Well, the state of relative peace is better than nothing. The better you understand life it becomes easier to achieve relative peace. — MoK
Is there a downside to accepting that "feeling" of change in the objective world and the practical effects of willful behavior? I feel older and wiser than I did at 18. Am I just naive, or deceiving myself that I can be an agent of change in the world? When I imagine that I'm driving my car to the grocery store, was that destination destined by God or Fate 14b years before I was born? If my free agency is a mirage, will I go hungry waiting for the world to bend to my will? :snicker: — Gnomon
Yes. I think we can have it both ways. But no, unlike Spinoza, I don't think G*D/Whole/Enfernity/Logos is changeless. A static do-nothing deity could not be creative, and our evolving world would not be compatible with an inert cosmos-creator. I don't have any empirical knowledge of anything outside of our space-time world. So anything I might say about Enfernity (eternity-infinity) is pure speculation. But, I would interpret Enfernity as unlimited & boundless, hence free to change in all possible ways. For all I know, a boundless Supreme Being might have created an infinite number of universes, with all possible modes of existence. But I don't waste my time trying to make sense of such literal non-sense.The problem IMO is that you seem to want it both ways. On the one hand, the Whole, i.e.God in your view, is ultimately changeless. On the other hand, you seem to think that change is ultimately real for us and that we are free.
But my question is: how can our perception of change be veridical if the Whole (of which we are mere aspects or maybe 'parts') is changeless? how can we have free will, i.e. a degree of autonomy, if we are mere aspects/modes/parts of God, who is changeless? — boundless
A state of relative peace is possible.But if there is nothing that guarantees that I may not fall from such a state of 'relative peace' (assuming that it is a positive state), then such a state is not possible (for instance, in traditional theism, God is the foundation of the stability of the beatitude of the blessed). — boundless
Correct. Life becomes boring if it is eternal.Also, if it is too similar to the present life - after all, if it is seen as a perpetual struggle, the comparison is IMO apt - I am not sure how it is better than nothing. If I really think that this life will last forever, well I think it will be at a certain point unbereable (due to boredom... after all, finite goods can give finite happiness). — boundless
Correct. Life becomes boring if it is eternal. — MoK
In other words, every possibility is a necessity, modal collapse? Good post btw, keep it coming. — Lionino
The whole point is why would a perfect god create this kind of game of hide-and-seek of his "blessedness" and "good and evil"? — schopenhauer1
In other words, when seen as themselves - i.e. abstracted from the Substance/God - they are contingent. But this perspective is ultimately illusory and therefore, ultimately, according to Spinoza, it is true that even the modes are necessary (but seen in this perspective, they are not individuals anymore). — boundless
Interesting. There is a revised version of Gödel's ontological proof of God that entails modal collapse because of the given definition of God. — Lionino
Perhaps good is not finite. If it is and life is eternal then we are in trouble.To be fair, I should have added that boredom would not the only one reason that after a certain point such an endless life would be unbereable. But in any case, I'm not sure how you have not conceded my point, i.e. that such a 'relative perfection' is undesiderable. We seem to agree that an endless life with only finite goods becomes after a certain point unbereable. — boundless
Well, either the state of relative perfection or the state of suffering. Which one do you pick? By nothing I didn't mean permanent death.Yet, you seem to say that a state of 'relative perfection' is 'better than nothing'. How can an 'endless unbeareable life' be better than 'nothing'? — boundless
That's not what I'm saying. I assume that all actualities/realities can be traced back to the beginning of space-time. Beyond which we can only conjecture. And the Cause of that sudden appearance of limited spatial volume and temporal change from whatever came before that beginning (Enfernity??) is what we humans typically call "G*D" or "Multiverse".↪Gnomon
In other words, are you saying that God/Whole determines all the possibilities but the actualities are determined or co-determined by the rational agents?
And maybe also by other phenomena?
In other words, God 'fixes' all the possible histories but the actual one is co-determined?
