I want to take this a step further. I suspect we will agree that you can be sure, at least sometimes, that we can be confident the colour people see is the same. Like when we both choose the red pen. But when we prefix the word "subjective", that colour becomes uncertain.

Why not avoid using the word "subjective", and keep your confidence?

That is, perhaps the notion of a subjective colour is a misapplication, and colours are not subjective. — Banno

Exactly. Subjective experiences are only useful to talk about when wanting to know about the state of other minds, not other pens.

Even if others don't experience red the same as I do, it is irrelevant to the goal at hand, which is drawing one's attention to a specific pen. As long as their experience is consistent (they always experience the same color when viewing certain wavelengths of light), then they will know which pen I am referring to.

This is no different than language in that as long as each user of language is consistent in the way they use certain words, we can understand what they say. Colors, shapes, sounds, feelings, smells, etc. are all words in a (private) language that you translate into your native language of scribbles and sounds that others know the rules for deciphering.

When viewing the words on this page, does it matter what color others see the letters as, or does it only matter that they see the same scribbles and use the same rules for deciphering the meaning of the scribbles? People that do not speak English will see scribbles on this page. English speakers see words.

I agree with your post overall, but I think that, despite perhaps both still private, colour and shape are not in the same category. I explained why in this post https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/923995

Most of metaphysics is word play. — Banno

I recognize that I'm not going to sway your opinion because it's fully committed to the Wittgensteinian model, but there is perhaps value in pointing out the source of our ongoing disagreement to the extent there's confusion in that regard.

If our focus is only upon words (which is your model), then it follows their meaning must be deciphered from shared use as opposed to the ontologicial constitution of the object because to explore the meaning of an object absent language would violate your foundational principle.

That it to say, to you, the beleagured beetle is not what anchors the word "beetle" to mean beetle, but it is our shared understanding of the use of the term, as opposed to the mystery that lies within our box. An entire system has therefore been created to avoid figuring out what the beetle actually is through language alone. Since you won't break character and you insist upon responding consistent with your language-centric position, we just go in circles arguing within our preferred systems speaking (ironically) from unshared positions.

Hopefully this post will at least point out the competing systems and let the casual reader pick his poison.

You may believe my approach is a form of incoherentism, referencing that which can't be described, but I see yours as a form of avoidism and denialism, refusing to delve into the real question as to what the beetle is and refusing to admit to simple scientific truths about how perception imposes upon reality. The best you can say is that the beetle is something, but since we can't speak of it, we avoid discussing it, and we deny it can be anything but the very beetle we talk about.

This leads to a difficult direct realism that is attenuated by mental gymnastics where we don't actually say the beetle is exactly as it appears, but we instead say the beetle isn't anything other than what the lot of us agree that it is, but, at the same time, that is actually what it is. The term "actually" even causes problems for you because it offers the suggestion there is something other than what the beetle is versus what we agree the beetle is. "Actual" is outmoded Kantian talk according to this model.

The avoidism becomes most apparent in your discussions with @Michael where he begins to offer an explanation of the beetle, as in its color is not a part of it, and that results in your refusal to speak of the beetle as an object versus it being a word. That, I think, forms the substance of his repeated complaint that you can't distinguish between a noun (a thing) and an adjective (a subjective descriptor).

Maybe this summarizes this well, maybe not, but it's a try. I do think the fact that you can't admit to the simple fact that color is imposed on an external object and is a subjective interpretation is a serious difficulty with your position. My position suffers from possibly falling into idealism, or at least an irrelevant form of realism, which too is a problem. Mine at least (I'd argue) has a certain fidelity to truth where it's willing to admit we may get no where in finally explaining things because of limits imposed by the noumena, but yours (I'd argue) is conconcted. Clever, complicated, obscure at many points, but concocted.

Why is it useful to report what you see? — Harry Hindu

So that the other person can be informed, more of less, of what I see.

In reporting what you see, you seem to know there are other people with other minds that can perceive what you do, in the way that you do, or else what is the point of reporting what you see? Why use language at all? — Harry Hindu

It's true that I assume the listener understands me, but I don't think he fully understands me. This thread is evidence of that.

You seem to be trying to build an argument with these questions, so I'll keep answering you, but maybe move closer to the point because it's not apparent to me.

It may be the other person doesn't see what I see or know what I know. My expectation is that much of what I do experience I do not fully convey in words and that much of what the listener hears isn't accurate of what I meant. Maybe we have shared experience, maybe not. I'd find it hard to believe that two people would fully share an experience down to the last emotion or perception.

