That's all that is needed to defeat this point. — schopenhauer1

I have seen discussions where I've leant toward this not being the case. I.e not being sufficient to support the position entirely. The non-identity problem does get its day, essentially. But I think it can be defeated, regardless. I would have to revisit those discussions (i believe one was on an Antinatalist podcast with a very irking woman presenting, tbh, but Benatar as guest) to get to it, though, so feel free to disregard that.

I think its not entirely wrong to require that a lack of harm is pursuant to an individual. But, if its true for *insert any considered future person* then it is true for every other considered future person. These are, to the degree it matters here, individuals in consideration. So, you can take an individual who does not exist, yet is on the other side of the Yes/No choice being made (determinists shhh) - it's clearly wrong to create something which will primarily suffer.

But this actually gives us an even clearer formulation - "Inducing suffering is wrong".

Explain what kind of "restrictions" you are talking about here. — I like sushi

(to be clear, I personally don't really think these restrictions are apt responses to the AN position, but other ethical considerations to be discussed elsewhere). One possible route would be licensing for parentage. Another would be restrictions on how many children can be part of any given (defined) genetic circle.

Anyone with a more thorough understanding in favour of enforcing such ideas by law are extreme radicals and should probably be treated with contempt by everyone else (they will be by me for sure). — I like sushi

I'm unsure contempt would be my response, as opposed to incredulity.

All of your points have to do with individuals already living, and so are irrelevant.

I think its not entirely wrong to require that a lack of harm is pursuant to an individual. But, if its true for *insert any considered future person* then it is true for every other considered future person. These are, to the degree it matters here, individuals in consideration. So, you can take an individual who does not exist, yet is on the other side of the Yes/No choice being made (determinists shhh) - it's clearly wrong to create something which will primarily suffer. — AmadeusD

I feel my post you quoted from sufficiently goes over reasons why the non-identity issue is a red herring. It's an abuse of language to reason that future conditionals are not in moral considerations. Also I gave some restatements of the Benatarian asymmetry that can change it to "states of affairs" language. The state of affairs of suffering can obtain (BAD), or it does not (good or at least NOT BAD). Obviously select the NOT BAD over BAD.

You have entirely missed that your arguments support action, while what I'm outlining supports the position.
I do not feel you post does what you've described. It's possible you missed that your arguments support action, while what I'm outlining supports the position. Maybe?

You have entirely missed that your arguments support action, while what I'm outlining supports the position.
I do not feel you post does what you've described. It's possible you missed that your arguments support action, while what I'm outlining supports the position. Maybe? — AmadeusD

I really don't know what you're getting at here about action and position in regards to the non-identity issue.

One possible route would be licensing for parentage. — AmadeusD

I have mentioned this before. That is not exactly something I would favour but it falls far away from the kind of of extreme I was talking about - an essential ban on procreation - which is not really what AN is about.

It's possible you missed that your arguments support action, while what I'm outlining supports the position. Maybe? — AmadeusD

I have a feeling this is parallel to something I have tried to mention before on the subject of AN.

Often what is ethical is used synonymously with what is moral. With AN we are really talking about a 'moral' view (individual conscience) whereas as an 'ethical' view (general rule for society) it is something quite different.

The lack of common distinction with these terms causes discussions about AN to become fractious. This is why you see so many people believing that others are condoning the extinction of the human species - they see the 'ethical' stance as saying this is better for society (the destruction of society is better for society).

I have a feeling this is parallel to something I have tried to mention before on the subject of AN.

Often what is ethical is used synonymously with what is moral. With AN we are really talking about a 'moral' view (individual conscience) whereas as an 'ethical' view (general rule for society) it is something quite different.

The lack of common distinction with these terms causes discussions about AN to become fractious. This is why you see so many people believing that others are condoning the extinction of the human species - they see the 'ethical' stance as saying this is better for society (the destruction of society is better for society). — I like sushi

How did you derive this from position and action? Am I not understanding the common usage of those words?

morals as personal position and ethics as suggested action.

I am not saying I understood what they said just that it made me think of this. Whether they can apply it or not we will see.

which is not really what AN is about. — I like sushi

Agreed.

This is why you see so many people believing that others are condoning the extinction of the human species - they see the 'ethical' stance as saying this is better for society (the destruction of society is better for society). — I like sushi

ANs do believe in the extinction of society being the ethically correct outcome of hte near-middle future. But, not by genocide. Not it's better 'for society'. It 'is better'. Full stop.

