As for Lommel, again, you never posted any of his evidence or argumentation. For all I know, he's a quack. I'm not going to take time out of my day to read an entire book, as I'm not arguing for consciousness existing outside of the body. If he has good arguments, post them — Philosophim

Non-Local Consciousness, Pim Van Lommel. It's a kind of summary of his research. He notes this anecdote from a nurse:

'During night shift an ambulance brings in a 44-year old cyanotic, comatose man into the coronary care unit. He was found in coma about 30 minutes before in a meadow. When we go to intubate the patient, he turns out to have dentures in his mouth. I remove these upper dentures and put them onto the ‘crash cart.’ After about an hour and a half the patient has sufficient heart rhythm and blood pressure, but he is still ventilated and intubated, and he is still comatose. He is transferred to the intensive care unit to continue the necessary artificial respiration. Only after more than a week do I meet again with the patient, who is by now back on the cardiac ward. The moment he sees me he says: ‘O, that nurse knows where my dentures are.’ I am very, very surprised. Then the patient elucidates: ‘You were there when I was brought into hospital and you took my dentures out of my mouth and put them onto that cart, it had all these bottles on it and there was this sliding drawer underneath, and there you put my teeth.’ I was especially amazed because I remembered this happening while the man was in deep coma and in the process of CPR. It appeared that the man had seen himself lying in bed, that he had perceived from above how nurses and doctors had been busy with the CPR. He was also able to describe correctly and in detail the small room in which he had been resuscitated as well as the appearance of those present like myself.'

Although it is clear that replication of this kind of event in controlled laboratory conditions might be challenging, but they are often reported in the literature. (The paper discusses attempts to corroborate this kind of evidence by placing objects in proximity of ICUs where such procedures are carried out, but with no conclusive results.)

He has an entry on Wikipedia also.

And I've long argued that if an individual life is understood as part of a continuum extending before physical birth that has consequences beyond physical death, that this can provide a framework within which the life beyond is at least conceivable.
— Wayfarer

Okay, so make the case – a sound argument – for this alleged "continuum" ... Once the facts of the matter are established, then we can interpret their philosophical ramifications (and, maybe, derive cogent, metaphysical conclusions). :chin: — 180 Proof

No doubt, @Wayfarer, you accidently missed this request.

I posted a sketch of a non-materialist metaphysic a few posts above. As I’ve noted, I think Stevenson’s research on children who claim to remember previous lives and the corroborating information is noteworthy but I understand from previous conversations that you reject it.

Obviously, he's an authority on what he does know - which is physics after the free miracle — AmadeusD

What’s the ‘free miracle’?

Further Implications of NDEs

The obvious implication of my argument is that there’s intelligence (consciousness or mind) behind the universe which naturally leads to the question, “Is there evidence of intelligence design in the universe?” The answer, for me at least, is an unequivocal yes, i.e., intelligent design is everywhere. However, even if there’s intelligent design in the universe that in itself doesn’t mean there is an afterlife, nor does it mean there’s a God as many religious people envision; it just means that there’s evidence of intelligent design and that there is a designer/s. The intelligent design argument that I’ll be presenting does not claim there’s a God or an afterlife. Intelligent design makes no religious claim, and since it doesn’t make religious claims, any rebuttal that it’s a God of the gap’s argument is a narrative that doesn’t have teeth. Many religious people use the design argument to support their ideas of God or creation, but those arguments are added to the intelligent design argument.

If one is going to use the design argument to support a broader conclusion, then one needs a separate argument that extends the conclusion of the teleological argument. I don’t believe any of the religious arguments work to support their religious ideas of God. I’m not saying there isn’t a God, I’m just saying that their arguments don’t work, including various forms of the cosmological, ontological, and moral arguments, and many of them are fallacious or based on some conceptual definition or framework.

One aspect of all this that is separate from the actual arguments (separate from the logic) is that all of us are influenced by our psychology or our cultural experiences. When presenting any argument, one has to be aware of one’s biases or proclivities to move toward a particular conclusion, which is why I started this thread. So, the question for all of us is whether the arguments presented here or in other threads have more to do with psychological predispositions or the actual arguments themselves. Balancing this can be very difficult, but it’s a question that must always be present, especially if our goal is truth. If our goal is to win an argument at all costs because we don’t like a particular conclusion, then we are not doing good philosophy. All of us fall short of this, some more than others, but there is a certain humility that should accompany all arguments. That’s my sermon for the day.

The obvious implication of my argument is that there’s intelligence (consciousness or mind) behind the universe ... — Sam26

Parsimony be damned, the principle of explosion (& effect of other "obvious" fallacies) always ... works in mysterious ways. :pray:

If our [my] goal is to win an argument at all costs because we don’t like a particular [valid, scary] conclusion, then we are [I'm] not doing good philosophy ... especially if our [the] goal is truth.

Confession is good for the soul, they say; don't you feel better now, Sam? :smirk:

What’s the ‘free miracle’? — Wayfarer

Where i put that, I just mean to indicate that we don't know (which ironically, is Carroll's view, elsewhere) and 'miracle' is a placeholder for whatever the answer is...could think here of the breathe-in-breathe-out view of the big bang, but we don't know whether or not that's the case. It would solve the 'miracle' is my point. Anything that answers the question is the 'miracle' until it's found. — AmadeusD

Post 1

First, some background information.