It's true that I assume the listener understands me, but I don't think he fully understands me. This thread is evidence of that.

You seem to be trying to build an argument with these questions, so I'll keep answering you, but maybe move closer to the point because it's not apparent to me.

It may be the other person doesn't see what I see or know what I know. My expectation is that much of what I do experience I do not fully convey in words and that much of what the listener hears isn't accurate of what I meant. Maybe we have shared experience, maybe not. I'd find it hard to believe that two people would fully share an experience down to the last emotion or perception. — Hanover

You sure are making a lot of knowledge statements about what you know about others' experiences for someone that says

The noumena isn't known. — Hanover

Why is it hard to believe that two people wouldn't fully share an experience down the the last emotion or perception if you don't have some knowledge about other people? Does it have to do with how others are shaped and behave in different ways than you? But then there are many similar ways that others are shaped and behave similar to you, too. So, wouldn't it be more likely that while they may not fully share an experience they do share some experiences, and those reasons for those similarities and differences can be pointed out as similarities and differences in our physiology and prior experiences? It doesn't seem as complex as some people here are making it out to be.

If that was true, then you could make the blind see by merely stimulating parts of their brains.
— jkop

We're working on it. — Michael

It means that the colour ain't in the head. That's why you need to add a prothesis, so that the brain can begin to develop neural connections corresponding to the information recieved from the the prothesis whose sensors are exposed to light reflected from pigments etc.

Given that the prothesis translates the information in the right way, the visual system is reconstructed, and the blind may experience colours. But it's improbable that an artificial prosthesis can do what nature does at the level of cells, neurons, synapses interacting with photons or on a quantum level even.

What you'll get is not a duplication of colour vision, but a replacement of it, like echolocation, morse code etc. But then it's no longer colour-vision, or ia meaningless use of the term (as Putnam proved way back in 1976 in his famous brain-in-a-vat-argument).

It seems to me that colors take certain shapes which is why it might be difficult to see a red pen on a red table and why camouflage works and is a useful survival trait.

It means that the colour ain't in the head. — jkop

No it doesn't. That colour experiences require neural connections ordinarily formed in response to electrical information from the eyes does not entail that colours are mind-independent properties of light or a material surface that reflects such light.

No it doesn't. That colour experiences require the appropriate neurological activity, which requires neural connections ordinarily formed in response to electrical information from the eyes, does not entail that colours are mind-independent properties of light or a material surface that reflects such light. — Michael

What's so special about neurological activity that causes color? How does a colorless process cause color? How do we know that a robot with cameras for eyes connected to a computer brain that can distinguish between different wavelengths of light isn't experiencing different colors as those distinctions in its working memory? How do we know that any object isn't experiencing color (panpsychism)? What's so special about organisms when they are just another kind of physical object?

What's so special about neurological activity that causes color? — Harry Hindu

What's so special about neurological activity that causes pain? This is the hard problem of consciousness that is yet to be solved.

In other words, it isn't known whether color experiences require the appropriate neurological activity..., In other words it is possible that colors ain't just in the head.

In other words, it isn't known whether color experiences require the appropriate neurological activity..., In other words it is possible that colors ain't just in the head. — Harry Hindu

So in other words it isn't known whether pain requires the appropriate neurological activity, and so it is possible that pain just ain't in the head?

Maybe pain really is some mind-independent property of the knife that my body can sense when I'm stabbed with it.

I agree that metaphysics/philosophy isn't a word game. In using language we are informing others of some state of the world which can include mental states, but not necessarily. Our perceptions inform us of what is there whether it be a pen or the scribble, "pen". I wonder does Banno think he is playing a word game when discussing religion or politics?

So in other words it isn't known whether pain requires the appropriate neurological activity, and so it is possible that pain just ain't in the head? — Michael

What is pain?

Isn't pain information in that it informs you of some injury in/on your body? Can a robot be informed of damage to its body? If so, does it experience pain?

What is pain? — Harry Hindu

A percept that occurs when there is the appropriate neurological activity, often in response to electrical signals sent from nociceptors.

See for example Role of the Prefrontal Cortex in Pain Processing:

The main brain areas that are most consistently activated under painful conditions are the insular cortex and secondary somatosensory cortex, bilaterally. Electrical stimulation of these areas, but not in other candidate brain areas, is able to elicit a painful sensation.

