I already have. Why won't you answer my question? Why do you trust a Geiger counter to tell you the local level of radiation? It doesn't resemble radiation at all. — Michael

I missed it. Where did you answer why you trust your senses?

My use of the geiger counter starts with trusting my senses with regard to the existence of the device. I trust my senses when I observe a readout. I trust the sensory input I received during the time I studied physics so that I have a vague idea how a geiger counter works. I always have a little doubt about the proper functioning of electronic equipment which is mostly a result of experience, so I trust what the counter says if it makes sense, in other words, if it fits in with everything else that's going on. Is that what you're looking for?

we are using the word "colour" to refer to something in particular — Michael

How do you know this to be so?

Why do you think that there must be a something, which is the thing "colour" refers to?

Why shouldn't we use the same word to refer to multiple, different things... indeed this seems to be exactly how colour words are used. They refer to multiple things that are quite different.

But the question under consideration isn't "what are all the ways that we use colour terms in our everyday lives?". — Michael

If your theory does not explain the way we use the word "colour" then what grounds could there be for your claiming it to be about colour?

Why shouldn't we use the same word to refer to multiple, different things... indeed this seems to be exactly how colour words are used. They refer to multiple things that are quite different. — Banno

Is this to say you understand (if not accept) that Red the epxerience and Red the frequency range (if you insist on muddying hte water) aren't the same thing?

If so, the blatant confusion this is causing to erudite thinkers such as we'me (lmao) over something as simple as what Colour is should be reasno enough

I believe in the existence of a Geiger counter despite the fact that experiences might not resemble their cause for the same reason that you believe in the existence of radiation despite the fact that Geiger counters do not resemble radiation.

Your very supposition, that if experiences do not resemble their cause then experiences cannot be "trusted" is a non sequitur and barely coherent.

I believe in the existence of a Geiger counter despite the fact that experiences might not resemble their cause for the same reason that you believe in the existence of radiation despite the fact that Geiger counters do not resemble radiation. — Michael

Which was what?

, thanks for your reflections.

I'd ask you to note that the notion of the noumena is not my invention - I didn't put the beetle in the box. The odd things here is that you insist that the noumena is not something about which we can know anything and then proceed to tell us about it. I'm just drawing attention to the inherent inconsistency that involves.

So if my sin is not to delve in to something about which we can know nothing, so be it.

I do think the fact that you can't admit to the simple fact that color is imposed on an external object and is a subjective interpretation is a serious difficulty with your position. — Hanover

I've been at pains to deny most of this. The argument I have been making is that colour is not only "subjective", since there is considerable agreement as to the colour of the things around us.. Your not noticing and accounting for this is also "a serious difficulty with your position".

Colour is not a solipsistic subjective interpretation. That does not mean it is not an interpretation.

, , you are addressing something vastly different to what I have written.

If your theory does not explain the way we use the word "colour" then what grounds could there be for your claiming it to be about colour? — Banno

I addressed this with the example of the Morning Star, but perhaps you need a simpler example.

If you ask me if bats are blind, and if in context it's clear that you are asking about the flying mammal, then I don't need to talk about anything else that is referred to using the word "bat", e.g. the club used in baseball.

Why shouldn't we use the same word to refer to multiple, different things... indeed this seems to be exactly how colour words are used. They refer to multiple things that are quite different. — Banno

I also addressed this before. The question "is the colour red mind-independent?" is not the question "is anything referred to by the term 'colour red' mind-independent?". Perhaps you need to re-examine the distinction between use and mention.

The question "is the colour red mind-independent?" is using the singular compound noun "colour red" to refer to a single thing, and then asking if that thing is mind-independent. Unless they provide greater clarification, you need to make a reasoned assumption as to what that thing is. It's clear in context that the OP isn't asking if 700nm light is mind-independent, or if a micro-structural surface that reflects 700nm light is mind-independent, but is asking if that sui generis, simple, qualitative appearance named "red" is mind-independent.

In other words, it's clear in context that the OP is asking which (if either) of realist color primitivism and color eliminativism/subjectivism provides a correct account of colour appearances.

Your repetition of the name "Amadeus" in your reply reminded me of this song:

The question "is the colour red mind-independent" is using the singular compound noun "colour red" to refer to a single thing, — Michael

Well, no, it isn't. The colour red of a sunset is not the very same as the colour red of the sports car out on the street.

Or, if you must have it this way, the colour of the sports car is not the same as the colour of the sunset. And yet we use the same word for both.

A point made multiple times.

Further,

Does the color “red” exist outside of the subjective mind that conceptually designates the concept of “red?” — Mp202020

is not the vary same as

...is the colour red mind-independent? — Michael

"Mind independent" serves only to befuddle.

:wink:

You seem to be intentionally misrepresenting my position, so I'll try an even simpler approach.

The term "colour" is also used to refer to the way quarks and gluons interact through the strong force, but that use is irrelevant to the question asked by the OP, and to the philosophy of colour in general.