The first part of the argument for intelligent design will be the one presented by Dr. Byron I. Bitar (philosopher) in his book Classical Christian Wisdom, pp. 99-114, 1993). And while I’m not a Christian I do think the argument presents good reasons/evidence for its conclusion, i.e., there is very strong evidence for the conclusion that the universe was intelligently designed. This argument adds to the strength of my metaphysical position.

“Teleological arguments, like cosmological arguments, begin from a feature of the cosmos or nature. In that sense, they are a kind of cosmological argument. In fact, Aquinas’ fifth cosmological argument is a teleological argument.

“The particular teleological argument we are going to examine in detail is set forth by William Paley [1743-1805] in his book Natural Theology written in the 18th century. The feature of nature he begins his argument with is this: a structure or architecture such that the whole individual can accomplish or be used to accomplish activities of a higher order than any part alone. In other words, the individual can perform or be used to perform actions that achieve purposes, goals, or forms of life that are higher than the action of a part alone. William Paley was obviously not the first to use a feature indicating purpose to prove the existence of God. Plato, Aristotle, and, of course, Aquinas did too. However, Paley is justifiably famous for his version (pp. 96-97).”

“[William Paley] spent nine years at Cambridge. Although Cambridge was fairly corrupt at the time and many professors looked upon their position, in which they sometimes had no prior training, as a sinecure, Paley took his appointment seriously. He served as an assistant to his former college tutor, Anthony Shepard, and lectured on metaphysics, moral philosophy, the Greek Testament, and divinity. He became known as one of Cambridge’s finest professors (p. 97).”

I’m not going to give Paley’s argument from his book Natural Theology, but I am going to give Dr. Bitar’s assessment of the argument. Later I will add to the argument with more evidence of intelligent design from recent research and thinking.

“It is worth noting that the publication of Paley's Natural Theology, which expounds, defends, and illustrates the argument from design, occurred after the publication of the two works that have been most influential in questioning the value of the argument. The first was David Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion published in 1779, three years after Hume's death. The second was Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason published in 1781. Both were published prior to any of Paley's works.

“1779 Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
1781 Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason
1785 Paley's first work: Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy
1802 Paley's last work: Natural Theology

“Nevertheless, it was Paley's argument in Natural Theology which triumphed in England for over a hundred years after its publication (pp. 98-99).”

It must be pointed out that Paley’s argument is inductive. In other words, it is not like other ontological or cosmological arguments that try to infer the conclusion with absolute necessity. “Paley's argument is a specific kind of inductive argument, called an "argument by analogy." An argument by analogy uses a likeness or analogy between two objects or groups of objects to infer the existence of a further likeness. For instance, if I owned four shirts made for L. L. Bean and all wore well, I could infer by analogy that a fifth shirt from L. L. Bean would also wear well.

“Premise: I own four shirts made for L. L. Bean and all have wore well.
Premise: This fifth shirt is made for L. L. Bean.
Conclusion: This fifth shirt made for L. L. Bean will also wear well.

“The likeness used to begin the argument is being made for L. L. Bean; all five shirts share it. The further likeness considered is wearing well; the first four shirts have it. Because of the likeness or analogy among all the shirts, namely all made for L.L. Bean, the property of wearing well is ascribed to the fifth shirt as well.

“[T]he argument has a very narrow, conservative immediate conclusion. It directly tries to show that it is rational to believe in one or more intelligent designers of natural objects. It does not directly try to show the universe was created out of nothing by the intelligent designer(s), nor that there is only one intelligent designer, nor that the designer(s) is a purely mental being with no body, nor that the designer(s) is perfectly good, nor that the designer(s) is the same as the individual(s) who executed the design in making the universe, and so forth. It only tries to show that there is one or more intelligent designers (pp. 100-101).”

In the next post I’ll continue with numbered premises and the conclusion, including an analysis of the strength of the argument.

I don’t believe I did that, nor did I wish to imply it. — Wayfarer

If I note you made a clear appeal to authority, ask you to give some actual examples because its an innocent enough mistake to make, then you double down and tell me you won't because you think I already know how I'll respond, then you're implying it. Even one example could have been enough to demonstrate you were taking the conversation seriously. Wayfarer, I keep telling you I'm a lot more open to your ideas then you'll allow in your own head. Give people a chance, especially if they're willing to engage with you.

Currently the hypothesis, "Our consciousness does not survive death," has been confirmed in applicable tests. You'll need to show me actual tests that passed peer review, and can be repeated that show our consciousness exists beyond death. To my mind, there are none, but I am open to read if you cite one.
— Philosophim

Where the obvious difficulty is that of obtaining an objective validation of a subjective state of being and which only occurs in extreme conditions. — Wayfarer

True, and I don't discount this. Again, I've gone over this in my conversation with Sam. I've mentioned how NDEs can be seemingly reproduced at a less intense level through drug stimulation and situations of oxygen deprivation. I do not have an issue with pointing out weaknesses in things I've addressed with Sam, but you aren't referencing those and just assuming things. Again, a simple enough mistake to make, but when I've tried to correct you to go read, you keep making false assumptions about where the conversation has gone, indicating you still haven't done that. If you don't want to, that's fine, but stop making accusations or criticisms from ignorance.

Myself, I don't really see how the claim that there can be a state beyond physical death is ever going to be scientifically validated, although I believe there are research programs underway to do that. — Wayfarer

There are. Here's a modern article which mentions a few groups that are attempting to study NDE's as the least.

https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/lifting-the-veil-on-near-death-experiences/

One example of a test that has not borne fruit yet is putting distinct objects out of sight of the patient and if they have a OBE, seeing if they can say they saw it while floating above their body.