I'm not sure how this doesn't lead to a theistic or theistic-like perspective (i.e. that God creates and sustaines but at the same time the creatures maintain an identity that is distinct from the Creator), but I'll wait your answers before delving into this. — boundless
Well, either the state of relative perfection or the state of suffering. Which one do you pick? By nothing I didn't mean permanent death. — MoK
During the expansion of space-time most emergent Actualities result from natural energy exchanges. But, since the recent advent of homo sapiens, some novelties in the world have been caused by human choices. That's what we call Culture as contrasted with Nature. Therefore, you could say that Cultural Evolution has been "co-determined" by rational agents. But I would not say that all actualities, or all phenomena, or all "actual histories" are determined by the "demi-gods" of the world. — Gnomon
Would Spinoza disagree? :smile: — Gnomon
I.e. if we are more like droplets of spray from a wave of the ocean (or rays of sunlight from the sun) than e.g. passengers riding on a moving train...Still my question is: how can we have some degree of autonomy if we are not separate from the Whole? — boundless
For Spinoza, no doubt an "inadequate idea" (i.e. imaginary, illusory) sub specie aeternitatis.Even the 'co-determination' of some actualities ... something like Tolkien's concept of subcreation, in a sense.
Yes, because sub species aeternitatis Spinoza's immanent-monist (unbounded, self-organizing vacuum field-like) metaphysics is acosmist and your "pan-en-deistic" whatever, Gnomon, implies an unparsimonious, transcendent-dualist (Pythagorean / Neoplatonist / Leibnizean / panpsychist monadic-like) metaphysics.it is Deistic ... specifically PanEnDeistic.
Would Spinoza disagree? — Gnomon
From the perspective of the Whole, the parts may or may not have any freedom, depending on the rigidity of rules that bind the parts. But from the perspective of the parts, our degree of freedom is relative to the other parts. Since I am unable to speak for the Whole, I can only judge based on the current state and history of human actions. As to "how", I must assume that the binding chains of natural Cause & Effect have some "gaps" or "loopholes" that can be exploited by Autonomous Agents. Otherwise, we would all be locked-in rocks.Still my question is: how can we have some degree of autonomy if we are not separate from the Whole? — boundless
I.e. if we are more like droplets of spray from a wave of the ocean (or rays of sunlight from the sun) than e.g. passengers riding on a moving train... — 180 Proof
For Spinoza, no doubt an "inadequate idea" (i.e. imaginary, illusory) sub specie aeternitatis. — 180 Proof
Fwiw, my view is that sub specie durationis (e.g. Husserl's "natural attitude") acosmism seems cogently pandeistic (or consistent with classical atomism). :fire: — 180 Proof
As to "how", I must assume that the binding chains of natural Cause & Effect have some "gaps" or "loopholes" that can be exploited by Autonomous Agents — Gnomon
In his book Freedom Evolves, Daniel Dennett concluded that some degree of Free Will*1 is compatible with Natural Law. He refers to certain "abilities" of homo sapiens that allow us to make choices that are not dictated by physical laws. Among those abilities are Logic and Language. Regarding the rigidity of natural law, I'll just mention that Thermodynamics is based on statistical averages not specific instances*2, and Quantum physics is also statistical, not mechanical. So some slack (statistical loopholes) in the chain of Cause & Effect seems to be allowed. — Gnomon
Of course this is so ... sub specie aeternitatis.Well, Spinoza's Natura Naturata would be cover both the 'vacuum' and the 'atoms', the union of them (also, according to him, the attributes are independent from each other, so emergentism is not compatible with Spinoza). — boundless
If not conditionally "deterministic" (i.e. constrained by your (my) nonlinear dynamic, ecology-nested, embodied cognition), then what makes any "choices" yours (mine)?For instance, if a compatibilist argues that my choices are 'free' because they do not have 'external' causes but they are still deterministic, I fail to see how this can be true 'freedom ...
Ha! You'll have to ask the Deus why He/r system of Cause & Effect is not strictly dictatorial & deterministic, but statistical, and frivolously creating novel arrangements of matter & energy as a basement hobby. Apparently you think the Deity is incapable of internal change, or oblivious to the little independent-minded creatures running around inside the Whole. Either our evolving world is accidental or intentional, or Deus is just having a bad dream.As to "how", I must assume that the binding chains of natural Cause & Effect have some "gaps" or "loopholes" that can be exploited by Autonomous Agents — Gnomon
Ok. But how these 'gaps' arise in a pantheistic/panentheistic/pandeistic/panendeistic system? — boundless
Of course this is so ... sub specie aeternitatis. — 180 Proof
That the world is divine play [göttliches Spiel] beyond good and evil―for this, my predecessors are the philosophy of Vedanta and Heraclitus.
