No, that doesn't make any sense. Obviously, having a true understanding of the human condition requires knowing about free will, as a part of the human condition. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're assuming that free will is part of the human condition. I'm saying that it likely isn't.

What is meant by it, is irrelevant to this point. Since it is commonly said that human beings have free will, then we need to know what is being referred to in order to understand the human condition, of which free will is said to be a part of. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is commonly said that God exists too, but I'm sure you are aware that there some contention on this issue. It was once commonly said the Earth was flat. The fact that something is commonly said does not necessarily imply that what is said is a fact. This is an argumentum ad populum.

You're assuming that free will is part of the human condition. I'm saying that it likely isn't. — Harry Hindu

What you believe about "free will" is irrelevant. We do have the capacity to choose, and we all know and accept this. Some call this 'free will", if you want to just call it "the capacity to choose", that's fine. Whatever, way that you describe it, or try to understand it, it's part of the human condition which we need to understand in order to adequately understand the human condition. The fact that some people say we have free will, and others do not, is very strong evidence that the human condition is not understood, and we need to know the truth about this matter before it will be understood.

The fact that something is commonly said does not necessarily imply that what is said is a fact. — Harry Hindu

That is exactly the point I am making. We need to know the truth about these things before we can claim to have an understanding of the human condition. If we knew the truth about free will, then we'd have a much better basis for a claim about understanding the human condition. Since we do not know the truth about this, we cannot claim to have an understanding of the human condition.

"Thomas Reid's excellent book, Inquiry into the Human Mind... affords us a very thorough conviction of the inadequacy of the senses for producing the objective perception of things, and also of the non-empirical origin of the intuition of space and time. Reid refutes Locke's teaching that perception is a product of the senses. This he does by a thorough and acute demonstration that the collective sensations of the senses do not bear the least resemblance to the world known through perception, and in particular by showing that Locke's five primary qualities (extension, figure, solidity, movement, number) cannot possibly be supplied to us by any sensation of the senses..." The World as Will and Representation, Vol. II, Ch. 2

I have some thoughts on perception that i wanted to post, so here it goes. It seems to me that there has to be a core ability/principle in man that turns raw sensation into perception. If colors are all in the head then an object doesn't "look like" anything. But then our eyes, perhaps the greatest organ, does not know reality. Does it see shape at least? In combination with touch, perhaps. But colors are just as much "there in front of us" as the solidity on which the colors lie. Things wouldn't even be black and white or translucent on there own. "In themselves" no sight could see them. So it seems to me that that there must be a soul in man that sees through the eyes and touches the object of vision in ocular activity. Science says all we see is light and that the objects are images in the brain (the world is in the brain?). George Berkeley was key in the development of this. But when I say soul I
Do not necessarily mean something spiritual. It could be a core principle that is more than spiritual (actually divine) or it could be a material principle (stemming from QM?) which is even more truly material than the world we are trying to know. That there is something unique in man in this way (although unique only as special and foundational, for animals may have it too) can be shown by how children learn language. We all know that if we come across ancient scrolls on which is written a language unlike any we know, we could never translate it. Yet this is the very situation a child is in. If i show a toddler a ball and say "ball", how does the child know that the word ball refers to that object instead of only to its extension, firure, solidity, or number. If i say to him "you jumped", how does he know the word "you" doesn't apply to the jumping? Of course this all happens in a complex context over time, but i still believe everyone would be autistic so to say without a natural core principle uniting our minds to each other. Even if a child is resting on the mother's breast and she says "love" as the child is feeling love, could not the word love mean rather "mother" instead of the act of love itself. Without a place to start we could never have common communication with each other. So I believe and think that we all have bodies that have all kind of natural intelligences in them, and the that mind is a limitless faculty that is designed to know people and the world itself. If we can't know the world, how can we know other people?

What you believe about "free will" is irrelevant. We do have the capacity to choose, and we all know and accept this. Some call this 'free will", if you want to just call it "the capacity to choose", that's fine. Whatever, way that you describe it, or try to understand it, it's part of the human condition which we need to understand in order to adequately understand the human condition. The fact that some people say we have free will, and others do not, is very strong evidence that the human condition is not understood, and we need to know the truth about this matter before it will be understood.

The fact that something is commonly said does not necessarily imply that what is said is a fact.
— Harry Hindu

That is exactly the point I am making. We need to know the truth about these things before we can claim to have an understanding of the human condition. If we knew the truth about free will, then we'd have a much better basis for a claim about understanding the human condition. Since we do not know the truth about this, we cannot claim to have an understanding of the human condition. — Metaphysician Undercover

The capacity to choose isn't just a human condition. Other animals make choices too. Computers make choices by running software with IF-THEN-ELSE statements which are options given some set of circumstances. When you make choices, you do the same thing. You measure your options against the current circumstances and ultimately choose the one that best fits the circumstances. Logically, you will always make the same choice given the same set of circumstances and the same set of options, just like a computer. And just like a computer, you choices can become predictable.