This is as regards the Asymmetry. The asymmetry supports acting to prevent more people. Not the position that more people is an unethical course of action. One pre, one proscriptive.

This is as regards the Asymmetry. The asymmetry supports acting to prevent more people. Not the position that more people is an unethical course of action. One pre, one proscriptive. — AmadeusD

I'd give a slight rebuttal to this that it depends if you are a utilitarian or a deontologist about it. A utilitarian would say that it is about the outcome of suffering that needs to be prevented (negative utilitarianism), the deontologist would say it is the principle of not causing harm.

Yes, that's entirely fair.

ANs do believe in the extinction of society being the ethically correct outcome of hte near-middle future. But, not by genocide. Not it's better 'for society'. It 'is better'. Full stop. — AmadeusD

No they do not. Only if they proclaim AN as an 'ethical' paradigm that must be followed by others. When it comes to believing that it should be followed the same would not apply if should is framed as a suggestion rather than am order based on irrefutable reasoning.

You are a believer in AN? If so I am curious what your views are. I know already know well enough what Schopenhauer believes what about you? Even if you are one of those I said I would have 'contempt' for I would still like to try and understand why you think what you think :)

As one, I can say confidently this is not the case. It is a clear entailment of AN thinking that the eventual non-existence of humans is preferable and an ethically correct outcome. They do believe people should not procreate. This is as prescriptive as one can be conceptually speaking.

My views are odd - because I am conceptually in line with AN entirely (including the above prescriptive thinking and hte delineation between living and potential persons) but I don't take anything seriously enough to think this is a view I could enforce. And nor would I want to. I have better things to do. Thsi is an intellectual position that I do believe in, but as with all of my positions, I think they apply to me. I can simply think one has their reasoning wrong without impugning htem intellectually.

Hell, I have two kids. That doesn't mean I don't feel guilt every moment of my life for that.

So in light of what I said you are framing yourself as 'moral' not 'ethical' in regards to AN? I say this because of the following:

My views are odd - because I am conceptually in line with AN entirely (including the above prescriptive thinking and hte delineation between living and potential persons) but I don't take anything seriously enough to think this is a view I could enforce. And nor would I want to. I have better things to do. Thsi is an intellectual position that I do believe in, but as with all of my positions, I think they apply to me. I can simply think one has their reasoning wrong without impugning htem intellectually. — AmadeusD

This is directly in line with what I outlined as 'moral' and almost entirely opposed to the 'ethical'. Do you agree that what you say here aligns with what I stated as being a 'moral' stance rather than what I stated as an 'ethical' stance? If not why? (Note: I used these terms fairly loosely so there is wiggle room).

This is directly in line with what I outlined as 'moral' and almost entirely opposed to the 'ethical'. Do you agree that what you say here aligns with what I stated as being a 'moral' stance rather than what I stated as an 'ethical' stance? If not why? (Note: I used these terms fairly loosely so there is wiggle room). — I like sushi

As an aside, based on @AmadeusD's position, he doesn't want to do the following:
1) Impose antinatalism
2) Impugn others who don't believe in the rightness of antinatalism

Number 1 is simply a given being that antinatalism is properly an ethic and not a political policy. One can make it into one perhaps, but then that is antinatalist policy, not antinatalist ethics, which for all intents and purposes is what people generally refer to when they say "antinatalism". Generally antinatalists do not advocate imposing/forcing others to follow antinatalism. This is similar to veganism.

Number 2 seems a non-sequitur or self-refuting. Simply don't debate it on a philosophy forum then if you don't want to "impugn" others' stances. If he meant that in public life he doesn't do this, that is one thing. Most antinatalists don't usually go around advocating for it, though there are some that do this. It is not incumbent to be a missionary for antinatalism. However, being on a philosophy forum, and defending the position, would in a minor way be "impugning" those who are objecting, if one engages with it. So I am not sure if this is sort of tu quoque fallacy Amadeus is unintentionally making on himself by even arguing anything related to AN, given 2.

This is directly in line with what I outlined as 'moral' and almost entirely opposed to the 'ethical'. — I like sushi

Not quite, no. I do think it would be better if people were ANs to the point that I believe people should not have children. This is proscriptive, and is an ethical position.
Perhaps I need to be clearer: I have ethical positions I never intend to enforce on others. If you look at all the arguments and conclude "Not good enough", fine, but I'll think you're wrong and would try to persuade you otherwise. I do not have to commit myself to arguing with everyone who has kids to hold an ethical position such as AN. Practically speaking, what is the point in that? Just Stop Oil are a joke for a reason.