If not conditionally "deterministic" (i.e. constrained by your (my) nonlinear dynamic, ecology-nested, embodied cognition), then what makes any "choices" yours (mine)? — 180 Proof
Ha! You'll have to ask the Deus why He/r system of Cause & Effect is not strictly dictatorial & deterministic, but statistical, and frivolously creating novel arrangements of matter & energy as a basement hobby. Apparently you think the Deity is incapable of internal change, or oblivious to the little independent-minded creatures running around inside the Whole. Either our evolving world is accidental or intentional, or Deus is just having a bad dream. — Gnomon
All I can do is guess : that the evolutionary system was intentionally designed to produce living & thinking creatures, with abilities that allow for some self-determination. Or, that our universe is a divine experiment gone disastrously awry. Why would an eternal/infinite/omnipotent Being have unruly pockets of space-time scrambling around in He/r bosom? Why would an absolute Entity allow little bubbles of evolving matter to grow inside He/r womb? How could Omniscience/Omnipotence have statistical "gaps", unless they were designed to provide opportunities for creativity? — Gnomon
The definition of God as "simple & unchanging" may or may not be true ; but it's irrelevant to you & me. I have no way of verifying that "standard position". But, in the evolving space-time world, where you and I are operating, Complexity and Change are the context from which we vainly try to imagine a First Cause capable of producing an evolving world. Presumably, enfernal G*D does not evolve, but He/r space-time creation may be a machine for evolving little gods.Well, I wasn't talking about my ideas on the matter. But anyway, the 'standard' philosophical position about God (even for the classical theists) is that God is simple, unchanging and transcends time. Spinoza accepted this kind of view. If you say that 'Deus' changes, then yeah I think that my objections do not apply strictly speaking. Still, by 'statistical' you don't mean 'probabilistic'. Probabilism is just as incompatible as determinism to free will/agency (choices are not random). — boundless
I don't know as an empirical matter whether or not Spinoza is an "emergentist"; metaphysically he's certainly not.Can you give some reference/arguments to argue that he was an emergentis? — boundless
– and, I think, "foreign" to Spinoza as well (re: infinite =/= "whole"). Anyway, apparently I wasn't clear enough:Also, I would say that the holistic character present in Spinoza was absent in Democritus, Ep[ic]ur[us], Lucretius et al. This doesn't mean that one can [can't?] build a 'Democrito-Epicurean Spinozism' of sorts but I believe that the ontological primacy of the 'whole' was completely foreign to the classical atomists.
I see no other way but to interpret Spinoza as both an immanentist and acosmist sub specie aeternitatis (though sub specie durationis also as a pandeist, which (for me) ontically relates him to that other great immanentist Epicurus). — 180 Proof
In other words, sub specie durationis I interpret Spinoza's natura naturans as ontologically deterministic and unbounded (i.e. unmanifest ... vacuum ("void")) and natura naturata as ontically chaotic and bounded (i.e. manifest ... fluctuation-patterns ("swirling recombing atoms")).[M]y view is that sub specie durationis (e.g. Husserl's "natural attitude") acosmism seems cogently pandeistic (or consistent with classical atomism). — 180 Proof
... which is why I describe compatibilism as conditionally deterministic. Neither strict determinism nor strict indeterminism are compatible with "free will / free action" (i.e. human agency).But if 'compatibilism' is strictly deterministic ...
