. Is this ever going to change? — Philosophim

I believe somewhere in that insecure mess of a brain of yours — Philosophim

I can practically see you sulking as you type the words out. — Philosophim

If you got over yourself — Philosophim

have a humble conversation — Philosophim

INteresting.

"Laws of Nature" just refer back to those causal regularities. — AmadeusD

That's a Humean account. More recent philosophers have developed an (arguably) superior account: law realism.

The notion is that there are actual, existing laws of nature. A law is a relation between universals.

Example: electron (-1 charge) and proton (+1 charge) are universals. It is a law that they will attract. Each particular electron instantiates the universal "electron" and each particular proton instantiates the universal "proton". They necessarily attract because the electron-proton pair necessarily instantiates the law.

Here's some sources:

https://www.jstor.org/stable/43153907

https://bates.alma.exlibrisgroup.com/discovery/fulldisplay?docid=alma991001713689708044&context=L&vid=01CBB_BCOLL:BATES&search_scope=MyInst_and_CI&adaptor=Local%20Search%20Engine&tab=MyInst_and_CI&query=sub,exact,%20Causality%20,AND&mode=advanced&offset=60

https://global.oup.com/academic/product/causation-9780198750949?cc=us&lang=en&

The basis for this breaks down into Humean skepticism nevertheless.

I agree, it's a better model, but a model nonetheless. I don't think it gets closer to any kind of certainty. We're just saying "Okay, let's run with it until we stab ourselves".

You keep taking the time to treat me like I'm an idiot, and I keep proving you wrong. Is this ever going to change? — Philosophim

I don’t believe I did that, nor did I wish to imply it. You can't have a conversation you don't like without falling into ad hominems. If I've been critical, it's because of what I see as the presuppositions you bring to bear, for example:

Currently the hypothesis, "Our consciousness does not survive death," has been confirmed in applicable tests. You'll need to show me actual tests that passed peer review, and can be repeated that show our consciousness exists beyond death. To my mind, there are none, but I am open to read if you cite one. — Philosophim

Where the obvious difficulty is that of obtaining an objective validation of a subjective state of being and which only occurs in extreme conditions. Would, for instance, the peer review group also had to have had NDE's? The 'replication crisis' in psychology is severe enough even for much more quotidian matters. Myself, I don't really see how the claim that there can be a state beyond physical death is ever going to be scientifically validated, although I believe there are research programs underway to do that.

I brought up Ian Stevenson's research into children with past-life memories, because it's obviously a more realistic source of objective data than are NDE's. Reason being, the subject children will make claims about his or her remembered previous identity, and those claims can be subjected to documentary evidence and witness testimony. And I have read it - I did take his two-volume Where Reincarnation and Biology Intersect out of the library, and read large parts of it (although it's two very large volumes and much of it worded in the dry technical terminology of medical literature). But it is the consequence of the examination of several thousand such cases. It's easy to dismiss Stevenson as a crank or charlatan but he did amass a considerable amount of data which I happen to think is a more empirically reliable source of data than NDE testimonies.

I also laid out a sketch of an alternative metaphysic, within which the idea of continuity from life-to-life might be considered plausible, to which you didn't respond.

I have no problem with his pointing out the fact scientism can't explain itself, but it would be more reasonable to point toward the need for a metaphysical model that fills the gap he identified. — Relativist

You make many solid points there, and I'll need to do some more reading, obviously. I will own up that the reason for my hostility to Armstrong, and he was the professor of philosophy were I was an undergrad, was that I believe that materialist theories of mind are incorrect in principle. But I also recognise that he was a brilliant thinker and that to get into the ring with him would take someone with a lot better skills than myself. I don't believe your responses really do adequately address the challenges of modern physics, but I know better than to try and pursue that line of argument. Anyway, many points to consider there and I appreciate that.