As a comparison, when we ask what the Morning Star is we are referring to a planet and are asking what it is (not knowing that we are referring to a planet and not a star). We don't respond to such a question by arguing that the term "Morning Star" is also used to refer to the archangel Lucifer. — Michael

"Morning star" is a definite description, functioning as a proper name. it picks out an individual.

Colour words are not proper names. They do not pick out some individual.

But, if someone were to mistakenly think of a colour word - say red - as a proper name, and hence to search for the individual named, they might well be obliged to invent a "mental percept" to stand in for the absent referent.

But they would then be stuck, because it is apparent that the mooted referent of "red" changes both over time and place, as well as from mind to mind.

If you work with a theory of language in which all words are nouns, difficulties will ensue.

The problem is even worse for those who think all things are signs.

The term "colour" is also used to refer to the way quarks and gluons interact through the strong force, but that use is irrelevant to the question asked by the OP, and to the philosophy of colour in general. — Michael

Yep. "colour" has different senses. But that is not what I am pointing out to you. I am pointing out that "red", in the sense of the colour word, does not refer to a single thing, but at the least to multiple different things.

I might think that "you seem to be intentionally misrepresenting my position", but rather I will assume that the point I am making is somewhat difficult for you to grasp because of the background assumptions you make.

Yep. "colour" has different senses. — Banno

And only the sense relevant to the question being asked is relevant, not any other sense. It is clear in context that the OP isn't asking if light or atoms reflecting light is mind-independent, and so any use of the word "colour" or "red" that refers to light or atoms reflecting light is irrelevant.

I am pointing out that "red", in the sense of the colour word, does nto refer to a single thing. — Banno

The single thing is a type, not a token.

And only the sense relevant to the question being asked is relevant, not any other sense. It is clear in context that the OP isn't asking if light or atoms reflecting light is mind-independent, and so any use of the word "colour" or "red" that refers to light or atoms reflecting light is irrelevant. — Michael

Oh, I quite agree. Odd that you think this worthy of mention. Seems to be the same misunderstanding as Amadeus.

I am pointing out that "red", in the sense of the colour word, does nto refer to a single thing.
— Banno

The single thing is a type, not a token. — Michael

All the more reason not to take an analogy with individuals ("morning star") seriously. But what I have said applies to type.

Oh, I quite agree. Odd that you think this worthy of mention. — Banno

You have previously said that colours are both appearances and something else. Except by this you just mean that the word "colours" can be used to refer to both appearances and something else.

But the use of the word "colours" to refer to this something else is of no relevance to the question asked by the OP. It is clear in context that he is asking about the appearance. And physics and the neuroscience of perception support colour eliminativism over naive colour realism with respect to this question.

What's the difference between seeing red and the mental percept that 620-750nm light ordinarily causes to occur?
— creativesoul

Nothing. — Michael

And what's the difference between hallucinating red and the mental percept that 620-750nm light ordinarily causes to occur?

Or between dreaming red and the mental percept that 620-750nm light ordinarily causes to occur?
— creativesoul

Nothing. — Michael

Well, there we have it. Straight from the horse's mouth, so to speak. On this view you're advocating for, you're clearly stating that there is no difference between seeing, hallucinating, and dreaming. Yet, there most certainly is. This is all very odd, considering that earlier you professed one of the reasons for holding that view was because it explained hallucinations, dreams, and seeing. What you call an explanation, I would call a confusion. There are differences between seeing red, hallucinating red, and dreaming red.

Reductio ad absurdum is adequate for rejecting the position you're arguing from/for. Equivocation is as well. Self-contradiction is also. I've neither the time, nor the inclination to show those again. You've sorely neglected to directly address those charges, in lieu of low hanging fruit.

You have previously said that colours are both appearances and something else. Except by this you just mean that the word "colours" can be used to refer to both appearances and something else. — Michael

I did? Where? I'd like the context.

Here's the OP:

Does the color “red” exist outside of the subjective mind that conceptually designates the concept of “red?” — Mp202020

No mention of "appearance" in that. Indeed the use of quotes indicates that attention be paid to the word "red", as opposed to... the appearance? I read it as asking something like 'does our use of the word "red" refer to something that exists outside the subjective mind that conceptually designates the concept referred to by the word "red"?' And I think from the discussions I've had with Mp202020 that they would readily agree this was not the best wording.

That is, it seems to me that the question is about the use of the word "red" rather than about the appearance of red.

@Michael wants there to be a something that is the same in his dreams and hallucinations as in his more lucid moments, in order to explain his use of the word "red" in all such cases.

In summary, @Michael, it seems that you think the word "red" must refer to a something, and in the absence of anything suitable in the world around us, you have resorted to claiming that it refers to a 'mental percept", borrowing the term from folk who use it to talk about what is seen by the subjects they put into MRI machines.

It's not that different to the folk who say that the word "red" refers to the concept "red", and think they have provided an explanation rather than just added a few words to the question.

