That's also false. The blind can't see anything no matter what their brains are doing. — jkop

Yep. :up:

It's odd that we even have to have these sorts of conversations.

I don't think telling the blind that they can see is a great idea. Mimicking such function is obviously helpful, offering a better quality of life, but it is because the facts are apparent—the blind have trouble seeing—that they were able to get the help in the first place.

If I have a cochlear implant and perceive you say "hello" through my "artificial" means, and I say "Nos said 'hello,'" my statement is true under both correspondence and coherence theories of truth. That is, my saying you said hello corresponds to what actually happened and my use of language is consistent with your own.

We would have a different result if I hallucinated you saying "hello. "

None of this demands a direct realism. To demand a direct realism forces a definition of "artificial" to simply mean "other than typically human, " which in no way can be assumed to be more accurate than other methods. To call one method artificial assumes there is an otherwise natural and correct way, but that assumption is the entirety of this debate. That is, what is contested is whether the world as it appears is as it is or whether it has been artificially manipulated by the internal processes.

My position is that all perception is "artificial" if that term means it is an unaltered representation of reality.

The question is not whether I said "hello" but whether you heard me say "hello". But hearing me say "hello" and recognizing the signals from a mechanical device stimulating your auditory nerve are two different acts. Evidence of this is that one has to relearn how to "hear" using such a device.

By "artificial" I am speaking of the mechanism, for instance the cochlear implant. It was designed, built, and inserted by a human being, whereas the organs were not. In any case, the only things manipulated by internal processes, whether artificial or natural, are internal processes. That's the only extent to which internal processes can manipulate the world.

The deaf can't hear without a cochlear implant but can hear with one. It's quite simple.

Why does that matter? It is still normal to describe someone with a cochlear implant as hearing things, and the same for those with an auditory brainstem implant.

If you only want to use the words “see” and “hear” for those with normally functioning sense organs then you do you, but it’s not wrong for the rest of us to be more inclusive with such language. — Michael

Of everyone with a brain, there are some blind and deaf people who can be helped by aids to sight or hearing, and others who cannot. To understand the difference between the two is to understand why sight and hearing are not reducible to the brain. If they were reducible to the brain then everyone with a brain would be able to see and hear, and everyone who is blind or deaf would be helped by brain-based aids.

This is equivocation on "seeing." For example, a blind person does not see when they dream, as your verbiage would have it. — Leontiskos

The question isn't whether seeing via an electrode, through glasses, through your screen window, or through your naked eye are different. They all obviously are. The question is whether there is an ontological difference that impacts the truth value of the judgment that requires differing descriptive words.

What distinguishes the dream with the electrode example is the claim "there is a chair" does not correspond with reality in the dream, but it does with the electrode.

If you wish to preserve the term "see" only for those instances where it is visualized through the naked eye, then why stop there, but instead create 1000s of gradients of the word "see" to preserve each type of corrective lens or optic surgery someone might have?

That is, to say "I 'see' the chair" with my thick eyeglasses and you to say you "see" the same through your cataracts, then that too would equivocate the term "see" as you're arguing it.

It's not equivocation to say that the schizoprenic hears voices. That's just the ordinary way of describing the phenomenon.

Verbs like "to see" and "to hear" don't just refer to so-called "veridical" perception.

If they can hear, why do they have a cochlear implant?

What distinguishes the dream with the electrode example is the claim "there is a chair" does not correspond with reality in the dream, but it does with the electrode. — Hanover

Does the "electrode" result in sight or a hallucination? (And why is this question important?)

If they were reducible to the brain then everyone with a brain would be able to see and hear — Leontiskos

That doesn't follow.

If they can hear, why do they have a cochlear implant? — NOS4A2

They hear because of the cochlear implant, much like I can see the words on the screen because of my glasses.

It's not equivocation to say that the schizoprenic hears voices. That's just the ordinary way of describing the phenomenon. — Michael

No, "hears voices" is a euphemism for "hallucinates." You are confusing yourself.

To understand the difference between the two is to understand why sight and hearing are not reducible to the brain. If they were reducible to the brain then everyone with a brain would be able to see and hear. — Leontiskos

No one is arguing brains can hear without input of any sort. The argument is that no can hear without a brain.

No one is arguing brains can hear without input of any sort. The argument is that no can hear without a brain. — Hanover

But who is arguing that persons can hear without brains?

No, "hears voices" is a euphemism for "hallucinates." You are confusing yourself. — Leontiskos

I'm not confusing myself because I haven't claim that "hearing voices" isn't a euphemism for "hallucinate".

I am simply saying that it is ordinary in English to use the verbs "to see" and "to hear" in a much more inclusive manner than the more restricted sense that you and NOS4A2 insist on.

I'm not confusing myself because I haven't claim that "hearing voices" isn't a euphemism for "hallucinate". — Michael

You've claimed that the "hears" in "hears voices" is just like the "hears" in ordinary predications about hearing, which is false, because "hears voices" is a euphemism for hallucination.

You've claimed that the "hears" in "hears voices" is just like the "hears" in ordinary predications about hearing — Leontiskos

No I haven't.