So the question isn't, "do we have the capacity to choose". It's "do we have the capacity to choose freely", whatever that means. Hopefully you can enlighten me.

The capacity to choose isn't just a human condition. Other animals make choices too. — Harry Hindu

You're still make irrelevant comments. The fact that human beings are animals is an essential aspect of the human condition. So, presenting the fact that other animals make choices, as do human beings, does nothing to suggest that this is not a part of the human condition. Neither does the fact that human beings make machines which also appear to be making choices.

Logically, you will always make the same choice given the same set of circumstances and the same set of options, just like a computer. And just like a computer, you choices can become predictable. — Harry Hindu

I believe this proposition is fundamentally flawed. There is no such thing as two distinct instances of "the same set of circumstances". That is a fundamental aspect of reality, and also of the human condition, ensured by the nature of time. Any set of circumstance is unique, and not repeatable as "the same". Do you disagree with this?

So the question isn't, "do we have the capacity to choose". It's "do we have the capacity to choose freely", whatever that means. Hopefully you can enlighten me. — Harry Hindu

You seem to be willfully ignoring what I am saying. We do not understand the capacity to choose. Therefore we do not understand the human condition. In order to understand the human condition we need to first understand the capacity to choose. "We" includes I. Therefore I cannot "enlighten" you on this matter.

You seem to be willfully ignoring what I am saying. We do not understand the capacity to choose. Therefore we do not understand the human condition. In order to understand the human condition we need to first understand the capacity to choose. — Metaphysician Undercover

...which is what I was doing in suggesting that we look at how other animals make decisions. If how animals make decisions is similar to how humans make decisions then that can shed some light on the human condition. This is why we use animals as test subjects to get at some aspect of the human condition without harming humans.

You seem to be willfully ignoring what I am saying. We do not understand the capacity to choose. Therefore we do not understand the human condition. In order to understand the human condition we need to first understand the capacity to choose. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not willfully ignoring anything. It is you that is ignoring my request for you to explain what you mean by free will. If free will simply entails making decisions and I have shown that computers can make decisions does that mean computers have free will? You either agree that it does and we can then settle the case as one of where you use different words than I do to explain the same process, or disagree and you would have to come up with a better explanation as to what free will is. The ball is in your court.

Let me just add that if you want to say that a computer doesn't actually have choices or make decisions then I would expect you to then define what you mean by "choices".

...which is what I was doing in suggesting that we look at how other animals make decisions. If how animals make decisions is similar to how humans make decisions then that can shed some light on the human condition. This is why we use animals as test subjects to get at some aspect of the human condition without harming humans. — Harry Hindu

But we still don't know how animals make choices. And, it's doubtful that selections made by other animals can even qualify as decisions. To choose, and to decide, have very different meanings.

It is you that is ignoring my request for you to explain what you mean by free will. — Harry Hindu

I answered this. It's the capacity to make choices. Some say it's free will, others do not. That there is not agreement on this indicates that we do not understand it.

If free will simply entails making decisions and I have shown that computers can make decisions does that mean computers have free will? You either agree that it does and we can then settle the case as one of where you use different words than I do to explain the same process, or disagree and you would have to come up with a better explanation as to what free will is. The ball is in your court. — Harry Hindu

Computers do not make decisions. To decide is to come to a resolution as the result of consideration. Computers are incapable of consideration. Computers do not even choose, they simply follow algorithms. To choose is to select from a multitude of options. There are no options for a computer, it must follow its rules. Even a so-called random number generator is a case of following a set of rules, and not a true choice

It appears like you just like to throw words around willy nilly, pretending that you can argue logically by giving the same word different meanings. That's known as equivocation. You can say that a computer "decides" if you want, and we say that a human being "decides", but obviously what is referred to by that word in each of these two cases, is completely different. So to say that the computer's activity is relevant to what we are discussing, would be equivocation.

But we still don't know how animals make choices. And, it's doubtful that selections made by other animals can even qualify as decisions. To choose, and to decide, have very different meanings. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's a weird assertion considering that the definition of "choose" is to decide, according to Merriam-Webster:
https://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/choose
So the ball is in your court again to explain YOUR distinction between what it means to choose as opposed to decide because I have no idea what you're talking about.

I answered this. It's the capacity to make choices. Some say it's free will, others do not. That there is not agreement on this indicates that we do not understand it. — Metaphysician Undercover

MOST people do not say that is free will. Most people define free will as "The capacity to make choices that are neither determined by natural causality nor predestined by fate or divine will." So "free will" isn't just making choices as there are choices that are forced and those that are not. You seem to be saying that "free will" entails both forced and unforced choices.