It's easy to dismiss Stevenson as a crank or charlatan but he did amass a considerable amount of data which I happen to think is a more empirically reliable source of data than NDE testimonies. — Wayfarer

Again, I would have taken this more seriously if you had given some examples and not a simple book reference.

I also laid out a sketch of an alternative metaphysic, within which the idea of continuity from life-to-life might be considered plausible, to which you didn't respond. — Wayfarer

This was not addressed to me, but AmadeusD. But if you think it relevant, I'll give my thoughts.

But I think the soul could be better conceived in terms of a field that acts as an organising principle - analogous to the physical and magnetic fields that were discovered during the 19th century, that were found to be fundamental in the behaviour of particles. — Wayfarer

This isn't a bad idea, but we have to be careful in understanding what a field is. The best analogy I can give is calculating the waves of the ocean vs measuring the particles of water involved. A wave is a mathematical way of looking at particle behavior in large groups. You've probably heard that light can be both a wave and a particle. Light doesn't change, its our mathematical calculations of viewing light as waves vs particles that hold sound in testing.

Meaning that if the soul were a wave, or some type of large conscious energy force, there would be something measurable. Considering that logically the soul would have to interact with the brain, this also means that the soul must be able to impact physical reality, and vice versa. Thus in repeated viewings of death, we should be able to detect something.

You'll note in the article I link this is a common thing they find.

"In 2023 Borjigin and her colleagues published what they suspect could be a signature of NDEs in the dying brain. The researchers analyzed EEG data from four comatose patients before and after their ventilators were removed. As their brains became deprived of oxygen, two of the dying patients exhibited a paradoxical surge of gamma activity, a type of high-frequency brain wave linked to the formation of memory and the integration of information.

Borjigin had seen the same upwelling of activity in previous studies of the brains of healthy rats during induced cardiac arrest. In the rodents, the surge occurred across the entire brain. In humans, though, it was confined primarily to the junction of the brain’s temporal, parietal and occipital lobes, a region involved in multiple features of consciousness, including visual, auditory and motion processing. Past research has also associated the region with out-of-body sensations, as well as with altruism and empathy. Although these are all regular components of NDEs, Borjigin says, it’s impossible to know whether the two patients actually experienced an NDE because they did not live to tell about it. But “I could almost guess what they might have experienced,” she says."

Things like these are exciting because they're repeatable finds. It still doesn't explain why some have it and others don't, but at least there's something measurable. Whether it will be something that the brain simply does on its own, or whether there is some energy or force we can trace leaving the brain remains to be seen.

As the morphic field is capable of storing and transmitting remembered information, then 'the soul' could be conceived in such terms. The morphic field does, at the very least, provide an explanatory metaphor for such persistence. — Wayfarer

I have often thought the memories and their preservation could be captured somehow. Generally though memory is stored as a medium, and it needs a translator to process it into an experience. Even a simple computer is a good example of the broad concept. To make this idea actionable, we would need to find this medium, find evidence of it interacting with the brain, and then attempt to repeat it and see what happens. So this is still in the speculative fiction category, but possibly the Jules Verne kind.

Then he identified from journals, birth-and-death records, and witness accounts, the deceased person the child supposedly remembered, and attempted to validate the facts from those sources that matched the child’s memory. — Wayfarer

Ah, I see, this is what you were talking about. I took some time to review a bit of Stevens. Its interesting material. Stevens himself never attempted to use his claims to prove that reincarnation was real, but that was what he leaned on the most. Honestly, a guy like him is a pioneer who I have a lot of respect for. The question is whether his methodology was sound, and whether a repeat in the study would result in similar conclusions. Science is not one study, but repeated attempts to poke, prod, and explore. Its a bit telling there doesn't seem to be much follow up research or attempts to build upon his work from the 1970s. There are several interested parties in wanting reincarnation to be real, and I'm sure enough money could be found to explore that interest. So a neat start, but can't be considered more seriously without further research.

Carroll goes on in his essay to say that 'Everything we know about quantum field theory (QFT) says that there aren’t any sensible answers to these questions (about the persistence of consciousness)'. However, that springs from his starting assumption that 'the soul' must be something physical, which, again, arises from the presumption that everything is physical, or reducible to physics. — Wayfarer

From my point we can replace the word physics with, "Measureable". And as I noted earlier, logically, if there is some other type of substance that interacts with the human body, it must be detectable in some way. It would be part of reality, and measurable. So its a neat idea to keep exploring, but until such a measurable thing is discovered, we can't conclude its more than a hypothesis.

My argument against Sam26 is that he believes the strongest inductive idea we can present is that consciousness survives death. That's plainly false. Its fun to think about, explore, and experiment with. But as of today, it is an incredibly weak argument in the face of the conclusions which have lead to us understanding that consciousness does not survive death. Its a difference between theory and fact. Theory is a lot of fun. Exploring possibilities is necessary for the human race to further itself. But expressing theories as facts, or more viability then they currently do, is wrong. Just as outright dismissing theories that contradict the norm as possible things we should explore. Both are instances of a misapplication of the human spirit and mind for discovery about the world.