The question is whether there is an ontological difference that impacts the truth value of the judgment that requires differing descriptive words. — Hanover

Indeed. The question is whether or not there is an ontological difference between veridical perception, dreaming, and hallucinating.

The difference is the things. In the first, they are always included. In the second and third, they are never included. Seeing rainbows always includes rainbows. Dreaming and hallucinating rainbows never does.

Pretty simple.

Same with hearing voices, hallucinating voices, or dreaming them. The voice is absent in the latter two, but always present in the first.

@Michael

So when the blind dream are they seeing? They are obviously interacting with percepts, and you think percepts are seeing, so apparently the blind are seeing when they sleep.

Sleeping pills are not a cure for blindness. — Leontiskos

They are seeing in the sense of having a visual experience but not seeing in the sense of responding to and being made aware of some appropriate external stimulus by way of their eyes, much like the schizophrenic is hearing in the sense of having an auditory experience but not hearing in the sense of responding to and being made aware of some appropriate external stimulus by way of their ears.

They hear because of the cochlear implant, much like I can see the words on the screen because of my glasses.

You can see the words on the screen because your eyes still function enough to be able to see. No amount of glasses can help the those with total blindness see, however.

No amount of glasses can help the those with total blindness see, however. — NOS4A2

But other mechanisms such as a cortical visual prosthesis can help (or will be able to help in a few decades). Much like a cochlear implant helps where an ear trumpet can't.

They are seeing in the sense of having a visual experience but not seeing in the sense of responding to and being made aware of some appropriate external stimulus, much like the schizophrenic is hearing in the sense of having an auditory experience but not hearing in the sense of responding to and being made aware of some appropriate external stimulus. — Michael

Okay good, and this is true even if their percepts are identical, yes? Therefore to see an external object is not merely a matter of percepts, yes?

But other mechanisms such as a cortical visual prosthesis can help. Much like a cochlear implant helps where an ear trumpet can't. — Michael

There are cases where nothing will help. Again:

Of everyone with a brain, there are some blind and deaf people who can be helped by aids to sight or hearing, and others who cannot. To understand the difference between the two is to understand why sight and hearing are not reducible to [the subject]. — Leontiskos

But other mechanisms such as a cortical visual prosthesis can help (or will be able to help in a few decades). Much like a cochlear implant helps where an ear trumpet can't.

It will definitely help and will improve the quality of life of those who cannot see. But if seeing is using the eyes to perceive the environment, that isn’t sight. That’s all I’m saying.

All that is required to have a visual experience is for there to be the appropriate neural activity in the visual cortex, and all that is required to have an auditory experience is for there to be the appropriate neural activity in the auditory cortex.

Most of the time this neural activity is a response to sensory stimulation of biological sense organs, but sometimes it is a response to other things, whether those be artificial sensory aids, drugs, sleep, or mental illness.

But if seeing is using the eyes to perceive the environment, that isn’t sight. That’s all I’m saying. — NOS4A2

And as I've said, you're welcome to only use the verb "to see" in that sense if you like, but there's nothing wrong with the rest of us being more inclusive in how we use such language.

They are seeing in the sense of having a visual experience but not seeing in the sense of responding to and being made aware of some appropriate external stimulus — Michael

Okay good, and this is true even if their percepts are identical, yes? Therefore to see an external object is not merely a matter of percepts, yes? — Leontiskos

Note that just as one can have a visual experience of an object without seeing an external object, so too one can have a visual experience of a colored object without seeing an external colored object. I can hallucinate a horse and I can hallucinate the horse's brownness, and this is different from seeing a real horse and seeing its real brownness. The distinction you are making applies equally well to color.

Absolutely. I have no qualms with people using those verbs. Philosophically speaking, however, my concern is only if it is true or false, and the use of those verbs falls under one category and not the other.

Most of the time this neural activity is a response to sensory stimulation of biological sense organs, but sometimes it is a response to other things, whether those be artificial sensory aids, drugs, sleep, or mental illness. — Michael

Does the same hold of color?

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The reason color is not a percept is because humans know that there are things which alter our percepts without altering the external objects of our percepts, and because of this the most common use of the word 'color' has a super-perceptual referent. For example:

This would be a neat argument for why colors and percepts are not the same thing. The percept of the ball changed, but its color stayed the same. — Leontiskos

When a shadow falls over a ball we do not say that the color of the ball has changed, because we differentiate our visual perception of the ball from the ball's color. We know that things like paint change the ball's color whereas shadows do not. This is just like the indirect realism argument regarding perspective (i.e. the way that distant objects appear smaller).

"Color is a percept" is a false statement, just as, "Objects are percepts" is a false statement. Nevertheless, there is a manner in which color is more "perceptual"/subjective than shape. Color is more one-dimensional than shape given that it cannot be perceived by any other sense, and it is interpreted by the brain in a more idiosyncratic manner than shape is (i.e. it is more dependent on the particularly human cognitive apparatus than something like shape). But it is incorrect to take these subtle differences and turn them into crass statements like, "Science has proved that color does not exist!"

The factual explanation is that the colours we see are determined by what the brain is doing. — Michael

The bolded word is where Michael oversteps. Things in the word, and the people around us, also have a say in what colours we see. The brain is not the sole determiner colour.