https://www.iltalehti.fi/politiikka/a/99d85643-946a-4d9c-8ff8-3021dc4106ab

If you have changed your mind you may start with the post whose contents you almost fully ignored in favor of a "I'm not going to talk to you anymore!" — Tzeentch

So then Tzeentch can ignore yours, @ssu, in favor of a "I'm not going to talk to you anymore!"

Caricatures aside — Tzeentch

Your "serious" arguments come out as caricatures already and you dare to complain if we serve you your own meal?

, thanks :up:

the idea that the West carries principal responsibility in this war and that the West's conduct so far has been nothing short of shameful — Tzeentch

Let’s complete your reasoning: if the West carries principal responsibility, which one carries secondary responsibility? Ukraine or Russia? I guess it’s Ukraine, right? So no matter what responsibility Russia has in this conflict, yet neither the West nor Ukraine are in position to reproach Russia or to demand compensation or impose punishment to Russia, right? They must pay whatever follows from Russian invasion. Including nuclear bombing of course. This is your serious reasoning or a caricature, Tzeench?

western experts, analists and academics - a group that has done a vastly better job at predicting the course and outcome of this war than those who subscribe to the narrative that is put forward by virtually every major western media outlet. — Tzeentch

In what sense "vastly better"? Actually many geopolitical and military experts other than the few names you often cite explained the root causes [1], or “roughly” predicted what the unfortunate course [2] and the outcome [3] could be, no matter how questionable you find Western media propaganda. So the fascination comes more from the way those few names argue and assess blame which pleases pro-Russian populists like you.

[1]
On Ukraine’s independence and its impact on Russia (1991):
* "Ukraine's independence fundamentally changes the post-Cold War landscape. For Russia, losing Ukraine is a major blow to its ambitions of maintaining a significant influence in Eastern Europe. The success or failure of Ukraine as an independent state will determine the future trajectory of Russian policy."
* Source: Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "The Premature Partnership." Foreign Affairs, March/April 1991.

On Ukraine’s strategic importance to Russia (1997):
* "It cannot be stressed enough that without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire. However, if Moscow regains control over Ukraine, with its 52 million people and major resources, as well as its access to the Black Sea, Russia automatically regains the wherewithal to become a powerful imperial state, spanning Europe and Asia."
* Source: Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives." Basic Books, 1997, p. 46.

On Russia’s likely strategy toward Ukraine (1994):
* "For Russia, the loss of Ukraine was geopolitically pivotal, reducing its geostrategic status and diminishing its sphere of influence in Central Europe. Thus, Russian efforts to reassert influence over Ukraine should be expected, especially given Ukraine's strategic significance."
* Source: Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "Ukraine: Crucial to Europe's Security." Foreign Affairs, September/October 1994.

On potential Russian moves against Ukraine (1997):
* "A Ukraine firmly aligned with the West would be a major setback to Russia's aspirations to reassert its influence over the former Soviet space. As such, the Kremlin might use a combination of political pressure, economic leverage, and covert actions to try to bring Ukraine back under its influence."
* Source: Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives." Basic Books, 1997, p. 92


[2]
”I fear that the West may not have the political will to sustain the level of support Ukraine needs to resist Russian aggression over the long term."
* Date: March 2022
* Source: Anders Fogh Rasmussen, former NATO Secretary General, in an interview with CNN.

"There is a real risk that Western countries will grow weary of the conflict and reduce their support for Ukraine, leaving it vulnerable to Russian advances."
* Date: February 2022
* Source: Anne Applebaum, historian and journalist, in an article for The Atlantic.

"I am skeptical about the West's ability to maintain a united front in supporting Ukraine, given the economic and political pressures at home."
* Date: April 2022
* Source: Ian Bremmer, political scientist and president of Eurasia Group, in a tweet.

"The West's capacity to provide sustained military and economic aid to Ukraine is uncertain, and this could have dire consequences for the conflict."
* Date: May 2022
* Source: Dmitri Alperovitch, co-founder of CrowdStrike, in an interview with The Washington Post.

"I worry that the West may not be willing to bear the costs and risks associated with supporting Ukraine, especially if the conflict escalates further."
* Date: June 2022
* Source: Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, in an article for Foreign Affairs.

"There is a concern that Western countries will prioritize their own interests over Ukraine's needs, leading to insufficient support."
* Date: July 2022
* Source: John Mearsheimer, political scientist at the University of Chicago, in an interview with The New York Times.

"I fear that the West's willingness to provide the necessary aid to Ukraine will wane as the conflict drags on and other crises emerge."
* Date: August 2022
* Source: Samantha Power, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, in an article for The New Yorker.

"The West's capacity to sustain support for Ukraine is uncertain, given the economic challenges and political divisions within Europe."
* Date: September 2022
* Source: Carl Bildt, former Prime Minister of Sweden, in an op-ed for The Wall Street Journal.

"I am skeptical about the West's ability to provide the military aid Ukraine needs to defend itself against Russian aggression."
* Date: October 2022
* Source: General Philip Breedlove, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in an interview with The Guardian.

"There is a risk that Western countries will grow tired of the conflict and reduce their support for Ukraine, leaving it vulnerable."
* Date: November 2022
* Source: Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General, in a speech at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

"The West's capacity to provide sustained military and economic aid to Ukraine is uncertain, and this could have dire consequences for the conflict."
* Date: January 2022
* Source: Condoleezza Rice, former U.S. Secretary of State, in an interview with Fox News.

[3]

"I fear that Ukraine may not have the military capacity to regain all the territory occupied by Russia, especially in the eastern regions."
* Date: March 2022
* Source: Anders Fogh Rasmussen, former NATO Secretary General, in an interview with CNN.

"There is a real risk that Ukraine will struggle to retake territory from Russia, given the significant military disparities."
* Date: February 2022
* Source: Anne Applebaum, historian and journalist, in an article for The Atlantic.

"I am skeptical about Ukraine's ability to regain control of the Donbas and Crimea, given Russia's entrenched positions and military strength."
* Date: April 2022
* Source: Ian Bremmer, political scientist and president of Eurasia Group, in a tweet.

"Ukraine faces significant challenges in retaking territory from Russia, particularly in areas where Russia has consolidated its control."
* Date: May 2022
* Source: Dmitri Alperovitch, co-founder of CrowdStrike, in an interview with The Washington Post.

"I worry that Ukraine may not have the resources or the military capability to push back Russian forces and regain lost territory."
* Date: June 2022
* Source: Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, in an article for Foreign Affairs.

"There is a concern that Ukraine's military, despite its bravery and determination, may not be able to overcome Russia's superior firepower and logistical support."
* Date: July 2022
* Source: John Mearsheimer, political scientist at the University of Chicago, in an interview with The New York Times.

"I fear that Ukraine may not have the capacity to regain all the territory occupied by Russia, especially in the eastern regions."
* Date: August 2022
* Source: Samantha Power, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, in an article for The New Yorker.

"Ukraine's ability to retake territory from Russia is uncertain, given the significant military disparities and the entrenched positions of Russian forces."
* Date: September 2022
* Source: Carl Bildt, former Prime Minister of Sweden, in an op-ed for The Wall Street Journal.