Wayfarer, I keep telling you I'm a lot more open to your ideas then you'll allow in your own head. Give people a chance, especially if they're willing to engage with you. — Philosophim

Fair enough, point taken, I will keep that in mind in future. Apologies if I was dismissive.

Stevenson was widely scorned for his research, as the whole idea of reincarnation is anathema to both regular science and Christian culture (where it was essentially declared heretical in the fourth century.) I’ve brought him up a few times on the forum but it provokes a lot of pushback. I think there’s a tendency to be either repelled by the idea or to be fascinated by it. Stevenson’s cases are not at all of famous historical figures. The remembered previous lives were generally those of very ordinary people, who often lost their lives in tragic circumstances. That’s one of the aspects of his research that lends plausibility.

Stevenson was associated with the Division of Perceptual Studies at the University of Virginia, the activities of which are mainly concerned with parapsychology and other paranormal phenomena. He has a successor there, Jim Tucker, but he’s not so well known (or notorious!) as was Stevenson.

From my point we can replace the word physics with, "Measureable". And as I noted earlier, logically, if there is some other type of substance that interacts with the human body, it must be detectable in some way. It would be part of reality, and measurable. — Philosophim

The word ‘substance’ can be misleading in this context. As a technical term in philosophy it means something very different to the usual meaning, which is ‘a material with uniform properties’. In philosophy, the word derives from ‘substantia’, which was the Latin word used to translate the Greek ‘ouisia’ from Aristotle. ‘Ousia’ is nearer in meaning to ‘being’, and ‘substantia’ is supposed to mean ‘that which stands under’. So in some ways, the meaning is nearer to ‘subject’ than ‘substance’ in the normal sense. But I think it’s misleading to believe that ‘substance’ in this context can be taken to mean something objectively measurable or perceptible - although that is obviously suggested by Descartes ‘mind-body’ dualism. I think it’s a major legacy issue from early modern philosophy.

I have often thought the memories and their preservation could be captured somehow. Generally though memory is stored as a medium, and it needs a translator to process it into an experience. — Philosophim

Animals often seem to remember things, like homing pigeons or Atlantic salmon that find their way back to their home stream from across the ocean. We put it down to ‘instinct’ as if that explains it, or assign it to their ability to somehow read magnetic fields. But what if there are biological fields? This is where Rupert Sheldrake comes in. And he’s another maverick, many dismiss him as a quack - when his first book was published, the then-editor of Nature said it ought to be burned (‘for exactly the same reason that Galileos’ books were banned - they were heresy!’) But anyway, he has a theory of morphic resonance, that ‘nature forms habits’, and that these are expressed in both organic and inorganic forms (i.e. through crystal formation.) Sheldrake has published quite a few papers on it, but again they’re frustratingly inconclusive. I’m afraid it always seems to be that way in respect of paranormal studies, (in fact I wonder if that is actually a ‘feature not a bug’. His research findings can be reviewed at sheldrake.org.)

But then, as we’re talking about reincarnation, it is a fringe issue, so maybe fringe theories are apposite. In any case, I don’t find the idea that ‘nature forms habits’ to be startlingly outlandish - the difficulty seems to be, in what medium are such memories preserved? I won’t venture an answer, but I don’t think it’s a ridiculous question. Although maybe the underlying idea behind both topics is the sense that the universe is more ‘mind-like’ than ‘machine-like’ in its operations.

What conditions are required for the reincarnation of Elvis Presley?

In my pragmatic view, a good Karaoke singer who does a reasonable impersonation of Elvis on stage, can be said to be of roughly the same "type" as Elvis, at least until the end of the impersonation.

I don't consider the questions of reincarnation to run deeper than that, because identity criteria are inexorably vague, conflicting and decided by convention or psychological prejudices. So why should it be assumed that the question of reincarnation has a definite and absolute answer that transcends our conventions?

That’s all well and good if your criteria of reincarnation is as slack as a good impression of that person or just imitation. Personhood has a more strict definition of what a person is as it covers what that person has experienced in life their memories made, habits personality traits and just general character. The issue boils down to personal identity and what it means to be you.

If I understand Sam26 correctly he’s saying that consciousness not personal identity continues after death. So Elvis could be reborn as a simple farmer if the theory is correct and there’d be no evidence that he was Elvis in his previous life despite an almost identical singing ability, assuming of course that consciousness does survive death and since we don’t understand consciousness very well I remain open minded that it can potentially continue after the brain is extinguished of its electrical activity as to how well I have no idea but if consciousness is emergent than that is not to say that there are other mediums capable of continuing consciousness apart from just brains.

That’s all well and good if your criteria of reincarnation is as slack as a good impression of that person or just imitation. Personhood has a more strict definition of what a person is as it covers what that person has experienced in life their memories made, habits personality traits and just general character. The issue boils down to personal identity and what it means to be you. — kindred

I'm arguing that even a supposedly strict definition of personhood is slack. Slackness is an inexorable feature of identity criteria; any application of identity criteria to any problem of philosophy leads to superficial and incomplete conclusions that are products of linguistic convention. At best, one's conclusions are circular and merely reiterate the identity criteria that one employed.

why should it be assumed that the question of reincarnation has a definite and absolute answer that transcends our conventions? — sime

As I mentioned to Philosophim, the point about the children with past-life recall is that there is at least the possibility of validating their statements against documentary and witness accounts, something which is obviously not possible with near-death experiences, as they are first-person by definition.

