And I suspect Rouse would consider Peirce’s view of the scientific image as an epistemologically-based first philosophy: — Joshs
Peirce’s cosmological metaphysics is perhaps the most interesting of his metaphysical writings. Where his general metaphysics discusses the reality of the phenomenological categories, his cosmological work studies the reality and relation to the universe of his work in the normative sciences. The cosmological metaphysics looks at the aesthetic ideal (the growth of concrete reasonableness) and its attainment through growth and habit in the universe at large.
In Peirce’s cosmology, the universe grows from a state of nothingness to chaos, or all pervasive firstness. From the state of chaos, it develops to a state in which time and space exist, or a state of secondness, and from there to a state where it is governed by habit and law, i.e. a state of thirdness. The universe does this, not in a mechanistic or deterministic way, but by tending towards habit and a law-like nature through chance and spontaneous transition. This chance-like transition towards thirdness is the growth of concrete reasonableness, i.e. the attainment of the aesthetic ideal through the spontaneous development of habit.
Peirce’s evolutionary cosmology has left many commentators uneasy about its relation to the rest of his work. His development of it during his own life time led some of his friends to fear for his sanity. Indeed, Peirce’s turn towards cosmological metaphysics is often attributed to a mystical experience and crisis of faith in the 1890’s. In truth, Peirce takes his cosmological work to be the logical upshot of the normative sciences and logic, which show the nature and desirability of the growth of reason. Cosmological metaphysics merely shows how the growth of concrete reasonableness occurs in the universe at large.
How we can develop a logical understanding of the world is then our best model for how the world itself could come to have that logical structure. Epistemology becomes ontology in its most direct possible fashion.
A reasonable person is going to find a reasonable universe – the Kantian point. But then also, a reasonable universe is going to eventually find itself inhabited by minds that can echo its reason. That is how Peirce closes the loop with his pragmatism. — apokrisis
What, then, does a post-sovereign epistemology have to say about the legitimation of knowledge? The crucial point is not that there is no legitimacy, but rather that questions about legitimation are on the same "level" as any other epistemic conflict, and are part of a struggle for truth. In the circulation of contested, heterogeneous knowledges, disputes about legitimacy, and the criteria for legitimacy, are part and parcel of the dynamics of that circulation. Understanding knowledge as "a strategical situation" rather than as a definitive outcome places epistemological reflection in the midst of ongoing struggles to legitimate (and delegitimate) various skills, practices, and assertions. Recognizing that the boundaries of science (or of knowledge) are what is being contested, epistemology is within those contested boundaries.
If we believe we can ground this reason in the sovereign epistemology of realism, — Joshs
Here's the visible spectrum. — Michael
The light without color?
Earlier you forwarded the claim "there is no color in light". The visible spectrum is light. If there is no color in light, and the visible spectrum is light, then it only follows that there is no color in the visible spectrum.
Yet you offer a rainbow called the visible spectrum.
Colorless rainbows. — creativesoul
The light without color?
Earlier you forwarded the claim "there is no color in light". The visible spectrum is light. If there is no color in light, and the visible spectrum is light, then it only follows that there is no color in the visible spectrum.
Yet you offer a rainbow called the visible spectrum.
Colorless rainbows.
— creativesoul
Light is just electromagnetic radiation. When it stimulates the eyes this causes neurological activity in the visual cortex, producing colour percepts. Just like chemicals stimulating the tongue cause neurological activity in the gustatory cortex, producing taste percepts. Colours are no more "in" light than tastes are "in" sugar. — Michael
Colors are unlike chemicals. — creativesoul
Are you saying that there are colorless rainbows? — creativesoul
The homogeneal Light and Rays which appear red, or rather make Objects appear so, I call Rubrifick or Red-making; those which make Objects appear yellow, green, blue, and violet, I call Yellow-making, Green-making, Blue-making, Violet-making, and so of the rest. And if at any time I speak of Light and Rays as coloured or endued with Colours, I would be understood to speak not philosophically and properly, but grossly, and accordingly to such Conceptions as vulgar People in seeing all these Experiments would be apt to frame. For the Rays to speak properly are not coloured. In them there is nothing else than a certain Power and Disposition to stir up a Sensation of this or that Colour.
Are you saying that there are colorless rainbows?
— creativesoul
It's not clear what you mean by the question — Michael
But don’t we - even at the meta-epistemic level - ground it all in pragmatism? A chair is real enough to take my weight — apokrisis
t. Pragmatism instead is a positive alternative in being based on a willingness to believe - and then test. Belief becomes an inveterate habit if it keeps passing the test. And that same evolutionary credo explains reality as a whole. — apokrisis
The homogeneal Light and Rays which appear red, or rather make Objects appear so, I call Rubrifick or Red-making; those which make Objects appear yellow, green, blue, and violet, I call Yellow-making, Green-making, Blue-making, Violet-making, and so of the rest. And if at any time I speak of Light and Rays as coloured or endued with Colours, I would be understood to...