So, wouldn't it be more likely that while they may not fully share an experience they do share some experiences, and those reasons for those similarities and differences can be pointed out as similarities and differences in our physiology and prior experiences? — Harry Hindu

I don't think any amount of talking will convey to you the first person experience I have of anything. It will always be a rough estimate. Experiences are not just personal, they are highly contextualized and nuanced. What it feels like to visit a grave, for example, will include thousands of memories, pain, happiness, and maybe even the heat from the sun and pebble in your shoe. A report of an experience is an experience of a report, not a coveyance of an experience.

But it seems to me that you can describe to me where your loved one is buried so that I may find it and pay my respects without knowing any of that other stuff you spoke about, and would actually be irrelevant to that goal anyway. It seems that it's difficult to translate mental states, but not so difficult to translate other states of the world that we share. How can we be so good at describing "external" states when all we have to go by is our "internal" states which you seem to think is so difficult to translate? How can I make it to your loved one's grave with a high chance of success (much more than random) when you are describing your internal states of what it is like being in that location and what it was like to get there yourself?

A percept that occurs when there is the appropriate neurological activity, often in response to electrical signals sent from nociceptors.

See for example Role of the Prefrontal Cortex in Pain Processing:

The main brain areas that are most consistently activated under painful conditions are the insular cortex and secondary somatosensory cortex, bilaterally. Electrical stimulation of these areas, but not in other candidate brain areas, is able to elicit a painful sensation. — Michael

This doesn't answer my question. It just bumps against the hard problem again and we are back where we started.

What is a percept?

You have given a visual model of the brain and its processes, yet have explained that colors and shapes are only in our head. If our visual experience is that inaccurate in that we are seeing things that are not there, then how can we trust the visual explanations scientists and neurologists provide us. When a neurologist says "the mind (color) is an illusion", they are pulling the rug out from under their own visual models and explanations.

How does a colorless process create color?

Do you never try to convey how you feel to others? If you do then you must have some degree of certainty that they will at least partially understand what you are saying because they can experience the same feelings but in different but similar contexts (they have lost a love one too, just not your loved one).

It just bumps against the hard problem again — Harry Hindu

Because you keep asking the hard question. We don't have an answer to it.

All I am explaining is what the science shows; that pain and colour are percepts that occur when there is the appropriate brain activity; they are not mind-independent properties of knives and pens.

How does a colorless process create color? — Harry Hindu

How does a painless process create pain?

Any time you ask me a question like this about colour, just ask the same question about pain. Colour is just like pain, whatever pain is.

It means that the colour ain't in the head.
— jkop

No it doesn't. — Michael

It does, and it's open to view. The prosthesis is at best a functional replacement, not a duplication of colour vision.

We see what is open to view, but only the seeing is inside the head. Some of the things we see are complex, context-dependent, dispositional, emergent etc.

Some of the things we see are complex, context-dependent, dispositional, emergent etc. — jkop

And some of those things, like colour and pain, aren't.

So colour experiences change when the neural activity in V4 and VO1 changes.

I was speaking of color qua color, not color experiences, whatever those are. I don’t doubt that you experience the changes in pigment, but it seems to me the changes in pigment are the result of the changes in the object, not some other mind-dependent property. We can test this by mixing paints. It results in a change in color of the paint. At no point am I altering a mind-dependent property to achieve the results.

I was speaking of color qua color, not color experiences — NOS4A2

Colour qua colour is the experience; colour isn't light, isn't how atoms reflect light, and isn't some third mind-independent thing that is neither light nor how atoms reflect light.

I don’t doubt that you experience the changes in pigment, but it seems to me the changes in pigment are the result of the changes in the object, not some other mind-dependent property. We can test this by mixing paints. It results in a change in color of the paint. — NOS4A2

Mixing paint changes which wavelengths of light it reflects. The wavelength of the light that stimulates the eyes is what determines which neurons are activated and so which kind of colour experience occurs.

At the moment your reasoning is akin to arguing that because it hurts when I put my hand in boiling water but doesn't when I mix in near-freezing water then pain must be a mind-independent property of boiling water that is then removed by the addition of near-freezing water.

Colour qua colour is the experience; colour isn't light, isn't atoms reflecting light, and isn't some third mind-independent thing that is neither light nor atoms reflecting light.

It’s not clear what we’re experiencing when we use that sort of language, though, leaving unexplained the question of what color is. It’s impossible for me to understand what experiencing an experience is and what that entails. On the other hand, I do know that I am experiencing mind-independent objects, such as the paint, the light, and its surrounding environment.