Ian Stevenson, who conducted that research, never claimed that his research proved that reincarnation occurred, although he did say the evidence suggests it. He concentrated on the methods for screening possible cases and validating the resulting records.

As I mentioned to Philosophim, the point about the children with past-life recall is that there is at least the possibility of validating their statements against documentary and witness accounts, something which is obviously not possible with near-death experiences, as they are first-person by definition. — Wayfarer

Our memories are mutable. We continually create, delete and edit our memories in real time, including the memories that we interpret as being veridical. In general we don't interpret amnesia as constituting proof of personal absence during the past. So why should the possession of a veridical memory be interpreted as constituting proof of having witnessed the past? When it comes to conceptions of personal identity, why should ownership of memories be taken more seriously than ownership of a collection of disposable photographs?

The idea that studies of past life regression can verify or refute reincarnation, is in relation to a convention that defines personal identity in terms of memory possession, together with a block-universe conception of the past that memories are considered to refer to in a manner analogous to time travel. So I don't interpret studies of past life regression as drawing deeper metaphysical conclusions, regardless of whether such conclusions are positive or negative, than our pragmatic judgements of object identification.

You may not be familiar with the research. It wasn’t based on 'past-life regression'. The cases Stevenson sought out were those where children claimed to be someone other than who they were known to be e.g. would start saying 'your not my family' or 'this is not my home, I live in (some other place)' etc. Then the researchers would look for evidence of that claimed previous identity, trying to identify death notices, locations, and other details to corroborate the infant's story.

In Sri Lanka, a toddler one day overheard her mother mentioning the name of an obscure town (“Kataragama”) that the girl had never been to. The girl informed the mother that she drowned there when her “dumb” (mentally challenged) brother pushed her in the river, that she had a bald father named “Herath” who sold flowers in a market near the Buddhist stupa, that she lived in a house that had a glass window in the roof (a skylight), dogs in the backyard that were tied up and fed meat, that the house was next door to a big Hindu temple, outside of which people smashed coconuts on the ground.

Stevenson was able to confirm that there was, indeed, a flower vendor in Kataragama who ran a stall near the Buddhist stupa whose two-year-old daughter had drowned in the river while the girl played with her mentally challenged brother. The man lived in a house where the neighbors threw meat to dogs tied up in their backyard, and it was adjacent to the main temple where devotees practiced a religious ritual of smashing coconuts on the ground.

The little girl did get a few items wrong, however. For instance, the dead girl’s dad wasn’t bald (but her grandfather and uncle were) and his name wasn’t “Herath”—that was the name, rather, of the dead girl’s cousin.

Otherwise, 27 of the 30 idiosyncratic, verifiable statements she made panned out. The two families never met, nor did they have any friends, coworkers, or other acquaintances in common, so if you take it all at face value, the details couldn’t have been acquired in any obvious way. — Source

This case was one of around 2,700 gathered over several decades of research.

The following is a straightforward version of the teleological argument as outlined in Dr. Bitar’s book Classical Christian Wisdom (pp. 99-115). After I present Dr. Bitar’s version of Paley’s argument I will add to the strength of the premises with more remarks about the argument.

Before I present the argument, I want to point out a major flaw with counterarguments, viz., that most if not all challenges to this argument suffer from the fallacy of the self-sealing argument . In other words, they present their argument in such a way that nothing would count as counterevidence. The argument is sealed off from counterevidence because nothing would count as evidence of intelligent design. Dr. Bitar phrases it like this: “If their belief is not simply a prejudice held to apart from evidence, then they should be able to specify what additional evidence of design would have to be present in the universe that is not there now which would then warrant belief in a designer. In short, what features of design are missing? Dr. Bitar continues, “If they cannot specify what is lacking, then their belief is an irrational prejudice sealed off from evidence (pp. 106-107).” This is a glaring problem that isn’t stressed enough.

All of the following is a direct quote and starts with the premises and the conclusion.

(1) Human productions that have a structure such that the parts are so arranged that the whole can accomplish or be used to accomplish activities of a higher order than any part alone, as in the case of a watch, are the result of intelligent design.

(2) Objects of nature have a structure such that the parts are so arranged that the whole can accomplish or be used to accomplish activities of a higher order than any part alone, as in the case of a dog.

(3) Hence, the objects of nature are the result of intelligent design.


Analysis of the Strength of the Argument

We need to now analyze the strength of this argument. Since it is inductive and analogical,
we should examine the following:

(a) the number of items used as evidence

(b) the number of analogies (similarities) shared by the objects compared,
here human productions and objects of nature

c) the number of disanalogies (dissimilarities) between the objects compared,
here again human productions and objects of nature

(d) the variety of items used as evidence

(e) the relevance of the properties viewed as connected, here
(1) a structure or architecture so the whole can do activities of a higher order than any part alone, and
(2) intelligent design

(f) the scope of the conclusion

(g) the truth and cogency of the premises

(h) the cogency of the argument structure

(i) the psychological impact or compellingness of the argument

First, the number of items used as evidence. The items used as evidence are human productions and objects of nature; they are innumerable.

Second, the number of analogies (similarities) shared by human productions and objects of nature. Virtually all are complex consisting of many parts, some obviously more complex than others. Moreover, the parts fit with some degree of precision, as in the case of engine parts, on the one hand, and human bones and joints, on the other hand. Sometimes the precision of fit in nature is better than what humans can achieve, as in the case of joints.