"I am skeptical about Ukraine's capacity to regain control of the Donbas and Crimea, given Russia's military strength and the strategic importance of these regions."
* Date: October 2022
* Source: General Philip Breedlove, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in an interview with The Guardian.

"There is a risk that Ukraine will struggle to retake territory from Russia, given the significant military disparities and the entrenched positions of Russian forces."
* Date: November 2022
* Source: Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General, in a speech at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

Whoever has basic notions of logic can't get easily impressed by roughly true predictions, no matter how many they are. Here is why:
1. from false premises one can correctly infer true conclusions,
2. from a set of incompatible premises (namely premises that can not be at the same time true but can be at the same time false, or premises that can be neither true nor false at the same time) one can correctly infer exactly the same true conclusions.

Examples:

Every Saturday it rains
Tomorrow is Saturday
Tomorrow it rains

Every other day of the week than Saturday it rains
Tomorrow is not Saturday
Tomorrow it rains

Both arguments are formally sound. And they lead to the very same conclusive prediction. However, such conclusive prediction may happen to be true even if all or some individual premises are false and comparatively incompatible because contrary or contradictory. So it's not enough that predictions are true, nor that reasoning is sound to have valid predictive arguments or theories.

As long as we have men like you, we are absolutely, absolutely invincible. It is one thing to shoot at a shooting range here, and another thing to put your life and health at risk. But you have an inner need to defend the Fatherland and the courage to make such a decision. — Putin · Al Jazeera · Aug 21, 2024

Well, they're still warring (with help from North Korea, China, Iran), 2½ years after the invasion, 10 years after grabbing Crimea.

Here's the orginal article in Finnish:

IL:n tiedot: Suomen suojaksi 4 000–5 000 sotilaan panssaroitu Nato-prikaati

I think it's basically just extremely sloppy journalism: didn't even care to read the article carefully, took just the headline and made a story from it.

:up:

How to circumvent sanctions and do a bit of spying:

Marinchefen: Vi misstänker att ryska skuggflottan spionerar (en)
^{— SVT · Apr 22, 2024}
Baiba Braže in Finland: Russia’s “shadow fleet” and other threats to the Baltic Sea states will be limited
^{— Ārlietu ministrija (Government of Latvia) · Jun 14, 2024}
How to rein in Russia’s shadow fleet
^{— Elisabeth Braw · POLITICO · Aug 26, 2024}

Nothing new I guess. Maybe oil market sensitivities/insecurities and international legalities can account for the lack of response, in part at least. Though, avoiding confrontation encourages offenders.

How long can Russia continue going as it is? Forever?

How long can Russia continue going as it is? Forever? — frank

Not forever. This is a high intensity conflict, a conventional war, and it cannot go like this forever. It can easily become a frozen conflict.

This conflict has gone for a decade, actually, so with the losses and the strain, it won't go forever. But it can go at worst for decades. But then it's likely, as in the 100 year war between France and England or the 30 years war in Germany, it will have those time of lower intensity.

The longer it will go, the worse will be Russia's failure and more likely that Russia will fall from being the last Western Empire.

Won't Russia become more and more hollowed out economically?

Won't Russia become more and more hollowed out economically? — frank

Of course!

It's been a disaster for Russia. Not perhaps as big as for Ukraine itself, but still.

Putin's gamble went all fine: first Russo-Georgian war, then the annexation of Crimea, then the involvement in Syria. Then finally this absurdity in 2022. Oh, it likely was a brave dashing plan.

And add to the picture that the US had just been humiliated in Afghanistan where it had just lost a war. So time for Putin to just pit it all in again and throw the dices ...with absolutely devastating consequences this time!

Europe and the West can keep supporting Ukraine. For them it's not a strain in any way. The real question is Ukraine, which with invading Russia proper has done a surprising move again. And what has Russia gained? With Crimea, a problematic territory which creates far more expenses than revenues. With the occupied Ukrainian territories it's even worse.

And this brings to the real question: What if Putin had resisted his imperialist urge and not grabbed Crimea from Ukraine. What would be the consequences?

- Many Ukrainians would still see Russians as brother people. With lots of Russian speakers Putin would be respected in Ukraine as he was prior to 2014.
- Ukraine would be seen as a problematic country. It wouldn't be anywhere close to NATO membership.
- West European countries would have continued their military disarmament.
- Sweden and Finland would be neutral. Finland would still be having bouts of "Finlandization" as it would try to keep good relations with Russia.
- Russia would enjoy good ties with the West and would be seen as a constructive European country. Putin likely would be in G8 meetings.
- A lot of Ukrainians and Russia wouldn't be dead and fighting the "break-up war of Soviet Union", a state that had ceased to exist before many of the victims of today had been born.

In fact the "Finlandization" of Europe that Gorbachev hoped to happen might have actually happened as European countries would have continued dismantling their armed forces leaving Russia to be better.

Why did Putin do it then? Is it because he would have eventually lost power if he worked on making Russia healthy?

Why did Putin do it then? Is it because he would have eventually lost power if he worked on making Russia healthy? — frank

Right from the start of his political career Putin's favorite move has been war. It's an integral part of how Putin's policy. Right from the start.



He was practically a nobody in politics when Yeltsin made him Prime Minister, even if he had been in the position of the director of the FDB. But after starting the Second Chechen War (after dubious apartment buildings were bombed in a distant suburb of Moscow), he won popularity. For him the "strong man" image has been important.

(The Second Chechen war was actually a victory for Russia, and Putin)


And since he and his Kleptocracy couldn't make Russia economically great, he chose the imperial greatness card. After all, for him the dissolution of the Soviet Union was a huge tragedy. Something that shouldn't have happened and which left many Russians stranded in these new "artificial" countries that got independence after the breakup of Soviet Union.

The first dent on his shiny image was the submarine Kursk disaster. It would have been an ordinary debacle for any Western politician, but for the former head of FSB it was too much. From there on the autocratic style was reinforced.

And Putin did see the writing on the wall that especially the young had had enough of him when he took the Presidency again after one brief stint of Medvedev on that role. Already 2011-2013 there were a lot of protests against Putin in Russia (see Russian protests 2011-2013).



And I think the real issue is that Putin is utterly corrupt as are the people around him. As one Russian opposition leader once commented, the watch on Putin's hand is more valuable than what the President's official annual salary is. He couldn't just leave office like old and sick Yeltsin and just hope that Medvedev's around. What if another party comes around and puts him into jail?

And now he's chosen his and Russia's path. Russia could have played the Imperialist card in the Caucasus and in Central Asia, but Ukraine was too close for East European countries. And annexing territory was the real no-no, which other states simply couldn't turn away from. But the lure of being "Putin the Great" for Russia was too much. Territory, land mass, has always been extremely important to Russian rulers. And the most obvious thing is to call it imperialism.

(One really should listen for example what Putin is saying here - especially those who think that everything has happened because of the US)

, whether strategic or something else, I suppose anyone can speculate ...
▸ Aug 13, 2024, ▸ Aug 16, 2024 (← embedded links for context or whatever)
Some say Ukraine → NATO plans and that's that, some say ongoing provocations kept alive by a military-industrial complex and covert conspirators to which the Kremlin is simply responding, ... (← such like tend to render the invaders mechanistic / assign blame outside / run with whatever comes out of the Kremlin)
Some add cultural tendencies (including historical) on the invader's part, ...
Anyway, I can't answer on 's behalf.