Impose antinatalism — schopenhauer1

Wrong. Enforce. I would impose the reasoning on anyone who would listen. Enforcement is a step too far to my mind.

) Impugn others who don't believe in the rightness of antinatalism — schopenhauer1

Impugn "intellectually". Very different to impugning their ethics in my view. I think other people should not have children. Would I purposefully insinuate this to people? No. I'd prefer to suffer in silence on this issue unless asked. I wouldn't assert someone's mind was wrong (in terms of some kind of retardation(in the strict sense)) for not agreeing with my ethical position. Please keep in mind, though, I am an emotivist to the degree that i have an actual Ethical view.
I don't believe my ethical framework can be enforced. It should should be followed by me. No, this is not morality, but it is a bit of a get-out-of-jail card because it basically is a meta-ethical theory that asserts there is no objective morality. Moral theories in general don't make any sense in this light.

umber 2 seems a non-sequitur or self-refuting. — schopenhauer1

Not at all. Possibly the exact way you worded it, it would be, but not once you've read the above paragraph.

However, being on a philosophy forum, and defending the position, would in a minor way be "impugning" those who are objecting — schopenhauer1

Not intellectually. I think you are morally deficient if you're intent on having children, though.

If you look at all the arguments and conclude "Not good enough", fine, but I'll think you're wrong and would try to persuade you otherwise. — AmadeusD

You do this actively or only when questioned about your AN beliefs?

I do think it can be quite problematic to argue about moral positions unless you adhere to some kind of moral realism. I am assuming you are a moral realist? If not how does this fit into your views on AN?

Thanks

Impugn "intellectually". Very different to impugning their ethics in my view. I think other people should not have children. Would I purposefully insinuate this to people? No. I'd prefer to suffer in silence on this issue unless asked. I wouldn't assert someone's mind was wrong (in terms of some kind of retardation(in the strict sense)) for not agreeing with my ethical position. Please keep in mind, though, I am an emotivist to the degree that i have an actual Ethical view.
I don't believe my ethical framework can be enforced. It should should be followed by me. No, this is not morality, but it is a bit of a get-out-of-jail card because it basically is a meta-ethical theory that asserts there is no objective morality. Moral theories in general don't make any sense in this light. — AmadeusD

A sideline to this: it seems to me that most antinatalist arguments apply to animals as well (possibly even more strongly, given the amount of suffering).

If you're unwilling to enforce your framework or even really convince people, what about animals? Would you spay/neuter as many animals as possible, given the chance? Perhaps avoid their procreation in other ways?

Largely, the suffering the AN refers to is a result of hte higher consciousness of humans. Though, some ANs absolutely go as far as to insist we should look at reducing wild populations of most animals. I think that's a bit of an 'unofficial' position some take though. It's not one for me for two reasons:

1. My current understanding of (most) animal psychology is either not good enough to assume, or leads me to believe that hte relevant animals do not 'suffer' the way humans do, but experience an aversion; and
2. I don't think we will ever have a very clear understanding of the above issue outside of some higher animals and fish.

If I could clearly understand 1. above to indicate that animals, on the whole, suffer the same way humans do, I would probably assent to your point.

You do this actively or only when questioned about your AN beliefs? — I like sushi

Not always directly on-point to AN stuff, but whereever it seems applicable to the discussion (several versions of a vague 'ethical' discussion would do this and hten, yes) and whenever I'm specifically prodded on the issue.

I am assuming you are a moral realist? If not how does this fit into your views on AN? — I like sushi

I am a pretty staunch moral antirealist (hence noting I am an Emotivist, to the degree that I will commit to an existing label). I don't think this has any affect or effect on my AN positions beyond noting that they are 'my' ethical beliefs. My meta-ethical position doesn't really give me any room to pretend i'm the arbiter of truth, no matter how sure I am that I have the 'right' idea.

Allow me to sum up your position then, generally.

You deem 'suffering' as 'bad' (or rather "Boo!") knowing it is your subjective emotions talking.

