You wrote:
Fair enough. I'd go further. (I think) we're starting with the hypotheses that there is a reality; reality is real; and we're content for the moment to let a brick informally represent what "reality" means. And that "truth" is a word that we define, for the moment, as naming a quality that reality has. For example, in the same way (not sense) we say a lemon is yellow, we are, for the moment, saying that reality is truth (let's call it T1).
Still same page?
...We are, for the moment, saying that reality is truth (let's call it T1).
I was ok to that point, but then you went on to say...
...We are, for the moment, saying that reality is truth (let's call it T1).
This doesn't seem right, tim. It doesn't work with the above..
Reality is a quality of reality? — creativesoul
If truth is a quality of reality, then reality cannot be truth. Otherwise it results in reality being a quality of itself. — creativesoul
If truth is a quality of reality, then reality cannot be truth. Otherwise it results in reality being a quality of itself.
I'm just trying to be as clear and committed to meaningful language use as we can be. — creativesoul
And that "truth" is a word that we define, for the moment, as naming a quality that reality has. For example, in the same way (not sense) we say a lemon is yellow, we are, for the moment, saying that reality is truth (let's call it T1) — timw
I also wrote "reality is truth." The real criticism - question - here is if truth, in Aristotelian terms, is a substance or an accident. In calling it a quality, I'm calling it an accident, and accidents depend on substances and cannot exist on their own. On the other hand if truth is a substance, then it isn't an accident, cannot be a predicate.
Before going there, it's worth a sentence or two on where we've been and where we're going. The critique of truth given by MU (as I understand it) is that it is always subject to, "how do you know?" MU's answer is judgment; our judgment tells us so. The problem is that judgment is ever-fallible; that is, it's judgment all the way down and at every level subject to the same, "how do you know?" — tim wood
This isn't for you to understand or see; it is a definition, or hypothesis - a starting point.
The point - my point - is to attempt to ground the meaning of the word "truth" in something secure and unequivocal. If truth just is reality, per definition, then, it seems to me, the only attack possible on truth is to attack reality. — tim wood
And because I assert it, it needs no justification. — tim wood
Do you challenge that hypothesis? My hypothesis is that, "there is a reality; reality is real." Are you arguing that it is not the case that there is a reality, or that there is a reality, but that it is not real? It must be one of these, else why mention it? — tim wood
But maybe we have to start with more primitive notions. Answer yes or no: Is there reality? Is there knowledge? — tim wood
I also wrote "reality is truth." — tim wood
in thinking, the intelligible object or form is present in the intellect, and thinking itself is the identification of the intellect with this intelligible.
A general point is that in the Platonic view, knowledge of sensory objects or of the 'domain of the senses', generally, can't be reliable because the senses are inherently treacherous. But knowledge of mathematical truths is relatively more stable, because they are not subject to the change and mutability that characterizes worldly things. — Wayfarer
You can define a word however you please, but if it's not a good representation of how the word is used, then what good is that definition? In other words, if you want to talk about what truth is then we should refer to the way that the word is used, the thing which is referred to by "truth", not some made up thing. If you just make up a definition, then truth will be just that, whatever you've made up. But what kind of truth is that, one you can just make up?
And because I assert it, it needs no justification.
— tim wood
See, what kind of truth is this? This is what truth is, and I don't need to justify this, because I assert it, this is truth. — Metaphysician Undercover
My challenge is this, if it is a hypothesis, "there is a reality", as you claim, then what justifies your claim that it is truth. In order that a hypothesis be recognized as truth, it must be justified. So yes, I challenge your hypothesis, "there is a reality". — Metaphysician Undercover
But maybe we have to start with more primitive notions. Answer yes or no: Is there reality? Is there knowledge?
— tim wood
I believe there is reality, and I believe that there is knowledge. — Metaphysician Undercover
The point is, in this tradition (and its cognates), 'reality', 'truth' and 'being' are in some fundamental way inseparable; to know something is to be at one with it. To know 'what is', is to be at one with it, but this is an existential state or condition, rather than propositional knowledge, as such. — Wayfarer
I'm struggling to understand the parallel between "truth" being a quality of reality and yellow being a quality of lemons.
"Truth", if it is the name of a quality that reality has then it would be a sensible parallel to draw. I mean, "yellow" is the name of a quality that lemons have. — creativesoul
Knowledge, different from truth, has its needs (stability one of them), that are not truth's. An example may settle the point: I have on a mountain ridge in fog and mists completely misunderstood what I was looking at. What I thought was the lodge, our goal, a kilometer distant turned out to be a rock about 150 meters away. I knew it was the lodge, until the wind blew some of the mist away. But it was never true.
You might argue that this is exactly the senses being treacherous (true, with respect to knowledge), but I would argue back that the senses gave true report; rather it was my understanding that failed in supposing what I saw provided enough data for me to draw a conclusion. That conclusion was false with respect to the facts - but true with respect to the information I had. — tim wood
I suspect it is a major cultural flaw (and personal), no doubt incubated in the expectations of science, to wait to be told what is, when at some point each of us needs to actively participate in that investigation. — tim wood
There is a stock example in Indian philosophy of 'mistaking a rope for a snake'. — Wayfarer
Well, if you've said that, you've fallen into the pit of relativism, solipsism, and various other isms, none of them healthy. Surely any proposition concerning either truth or knowledge, has to be grounded in what really is the case.Or is it, for a moment, while the error stands? Not as a matter of knowledge: but as truth is prior to knowledge, so as a matter of truth. — tim wood
Well, if you've said that, you've fallen into the pit of relativism, solipsism, and various other isms, none of them healthy. Surely any proposition concerning either truth or knowledge, has to be grounded in what really is the case. — Wayfarer
If, knowing that it's really a rope, I still claim it's a snake, then that's crazy. But before I know? — tim wood
most people here will say that value is subjective, something which humans project onto the supposedly blank canvas of the Universe. — Wayfarer
Well, the problem is that the word "truth" in ordinary usage is simply not well-understood. — tim wood
My definition is a test, a hypothesis: can it stand; is it useful? Or does it fail, and why? As such it is not the conclusion of an argument, instead it is an early waypoint in a discussion. You object to it. Were it a conclusion there might be merit in the objection. But it's a premise, a for-the-sake-of-argument presupposition: objecting to that simply short-circuits the discussion. — tim wood
My argument runs this way: given definitions of "truth" all have problems. Is it possible to find for it a substantive and non-trivial definition that is simple and problem free, even if the meaning is constrained as compared with the problematic definitions. I find one in regarding truth as reality (and reality as truth). The constraint is that in-so-far as reality does not speak, so truth does not speak. But like reality, it grounds, evidences, reveals, is; and in these, it is secure, simple, non-problematic. You don't like it because it's not the way you understand truth, but that's the whole point! Incumbent on you if you're engaging is to show where it fails on its own terms. — tim wood
You're simply conflating 'this is truly my belief' with 'this is a true belief'. — John
Several questions: can experience (by itself, in itself) be true? Is experience a kind of proposition? — tim wood
I don't see a problem with "truth" according to ordinary usage. — Metaphysician Undercover
You insist that there is a problem defining "truth", when no such problem exists. — Metaphysician Undercover
Truth is reality. Reality is truth.
That's a fine starting point. I'll accept that use of both terms. — creativesoul
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