If there is no color in light, and the visible spectrum is light, then it only follows that there is no color in the visible spectrum. — creativesoul
Light exposure influences the biological machinery to do different things... mindlessly. This includes the eyes, when looking at the infamous image of the dress. — creativesoul
Knowledge doesn’t represent the reality of things in the world, it anticipates and enacts relations of active interaction with a world. — Joshs
We are already intimately and actively embed with a world, which means that we are always thrown into beliefs, practical forms of meaningful engagements with our surrounds. — Joshs
We don’t just test to confirm already anticipated events, we also anticipate beyond what is confirmed and true, in the direction of not already foreseen possibilities that may shift our conceptions. Reality isn’t something we simply aim to explain, but to participate in constructing in new directions. — Joshs
If there is no color in light, and the visible spectrum is light, then it only follows that there is no color in the visible spectrum.
— creativesoul
Light exposure influences the biological machinery to do different things... mindlessly. This includes the eyes, when looking at the infamous image of the dress.
— creativesoul
These comments are inconsistent. — Hanover
The point of this is that it is empirically proven that an internal, subjective experience can be evoked by direct brain stimulation. This means that you cannot conclude anything about the constitution of the stimulus from the experience. — Hanover
Knowledge doesn’t represent the reality of things in the world, it anticipates and enacts relations of active interaction with a world.
— Joshs
So how does that impact my position given that I've already been explicit that I am rejecting Cartesian representationalism – the ontology that permits all representation to be misleading – and instead promoting a Kantian/Peircean enactivism? A modelling relation view where our beliefs only have to be "near enough for all practical purposes or observable consequences". — apokrisis
Models should be thought of as simulacra rather than representations. The crucial difference is that representation too often denotes a semantic content that intervenes between knowers and the world, whereas simulacra are just more things in the world, with a multiplicity of relations to other things. What makes them models, with an intentional relation to what they model, is their being taken up in practices, ongoing patterns of normatively accountable use.
The recognition of models as simulacra extends the interconnection of meaning and power beyond the immediate relation between speakers and their interpreters. To see why this is so, consider a question sometimes asked rhetorically about meaning: how could merely representing things differently possibly have a causal influence on them? A similar question about simulacra cannot have the same rhetorical effect: simulacra are transformations of the world, and more significantly, they transform the available possibilities for human action. They do so both by materially enabling some activities and obstructing others, and also by changing the situation such that some possible actions or roles lose their point, while others acquire new significance.
your pluralism relies on the claim all knowledge can be doubted, while my pragmatism says it is only unreliable belief that needs to be adjusted. — apokrisis
Your pluralist project appears to be reassert the very Cartesianism you would claim to reject as an enactivist. To retreat into the privilege of "personal phenomenal experience" at the expense of the broader social level enactivism offered by a pragmatist epistemology – Peirce's community of reason – seems a very backward move to me — apokrisis
Your naive projection has long since been refuted by physics and neuroscience. — Michael
There is a clear distinction between wavelengths of light and the corresponding colour... — Michael
Are there colorless rainbows? — creativesoul
And yet... you and Michael are doing exactly that. — creativesoul
Ripeness?Any other use of the word "red", e.g. to describe 620-750 light, or an object that reflects 620-750 light, is irrelevant, because the relevant philosophical question is "do objects like tomatoes, strawberries and radishes really have the distinctive [colour] property that they do appear to have?", and this question is not answered by noting that we use the word "red" in these other ways. — Michael
Colors are unlike chemicals. — creativesoul
Correct, they are like tastes. They are mental percepts caused by neurological activity, often in response to sensory stimulation. — Michael
Remaining silent, hiding from light might be wise if you are a liar and have no beetle after all. It's like interacting with a catfish, who is a person using another persons looks, identity, color to portray something they are not. A deception in action, pretending to be a super model, when in reality they are obese and not in the league of where they are trying to play...They didn't think that far, so the deception is real...The ugly chick knows what her type WANTS to see, the person she is fooling also knows what they want. The ugly chick wouldn't even get the time of day if they crossed paths in daylight, maybe in a poorly lit bar after heavy consumption, she gets lucky.Maybe we have the same beetle, maybe we don't.We must realize it's irrelevant so we remain silent about it.— Hanover
But the colour just is that mental percept — Michael
No, you aren't. They have 'determined" no such thing. You are treating the presumption as if it were a conclusion.I am telling you what physics and neuroscience have determined. — Michael
An imagined naive realists and mind-independent properties. You haven't explained what that might be. Is your claim that "The tomato is red" is true only when someone is looking at it? So there are no red tomatoes in a box, unobserved? One can never order a box of red tomatoes without threatening metaphysical collapse?...falsely believed by the naive realist to be a mind-independent property of the tomato — Michael
The tomato is red" is true only when someone is looking at it? — Banno
there are no red tomatoes in a box, unobserved? One can never order a box of red tomatoes without threatening metaphysical collapse? — Banno
You haven't thought this through. — Banno
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