How then can you state, in any serious way, that something is 'right' or 'wrong'. The whole point of AN is to state that natalism is wrong. But you seem to be saying "it is 'wrong' (boo!) for me" not that it is out and out wrong (Boo!) for everyone or that there is anything dictating what is objectively viewed as 'right; or 'wrong' other than commonality of emotional expressions.

It is interesting how this, in part, appears similar to moral naturalism rather than moral scepticism.

Following this lien of questioning I find myself framing you as what I previously expressed as harbouring a 'Moral' stance of AN rather than an 'Ethical' stance of AN. I made this particular distinction in an essay I wrote on AN to highlight the flaw in some who make claims to both 'Moral' and 'Ethical' stances on AN as to do so is to hold contradictory positions.

Anyway, thanks for your replies. I think we could argue back and forth a bit more but it may be mostly a semantic issue given that emotivism is hard to articulate (a serious flaw of emotivism).

You deem 'suffering' as 'bad' (or rather "Boo!") knowing it is your subjective emotions talking. — I like sushi

It's hard to commit to a formulation of this part, but I think this is a bullet to bite, in terms of its vagueness. Yes.

How then can you state, in any serious way, that something is 'right' or 'wrong' — I like sushi

I don't see a problem. I'm an Emotivist. That's what 'right' and 'wrong' mean.

But you seem to be saying "it is 'wrong' (boo!) for me" not that it is out and out wrong (Boo!) for everyone or that there is anything dictating what is objectively viewed as 'right; or 'wrong' other than commonality of emotional expressions. — I like sushi

A lot here.
It is wrong for anyone(currently, anyhow) as far as I am concerned. Enforcement of that policy can only apply to me based on my ethical views.
(my view is that..)There is nothing that could even begin to dictate what is objectively right or wrong (in the meta-ethical sense of the term "objective"). Those words don't have objective bases.
The basis is necessarily one's emotional disposition (maybe predisposition? This could in a very weird and unsatisfying way open the door to a more-objective ethic) as there is nothing else which could inform us.
The commonality of emotional expression is probably hte best way (:optimal) to work toward policy. I don't take this to indicate anything truly ethical. But it does indicate the overall moral vibe of a society/culture.

It is interesting how this, in part, appears similar to moral naturalism rather than moral scepticism. — I like sushi

Could you expand? My understanding of Moral Naturalism is that it more or less indicates that morals are evolutionarily-required aspects of human development, which I don't agree with.

...what I previously expressed as harbouring a 'Moral' stance of AN rather than an 'Ethical' stance of AN...I think we could argue back and forth a bit more but it may be mostly a semantic issue given that emotivism is hard to articulate (a serious flaw of emotivism). — I like sushi

Hmm. Pretty hard disagree. I think in these exchanges I have navigated through that suggestion pretty well. The fact that I don't think I should be forcing other people to adopt my view doesn't make it less ethically-driven. Not doing much about it is a dispositional fact of my mind or, to be a bit more sanguine, a practical necessity to not hating my life and hte world I live in.

I disagree that Emotivism is either hard to articulate, or flawed in any meaningful way (beyond causing discomfort, that is - but that's baked into the position so LOL). But that would make sense if it's my position, so just noting this for thoroughness.

I think it is hard to articulate - hence the problem of vagueness. It is something some people struggle to fully grasp. Emotivism that is!

The fact that I don't think I should be forcing other people to adopt my view doesn't make it less ethically-driven. — AmadeusD

In common parse, yes. In the framing I made for 'Moral' and 'Ethical' I am satisfied with how you have responded. If you had said some other things then I would have pulled you up about them. This is because AN only makes rational sense if it is either 'Moral' OR 'Ethical' in the way I framed those terms.

Could you expand? My understanding of Moral Naturalism is that it more or less indicates that morals are evolutionarily-required aspects of human development, which I don't agree with. — AmadeusD

It just seemed that you were framing emotional dispositions as the grounding for moral choices rather than there being no moral choices. I made the leap from biological necessity to emotional dispositions. That is clearly not what you meant though.

What is Right For You (Emotivism) is not deemed Objectively Right. Ergo, your claim is Subjectively Led not Objectively Led - for emphasis this is what I meant in my distinction between Moral (Right for Your Perspective) and Ethical (The Right Objective Implementation).

It just seemed that you were framing emotional dispositions as the grounding for moral choices rather than there being no moral choices. — I like sushi

Oh, okay, I see what you mean. That might be a language issue - Emotional dispositions are the only possible grounding for moral choices. But that lives within the vagueries of "moral decision" so probably cannot be adequately defined (in either direction).