Computers do not make decisions. To decide is to come to a resolution as the result of consideration. Computers are incapable of consideration. Computers do not even choose, they simply follow algorithms. To choose is to select from a multitude of options. There are no options for a computer, it must follow its rules. Even a so-called random number generator is a case of following a set of rules, and not a true choice

It appears like you just like to throw words around willy nilly, pretending that you can argue logically by giving the same word different meanings. That's known as equivocation. You can say that a computer "decides" if you want, and we say that a human being "decides", but obviously what is referred to by that word in each of these two cases, is completely different. So to say that the computer's activity is relevant to what we are discussing, would be equivocation. — Metaphysician Undercover

You also said,

We do not understand the capacity to choose. Therefore we do not understand the human condition. — Metaphysician Undercover

So if we do not understand the capacity to choose how can you say whether or not a computer makes choices or not? I asked you to define what you mean by "choose". If I can learn to predict what you will choose does that no imply that you are following some predictable pattern (algorithm) in making your decisions? Give me an example of one instance where you made a decision and tell me what it was like for you. Explain the process that you used in making your decision.

This discussion has strayed too far off topic.

Yep. And understanding the order of events is paramount. The role that language can and cannot play in our lives; particularly early on. That seems crucial to me.

We are picking out color - to the exclusion of all else - each and every time we gather red things. We even use the same biologically activated structures(brain areas). Such activities go hand in hand - so to speak - with correctly, appropriately, and hence sensibly... uttering "red". There are other ways to use the word.

We are not picking one or the other. We are connecting them. All red things share that in common, even if the common denominator boils down to being capable of causing those capable of having subjective color experiences of red to do so.

I think Searle would distinguish between the subjective and objective aspects of experience.

Red things are not in the head even if they do not look red unless their being viewed.

Red things are not in the head even if they do not look red unless their being viewed. — creativesoul

:up: Right, how could it be sensible to say anything looks like anything outside the context of being seen?

I'm amazed that some in this thread seem to think there is a fact of the matter concerning whether unseen things are coloured. Of course in ordinary parlance it is said they are, but that doesn't mean that what is being claimed is that unseen objects look red or any other colour.

An unseen tomato is not invisible per se. An unseen tomato does not look red it is red.

@Michael@Banno

https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=8066898573347962

Nice.

The arguments from illusion continue to pile up, as if the hight of the pile would make them more convincing. :roll:

Did anyone mention RGB? The screens of modern phones, tablets, computers, TVs etc use three colour channels: red, green, blue. There's no yellow light emitted from these screens, yet they can depict yellow objects, and we see them as yellow. But the truth is that those are faint green colours looking as yellow.

Try this. Open a picture of a yellow colour swatch on your phone, zoom in so that the colour covers the entire screen. Then go into a dark room or closet, and let the light from the screen shine on a (white) wall. The light on the wall does not look so yellow. It's faint green.

The arguments from illusion continue to pile up, as if the hight of the pile would make them more convincing. :roll: — jkop

Well, whether you’re convinced by it is irrelevant. What matters is that both a) I see a can of red Coke and b) the photo does not emit 620-750nm light are true. So one’s account of seeing the colour red cannot depend on 620-750nm light.

The factual explanation is that the colours we see are determined by what the brain is doing.

What matters is that both a) I see a can of red Coke and b) the photo does not emit 620-750nm light are true. So one’s account of seeing the colour red cannot depend on 620-750nm light. — Michael

Unless having already seen red is necessary for the illusion to work.

The factual explanation is that the colours we see are determined by what the brain is doing. — Michael

In part.

Unless having already seen red is necessary for the illusion to work. — creativesoul

By this do you mean that 620-750nm light must have stimulated my eyes for me to see the colour red? Why do you think that? What’s the relationship between 650-720nm light and the colour red?

Unless having already seen red is necessary for the illusion to work.
— creativesoul

By this do you mean that 620-750nm light must have stimulated my eyes for me to see the colour red? — Michael

Must have already in past...

Why do you think that?

That's how gestalts work.

What’s the relationship between 650-720nm light and the colour red?

They're both elements for the emergence of red experience(s).

They're both elements for the emergence of red experience(s). — creativesoul

Sure, like getting stabbed or burnt or whatever are elements for the emergence of pain experience(s). But pain is nonetheless the experience. My claim is only that these colour experiences are our ordinary and everyday understanding of colours. When I think about the colour red I'm not thinking about atoms and electrons and photons or anything like that; I'm thinking about the experience.

