It doesn't have to be left there, if you like. So long as it is noted that we do agree that tomatoes are (sometimes) red, and that a theory which cannot account for this is thereby inadequate.
So any theory that claims colour to be a something in an individual's head, and no more, is inadequate. — Banno
Of course. It just seems to me that if one sets out to measure the height of a mountain, one already presumes it has a height to be measured. — Banno
The point is, colour is not a beetle. Lionino cannot see your beetle, by definition, but you both see the red pen. You both see red. — Banno
Indeed. And if colour is only in your head, then how is it that Lionino is able to use the word in a way that is consistent with what is in your head? Could it be because there is a shared pen that is red? — Banno
These are quite different. — Banno
Missed then why writing the above response - sorry, think it's a really, really good point. I think it is describable, but only describable by reference to our experience (aesthetically, even!). This removes any certainly outside of hte word game - but it does present the exact delineation you've aptly outlined. I just think Banno is sitting pretty on "thats nonsense. This is how we refer to things.."And I'd like to know what a pen is other than that indescribable thing we've labeled "pen." — Hanover
Yes! More small steps. A small progress. One can have a conversation concerning the beetle: 'But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language?—If so it would not be used as the name of a thing'.All that is relevant is we speak consistently enough to play our word game. That is, don't speak of what I see. — Hanover
That's your painting of the arch linguistic philosopher rather than anything real. "We have words and only words" is far from what is the case. We have pens. There are things shown, not said. Like what a pen is.You've committed to a linguistic model, — Hanover
But this newer work makes some good headway on the metaphysical implications of ITP. I believe they say quite adamantly that there is no world sans observation, without observation/decoherence, we have the quantum state of indeterminate possibilities/properties. Upon observation, a classical state is registered: — Bodhy
So there is nothing "behind" or "underneath" appearances. Without observation, there is just superposition of quantum possibilities, but no "unknowable" world out there. I do believe, though, that there are many observers and many concomitant worlds, but these are their worlds, so this might actually be a kind of ontological pluralism. — Bodhy
This brings out part of what appears so circular in Hoffman - he uses the physics of the world to show that there is no world. This leads me to supose he has missed something important. — Banno
and AmadeusD claiming to be unable to tell colour from pain — Banno
Objects in space are there to communicate information about your fitness. They are not apart from you - Yourself and the environment are co-dependent and co-arising. You're entangled. A system dividing itself into two -- but not separate things-- to communicate information to itself about how to perpetuate its own existence. If you don't interpret the icons properly, the Conscious Agent-Decision-Action loop breaks and both you and the environment "die". — Bodhy
Yes, and yes. Primary qualities or attributes are just those which are measurable, and, crucially, those that are said to be mind-independent. A hue may look different to different observers - although that’s hard to tell - but any value that can be measured objectively is not subject to opinion. Principally: mass, charge, velocity, dimension, and location. Just those elements of matter and chemistry which are said by materialism to be the foundation of all else that exists. — Wayfarer
And now we have Meta claiming maps have height, but mountains do not, — Banno
It seems to me that the distinction between direct and indirect realism is useless. Would you say that you have direct or indirect access to your mental phenomenon? — Harry Hindu
How did scientists come to realize how pain works and that our experience of it is incorrect if all they have to go by is their own observations which you are calling into question? — Harry Hindu
I interpret the pain as being located in my foot because most, if not all, of the other times the pain was located in my foot I had an injury on my foot. — Harry Hindu
s I said before, we have more than one sense for fault tolerance - to check what one sense is telling us, and we have the ability to reason, to compare past experiences with current ones, and to predict what experiences we can have. — Harry Hindu
Does the color “red” exist outside of the subjective mind that conceptually designates the concept of “red?” — Mp202020
Supose that we all do see colours differently, and named them accordingly - so what Lionino sees as red, you see as blue, and you both use the name for what you see. This is to take @Michael's suggestion literally! If @Lionino were to ask for the red pen, you might say "There is no red pen here, but there is a blue pen, and from past experience I know that Lionino is content for me to pass the blue pen when he asked for a red. At the least, it shuts them up.' — Banno
The percept that occurs when we hallucinate red is the percept that occurs when we dream red is the percept that optical stimulation by 620-750nm light ordinarily causes to occur.
Or if you prefer, the neural activity that is responsible for dreaming red is the neural activity that is responsible for hallucinating red is the neural activity that optical stimulation by 620-750nm light ordinarily causes to occur.
When this neural activity occurs when asleep we call it a dream. When this neural activity occurs when awake but not in response to optical stimulation we call it an hallucination. When this neural activity occurs when awake and in response to optical stimulation we call it a non-hallucinatory waking experience. — Michael
Hence, if they all include "the mental percept", and yet they are distinct, then it only follows that the notion of the "mental percept" is inadequate/insufficient for explaining those differences. — creativesoul
When this neural activity occurs when asleep we call it a dream. When this neural activity occurs when awake but not in response to optical stimulation we call it an hallucination. When this neural activity occurs when awake and in response to optical stimulation we call it a non-hallucinatory waking experience. — Michael
The beetle analog was written about pain, not colour. While to some extent there is an overlap, one can produce samples of colour and chat about whether these are red, and what shade of red. One cannot do the came with pain; what one sees is the manifestation of pain, the groaning and grimacing. One cannot see into the box. — Banno
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