Moral (Right for Your Perspective) and Ethical (The Right Objective Implementation). — I like sushi

But this misses that Emotivism is a meta-ethical position. It says that human Ethics are dispositional. That framing Ethics as something objective, under which we must argue for our chosen source (God, Ayn Rand, deontology, utilitarian calc etc...) is wrong ethically. Ethics inform morals - so this ethical position means that all moral choices are in response to one's emotional state which is in turn in response to a moral proposition. You can't have a meta-moral system to explain this, because that's just ethics. And the "ethics" is that it is right to ascribe moral positions to their underlying emotional states. I'm unsure more needs to be said here, but feel free to pick it apart.

For what it's worth, I think people are ethically wrong to enforce their ethical position if their position entails an objective moral outcome. Strange, I know.

It was from a meta-ethical standpoint I said this. That is why I reframed 'Moral' and 'Ethical'. Anyway, I think we mostly understand each other here even if we disagree about AN :)

Thank you

fair enough! I like that :) Thank you mate.

I thought this was a thoughtful, respectful, conversation with two more-or-less differing views on antinatalism. It's weird to listen to a debate without the vitriol you generally see on forums like this.

Just my thoughts on the above video language discussion on the word "better". The question was basically, "Who is it "better" for not to exist, if "they" don't exist to be better?". My response to that would be that it is simply from the perspective of someone already existing. I've had that conversation on here many times before. If there are no humans in the world, or ethical agents at the least, there is no need for ethics. As long as there is at least one person who has a "perspective" for lack of better terms, they can still fathom what better means from their actions. As long as an ethical perspective is around at all, then "better" exists, and thus ethics come into play such as, "This state of affairs will be better". That's how I would have answered that part of the debate.

I think, for me, it's a bit simpler: Not needing ethics would be a goal in this context. No human seems to be the only possible way for that to obtain. Therefore, antinatalism leads to the ultimate ethical goal of never needing ethics.

Therefore, antinatalism leads to the ultimate ethical goal of never needing ethics. — AmadeusD

Which is another way AN harms itself as a reasonable ethical system.

If the goal of ethics is to eliminate ethics, we could just ignore any pangs of morality now instead. Like ignoring pangs of procreation when trying to be an ethical AN.

If It’s all pang manipulation, why base the manipulations on any ethics, let alone an ethics that seeks to undo its application anywhere?

Sure, pain and suffering suck and sex feels good and so does a cheeseburger when you are hungry, but using scales of ethics and motality to help decide one’s way forward for sake of eliminating ethics is a bit like using math to show how numbers can’t exist (or in this case shouldn’t exist).

Which is another way AN harms itself as a reasonable ethical system. — Fire Ologist

I'll try to sort out your comments below, but I do not see how that, in any way, harms itself. If the ethical goal is to no longer require ethical systems (because the world is perfectly ethical) then it is precisely, as an ethical system, that AN succeeds (obviously if you disagree with it then success is subjective, but I hope you get the sense in which I mean this).

If the goal of ethics is to eliminate ethics — Fire Ologist

I'm unsure this is the right description of the goal, but onward..

we could just ignore any pangs of morality now instead — Fire Ologist

I'm not sure what you're getting at, but this seems to violate the former idea: If we're ignoring moral pangs (though, I couldn't give a shit what your moral pangs are. Show me the results of your behaviour) then ethics would say this is unethical, in some sense. You are not attended to ethics in this case. The case I'm, at least superficially, putting forward as a goal of AN would be that there are no ethics to attend. I think there is a clear distinction, myself, because you're right - the conception you've described here is inapt, and probably self-defeating.

using scales of ethics and motality to help decide one’s way forward for sake of eliminating ethics is a bit like using math to show how numbers can’t exist (or in this case shouldn’t exist). — Fire Ologist

I do not see this at all, unfortunately. They are not the same thing, or comparable. To be fair, morality would likely only pertain to the acts of hte living. Ethics are to do with the effect of those acts so there can be a difference between the two 'scales' being considered, I think - though, I ahve written this on the fly while editing a settlement statement so go easy LOL

because the world is perfectly ethical) — AmadeusD

Don’t you mean because the world is perfectly non-ethical?

the ultimate ethical goal of never needing ethics — AmadeusD