Anyway, the answer is that you trust your senses because you don't have any choice. You're an obligate direct realist, at least in the way you behave. Where there's a conflict between the way you behave and the philosophy you espouse, blah blah blah.

Interesting to link this to the trouble @Michael had with keeping his promises. I'm not sure of your diagnosis, though.

If the biological machinery behaves in a certain way when one looks at a red pen, and yet also behaves the exact same way when there is no red pen, then we have a hallucination(malfunction).

If the biological machinery acts as though one is looking at a red pen, but it is doing so while one is sleeping, it's causing one to dream about a red pen. Again, there is no red pen.

Red pens are always included in seeing red pens, but they are never included in hallucinating or dreaming about them.

Sure, the biological machinery acts the same. That's not an issue.

Sure, the biological machinery acts the same. That's not an issue. — creativesoul

Only part of the machinery acts the same way - V4, apparently...

There's an old argument (from Davidson?) that is relevant here. Supose that we propose the theory that a certain firing in the part of the brain named V4 just is seeing red. We experiment on a thousand folk and in all cases we find the firing of V4 occurs just as they report seeing red.

But then we find subject 1001. When V4 fires in that way for them, they report seeing blue.

What are we to make of this? Will we be good scientists and acknowledge the theory falsified, because Subject 1001 reports that they see blue? Or are we going to say instead that Subject 1001 is mistaken?

I suppose it will depend on our funding.

you are addressing something vastly different to what I have written. — Banno

No, that doesn't seem to be hte case. It seems to be hte case that you're not really understanding what Michael and I have said in response to your position.

If you had just said "yes" in response to my question, it would have been clear. But given your response here, it remains to be seen whether you're even understanding the point.

"Red" does not exist outside the mind. This is true whether or not you take 'Red' to refer to "a" thing or "multiple" things. It isn't "out there", regardless.

In any case, I was trying to have you commit to a position on "Red" which is an apt thing to want you to do. If you position boils down to "Well, it doesn't matter - use it how you use it" then why are you here? If your position is that Red is something other than a mental experience of an "actual" thing then I would want to know what on God's Green Earth you could be referring to, given that Red is not mind-independent?

I did? Where? I'd like the context. — Banno

This is also what I got from you, so it's highly likely you misspoke if that's not your intention. Given I quoted you exactly saying colour words are used to refer to multiple things, this cannot be a failure of understanding or a confusion on our part. What do you refer to when saying "red"?

Well, there are certain groupings of nerves(specific parts of the nervous system) that do different stuff than others. If certain biological structures are always active while urinating, it does not make urinating equivalent to the structures.

That seems to apply equally to C4 fibres and pain as well as V4 and seeing red.

"Red" does not exist outside the mind. — AmadeusD

And yet there are red pens.

(note the obfuscation in "the mind", as if there were only one...)

If you position boils down to "Well, it doesn't matter - use it how you use it" then why are you here? — AmadeusD

To point out that red does not "exist" in "the" mind.

Honestly, AmadeusD, You do not seem to be on the same page at all.

Yep. There's a category error happening here.

Now the word "red" is no longer in books, on paper, spoken aloud for everyone to hear, or on our screens... it exists only in the mind.

Perfect.

Oh brother...

What are we to make of this? Will we be good scientists and acknowledge the theory falsified, because Subject 1001 reports that they see blue? Or are we going to say instead that Subject 1001 is mistaken? — Banno

You would investigate a biomechanical reason for this. If V4 firing causes X cascade in the brain(resulting in the 'Red' experience, that is to say) for all other subjects, then subject 1001 is an anomaly and we would be bad scientists for thinking they were mistaken as opposed to different. Is what we're calling V4 the same

And yet there are red pens. — Banno

This is bare assertion; the responses to it going ignored. Hand waved, if you will.

To point out that red does not "exist" in "the" mind. — Banno

Red doesn't 'exist'. It consists in an experience we've termed Red. That this is a purely mental phenomenon doesn't disappear because you've chosen slightly less rigid language.

That seems to apply equally to C4 fibres and pain as well as V4 and seeing red. — creativesoul

Yes. I cannot fathom how this, if taken as true, allows Banno to pretend Red is in the pen. It isn't even part of hte process that gets us to Red, in this context.

Now the word "red" is no longer in books, on paper, spoken aloud for everyone to hear, or on our screens... it exists only in the mind. — creativesoul

This seems to be the (honestly, stupid) mis-interpretation Banno is running with. Its a bizarre one, and not hte position being put forward.

Which was what? — frank

We know how things affect the world and so can know about a thing from its effect.

Perhaps a different analogy is more helpful. A blind man can know that he is eating an apple because he knows what apples taste like, but the taste of an apple does not resemble the apple or any of its properties. An apple’s taste is a phenomenological consequence of the apple’s chemicals interacting with the tongue’s sense receptors.

Sight isn’t special. Visual sensations (such as colour) need not resemble their cause.