Human productions and objects of nature both utilize physical laws. The eye and a microscope both utilize the laws of optics. The bones and muscles of the skeleton and the parts of a crane both utilize the laws of mechanics. And so forth.

eye - microscope, telescope, camera - use laws of optics
skeleton - crane, robot - use laws of mechanics
ear - megaphone, stereo - use laws of acoustics

Some are basically static, such as a house and a rock. Some are active, such as a tree and a watch or a battery.

Human productions and objects of nature can be so 'similar that one is used to replace the other, as in the case of an artificial valve or heart. It takes careful study of the structure of the natural object to produce the artificial entity; this obviously shows their similarity. They can also be so similar that it is not clear whether they are one or the other. For instance, genetically engineered ecoli and mice, are they human productions or objects of nature? Without human study, planning, and action, they would not exist. Yet they are alive, living beings, not your typical human artifacts. They are both human productions for which patents are sought and objects of nature that are alive; this again shows the similarity of the two kinds of beings.

Third, number of disanalogies (dissimilarities). I do not know of any disanalogies between all human productions, on the one hand, and all objects of nature, on the other. Some objects of nature are alive, but not all are. Some have mental life, but not all. Similarly, some human productions are also alive, as in the case of genetically engineered plants and animals. Also, some have mental life, as in the case of genetically engineered animals.


Fourth, variety of the items used as evidence, namely, human productions. There is tremendous variety among human productions ranging from dams and skyscrapers, to watches, pens, batteries, and cars, to artificial limbs, valves, and hearts, and to genetically engineered ecoli.

Fifth, relevance. The issue here is the relevance of the feature or structure in question, namely the parts are so arranged that the whole can perform higher functions than any part alone, to the activity of design. Does design cause such structure? 'The relevance, of course, is perfect, for what is the activity of design but the arrangement of parts so the whole can perform a higher function than any part alone?

Sixth,scope of the conclusion. The conclusion is the narrowest and most conservative possible, namely, that there is one or more designers of natural objects.

(1) Human productions that have a structure such that the parts are so arranged that the whole can accomplish or be used to accomplish activities of a higher order than any part alone, as in the case of a watch, are the result of intelligent design.

(2) Objects of nature have a structure such that the parts are so arranged that the whole can accomplish or be used to accomplish activities of a higher order than any part alone, as in the case of a dog.

(3) Hence, the objects of nature are the result of intelligent design.

Seventh, truth and cogency of the premises, i.e., knowledge of the truth of the premises. I believe every normal adult human, including the agnostic and atheist, knows the premises are true.

Eighth, cogency of the argument structure. Can the argument be followed? The argument is very simple and easy to follow.

Ninth, psychological impact or compellingness of the argument. My experience is that most find it compelling; only committed agnostics and atheists do not, and they are few and far between. They know the premises are true, but refuse to draw the conclusion. We will deal with why they do not find the argument compelling later.

What is the result of our analysis? Given the criteria of strength for analogical arguments, the teleological argument is a very strong argument. In fact, it is hard to think of a stronger analogical argument. I believe the analogy between human productions and natural objects is one of the reasons that the vast majority of humans believe in a divine designer(s), whether that analogy is formulated as an argument or not. Since the analogy and the argument are so strong, the upshot is straightforward and striking: it is rational to believe the universe is the product of intelligent design, and, concomitantly, it is irrational not to believe the universe is the product of intelligent design.

We need to be clear on a crucial point here. It is this: rationality of belief is not determined by what can possibly happen; rather, it is determined by what probably has or will happen. In other words, it is determined by what the evidence indicates is most likely the case. For instance, it is possible to jump out of an airplane in flight far above the ground, not open one's parachute, fall to the earth, land in soft soil, and live to tell about it. That possibility does not make it rational to believe it will happen in your case; it does not make it rational to jump and purposely not open your parachute. Assuming you are not aiming at your death, it is irrational to believe and act in such a manner because probably you will not survive. Similarly, it is not rational to believe that the universe originated by chance without design just because it is thought to be possible that it did so. The issue is not what is possible, but what is probable; in other words, what one has reason to believe is the case. The evidence obviously points to divine design. And it is so overwhelming that almost nothing can eradicate belief in design, even years and years of atheist indoctrination and religious persecution.

I think this is a good conversation between Dr. Tour and Dr. Cronin about some of the complexity involved in creating life naturalistically. I'm not posting this video because it supports my position, I'm posting it to show where we are in terms of a naturalistic explanation. Once the video gets past some of the misunderstandings, I think it makes good points. I like what Dr. Lee is doing, although I disagree with his optimism. Obviously, there is a lot more going on in other fields that will give more information, but I think this is a good start.

I do think this is worth listening to because I think many people think that we have the answers, and we don't.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DHvNRK452c

The teleological argument for God is by far the best of the core 3, but it suffers from a crippling counter point.

Essentially, you are saying people and the world are too complex to simply have formed. But have you applied that same criticism to a God? Once you do, the argument falls apart. God is at least as complex as a human being, so therefore the same argument would apply to a God. Something would have to create a God. But then, something would have to create that as well! The only logical conclusion is that the origin point of causality must have existed without prior cause. That origin could be a God, but it could also be a universe without a God. I have post on it here if you want to look into it.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12098/a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary/p1

God is at least as complex as a human being, so therefore the same argument would apply to a God. — Philosophim

But is He? Richard Dawkins also says that, but it founders on the rock of divine simplicity.