:up:

Has anyone been able to come up with a credible explanation for Ukraine's incursion into Kursk yet?

Let us ask the simple question: "Cui bono?"

Hypothetically, what country might want Ukraine to be unable to sit down for negotiations before a certain, hypothetical election that may take place in the Autumn?

Hmmmm..... :chin:

Debris analysis shows Russia using North Korean missiles in Ukraine, US military says
^{— Phil Stewart, Michelle Nichols, Josh Smith, Diane Craft · Reuters · May 30, 2024 — usnews·com}
Kim Sent Russia Millions of Artillery Shells, South Korea Says
^{— Soo-Hyang Choi · Bloomberg · Jun 14, 2024 — time·com}

Kim must hate Ukraine, waging such "a proxy war" against them. Actually, he probably doesn't care, except he's not fond of those that have sanctioned North Korea. Well, it's understandable when the Ukrainians take issue with Kim, everyone knowing the intent (cf reports above), North Korean crap raining down on Ukraine. The actions of the Kremlin amount to a partial reversal of Ukraine's independence (+ sovereignty + integrity), established in 1991 a couple of years after the Berlin Wall came down, or at least an attempt at such reversal. Consequently, that's what Kim is helping. Independence includes freedom to seek EU membership, wrestle free from the dominating north+eastern neighbor, implement political reforms and develop a democracy, assert integrity, whatever.

Has anyone been able to come up with a credible explanation for Ukraine's incursion into Kursk yet?

Let us ask the simple question: "Cui bono?"

Hypothetically, what country might want Ukraine to be unable to sit down for negotiations before a certain, hypothetical election that may take place in the Autumn? — Tzeentch

Not sure why you're asking, since clearly you already know.

But for the benefit of everyone else, I'll summarise all the various explanations I've heard:

• At a basic level, Kursk was badly defended and offered the chance to take a bunch of territory and POWs, in effect strategic depth that could be bought cheaply.
• The incursion forces Russia to treat the protection of it's borders more seriously, thus requiring more resources and complicating logistics.
• On the subject of logistics, the offensive has cut a rail line and is putting artillery systems deeper into Russia, thus opening up more targets. Ukraine needs a way to target russian rear areas, and one way to do that is to just cross the border.
• By crossing the border, Ukraine demonstrates that simply limiting the use of western weapons systems won't keep the war on some preordained railroad, thus hopefully (for Ukraine) forcing western governments to rethink those restrictions.
• Russian commanders might overcommit to the defense and reconquest of Kursk for political reasons, thus opening up opportunities at other parts of the front.

Whether or not the offensive was ultimately "worth it" is a different question we won't be able to answer for some time. The Pokrovsk direction looks bad for Ukraine and Pokrovsk is more valuable to Ukraine than anything Ukraine has taken in Kursk is to Russia (in objective terms). At the same time, committing the offensive troops used in Kursk anywhere else doesn't necessarily change the outcome there.

:up:

On 31 January 2022, during the 2021–2022 Russo-Ukrainian crisis, as Chairman of the Russian Officers' General Assembly, Gen. Ivashov published a statement condemning Putin's "criminal policy of provoking a war" and calling for President Putin's resignation.[6][7][8] Blaming Putin for risking "the final destruction of Russian statehood and the extermination of the indigenous population of the country" Ivashov stated that the real danger for Russia was not NATO or the West but "the unviability of the state model, the complete incapacity and lack of professionalism of the system of power and administration, the passivity and disorganization of society." Under these conditions "no country survives for long".[8] According to Roderick Gregory, "Ivashov believes that NATO is a hostile power, but his experience has taught him that the NATO/U.S. threat is under control and no external threat is imminent from the Western powers."

Also on 7 February 2022 Ivashov publicly called for Putin to resign over threats of a "criminal" invasion of Ukraine.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leonid_Ivashov


The Chairman of the All-Russian Officers' Assembly, Colonel General Leonid Grigorievich Ivashov, wrote an Appeal to the President and Citizens of the Russian Federation "The Eve of War":

Appeal of the All-Russian Officers' Assembly

to the President and Citizens of the Russian Federation

Today, humanity lives in anticipation of war. And war is inevitable human casualties, destruction, suffering of large masses of people, destruction of the usual way of life, disruption of the life support systems of states and peoples. A great war is a huge tragedy, someone's grave crime. It so happened that Russia found itself in the center of this looming catastrophe. And, perhaps, this is the first time in its history.

Earlier, Russia (the USSR) waged forced (just) wars, and, as a rule, when there was no other way out, when the vital interests of the state and society were under threat.

And what threatens the existence of Russia itself today, and are there such threats? It can be argued that there really are threats - the country is on the verge of the end of its history. All vital spheres, including demography, are steadily degrading, and the rate of population extinction is breaking world records. And the degradation is systemic, and in any complex system, the destruction of one of the elements can lead to the collapse of the entire system.

And this, in our opinion, is the main threat to the Russian Federation. But this is an internal threat, emanating from the model of the state, the quality of power and the state of society. And the reasons for its formation are internal: the unviability of the state model, the complete incapacity and unprofessionalism of the system of power and governance, the passivity and disorganization of society. No country can live long in such a state.

As for external threats, they are certainly present. But, according to our expert assessment, they are not currently critical, directly threatening the existence of Russian statehood, its vital interests. In general, strategic stability is maintained, nuclear weapons are under reliable control, NATO force groups are not increasing, they do not show threatening activity.

Therefore, the situation being whipped up around Ukraine is, first of all, artificial, selfish in nature for certain internal forces, including the Russian Federation. As a result of the collapse of the USSR, in which Russia (Yeltsin) played a decisive role, Ukraine became an independent state, a member of the UN, and in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter has the right to individual and collective defense.

The leadership of the Russian Federation has still not recognized the results of the referendum on the independence of the DPR and LPR, while at the official level, more than once, including during the Minsk negotiation process, it emphasized the belonging of their territories and population to Ukraine.

It has also been repeatedly said at a high level about the desire to maintain normal relations with Kiev, without singling out special relations with the DPR and LPR.

The issue of the genocide committed by Kiev in the south-eastern regions was not raised either in the UN or in the OSCE. Naturally, in order for Ukraine to remain a friendly neighbor for Russia, it was necessary to demonstrate to it the attractiveness of the Russian model of state and system of power.

But the Russian Federation has not become such, its development model and foreign policy mechanism of international cooperation repel almost all of its neighbors, and not only.

Russia's acquisition of Crimea and Sevastopol and the non-recognition of them as Russian by the international community (and, therefore, the overwhelming majority of countries in the world still consider them to belong to Ukraine) convincingly demonstrates the failure of Russian foreign policy and the unattractiveness of its domestic policy.

Attempts to force people to "love" the Russian Federation and its leadership through ultimatums and threats of force are senseless and extremely dangerous.

The use of military force against Ukraine, firstly, will call into question the existence of Russia itself as a state; secondly, it will forever make Russians and Ukrainians mortal enemies. Thirdly, there will be thousands (tens of thousands) of young, healthy guys killed on both sides, which will certainly affect the future demographic situation in our dying countries. On the battlefield, if this happens, Russian troops will encounter not only Ukrainian servicemen, among whom there will be many Russian guys, but also servicemen and equipment from many NATO countries, and the member states of the alliance will be obliged to declare war on Russia.

