So what is the difference between a logically consistent object and a real object? Can you imagine that? — litewave

In the words of a realist, we could all be totally ignorant and illogical all we want, but the universe would be here.

What do you mean by 'following relations'? Different things have different relations. — litewave

And same things viewed under ordinary observation could have different relations viewed under quantum existence.

In the words of a realist, we could all be totally ignorant and illogical all we want, but the universe would be here. — L'éléphant

I asked you whether you can imagine a difference between a logically consistent object and a real object. Are you saying that if you were totally ignorant and illogical you could imagine such a difference?

And same things viewed under ordinary observation could have different relations viewed under quantum existence. — L'éléphant

So what? Two things viewed from a distance could seem the same but when viewed more closely we would see them as different. I am talking about things and relations in the ontological (existential) sense, not in the epistemical sense.

I asked you whether you can imagine a difference between a logically consistent object and a real object. Are you saying that if you were totally ignorant and illogical you could imagine such a difference? — litewave

I can imagine a logically consistent object and a real object.
If I were totally ignorant and illogical, I could still imagine such a difference. For the order of things in my mind during my 'illogical' tenure would be uniformly applied to the objects in front of me.
If I were ignorant, I could still imagine such a difference. I imagine myself, no? I am a consistent object and a real object at once.

I am talking about things and relations in the ontological (existential) sense, not in the epistemical sense. — litewave

And here you are even more out of line for asking the ontological nature of relations. Relations are our perceptual interpretation of the tangible objects. And I say 'tangible' as a rule, for gravity is invisible and not readily available to us, except that we, the objects, do not readily float at will because something is keeping us grounded. There is no instance where you yourself have understood relations except in situations where there is at least one physical object as an element in your analysis.

I can imagine a logically consistent object and a real object. — L'éléphant

And what is the difference between them? I can't imagine the difference.

Perhaps one object is only logically coherent, but not metaphysically possible in any possible world?

Such as infinitely tall unicycle. Not logically contradictory, but not metaphysically possible. Or the existence of literally only one thing. That's not a logically incoherent notion, but I don't think there can exist literally only one thing because I believe for something to exist it must causally interact with something else as either an agent or a patient.

Perhaps one object is only logically coherent, but not metaphysically possible in any possible world? — Bodhy

But what is the difference between logical and metaphysical possibility?

Such as infinitely tall unicycle. Not logically contradictory, but not metaphysically possible. — Bodhy

If such a unicycle is logically possible why is it not metaphysically possible? I guess it is not metaphysically possible in our world but that also means that it is not logically possible in our world either, because it is not logically consistent with the laws of physics in our world. But it might be possible (logically and metaphysically) in some other world.

Or the existence of literally only one thing. That's not a logically incoherent notion — Bodhy

Well, it is, because the existence of only one thing is a property of the content of another thing - a thing that contains only one thing.

I can imagine a logically consistent object and a real object. — L'éléphant

And what is the difference between them? I can't imagine the difference. — litewave

A real object is prior to you giving a reason for its existence. It does not have to have a reason to exist. It just is. Water is not meant to be logical -- just liquid.

A logically consistent object could not exist without the perceptual evaluation of humans. It must conform to the coherence and epistemic requirements of rational beings. Note again that animals do not need this approval.

Here is a summary: real objects are discovered. Logically consistent objects are invented.

. Water is not meant to be logical -- just liquid. — L'éléphant

But it must be logically consistent too, otherwise it wouldn't exist. Logically inconsistent water cannot exist, for example water that is not water, or water in a glass that is not in a glass. And that is irrespective of the evaluation of any humans.

This all points to what I just said earlier -- that it is our own perceptual interpretation that gives a logical picture.

Logical possibility just means it can be stated in a way that doesn't violate an axiom of logic, but metaphysical possibility requires there is a possible world where such a thing can really exist.

A mile high unicycle is not incoherent, but it's not metaphysically possible because of the impossibility of an actually existing infinite set of things. So it is definitely possible for something to be logically coherent but not existentially possible.

And on the only one existing thing idea, what you might be suggesting is that the existence of a thing implies the set of existing things albeit with only one member, so a thing existing presumes the set existing.

But do sets exist? That's an unresolved metaphysical debate. So I don't think it's incoherent to claim only one thing exists, despite its metaphysical impossibility.

Logical possibility just means it can be stated in a way that doesn't violate an axiom of logic, but metaphysical possibility requires there is a possible world where such a thing can really exist. — Bodhy

And for me a possible world is a logically consistent one, so I see no difference between metaphysical and logical possibility.

A mile high unicycle is not incoherent, but it's not metaphysically possible because of the impossibility of an actually existing infinite set of things. So it is definitely possible for something to be logically coherent but not existentially possible. — Bodhy

A mile high unicycle would be logically inconsistent in a world whose structure, including laws of physics, is logically inconsistent with a mile high unicycle. For example, if there was a world in the shape of a cube whose side is 10 yards, it would be logically inconsistent for a mile high unicycle to exist in such a world. I see no problem in the existence of actual infinity. Maybe it doesn't exist in our world but it may exist in a different one.

But do sets exist? That's an unresolved metaphysical debate. — Bodhy

Sets are collections. When there are some things, they are automatically the content of a collection (unless the collection is logically inconsistent, for example there is no set of all sets that are not members of themselves). In a special case, the content can be just one thing. In yet another special case, an empty collection has no content; it is a collection that has the property of having no content; in other words it is a non-composite thing. That is also the reason why there can't be absolute nothingness - nothingness is absence of content, absence of content is the property of an empty collection, and an empty collection is something, a non-composite thing.

To put this in simple terms, how or why does modality exist? — Shawn

what are the leading theories of causality, nowadays? I ask because if indeterminism is at hand and how intuition grapples with indeterminism, then are we at a limit of how to interpret nature? If the preceding is true, then where do we go on from here? — Shawn

IMO, the most plausible account of causality is law realism:

where a and b are particulars: a causes b iff there is a law such that Type(a) necessarily causes Type(b).

Stated differently: laws are relations between universals.

Regarding quantum indeterminacy, this would be expressed as a probabilistic law:
Type(a) necessarily causes (a probability distribution).

Probabilistic causation accounts for ontological contingency in the world. Ontological contingency grounds statements about what is possible (i.e. modality).