There's a lot of philosophical background to this argument which presumably Dawkins is not familiar with. Dawkins' is based on the human- and science-centred view, which is that 'what is more intelligent is more complex', as humans are more intelligent than animals and have more complex brains.

Dawkins says in The God Delusion that God must be more complex than the entire universe. But this is a highly anthropomorphic conception of God, as kind of super-manufacturer, which is completely at variance with classical theism. And indeed, Dawkins is often taken to task by even non-theistically-inclined reviewers for his ignorance of the basics of theology (the assumption seems to be that as he regards it as a meaningless subject, there's no need to actually understand any of it.)

According to the doctrine of divine simplicity, God is simple, not complex, and not composed of parts.

God is necessary because he is simple and not because he exists in all metaphysically possible worlds. And while one may say that the simple God is or exists, God is not an existent among existents or a being among beings, but Being (esse) itself in its prime instance and in this respect is different from every other being (ens). — SEP

Accordingly, 'the divine' is of a different order of being, and its author not at all a cosmic director or manufacturer with high degrees of complexity. It means something totally different to that.

I looked at your thread on 'first cause', but I don't think you're at all familiar with the classical description of 'first cause'. A forum thread is not the place to try and fill that void, and anyway, I lack the expertise to do it.

Suffice to say, the 'argument from the complexity of God' is way off base.

All that said, I'm surprised that @Sam26 has introduced the subject of intelligent design, as it's a thoroughly discredited notion as far as this forum is concerned, and hardly relevant to the topic of the OP, even more so as Sam regularly eschews any religious motivation for his entries.

Also contra "intelligent design" (i.e. creationism), consider the dysteleological argument:

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_poor_design

In sum: both the universe in general and organic life in particular appear defective, or suboptimal, just as it's most reasonable to expect it be according evident and explicable, nonintelligent processes of (e.g.) nucleogenesis and biological evolution (especially given that 99.99% of baryonic matter – the observable universe that has been expanding for at least 13.8 billion years from a planck radius of random (i.e. non-causal, ergo not "created / designed") fluctuations – is vacuum radiation inimical to organic/human life (in a universe evidently "fine-tuned" for lifelessness).

both the universe in general and organic life in particular appear defective, or suboptimal — 180 Proof

(Y) Very hard to answer this one without just claiming the opposite with empty words. Nice.

Consciousness surviving the body? If you are dualist, perhaps.

I don't see good evidence for consciousness absent a body, never mind consciousness being realized absent a brain.

If panpsychism is true, then maybe there is some very (but very) obscure way in which you could argue that something experiential remains as a fundamental aspect of the universe.

But this "consciousness" is so foreign and alien to what we understand when we use that word, that it is in effect, indistinguishable from the ordinary view that (human) consciousness vanishes.

Consciousness surviving the body? If you are dualist, perhaps. — Manuel

:up:

You may not be familiar with the research. It wasn’t based on 'past-life regression'. The cases Stevenson sought out were those where children claimed to be someone other than who they were known to be e.g. would start saying 'your not my family' or 'this is not my home, I live in (some other place)' etc. Then the researchers would look for evidence of that claimed previous identity, trying to identify death notices, locations, and other details to corroborate the infant's story. — Wayfarer

Yes, I wasn't questioning the veracity of anecdotes such as the one you mention, rather I'm pointing out that to interpret such cases as being "evidence for reincarnation" is relative to a convention that defines personal identity in terms of memories, by which the person is said to be reincarnated. Which is why I do not take such cases with special seriousness - not because I am assuming that such reported cases cannot be happen as described, but because I consider the identity of persons to be arbitrary and decided by convention, and ultimately grounded in either psychological habits and prejudice or in the utility of adopting the chosen identity criteria.

For example, lets assume that the account you mention is accurate and defies mundane natural explanations. Then unless one has defined personhood in terms of personal memories, one cannot conclude that the child is a reincarnation of the previous person he is said to remember. In which case all that one concludes is that the child presently has abnormal access to novel information of historical significance.

Certainly, the child-as-token is not a previous person - by definition of "token". Compare this situation to a caterpillar-token that is said to become a butterfly-token. In that case, we don't insist that the butterfly remembers his life as a caterpillar in order for us to identify the caterpillar with the butterfly, rather we identify their tokens as being parts of a greater token on the basis of temporal continuity. Whereas in the case of the child, there is no apparent spatio-temporal continuity for us to say that the child was the becoming of the previous person, and instead we bridge their lives via a notion of "memory continuity", in spite of the fact that we rarely if ever employ such criteria in our own lives when we ordinarily identify ourselves and our loved ones over time.

For example, lets assume that the account you mention is accurate and defies mundane natural explanations. Then unless one has defined personhood in terms of personal memories, one cannot conclude that the child is a reincarnation of the previous person he is said to remember. In which case all that one concludes is that the child presently has abnormal access to novel information of historical significance. — sime

From memory, Stevenson does consider ideas such as a kind of collective memory. It’s been a long time since I read anything but he canvasses those kinds of ideas. He was reticent in claiming that the cases he studied prove that reincarnation occurs, but at the same time, the copious evidence he gathered makes it seem a at least a possibility. But even that says something about the topic at hand, doesn’t it? That ‘consciousness’ as the ground or core of identity is more fluid than we might normally think?