The President of the Republic of Turkey R. Erdogan clearly stated on whose side Turkey will fight. And it can be assumed that two field armies and the navy of Turkey will be ordered to "liberate" Crimea and Sevastopol and, possibly, invade the Caucasus.

In addition, Russia will definitely be included in the category of countries threatening peace and international security, will be subject to the heaviest sanctions, will become an outcast of the world community, and will probably be deprived of the status of an independent state.

The president and the government, the Ministry of Defense cannot fail to understand such consequences, they are not that stupid.
source: https://web-archive-org.translate.goog/web/20220214005455/http://ooc.su/news/obrashhenie_obshherossijskogo_oficerskogo_sobranija_k_prezidentu_i_grazhdanam_rossijskoj_federacii/2022-01-31-79?_x_tr_sl=ru&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=wapp

03.02.2022 20:42:00
Forecasts of bloodthirsty political scientists
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Of delighted hawks and hasty cuckoos

Mikhail Khodarenok

About the author: Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok – former head of the group of the 1st direction of the 1st directorate of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, colonel

Tags: realities , russia , ukraine , donbass , conflict

realities, russia, ukraine, donbass, conflict In anticipation of "Russian aggression," Ukrainian soldiers are settling down on the line of confrontation with the defenders of the DPR and LPR. Photo: Reuters

Some representatives of the Russian political class today claim that Russia is capable of inflicting a crushing defeat on Ukraine in a few hours (shorter periods are also mentioned) if a military conflict begins. Let's see how much such statements correspond to reality.

In the Russian expert community, the opinion has recently become quite ingrained that there will be no need to even introduce troops into Ukrainian territory, since the Armed Forces of this country are in a deplorable state.

Some political scientists emphasize that a powerful Russian fire strike will destroy virtually all surveillance and communication systems, artillery and tank formations. Moreover, a number of experts conclude that even one crushing strike by Russia will be enough to end such a war.

As the icing on the cake, some analysts particularly emphasize the fact that no one in Ukraine will defend the “Kiev regime.”

IT WILL NOT BE AN EASY WALK

Let's start with the latter. To claim that no one in Ukraine will defend the regime means, in practice, complete ignorance of the military-political situation and the mood of the broad masses of the people in the neighboring state. Moreover, the degree of hatred (which, as is known, is the most effective fuel for armed struggle) in the neighboring republic towards Moscow is frankly underestimated. No one will meet the Russian army with bread, salt and flowers in Ukraine.

It seems that the events in the south-east of Ukraine in 2014 have taught no one anything. Back then, they also expected that the entire left-bank Ukraine would, in a single impulse and in a matter of seconds, turn into Novorossiya. They were already drawing maps, figuring out the personnel of future city and regional administrations, and developing state flags.

But even the Russian-speaking population of this part of Ukraine (including such cities as Kharkov, Zaporozhye, Dnepropetrovsk, Mariupol) did not support such plans in their vast majority. The Novorossiya project somehow imperceptibly fizzled out and died quietly.

In short, there is no way a liberation campaign in 2022, modeled on and likened to 1939, will work out. In this case, the words of the classic of Soviet literature Arkady Gaidar are truer than ever: "It seems that we will now have not an easy fight, but a hard battle."

"WITH LITTLE BLOOD, WITH A MIGHTY BLOW"

Now about the “powerful fire strike by Russia,” which will allegedly destroy “virtually all surveillance and communication systems, artillery and tank formations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.”

This expression alone shows that only political workers could say such a thing. For reference: during hypothetical military actions on the scale of a theater of military operations, strikes are made on priority targets and massive fire strikes are carried out. Note that during operational-strategic planning, the epithets "powerful" (as well as "medium", "weak", etc.) are not used.

In military science it is emphasized that strikes can be strategic (this mostly applies to strategic nuclear forces), operational and tactical. According to the number of participating forces and targets, strikes can be massive, group and single. And other concepts, even in works of a political science nature, are still better not to introduce or use.

Strikes at priority targets and massive fire strikes can be carried out within the framework of a front (fronts on Russia's western borders have not yet been formed) or the main command of the armed forces in the theater of military operations (such a command has not yet been created in the Southwestern strategic direction). Anything less than this is no longer a massive strike.

And what is, for example, a massive fire strike (MFS) of the front? To begin with, let us note that the MFS involves the maximum number of combat-ready forces and means of aviation, missile troops and artillery, electronic warfare means at the disposal of the front (operational-strategic association) commander. The MFS is one massive sortie of aviation, two or three launches of OTR and TR missile systems, several artillery fire raids. It is good if the degree of fire damage to the enemy is 60-70%.

What is the most important thing in this issue, as applied to the conflict with Ukraine? Of course, the MOU will inflict heavy losses on the probable enemy. But to expect to crush the armed forces of an entire state with just one such blow means to show simply unbridled optimism in the planning and conduct of military operations. Such MOUs will have to be inflicted not one or two, but many more in the course of hypothetical strategic actions in the theater of military operations.

It is necessary to add to this that the reserves of advanced and high-precision weapons in the Russian Armed Forces are not unlimited. Hypersonic missiles of the Zircon type are not yet in service. And the number of Kalibrs (sea-based cruise missiles), Kinzhals, Kh-101s (air-based cruise missiles) and Iskander missiles is measured in hundreds at best (tens in the case of Kinzhals). This arsenal is absolutely insufficient to wipe off the face of the Earth a country the size of France and with a population of over 40 million people. And these are precisely the parameters that characterize Ukraine.

ABOUT AIR DOMINANCE

Sometimes in the Russian expert community it is claimed (by fans of the Douhet doctrine) that since hypothetical military actions in Ukraine will take place under conditions of complete dominance of Russian aviation in the air, the war will be extremely short-lived and will end in the shortest possible time.

At the same time, it is somehow forgotten that the armed formations of the Afghan opposition did not have a single aircraft or a single combat helicopter during the conflict of 1979-1989. And the war in that country lasted for 10 years. The Chechen fighters did not have a single aircraft either. And the fight against them lasted for several years and cost the federal forces a lot of blood and victims.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces do have some sort of combat aviation, as well as air defense systems.

By the way, Ukrainian anti-aircraft missile forces (not Georgian ones) significantly pinched the Russian Air Force during the 2008 conflict. After the first day of combat operations, the Russian Air Force leadership was in outright shock from the losses they had suffered. And we shouldn't forget about that.

MOURNED IN ADVANCE

Now about the thesis "The Armed Forces of Ukraine are in a deplorable state." Of course, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have problems with aviation and modern air defense systems. But we must also admit the following. If before 2014 the Armed Forces of Ukraine were a fragment of the Soviet army, then over the past seven years a qualitatively different army has been created in Ukraine, on a completely different ideological basis and in many respects on NATO standards. And very modern weapons and equipment are now coming and continue to come to Ukraine from many countries of the North Atlantic Alliance.

As for the weakest point of the Ukrainian Armed Forces – the Air Force. It cannot be ruled out that the collective West can, in a relatively short period of time, supply Kyiv with fighters, so to speak, from the armed forces – in other words, used. However, this second-hand will be quite comparable in its tactical and technical characteristics to most of the aircraft in the Russian air fleet.

