I'm not complaining about criticism, but about the weird appeal to authority. You didn't actually say why my analogy was poor. — hypericin
In Chapter 3 of Part I - “The Mereological Fallacy in Neuroscience” - Bennett and Hacker set out a critical framework that is the pivot of the book. They argue that for some neuroscientists, the brain does all manner of things: it believes (Crick); interprets (Edelman); knows (Blakemore); poses questions to itself (Young); makes decisions (Damasio); contains symbols (Gregory) and represents information (Marr). Implicit in these assertions is a philosophical mistake, insofar as it unreasonably inflates the conception of the 'brain' by assigning to it powers and activities that are normally reserved for sentient beings. It is the degree to which these assertions depart from the norms of linguistic practice that sends up a red flag. The reason for objection is this: it is one thing to suggest on empirical grounds correlations between a subjective, complex whole (say, the activity of deciding and some particular physical part of that capacity, say, neural firings) but there is considerable objection to concluding that the part just is the whole. These claims are not false; rather, they are devoid of sense.
Wittgenstein remarked that it is only of a human being that it makes sense to say “it has sensations; it sees, is blind; hears, is deaf; is conscious or unconscious.” (Philosophical Investigations, § 281). The question whether brains think “is a philosophical question, not a scientific one” (p. 71). To attribute such capacities to brains is to commit what Bennett and Hacker identify as “the mereological fallacy”, that is, the fallacy of attributing to parts of an animal attributes that are properties of the whole being. Moreover, merely replacing the mind by the brain leaves intact the misguided Cartesian conception of the relationship between the mind and behavior, merely replacing the ethereal by grey glutinous matter.
Yet, we say without issue, "Hearts pump blood". — hypericin
made about the world translate to a conception of the world ..an inference — Apustimelogist
in an objectuve way. — Apustimelogist
At the same time, knowing that there exists a certain thing in the world doesn't mean one has to know the intrinsic nature of that thing, in the same way that someone might know fire exists but not know what fire is. — Apustimelogist
I'm forgetting his exact wording on this, but I don't find his rebuttal forceful. He accepts that evolutionary theory says something (true) about the world, ergo some of our theories are true.
But then there's the whole issue of evolved to discover what kind of truths? Truths about the constitution of the universe? Very unlikely. That must be some kind of lucky accident that we are able to form theories that apply to the universe.
Hoffman's interface theory is ultimately guilty of the same old Cartesian/representationalist error that haunts a good deal of contemporary philosophy. Saying "we don't know the world, we just know our experiences of it," is a bit like claiming no one can drive a car because "they can only push pedals and turn a steering wheel," or that writing is impossible because "we can only move muscles in our fingers." What is "being" supposed to mean if it's not what is thought, experienced, known or talked about? — Count Timothy von Icarus
Yes, there seems to be a bit of the common move of setting up the "view from nowhere," as a strawman foil here. You see the same thing in deflationary thinkers like Rorty as well. The old "we cannot achieve 'the one true ahistorical, perspectiveless view of truth,' thus truth is inaccessible," as if there is no middle ground. Yet it's not like my brother and I cannot both know our parents simply because each of our knowledge of them differs. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Or no luck is required. It has become common to think of logic and reason as being the sui generis products of mind, something "constructed" or something like that. But if there is a certain logic to the world, a Logos, then it should not be surprising if minds correspond to it. Rather it would be impossible for it to be otherwise. And the world certainly appears to have an intelligible order. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Why not? — Apustimelogist
"An inference which you've made about the world based on repeated experience can directly translate to a conception of the world in an objective way" — AmadeusD
With respect to specificity, I rather think, assuming an interest in such matters despite the absence of sufficient empirical facts from the scientific method proper, little remains but to fall back on logical constructions, the certainty, hence the explanatory value, of which is our own responsibility. — Mww
I'm finding Donald Hoffman's book alternately interesting and frustrating. His formula of 'fitness beats truth' makes me want to ask what is the ‘truth’ that is ‘beaten by fitness’. He says that we don’t see ‘objective reality’ but that we see what evolution primes us to see. But at the same time, as we all have the same evolutionary heritage, then why that can’t also be ‘objective’? We’ll all share a very large pool of common objects of experience, so if I call a tomato an orange, or measure a meter to be 80cm, I’ll be objectively mistaken. — Wayfarer
If you meant that consciousness is an 'unifying' activity, in a sense yes, I agree. — boundless
Me neither. Didn’t really understand it either. Although I can see the connection with QBism. — Wayfarer
‘Meta-conscious awareness’ is the term, I believe. — Wayfarer
I didn’t mean that; I said consciousness is a capacity, understood, in accordance with a particular methodological system, as a necessary condition of intelligent agency. That being given, it can be deduced consciousness doesn’t unify; it is that under which unity occurs. — Mww
you cannot know the intrinsic nature of the world but you can infer that the world indeed does exist when you are not looking at it. — Apustimelogist
That the world exists in an objective way just means it exists when nobody is looking. — Apustimelogist
Isn't this a bit loose? What exactly does an 'objective way' entail? Even Hoffman and most idealists would say there is an objective world. Isn't the key issue what is the nature of the world we have access to and think we know? — Tom Storm
Isn't this a bit loose? — Tom Storm
That the world exists in an objective way just means it exists when nobody is looking. — Apustimelogist
I see no contradiction in what you quoted of me in this post. — Apustimelogist
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