Furthermore, as I’ve mentioned several times, it’s interesting that Buddhist cultures believe that rebirth is real, but they reject that ‘a person’ or ‘a soul’ is reborn. As is well known, Buddhism denies there is a permanent unchanging core or essence of a person, but they do agree that karma propagates life to life. I’ve found, discussing it with Buddhists, that despite the dogmatic prescription against the idea of a soul, they accept that there is a ‘gandhabba’. In the early Buddhist texts, a gandhabba may represent the subtle form a consciousness takes after death, before it is reborn into a new physical body. (Gandhabba can also be celestial spirits and minor deities.) This intermediate existence is sometimes called the antarabhava or “in-between state” in Mahayana and some Theravada interpretations. Just as in Christian folk beliefs, the gandhabba becomes associated with a foetus during the gestation period - naturally, to one that it is drawn to as a consequence of karma. So in effect, despite the ‘no-soul’ dogma, there is a functional equivalent to the soul, albeit described in terms of a mind-stream or process, rather than eternally existent entity.

In respect of the question of identity, Buddhists will respond, if you ask them, ‘are you the same person you were as a child?’ ‘No’. ‘Then are you a different person?’ Also, ‘no’. There is a continuity, but also change. I don’t think Buddhism has a difficulty with that. Overall, I find the Buddhist attitude congenial in these matters.

So I’m not really seeing your philosophical objection at this point.

↪Philosophim ↪Sam26 Also contra "intelligent design" (i.e. creationism), consider the dysteleological argument:

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_poor_design

In sum: both the universe in general and organic life in particular appear defective, or suboptimal, just as it's most reasonable to expect it be according evident and explicablee, nonintelligent processes of (e.g.) nucleogenesis and biological evolution (especially given that 99.99% of baryonic matter – the observable universe that has been expanding for at least 13.8 billion years from a planck radius of random (i.e. non-causal, ergo not "created / designed") fluctuations – is vacuum radiation inimical to organic/human life (in a universe evidently "fine-tuned" for lifelessness). — 180 Proof

This is another good point.

But is He? Richard Dawkins also says that, but it founders on the rock of divine simplicity. — Wayfarer

If you're going on the fact of an intelligent designer, we need a base line of what 'intelligent' means. Can a dog create anything more complex then a hole? No. A beaver can create dams. Monkeys can create primitive tools. So if we're going to state that there is an intelligent designer, at minimum, it would need to be at the level of a human. If it did not have intelligence, then it would be a mechanical process, but then it wouldn't really be a designer anymore either.

And if a human being, the height of known intelligence, is considered so complicated that it needs a designer, then God as an intelligent being which can design and create far more than a human can, would also need a designer. I think its a straight forward line of reasoning.

According to the doctrine of divine simplicity, God is simple, not complex, and not composed of parts.

God is necessary because he is simple and not because he exists in all metaphysically possible worlds. And while one may say that the simple God is or exists, God is not an existent among existents or a being among beings, but Being (esse) itself in its prime instance and in this respect is different from every other being (ens). — Wayfarer

This is nonsense. Being which is not being. Existence which is not existence. This is poetry masking as meaningfulness.

I looked at your thread on 'first cause', but I don't think you're at all familiar with the classical description of 'first cause'. A forum thread is not the place to try and fill that void, and anyway, I lack the expertise to do it. — Wayfarer

Feel free to post what you think it lacks on that thread so we don't detract here. You'll notice I give a definition of first cause, and build from there. If you disagree with the definition or find a problem with it, please give your opinion there, I'll address it.

If you're going on the fact of an intelligent designer, we need a base line of what 'intelligent' means. Can a dog create anything more complex then a hole? No. A beaver can create dams. Monkeys can create primitive tools. So if we're going to state that there is an intelligent designer, at minimum, it would need to be at the level of a human. If it did not have intelligence, then it would be a mechanical process, but then it wouldn't really be a designer anymore either. — Philosophim

None of which has any bearing on what ‘divine intelligence’ means. I’m not sticking up for the idea, but at least it should be framed in the terms of classical theism. You may think that the doctrine of divine simplicity is ‘nonsense’ but it is the orthodox view of the nature of God. So rather than dispute intelligent design on spurious philosophical grounds you’d be better off saying you just don’t believe in it.

None of which has any bearing on what ‘divine intelligence’ means. I’m not sticking up for the idea, but at least it should be framed in the terms of classical theism. — Wayfarer

What? No, I frame it in MY argument. If my argument is illogical, point it out. But you don't get to insist I use words, phrases, or OTHER people's arguments in my argument.

You may think that the doctrine of divine simplicity is ‘nonsense’ but it is the orthodox view of the nature of God. So rather than dispute intelligent design on spurious philosophical grounds you’d be better off saying you just don’t believe in it. — Wayfarer

Wayfarer, what do you think philosophy is? Every idea that has ever been thought of or put down in a book was thought about by 'just a another person'. There is no weight to the argument because of its history, who wrote it, or what book its in. Those things are starters, places to begin in discussion with the hopes that such writings and arguments have some worth. But past that, the only thing which matters in the argument is the logic of the idea. As someone who harshly questions physicalism, I would think you would understand that well.

I laid out a clear idea of intelligence, and why the teleological argument fails. If you wish to introduce some catholic ancient idea of divine intelligence, and how its different, feel free. But if its nonsense, its nonsense. It deserves no more consideration or respect, and I surely am not going to use such outdated and nonsensical framing in my arguments.