They're both elements for the emergence of red experience(s). — creativesoul

Although re-reading this, maybe I've misunderstood you. Are you saying that these are three distinct things?

1. 650-720nm light
2. The colour red
3. Red experiences

Well, they're different sets of meaningful marks(names). For me, the last two are inseparable, whereas they are both existentially dependent on the first.

An unseen tomato does not look red it is red. — Janus

I agree, if by "is red" we mean is capable of causing red experience in those capable of having them.

What matters is that both a) I see a can of red Coke and b) the photo does not emit 620-750nm light are true. — Michael

a) is false. You don't see red. One colour, or a bundle of colours, can look like another colour. For example, at dusk, dawn, under coloured lights, in pointilistic paintings, RGB screens etc.

the colours we see are determined by what the brain is doing. — Michael

That's also false. The blind can't see anything no matter what their brains are doing.

One colour, or a bundle of colours, can look like another colour. — jkop

Colour is the look, not a wavelength of light (which you seem to be saying here). There is usually a correspondence between the two, but dreams, hallucinations, illusions, and cases such as the dress show that this correspondence doesn't always hold.

The blind can't see anything no matter what their brains are doing. — jkop

See cortical visual prostheses.

That's also false. The blind can't see anything no matter what their brains are doing. — jkop

The blind can see if their brains are directly stimulated.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phosphene

Similarly, the profoundly deaf can hear using direct stimulation methods.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cochlear_implant

This is due to the uncontroversial scientific fact that perception is created by the brain regardless of whether the stimulus enters the brain through the normal means of sensory organs or whether it is hot wired directly through a probe.

And perhaps more fittingly than a cochlear implant is an auditory brainstem implant.

This is due to the uncontroversial scientific fact that perception is created by the brain regardless of whether the stimulus enters the brain through the normal means of sensory organs or whether it is hot wired directly through a probe.

One might perceive that he is running while in fact he is dreaming. In that case it would be an error to say he is running. It’s the same with sight and hearing. So while one might perceive that he is seeing or hearing with direct stimulation of some part of his brain, it is in fact untrue that he is. The environmental stimulus and the means with which it interacts with a fully-functioning sensory organ is a large part of acts such as “seeing” and “hearing”, and ought not be confused with some other stimulus. Stimulating a brain with some of the methods indicated is just an artificial way to illicit some of the biological effects of an actual, natural stimulus, but is in fact not the same act.

The environmental stimulus and the means with which it interacts with a fully-functioning sensory organ is a large part of acts such as “seeing” and “hearing”, and ought not be confused with some other stimulus. Stimulating a brain with some of the methods indicated is just an artificial way to illicit some of the biological effects of an actual, natural stimulus, but is in fact not the same act. — NOS4A2

Why does that matter? It is still normal to describe someone with a cochlear implant as hearing things, and the same for those with an auditory brainstem implant.

If you only want to use the words “see” and “hear” for those with normally functioning sense organs then you do you, but it’s not wrong for the rest of us to be more inclusive with such language.

Stimulating a brain with some of the methods indicated is just an artificial way to illicit some of the biological effects of an actual, natural stimulus, but is in fact not the same act. — NOS4A2

If I have a cochlear implant and perceive you say "hello" through my "artificial" means, and I say "Nos said 'hello,'" my statement is true under both correspondence and coherence theories of truth. That is, my saying you said hello corresponds to what actually happened and my use of language is consistent with your own.

We would have a different result if I hallucinated you saying "hello. "

None of this demands a direct realism. To demand a direct realism forces a definition of "artificial" to simply mean "other than typically human, " which in no way can be assumed to be more accurate than other methods. To call one method artificial assumes there is an otherwise natural and correct way, but that assumption is the entirety of this debate. That is, what is contested is whether the world as it appears is as it is or whether it has been artificially manipulated by the internal processes.

My position is that all perception is "artificial" if that term means it is an unaltered representation of reality.

The blind can see if their brains are directly stimulated. — Hanover

This is equivocation on "seeing." For example, a blind person does not see when they dream, as your verbiage would have it. Sleeping pills are not a cure for blindness.

This is due to the uncontroversial scientific fact that perception is created by the brain regardless of whether the stimulus enters the brain through the normal means of sensory organs or whether it is hot wired directly through a probe. — Hanover

This is an equivocation on "created." There is a lot of equivocation going on between you and Michael.

In sight the brain processes external signals, it does not create images. In that case the images require both the brain and the external stimulus. In hallucination the brain does create images, for in that case the images require no external stimulus. Your whole facade requires equivocation between these two very different cases. If there were no difference between seeing the wolf and hallucinating the wolf, then you would be right. In that case we would not even have two different words, "seeing" and "hallucinating."