Of course, today the Ukrainian Armed Forces are significantly inferior to the Russian Armed Forces in their combat and operational capabilities. No one doubts this - neither in the East nor in the West.

But you can't treat this army lightly either. In this regard, you should always remember the advice of Alexander Suvorov: "Never despise your enemy, don't consider him stupider and weaker than you."

Now, regarding the claim that Western countries will not send a single soldier to die for Ukraine.

It should be noted that this is most likely what will happen. However, this does not at all exclude, in the event of a Russian invasion, massive aid to the Ukrainian Armed Forces from the collective West in the form of a wide variety of weapons and military equipment and large-scale deliveries of all kinds of material resources. In this regard, the West has already demonstrated an unprecedented consolidated position, which, it seems, was not predicted in Moscow.

There is no doubt that the US and the North Atlantic Alliance will begin a kind of reincarnation of Lend-Lease, modeled on the Second World War. An influx of volunteers from the West, of which there could be many, is also possible.

PARTISANS AND UNDERGROUND MEMBERSHIP

And finally, about the duration of the hypothetical campaign. The Russian expert community names several hours, sometimes even several tens of minutes. At the same time, it is somehow forgotten that we have already been through all this. The phrase "to take a city with one parachute regiment in two hours" has already become a classic of the genre.

It is also worth recalling that Stalin's mighty NKVD and the multi-million Soviet army fought the nationalist underground in Western Ukraine for more than 10 years. And now there is an option that all of Ukraine can easily join the partisans. Moreover, these formations can easily begin to operate on Russian territory.

Armed fighting in large Ukrainian cities is generally difficult to predict. It is well known that a large city is the best battlefield for the weaker and less technically advanced side of an armed conflict.

Serious experts emphasize that in a megalopolis it is possible not only to concentrate a group of thousands and even tens of thousands of fighters, but also to hide it from the superior firepower of the enemy. And also to supply it with material resources for a long time and to replenish losses in people and equipment. Neither mountains, nor forests, nor jungles provide such an opportunity today.

Experts are convinced that the urban environment helps the defenders, slows down the movement of the attackers, allows for a record number of fighters to be deployed per unit of area, and compensates for the lag in forces and technology. And in Ukraine there are more than enough large cities, including those with a million inhabitants. So, during a hypothetical war with Ukraine, the Russian army may encounter more than just Stalingrad and Grozny.

CONCLUSIONS

In general, there will be no Ukrainian blitzkrieg. Statements by some experts such as "The Russian army will defeat most of the Ukrainian Armed Forces units in 30-40 minutes", "Russia is capable of defeating Ukraine in 10 minutes in the event of a full-scale war", "Russia will defeat Ukraine in eight minutes" have no serious basis.

And finally, the most important thing. The armed conflict with Ukraine at the present time fundamentally does not meet the national interests of Russia. Therefore, some overexcited Russian experts would be better off forgetting about their self-indulgent fantasies. And in order to prevent further reputational losses, never to remember them again.

source: https://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2022-02-03/3_1175_donbass.html

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikhail_Khodaryonok

It has just been 15 years since Putin gave his speech in Munich. I re-watched it. And I thought — what a purely negative path we have taken in foreign policy over these 15 years.
Back then, there was an absolutely safe situation on our western borders. At one time, I worked as deputy head of the presidential administration and supervised military personnel. When future top military commanders came to me for interviews, I often asked them — do they see any real threat to Russia from the West? Is there any sensible and beneficial scenario for the West to attack Russia?
Not one has said “yes” in all these years.
Everyone understands perfectly well that the West is not living badly, it does not need anything. And even more so, it does not need to attack us, to receive a retaliatory strike, burned cities and countries. From the point of view of the country's security, this is empty.
If suddenly Ukraine joins NATO - and NATO commitments towards it have been accepted - then, of course, the strategic balance will shift if strike weapons, medium-range missiles, even shorter-range missiles with a flight time of several minutes to Moscow are deployed on the territory of Ukraine. But this is a topic of a completely different plan. Then it is necessary to discuss the conditions within the framework of arms limitations in Europe, non-deployment of strike weapons in Ukraine. Of course, then the corresponding demands will be put forward to us. And I fully admit that this will be one of the most important topics of negotiations, at which it will be possible to come to a common denominator.
But I repeat once again: there is no sensible scenario for an attack on Russia from Europe.
On the other hand, let's imagine that Ukraine joined NATO. It is possible that there will be hotheads there who will decide to "feel out" Russia, tickle its nerves, and maybe even drag it, as Lavrov and Putin said, into a direct confrontation with NATO. Can this be imagined? Should our territory be covered? It should be covered. Therefore, I consider the concentration of Russian troops in that region not so much as preparation for an attack, but as preparation for the formation of future fortified areas on the border with Ukraine. If in the end it is possible to reach an agreement on a general withdrawal of troops from the contact lines by 200-300 kilometers, then the troops will be redeployed. But in general, of course, when you watch Putin's old speeches, where he talks about what huge investments are coming from the West to Russia, what good relations we have, that Bush is his friend, you recall the words of Vito Corleone from "The Godfather" - "How did we come to this?"
source: https://republic.ru/posts/103121
By Evgeny Savostyanov (https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A1%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D1%8C%D1%8F%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2,_%D0%95%D0%B2%D0%B3%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B9_%D0%92%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D1%87)

, things the Putinistas don't want to hear, don't want anyone to hear, let alone discuss.
Had Ivashov been younger, there's a fair chance he'd "fall off a balcony and die".

From a telegram channel of ultra-nationalist Ukrainians:

На фоні новин про передачу іранських балістичних ракет малого радіусу дії в руки московитів, можна констатувати що вісь зла більш монолітна, рішуча та згуртована, аніж мʼякий західний світ. Вісь зла думає про збереження своїх багаторічних правлячих режимів, хворих на голову провладних еліт та про запаси зброї щоб це все вберегти від оточуючого світу. Західний світ думає про наступні вибори та плюралізм думок в своєму ліберальному раю, де ультраліві, ультраправі, послідовники ІДІЛу, фанати Палестини, прихильники Ізраїлю, зелені, ліберали, бізнесмени та бомжі, наркомани і баптисти мирно співіснують на одній вулиці, і поважають одне одного. Вісь зла, врешті-решт, переможе цивілізований світ. Бо сильні ті, хто відвантажує запаси смертоносної зброї своїм союзникам, а не боїться міфічної «ескалації», коли повномасштабна війна триває вже третій рік. Сильні ті, хто диктує свої умови і діє, а не обіцяє з огляду на соціологічні опитування.


Against the background of the news about the transfer of Iranian short-range ballistic missiles into the hands of Muscovites, it can be stated that the axis of evil is more monolithic, decisive and united than the soft Western world. The axis of evil is thinking about preserving its long-term ruling regimes, sick-headed pro-government elites, and stockpiles of weapons to protect it all from the outside world. The Western world is thinking about the next election and pluralism of opinion in its liberal paradise, where far-left, far-right, followers of ISIS, fanatics of Palestine, supporters of Israel, greens, liberals, businessmen and homeless people, drug addicts and Baptists peacefully coexist on the same street, and respect each other. The axis of evil will ultimately defeat the civilized world. Because those who are strong are those who ship stocks of deadly weapons to their allies, and are not afraid of the mythical "escalation", when a full-scale war has been going on for the third year. Strong are those who dictate their terms and act, rather than making promises based on sociological surveys.




