but did he also make the parallel with “Existence is not a predicate”? — J
I can say “It is true that there are a hundred thalers on the table” but this adds nothing to the proposition ‛There are a hundred thalers on the table’. — J
I can say “A hundred thalers exist” but this adds nothing to the concept ‛a hundred thalers’; — J
I’m looking for some source help — J
Aristotle's claim in the Metaphysics that to speak truth is to say of what is that it is or of what is not that it is not is very close to the truth predication question. — Leontiskos
But I assume Aristotle did not describe truth as a property that could or could not be predicated; that way of thinking wasn't available to him. — J
Is there something he did say that would be more or less the equivalent of "To say of what is that it is, is not to provide additional knowledge about it"? Or maybe: "To assert of what is that it is, is the same act as identifying the being/existence of what is"? — J
This ability to look at a proposition abstractly while prescinding from its truth value would seem to require the use of truth and falsity as predicates. — Leontiskos
In other words, [for Frege and Geach] a propositional sign manifests, through its symbolic composition, the semantical character of each actual occurrence of the proposition, but not the force character of any [of] those occurrences. — Kimhi, Thinking and Being, page 39
"putatively existing"?It's the reverse -- we're saying of some putatively existing individual that it has the property of f. — J
I can say “It is true that there are a hundred thalers on the table” but this adds nothing to the proposition ‛There are a hundred thalers on the table’. — J
Basically, yes. — Leontiskos
I can say “A hundred thalers exist” but this adds nothing to the concept ‛a hundred thalers’; — J
This is a bit different, as the latter possesses a conceptual existence which the former surpasses by asserting a super-conceptual existence, at least according to common language. As far as I can see things can only be true or false in one way, whereas things can exist in multiple ways. The domain of the former is propositions whereas the domain of the latter is ontological realities, and ontological realities are more variegated and complicated. — Leontiskos
“Truth is not a predication.” That is, neither existence nor truth add anything, conceptually, to what they appear to be predicating ‛existence’ and ‛truth’ of. — J
I suppose Frege was the first to have pointed out the “emptiness” of the “It is true that . . .” prefix, but did he also make the parallel with “Existence is not a predicate”? — J
Aristotle's claim in the Metaphysics that to speak truth is to say of what is that it is or of what is not that it is not is very close to the truth predication question. — Leontiskos
J could easily respond by restricting his sphere of discourse to the logical frame and asking something like, "But do they add anything as far as the logic is concerned?" But this raises the fraught question of where the logical ends and the metalogical begins, or else where the metalogical ends and the ontological begins, in any given system. — Leontiskos
What I'm trying to pin down is whether anyone has addressed specifically the apparent parallel between "Existence is not a predicate" and "Truth is not a predication." Does it ring any bells? — J
I am not saying "it is true that there are a hundred thalers on the table", but rather ""it is true that "there are a hundred thalers on the table"". — RussellA
Truth is just a property of a being and only derivatively it's a property of judgements — Johnnie
I think you’d get a lot out of Kimhi’s book – I certainly have. — J
Minor point: The passage you quote from p. 39 isn’t actually about Frege and Geach. — J
These deep borderline questions are exactly what Kimhi is chasing down, just as you'd expect from a book called Thinking and Being. — J
↪Johnnie Appreciate the references — J
If I discover that there is something that is a ball, whatever reasons I give to support that discovery will be the same reasons needed to show that ‛There is a ball’ is true. There is no further fact I need to learn in order to affirm the truth of the proposition about the ball’s existence. This takes “parallel” extremely close to “identity,”... — J
Truth is being under the aspect of being-known (Aquinas). — Leontiskos
Objection 3. Further, things which stand to each other in order of priority and posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true appears to be prior to being; for being is not understood except under the aspect of the true. Therefore it seems they are not convertible.
Reply to Objection 3. When it is said that being cannot be apprehended except under the notion of the true, this can be understood in two ways. In the one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended, unless the idea of the true follows apprehension of being; and this is true. In the other way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended unless the idea of the true be apprehended also; and this is false. But the true cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be apprehended also; since being is included in the idea of the true. The case is the same if we compare the intelligible object with being. For being cannot be understood, unless being is intelligible. Yet being can be understood while its intelligibility is not understood. Similarly, being when understood is true, yet the true is not understood by understanding being. — Aquinas, ST Ia.16.3.ad3 - Whether the true and being are convertible terms?
Objection 3: Things that are related as prior and posterior do not seem to be convertible. But true
seems to be prior to being, since a being is understood only under the notion of the true (sub ratione
veri). Therefore, it seems that they are not convertible.
Reply to objection 3: There are two ways to interpret the claim that a being cannot be
apprehended without the notion of the true (sine ratione veri).
In the first way, it has this sense: ‘A being is not apprehended unless the notion of the true follows
upon the apprehension of the being’. So interpreted, the claim is true.
In the second way, it can be interpreted as follows: ‘A being could not be apprehended unless the
notion of the true were apprehended’. And this is false.
It is the case, however, that something true cannot be apprehended unless the notion of being is
apprehended. For being enters into the definition of true.
It is the same as comparing intelligible to being. For a being cannot be understood unless that
being is intelligible, and yet a being can be understood without its intelligibility being understood.
Similarly, a being as understood is true, but it is not the case that in understanding being, one understands true. — Aquinas, ST Ia.16.3.ad3 - Is 'true' convertible with 'being'?
Indeed, and I think that making use of the grammar of first order logic helps here, in obliging us to take care as to what we mean by "exists". So "∃(x)f(x)" is understood as something like "Of the things we are discussing, some of them satisfy f". "∃(x)f(x)" will be true only in the case that something is f. The ontological commitments here are pretty minimal.it’s hard to find the right language in these situations. — J
So this seems like quite a parallel between “truth” and “existence, — J
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.