The definition of God as "simple & unchanging" may or may not be true ; but it's irrelevant to you & me. I have no way of verifying that "standard position". But, in the evolving space-time world, where you and I are operating, Complexity and Change are the context from which we vainly try to imagine a First Cause capable of producing an evolving world. Presumably, enfernal G*D does not evolve, but He/r space-time creation may be a machine for evolving little gods. — Gnomon
I disagree about the relevance of Probability to Free Will*1. Calvinistic Classical Physics assumed that the fate of the world is pre-determined by the absolute Will of God. But Quantum Physics has undermined the philosophical certainty of that presumption. According to 21st century science, the physical foundation of reality is Relative, not absolute, and Uncertain, not pre-destined, and Organic, not Mechanistic. The Probability "gap" in quantum physics is anywhere a mind makes a measurement. No minds : no gaps in Determinism. — Gnomon
I don't know as an empirical matter whether or not Spinoza is an "emergentist"; metaphysically he's certainly not. — 180 Proof
In other words, sub specie durationis I interpret Spinoza's natura naturans as ontologically deterministic and unbounded (i.e. unmanifest ... vacuum ("void")) and natura naturata as ontically chaotic and bounded (i.e. manifest ... fluctuation-patterns ("swirling recombing atoms")). — 180 Proof
... which is why I describe compatibilism as conditionally deterministic. Neither strict determinism nor strict indeterminism are compatible with "free will / free action" (i.e. human agency). — 180 Proof
To give an analogy, I believe that if the 'ocean' is 'natura naturata', a wave is a 'mode'. Regarding 'natura naturans', maybe water itself. But I'm not sure how much the analogy makes sense. — boundless
For me it doesn't make sense ...To give an analogy, I believe that if the 'ocean' is 'natura naturata', a wave is a 'mode'.Regarding 'natura naturans', maybe water itself. But I'm not sure how much the analogy makes sense. — boundless
Well, imo they don't work. In each case "ocean" "house" "statue" are manifest, finite modes (natura naturata) and yet you claim that the corresponding infinite modes of "water" "wood" "marble", respectively, are not manifest which clearly doesn't fly. Analogously it's the 'laws of nature' – causing and constraining modes such as "water [ocean [waves]]" "wood [house [rooms ...]]" & "marble [statue [male-figure]]" to manifest – which themselves are not manifest and which reason attributes to (i.e. conceptualizes as) natura naturans. All analogies are limited in application, of course, much more so when used to 'illuminate' a metaphysics as subtle as Spinozism.What do you think about these analogies? — boundless
I don't agree with that arbitrary conditional hypothetical if-then scenario. It seems to be placing restrictions on what an omnipotent deity can or cannot do*1. If there are no parts or aspects, then what is G*D*2 the Whole of? That negative definition of Perfection seems to be a bunch of nothing : no boundaries, no parts, no change. no properties, no place for an evolving world with imperfect creatures. Nothing to do : Eternally Boring.I think that the argument goes like: if God weren't simple, i.e. it God was composed of parts (which themsleves are entities) then it could not be eternal, or at least God would be contingent. God would be ontologically dependent on its parts.
In other words, God's ontological necessity and eternity requires an ontological simplicity.
Anyway, maybe you could say that some aspects of God/Whole evolve and some aspects do not, in order to accept both a panendeistic world view and God's eternity and necessity. But I am not sure if this helps. — boundless
Lately I prefer "the sun, its sunrays & their heat" (rather than "the ocean & its waves") as an analogy because "the sun" is so remote and not visibly manifest at night even though its effects of "light & heat" are always manifest on Earth (e.g. gravity-well, climate, weather, seasons, photosynthesis); and also, that staring directly at the sun with naked eyes is blinding more or less like fully comprehending 'eternal & infinite substance' with temporal, finite reason is impossible. So for me, in this limited (physical) sense, analogously "the sun" is naturing and Earth, etc are natured ... even though our local star is, according to Spinoza, just another mode (of the attributes of substance (i.e. 'laws of nature')). :fire: — 180 Proof
I don't agree with that arbitrary conditional hypothetical if-then scenario. It seems to be placing restrictions on what an omnipotent deity can or cannot do*1. If there are no parts or aspects, then what is G*D*2 the Whole of? That negative definition of Perfection seems to be a bunch of nothing : no boundaries, no parts, no change. no properties, no place for an evolving world with imperfect creatures. Nothing to do : Eternally Boring. — Gnomon
On the other hand, I can only guess that G*D is not frozen into a boundless timeless changeless blocktime popsicle, but is instead a dynamic entity capable of creating an imperfect world internally without compromising He/r own boundlessness or wholeness. Just as a human mind can imagine a Utopian or Dystopian world without reducing its own unity & wholeness, a G*D-mind could move imaginary chess pieces around without compromising its own integrity. As some have expressed the idea : G*D is dreaming our world, so our "real" existence is imaginary or fictional from the perspective of the dreamer. :smile: — Gnomon
Yes. To portray G*D as a "composite", of which we humans are the parts, seems to be a materialistic/physicalist notion. It views G*D as a mechanism with interdependent interacting parts. A machine (e.g. a watch) is indeed dependent on its constituent parts. Take away one cog and the machine no longer functions properly.But if G*D is not simple, i.e. if G*D is composite, then it necessarily depends on the parts. If those parts were to 'separate', G*D is no more. BTW, G*D being simple doesn't mean that G*D has no properties, just that G*D has no parts. — boundless
:clap: :lol:The Universal Field Theory :
The U F T is not a physics theory in a classical sense. It is rather aphilosophicaltheory explaining Why and How physical phenomena appear.
https://theuniversalfieldtheory.com/ — Gnomon
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.