Зеленський похвалився, що українські військові не беруть в полон цивільних московитів. Дійсно, що ми звірі якісь? Ми ж не московити, це тільки їм можна бити електричним струмом 16-річних підлітків з окупованих територій та садити на двадцять пʼять років цивільних тітоньок-кухарок. У нас і військовополонені московити в полоні виглядають набагато краще, ніж до полону.
Тим часом, наш обмінний фонд далі залишається надто скудним, а проросійські депутати голосують в Раді разом з монобільшістю, допомагають одне одному втікати з країни, блокують трибуни парламенту щоб, боронь боже, не заборонили рпц фсб. Московити хапають українців та кримських татар в окупованому Криму за вподобайки в ВКонтакті та схований український прапор в шухляді. Чому ми не можемо забрати всіх цивільних московитів з контрольованих територій та обміняти на наших цивільних - поза межами мого розуміння. Доки буде панувати вся ця толерастія до ворога? Війна все більше виглядає гнилим договорняком. І буде виглядати ще більшим, якщо ми на божевільні дії ворога будемо відповідати ниттям в імпотентних міжнародних організаціях. В моєму розумінні моралі: на жесть ти маєш відповісти подвійною жестю. На подвійну жесть - потрійною. Коли по відношенню тебе жестять, а ти терпилиш - ти тільки подовжиш строк свого ганебного існування, а в підсумку програєш.



Zelensky boasted that the Ukrainian military does not capture civilian Muscovites. Are we really some animals? We are not Muscovites, only they can electrocute 16-year-old teenagers from the occupied territories and imprison civilian cook aunties for twenty-five years. Muscovites who are prisoners of war look much better in our country than before they were captured.
Meanwhile, our exchange fund continues to be too meager, and pro-Russian deputies vote in the Rada together with a monomajority, help each other flee the country, block the stands of the parliament so that, God forbid, they do not ban the FSB RPC. Muscovites are grabbing Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars in occupied Crimea for VKontakte likes and a hidden Ukrainian flag in a drawer. Why we can't take all civilian Muscovites from the controlled territories and exchange them for our civilians is beyond my understanding. How long will all this tolerance for the enemy prevail? War looks more and more like a rotten deal. And it will look even bigger if we respond to the crazy actions of the enemy by whining in impotent international organizations. In my understanding of morality: you must respond to a gesture with a double gesture. On double tin - triple. When they treat you harshly and you tolerate it, you will only prolong the term of your shameful existence, and in the end you will lose.



В рамках екзистенційного протистояння, коли московити вбивають українців цілими сімʼями (як позавчора в Запоріжжі, а сьогодні у Львові), ми не можемо собі дозволити уникати цілей серед руснявих цивільних. Кожен український офіцер має наносити дитячі будинки, лікарні, будинки пристарілих, ринки, супермаркети в рф - в список планових цілей. Кожен цивільний автомобіль московита в Брянській області має бути під прицілом українського FPV. Треба запамʼятати одне: якщо у московитів закінчаться ракети - їм їх надішле КНДР. Якщо дрони - допоможе Іран. Будуть знищені всі бомбардувальники - купить Китай. Це аксіома, в якій московитам вісь зла не дасть програти військовим шляхом. Ми можемо діяти лише терористичними методами, адже ми набагато слабкіші в ресурсному плані, аніж московити. Паніка, страх, знищені населені пункти, терор - супутники нашої Держави; женевські конвенції, «права людини», «міжнародні домовленості» - слабкість.



In the framework of the existential confrontation, when Muscovites kill Ukrainians in whole families (as the day before yesterday in Zaporizhzhia, and today in Lviv), we cannot afford to avoid targets among Russian civilians. Every Ukrainian officer should put orphanages, hospitals, homes for the elderly, markets, supermarkets in the Russian Federation on the list of planned targets. Every civilian car of a Muscovite in the Bryansk region should be under the sights of the Ukrainian FPV. One thing must be remembered: if the Muscovites run out of missiles, the DPRK will send them to them. If drones - Iran will help. All bombers will be destroyed - China will buy. This is an axiom in which the axis of evil will not allow Muscovites to lose by military means. We can only act with terrorist methods, because we are much weaker in terms of resources than Muscovites. Panic, fear, destroyed settlements, terror are companions of our State; Geneva Conventions, "human rights", "international agreements" - weakness.

В Україні багато хто мастурбує на Ізраїль, включно з першими особами держави. Проте, ми не діємо як Ізраїль. Чи могли б ми знести з лиця землі бєлгород? Могли б. Чи могли б завдавати ударів по московитських ринках та ТЦ в вихідні дні, заживо хоронячи електорат путіна? Звісно, могли б.

In Ukraine, many people masturbate to Israel, including the first heads of state. However, we do not act like Israel. Could we destroy Belgorod from the face of the earth? They could. Could they strike Moscow's markets and shopping centers on weekends, burying Putin's electorate alive? Of course, they could.

Нині модно бути підспівувачем у центральної влади. Не знаю - свідомо це роблять певні люди при погонах чи ні, але виглядає так, наче це заплановано. Погані бояри, хороший цар. Чекаю з нетерпінням, коли весь цей треш, що коїться, якось закінчиться, більшість мобілізованих повернеться додому, пройдуть нові вибори, на яких громадяни зможуть впевнено дати оцінку нинішній владі, частина людей емігрує. Так буде виглядати наша «перемога», якщо Київ не буде окупований московитами, а Українська Держава існуватиме як така.

Nowadays, it is fashionable to be a backup singer for the central government. I don't know if certain people do it consciously or not, but it looks like it's planned. Bad boyars, good king. I am looking forward to when all this trash that is happening will somehow end, most of the mobilized will return home, new elections will be held, at which citizens will be able to confidently evaluate the current government, some people will emigrate. This is what our "victory" will look like if Kyiv is not occupied by Muscovites, and the Ukrainian State exists as such.

З огляду на те, що переважна кількість московитських ракет, що летіли сьогодні від Краматорську до Ужгорода, йшли по обʼєктах енергетики, я ще раз наголошую на фактичній безперспективності ударів лише по військовій інфраструктурі. Військові літаки, в яких летять сотні наших дорого вартісних дронів, перемістяться далі на схід від кордонів, а їх кількість у москивитів перевищує кількість наших літаків у десятки разів. Єдиний вихід перемоги (мирних перемовин з росією на вигідних умовах) - засипати росію трунами. Кількість вбитих цивільних московитів має в рази перевищувати кількість вбитих цивільних українців. Українська артилерія має рівняти з землею не лише ворожі спостережні пости, а й дитячі садки, навіки засипаючи маленьких рамзанів, ахматів, кужугетів та сєрафімів. Дрони мають летіти не тільки по летовищах, а і по густонаселених кварталах прикордонних обласних центрів. Це єдина формула перемоги, яка є на сьогодні. Поки росія не захлинеться кровʼю, а кількість трауру не перевищуватиме сумарну кількість радощів - війна буде тривати.