The adjective “red” can only describe a red thing, and it is that thing that absorbs certain wavelengths, and reflect others. There is no reason for me to apply that adjective to any other objects, especially mind-dependent ones.

It’s not clear what we’re experiencing when we use that sort of language, though, leaving unexplained the question of what color is. It’s impossible for me to understand what experiencing an experience is and what that entails. — NOS4A2

Do you understand what pain is? What smells and tastes are? Vision isn't special.

The adjective “red” can only describe a red thing, and it is that thing that absorbs certain wavelengths, and reflect others. There is no reason for me to apply that adjective to any other objects, especially mind-dependent ones. — NOS4A2

I'm not concerned with the adjective "red". I'm concerned with the noun "red". I've been over this with Banno and others.

You can talk about pens as being coloured, just as you can talk about stubbing one's toe as being painful. But colours and pain are not mind-independent properties of pens or stubbing one's toe; they are the mental percepts (which may be reducible to brain states) that pens and stubbing one's toe cause to occur.

Besides, I can dream about red dragons. The adjective "red" is not being applied to some mind-independent dragon that reflects 700nm light.

But if I were to give a general account of the meaning of "the X is red" or "red X" it would be something like "the X looks red" or "red-looking X". The noun "red" in the phrases "looks red" and "red-looking" does not refer to a mind-independent property.

You sure are making a lot of knowledge statements about what you know about others' experiences for someone that says
The noumena isn't known. — Harry Hindu

I know that others don't know what I feel when I tell them about it because I don't know what they feel when they tell me about it. I could question the person for hours and still have more questions.

The noumena doesn't refer to subjective experience. It refers to the object. That is, the pen is noumenal. The experience of the pen is phenomenal. The fact that I can't fully know another person's subjective experience isn't because it's noumenal, but it's because I simply can't experience it like I can a first person experience.

How can I make it to your loved one's grave with a high chance of success (much more than random) when you are describing your internal states of what it is like being in that location and what it was like to get there yourself? — Harry Hindu

I've not argued that communication is worthless. I've only said that it can't be used to precisely convey my mental state. Whatever is expressed will be significantly limited in content.

Kant described transcdenntal apperception, which is the ability to form a single conscious state from the millions of elementary inputs. That is, as I sit here right now, I have a single conscious state. I could itemize various aspects, like what I see, how I feel, what I'm thinking about, etc., but the entirety of that mental state is singular. It is what I am experiencing in total right now. That cannot be conveyed.

That I might be able to convey to you the directions to the park doesn't suggest that I am able to convey to you my mental state. In fact, the directions I might articulate to you that will get you to the park is not how I conceive of getting to the park. I don't have a silent train of words going through my mind thinking about where I turn and where I go. I just know how to get there, and If you asked me for directions, I would think of the roads and the buildings along the way and then after the fact put that in to words so you'd know where to go. I can't transmit my mind's eye of me visualizing internally how to drive there.

We're way too in love with the notion that we must think in words. That's either a fabrication created by philosophers or I'm super strange in my thought processes. I think it's the former.

Do you never try to convey how you feel to others? If you do then you must have some degree of certainty that they will at least partially understand what you are saying because they can experience the same feelings but in different but similar contexts (they have lost a love one too, just not your loved one). — Harry Hindu

Heavy emphasis of "partially." Words aren't useless. They are massively important to communicate with one another. Words are an interpretation of mental states into symbols. The mental states stay behind and the symbols do the best they can to project one's thoughts to another. Much is lost in translation.

Relevant:

The various languages placed side by side show that with words it is never a question of truth, never a question of adequate expression; otherwise, there would not be so many languages. The "thing in itself" (which is precisely what the pure truth, apart from any of its consequences, would be) is likewise something quite incomprehensible to the creator of language and something not in the least worth striving for. This creator only designates the relations of things to men, and for expressing these relations he lays hold of the boldest metaphors. To begin with, a nerve stimulus is transferred into an image: first metaphor. The image, in turn, is imitated in a sound: second metaphor. And each time there is a complete overleaping of one sphere, right into the middle of an entirely new and different one. One can imagine a man who is totally deaf and has never had a sensation of sound and music. Perhaps such a person will gaze with astonishment at Chladni's sound figures; perhaps he will discover their causes in the vibrations of the string and will now swear that he must know what men mean by "sound". — Friedrich Nietzsche – On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense