Well, your confusing pain and touch certainly is an error. They, again, are not the same. So:This strikes me as special pleading and a category error — Hanover
This is exactly not the case with pain. It inflicts itself whether you "make your perceptions available" or not. Pain is not touch....you must make your perceptions available to the object to experience it — Hanover
What twaddle. No, that's not the "thesis" (are we writing doctorates now? That explains the length of this thread). Pain is not in the knife.If we insist the red is in the pen (which is your thesis), the we must insist the pain is in the knife — Hanover
Ok. You go with such absurdism.I'm saying pain is no different than red. — Hanover
You are obligated to deny that being red is communal in order to maintain your limited account. And yet, overwhelmingly, we agree as to what is red and what isn't. Here are some shades of red:The fact that I pass Lionino the apple when he says in our non-English language "flurgle nurgle blurgle" is utterly irrelevant to the issue being discussed. — Michael
I certainly am!I might be hopelessly lost. — frank
The basic point I would make is that colour is not entirely in the mind of an individual, but also functions at a social level. — Banno
The broader methodological point is that philosophical dichotomies such as subject/object. subjective/objective, internal/external, private/public are difficult to maintain on close examination — Banno
Notice that the shades of red are red? Do you suppose that the shades of pain are painful? No; the items in the first are red, the items in the second are not pain. — Banno
And so showing me a bunch of images that I see to be red doesn't prove that colours are not mental phenomena. — Michael
The basic point I would make is that colour is not entirely in the mind of an individual, but also functions at a social level. I think that pretty well undeniable. — Banno
are difficult to maintain on close examination — Banno
As always your arguments are non sequiturs. — Michael
The fact that we know that phenomenal states can exist without external stimuli and that phenomenal states can be manipulated to provide varying perceptions of the same external stimuli forecloses direct realism as a viable option. Yet it persists. — Hanover
If I have a fear of dogs and I feel that fear every time I see a dog, is the fearsome dog an object like a red pen, with the fearsomeness and the redness within the object, or is the fearsomeness within me the perceiver only?
If I internally create the fearsomeness but not the redness, how do you decide which traits of the perception go into the internally created bucket and which go into the objectively existing bucket? — Hanover
The broader methodological point is that philosophical dichotomies such as subject/object. subjective/objective, internal/external, private/public are difficult to maintain on close examination
— Banno
— apokrisis
Notice that the shades of red are red? Do you suppose that the shades of pain are painful? No; the items in the first are red, the items in the second are not pain. — Banno
I'd love to think myself so clever that I pierced this complex philosophy, but I find that hard to believe. — Hanover
cause differs — AmadeusD
Those dichotomies cannot properly account for that which is both. — creativesoul
My bold claim is just how quickly this project has been progressing these past 50 years. — apokrisis
OK, theism would be our sticking point then. I doubt I could have had a more atheistic upbringing. :smile:
But pursuing that line would be futile unless you were defending some point where a deity must intrude into the workings of nature. If God is unnecessary for consciousness, fine feelings, or the Platonic necessity of mathematical patterns, then where is His role in causality? — apokrisis
So all causality appears to be wrapped up in this physics. It is pure internalism. No divine hand needed either to light the blue touch paper, nor call time in a final judgement. — apokrisis
But Natural Philosophy encourages the idea that the Cosmos is a Darwinian event, and even a structualist story – in particular, a dissipative structure story. And I like the idea that pansemiosis is another way of labelling the physics of dissipative structure. — apokrisis
But anyway, that would be my next challenge. Where does any divine cause seem needed in a Cosmos that keeps seeming to be explained in the terms of a self-organising structure of relations?
If it can be shown that the Cosmos is not just some random thermal event, but instead the self-organising story of a world managing to exist because it constructs the very heat sink upon which its existence is contingent, well where is even a God of the gaps a necessary character in the collective narrative? — apokrisis
When do you actually 'see' a Red pen? — AmadeusD
Given that we only call the pen 'red' by convention, can this particular difference (realistically, the proximity to the trigger (whereas dreaming is far askance)) really do much lifting? — AmadeusD
When 'you' have biological machinery close enough to our own. — creativesoul
What difference are you drawing/maintaining? If it's unacceptably weak, then why mention it? — creativesoul
When do you actually 'see' a Red pen?
— AmadeusD
When 'you' have biological machinery close enough to our own. — creativesoul
This is unfortunately, quite unhelpful. That obtains in all three cases and provides no basis to delineate. — AmadeusD
None. This is literally something I am asking you to address. You drew the distinction. — AmadeusD
In all three cases we're experiencing the event of 'looking at an object we apprehend as a pen which will write with red ink", right? — AmadeusD
We already drew and maintained the distinctions between seeing, hallucinating, and dreaming?
Those still hold. — creativesoul
There are no red pens in hallucinations and/or dreams thereof. — creativesoul
There are no red pens in hallucinations and/or dreams thereof.
— creativesoul
I think this is incorrect, — AmadeusD
There are no red pens in hallucinations and/or dreams thereof.
— creativesoul
I think this is incorrect, depending on your response to what the difference would be between these and the "seeing" instance. That's all I'm asking... I would call it incorrect if we cannot pick out a feature of hte 'actual' seeing of a Red pen in contrast to the other two — AmadeusD
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