Given the fact that the majority of Muscovite rockets flying today from Kramatorsk to Uzhhorod hit energy facilities, I once again emphasize the actual futility of strikes only on military infrastructure. Military planes, in which hundreds of our expensive drones fly, will move further east of the borders, and their number among Muscovites exceeds the number of our planes ten times. The only way out of victory (peace negotiations with Russia on favorable terms) is to cover Russia with coffins. The number of killed civilian Muscovites must be many times higher than the number of killed Ukrainian civilians. Ukrainian artillery must raze not only enemy observation posts to the ground, but also kindergartens, forever burying little Ramzans, Akhmats, Kuzhugets, and Seraphim. Drones should fly not only over airports, but also over densely populated quarters of border regional centers. This is the only winning formula available today. As long as Russia does not choke on blood, and the number of mourning does not exceed the total number of joys, the war will continue.

Важливим аспектом проведення операцій на територіях ворога - є знищення майна та садиб московитів: підпали, вбивства ватного електорату, підриви. Найбільше московити зі звільнених територій бояться втратити майно і ніколи не повернутись в свої халупи.

Нехай же український солдат, памʼятаючи Бучу, Волноваху, Маріуполь та Бахмут, зробить так, щоб кожен московит памʼятав суджу та льгов

An important aspect of conducting operations in the enemy's territories is the destruction of property and estates of Muscovites: arson, murders of the cotton electorate, bombings. Muscovites from the liberated territories are most afraid of losing their property and never returning to their shacks.

Let the Ukrainian soldier, remembering Bucha, Volnovakha, Mariupol and Bakhmut, make sure that every Muscovite remembers the court and lies


Подивіться який злий сидит путін в кріслі і слухає доповідь військового пенсіонера герасімова, який в стилі його українських симетричних колег розповідає про стабільну ситуацію та зупинку просування наших військ. Подивіться як мерзенно виправдовуються американці за наш курський наступ. Ниють, що з ними не погодили, кажуть що нічого не розуміють що відбувається, починають згадувати про заборону застосування американської зброї і все таке. Наші в ГШ просто не беруть слухавку від стурбованих «колег» з-за океану. Бо колег, як і раніше, дуже турбує спокій російських обивателів, адже американці нормально сприймають смерть українських дітей в Україні, але дуже болісно сприймають смерть російських громадян в росії. В їх парадигмі вмирати мають лише українці, на крайняк - московити у яких є автомат і камуфляж. Московит в Суджі, на думку американців, має ходити на роботу, пити по вечорах пиво перед телешоу скабєєвой, ходити раз на пару років на вибори - голосувати за путіна чи його партію. Жити це просте російське тихе життя гєни букіна тихої курської губернії.

Єдиний, хто на сьогоднішній день може захистити українців в мирних містах - це український солдат, що йде по чужій землі, вбиваючи наших ворогів. Нашим важко, складно, багато хлопаків після базового курсу відразу попали на дискотеку, але це ще не кінець історії.

Look at how angry Putin is sitting in a chair and listening to the report of military pensioner Gerasimov, who, in the style of his Ukrainian symmetrical colleagues, talks about a stable situation and stopping the advance of our troops. Look at how despicable the Americans make excuses for our Kursk offensive. They whine that they did not agree with them, they say that they do not understand what is happening, they begin to mention the ban on the use of American weapons and all that. Our staff at the GS simply do not pick up the phone from worried "colleagues" from overseas. Because colleagues, as before, are very concerned about the peace of Russian citizens, because Americans perceive the death of Ukrainian children in Ukraine normally, but the death of Russian citizens in Russia is very painful. In their paradigm, only Ukrainians should die, on the extreme - Muscovites who have a machine gun and camouflage. A Muscovite in Suja, according to the Americans, should go to work, drink beer in the evenings before Skabeeva's TV show, go to the elections once every couple of years - vote for Putin or his party. To live is a simple Russian quiet life of the genea bukina of the quiet Kursk province.

Today, the only one who can protect Ukrainians in peaceful cities is a Ukrainian soldier walking on foreign land, killing our enemies. It is difficult for us, it is difficult, many guys after the basic course immediately went to the disco, but this is not the end of the story


Цивільний московит має страждати більше за московитського військового. Війна - це складне політичне рішення політичного керівництва країни-окупанта, обраного на виборах абсолютною більшістю московитського населення (> 80%). Відповідно, дії свого президента, уряду, міністра оборони та армії більшість московитів підтримують. Допоки цивільне населення країни-окупанта буде підтримувати війну, війна або ідеї повного захоплення України, у випадку якщо вона закінчиться чи призупиниться, будуть жити в мерзенних головах унтерменшів. Чим більше ворожого населення буде деморалізовано, налякане та розчаровано міфом власної непереможності - тим менше такі реваншистські ідеї будуть панувати в ворожих головах.

A civilian Muscovite must suffer more than a military Muscovite. War is a complex political decision by the political leadership of the occupying country, elected by the absolute majority of the Muscovite population (> 80%). Accordingly, the majority of Muscovites support the actions of their president, government, defense minister, and army. As long as the civilian population of the occupying country will support the war, the war or the idea of ​​a complete takeover of Ukraine, in case it ends or is suspended, will live in the vile minds of the Untermanches. The more the enemy population will be demoralized, frightened and disappointed by the myth of their own invincibility, the less such revanchist ideas will reign in the enemy's minds.

Do you read what you write? I got it from your own statements which I quoted and highlighted for you (here again: “You cannot invade the US from Ukraine.”). You are FOCUSING on a hypothetical scenario where Russia invades the US from Ukraine. Why? Because you want us to compare such scenario with the hypothetical scenario where the US invades Russia from Ukraine once Ukraine is inside NATO. How should we logically infer from such a comparison that Russia has “legitimate” security concerns?! And Russia is “justified” to invade Ukraine?! And therefore we should somehow appease Russia?! None of this logically follows, RIGHT? My charitable guess is that if you feel compelled to get to these conclusions from “you cannot invade the US from Ukraine” this is because you are drawing your conclusions also from hidden and uncritically accepted premises. So I’m challenging you to make them explicit. More on this in the following comments. — neomac

Again, unfortunately I still don't have too much time to deconstruct in detail all of your misconceptions and correct them, but I'll do a few.

Yes, obviously the point of pointing out Russia can be invaded from Ukraine is to point out that is therefore a legitimate security concern of Russia, as well as to emphasize that Russia will be much more committed to the war than the US.

However, your main problem is with this term "legitimate security concern". As I've explained many times, I am using the concept functionally as meaningful in the context of a negotiation or then discussing a negotiation.

If you want to get a criminal to talk you may need to get them a coffee as that's a legitimate ask (even from your point of view), whereas you probably won't get them a flying unicorn because that doesn't seem a legitimate ask. If you want nothing from the criminal, then that they want a coffee right now in between designated meals probably doesn't concern you all that much.

It's in the situation of wanting to come to an agreement with Russia that assigning legitimacy to some of their concerns is necessary. Some of that could be purely pragmatic (we don't genuinely agree, but some compromise is needed for a deal) and some could be genuine agreement (for example because we would have the same concern if the situation was reversed; aka. the Soviet Union placing missiles in Cuba).

Now, if you say "Bah!! Nothing the Russians want is legitimate!!" then ok, you can hold that position but what follows from that is therefore more fighting and if that's your position then you need to justify more fighting as a worthwhile endeavour: aka, what's the plan? how to win? what does more fighting achieve for Ukraine? and so on.

Which you've never done!! It's always ... well Ukrainians want to fight, it's their choice.

To which my response is that coercion is not free choice and the West bribing Ukrainian elites as well as bold faced lying to the Ukrainian people is called coercion. Likewise, forcibly drafting people and forcing them to front is also coercion and not "Ukrainians want to fight".

You're theory around these questions is so hopeless confused that unfortunately I don't have the time at the moment to explain exactly why they are hopelessly confused.

And this is on top of never answering simple questions such as how many Nazis in Ukraine would be too many Nazis with too much power and therefore appeasement of said Nazis to not invade? If you have a theory of just war then you should be able to answer this question and then go onto explain that the Nazi levels in Ukraine do reach the required number and influence to morally require un-impeasement which would therefore be exactly the invasion we see.

Also, generally speaking, everything I have predicted is now coming to pass, so it seems redundant to point it out everyday. It's sort of perfunctory at this point, but I'll keep repeating myself when I have a moment.

I'll quote myself when I have the time, but within the first weeks of the war I predicted that as soon as it no longer served US interest the throwing-under-the-bussing would commence and that at anytime the US can simply paint the Ukrainians as losing, and one thing Americans don't like is people who lose, and that the loss is Ukrainians fault, that they should have tried harder and won instead.

But with most of his troops now dead or severely injured, Dima decided he’d had enough. He quit and took another job with the military – in an office in Kyiv.

Standing outside that office, chain smoking and drinking sweet coffee, he told CNN he just couldn’t handle watching his men die anymore.

Two and half years of Russia’s grinding offensive have decimated many Ukrainian units. Reinforcements are few and far between, leaving some soldiers exhausted and demoralized. The situation is particularly dire among infantry units near Pokrovsk and elsewhere on the eastern front line, where Ukraine is struggling to stop Russia’s creeping advances. — CNN - Outgunned and outnumbered, Ukraine’s military is struggling with low morale and desertion

Bt the really key parts of this front page, top right article, is the following statements:

Ukrainian soldiers in the area paint a grim picture of the situation. Kyiv’s forces are clearly outnumbered and outgunned, with some commanders estimating there are 10 Russian soldiers to each Ukrainian. — CNN

and most importantly:

But they also appear to be struggling with problems of their own making. — CNN

So ... who's to blame for the West putting the Ukrainians up to fighting a war with the Russians that every single Western analyst and "decision maker" knew they would lose? (especially as they 100% knew that "whatever it takes" and "for as long as it takes" are obvious lies)

Ukraines fault!!!

The purpose of this article by CNN is to signal to the American elite that the "Ukraine show" is just about wrapped up and to inform them who the blame will be assigned to.

If memory serves me right, when I said the Ukrainians will be thrown under the exact same bus that we threw our "Afghani friends" it was you that explained that it's different because the Ukrainians are more "culturally close" or something along those lines (aka. we wouldn't let down white people).

Well, yes, they're white but very strange ... and also irredeemably corrupt and also fleeing from the battle lines as the above article explains in some detail, and most importantly they're losing and white people who win would really be a lot better.

Look at how despicable the Americans make excuses for our Kursk offensive. They whine that they did not agree with them, they say that they do not understand what is happening, they begin to mention the ban on the use of American weapons and all that. — neomac

A civilian Muscovite must suffer more than a military Muscovite. War is a complex political decision by the political leadership of the occupying country, elected by the absolute majority of the Muscovite population (> 80%). Accordingly, the majority of Muscovites support the actions of their president, government, defense minister, and army. As long as the civilian population of the occupying country will support the war, the war or the idea of ​​a complete takeover of Ukraine, in case it ends or is suspended, will live in the vile minds of the Untermanches. The more the enemy population will be demoralized, frightened and disappointed by the myth of their own invincibility, the less such revanchist ideas will reign in the enemy's minds. — neomac

You see, even these delusional "ultra idiots" can see the bus the Americans are pointing to Ukrainian elites to prepare (their people) to lie in front of.

Today, the only one who can protect Ukrainians in peaceful cities is a Ukrainian soldier walking on foreign land, killing our enemies. It is difficult for us, it is difficult, many guys after the basic course immediately went to the disco, but this is not the end of the story — neomac

Another prediction I'm pretty extremely confident on is that these kinds of hopeless offensives are mainly about getting rid of these dangerous morons: you want to fight Russians? You think "not-attacking-Russia" has been the big mistake? Have we got the operation for you!!!

Against the background of the news about the transfer of Iranian short-range ballistic missiles into the hands of Muscovites, it can be stated that the axis of evil is more monolithic, decisive and united than the soft Western world. The axis of evil is thinking about preserving its long-term ruling regimes, sick-headed pro-government elites, and stockpiles of weapons to protect it all from the outside world. The Western world is thinking about the next election and pluralism of opinion in its liberal paradise, where far-left, far-right, followers of ISIS, fanatics of Palestine, supporters of Israel, greens, liberals, businessmen and homeless people, drug addicts and Baptists peacefully coexist on the same street, and respect each other. The axis of evil will ultimately defeat the civilized world. Because those who are strong are those who ship stocks of deadly weapons to their allies, and are not afraid of the mythical "escalation", when a full-scale war has been going on for the third year. Strong are those who dictate their terms and act, rather than making promises based on sociological surveys. — neomac

This is reminiscent of the old sentiment about the weakness of democracy in a fight with authoritarianism, isn't it?

I think the reality is more complicated. Democracies are often clumsy and inefficient, but the plurality of views they offer also makes them more resilient. History has not been kind to autoritarian regimes that assumed that a democratic state would just fold because it's people and government would lack the will to fight.

With regards to aid for Ukraine especially, one aspect that seems underrepresented in the discussion is that there might be more going on internationally than we are directly aware of. The narrative is usually that western governments limit aid and restrict weapon use in order to not anger domestic constituencies. And that is certainly the case. But it might also be the case that a number of important international actors wouldn't be too happy to see the west throw it's entire armaments capacity in behind Ukraine. Chief among them China.

It seems plausible that China is threatening western nations with much more significant support for Russia because China does not care to hand the West a clean "win" in Ukraine.

To which my response is that coercion is not free choice and the West bribing Ukrainian elites as well as bold faced lying to the Ukrainian people is called coercion. Likewise, forcibly drafting people and forcing them to front is also coercion and not "Ukrainians want to fight". — boethius

I feel the need again to point out that Russia invaded and that it didn't have to do that. Ukraine was not coerced into fighting Russia by the west. It was coerced into fighting Russia by Russia.

And if we're talking about legitimate interests and security concerns, the big question becomes why invade in the first place? These discussions always revolve around how the west wronged Russia, how Russia was right to feel threatened etc. However, so far I have not seen someone actually sketch the victory scenario for Russia. If we're trying to figure out what we could offer Russia to achieve peace rather than another ceasefire, we have to answer the question of how the invasion could have advanced the legitimate concerns of Russia.