How do you define truth?

It may be problematic to see relativism or objectivitism as an ultimate 'truth'. That is because they are both perspectives. Saying that may amount to relativism in some respects. However, relativism may go too far in reducing all matters of 'truth' to the subjective, which may rule out the shared and intersubjective elements are missed. This can apply to most aspects of 'truth', including morality.

Both the subjective, or relative, and objective matter in thinking about the construction of 'truth and, need to be juggled effectively. Human beings may seek 'truth'. It is constructed uniquely from cultural and personal angles, and on an ongoing basis throughout life.

Welcome to TPF!

Objectivism asserts that truth exists independently of human beliefs, emotions, or perceptions. — Cadet John Kervensley

This seems more of a definition of non-anthropocentrism. Neither objectivism nor relativism hinges on humans (anthropocentic) or perceptions (idealist).

According to this view, there are facts that are true regardless of who examines them or under what circumstances.

For example, is the sum of 3 and 5 equal to 8, or is that just a property of our universe? Mathemaical 'truths' are often held as objective, but proving that is another thing.

For example, the laws of physics or mathematical truths are often cited as examples of objectivism in action.

The laws of physics are not necessarily the same from one universe to the next, so that would be an example of relativism (or relational, as I tend to use the word, to distinguish it from Einstein's relativity theory, which is something else).

relativism claims that truth is subjective and dependent on context,

Subjective implies a perceiving subject. A relational view does not require a subject. A subject is only required for the view (the map), but not the territory. A rock can get wet without a human to notice it. The water exists relative to the rock.

Something like moral relativism does indeed require perceiving subjects, since it is relativism of abstrations. Your post seems to largely focus on opinions being objective or relative, and not so much the more general scope of the two terms.

truth depends on each person's viewpoint?

The 3+5 thing borders on objective truth. Most all of the rest you mention seems to be opinion, which has nothing to do with truth. If there are for instance objective morals, then opinions on the matter are completely irrelevant to that truth.

Does relativism allow for greater respect for differences, or does it lead to moral chaos?

Chaos seem to only result from pushing one's opinion onto those that don't share it.

And is objectivism too rigid to accommodate human diversity?

Not at all since no counterexample can be shown. To do that, one would have to demonstrate an objective truth. Plenty try, but all seem to beg their opinion.


I find a relational view (in ontology say) to make more sense, to have far fewer self contradictions. The view doesn't really touch on opinions such as personal morals.

Does the universe objectively exist, or does it exist only in relation to some things? If there is a correct answer to that question (however unknowable), then that would be an objective truth, regardless of which of the two is that correct answer. Some say that there must be a correct answer, however unknowable, but I'm not even sure of that.

I think one can view many truths as being objective, and others as being somewhat subjective. Thus, I think the specific topic at hand is important in some sort of discussion of objectivism versus subjectivism.

While objectivism and subjectivism clash, I don't think I've ever heard someone argue in good faith that truth is entirely subjective or entirely objective.

(Upon doing a little research some people do indeed argue all truth is subjective)

How do you define the truth? — MoK

I think this post is getting at exactly that - is the property of being true based on facts that are verifiable independent of our feelings, or is the property of being true based on subjective experiences? Or at least, that's what I would like to think.

To say, for instance, that objectivism doesn't recognize context is a little strange:

relativism encourages us to acknowledge the plurality of perspectives and accept that truth may be shaped by our experiences and contexts. — Cadet John Kervensley

It may be problematic to see relativism or objectivitism as an ultimate 'truth'. That is because they are both perspectives. Saying that may amount to relativism in some respects. However, relativism may go too far in reducing all matters of 'truth' to the subjective, which may rule out the shared and intersubjective elements are missed. This can apply to most aspects of 'truth', including morality. Both the subjective and objective matter in thinking about the construction of 'truth and need to be juggled effectively. — Jack Cummins

I think I agree with this. And I think the main, practical distinction between the two is that one is experienced by a mind, and that a truth can be subjectively true just on the basis of being related to that experience with no other evidence being required. On the other hand, when one asserts an objective truth, one is expected to back it up. These two differing expectations lead to a useful delineation between the truths derived from, say, literature and science.

For example, the laws of physics or mathematical truths are often cited as examples of objectivism in action.The laws of physics are not necessarily the same from one universe to the next, so that would be an example of relativism (or relational, as I tend to use the word, to distinguish it from Einstein's relativity theory, which is something else). — noAxioms

Okay, I'm no physicist, or mathematician, but this sounds suspect. If a fact - like the laws of physics - in one universe is not the same as in another universe, wouldn't there have to be some independent reference frame against which the two can be compared to evaluate them relationally? The laws of physics in one universe could be so different from another that they cannot be compared via knowledge of the two alone. I mean, if there were something similar to Newton's laws in both, just changed a little (which would have massive consequences I'm sure), maybe then, but what if fundamentally they are nothing alike? I think you have to use the term "relative", because relational implies some sort of connection.

All of that might be an admitted layman just shouting into the void, and if so, please correct me.

Welcome to the forum. A well-written and well thought out OP (original post).

To start... If you hang around you'll see that my arguments very often come back to metaphysics. Objectivism and relativism are metaphysical positions. I'm a fan of R.G. Collingwood who wrote that metaphysical positions are neither true nor false. My own formulation as a pragmatist is to use whichever works best in a given situation.

Objectivism asserts that truth exists independently of human beliefs, emotions, or perceptions. — Cadet John Kervensley

There is a strong philosophical argument to be made that objective reality does not exist, or rather it is not always a useful way of looking at things. I've started discussions on this in the past and participated in many others over the years.

And Relativism?
In contrast, relativism claims that truth is subjective and dependent on context, cultural beliefs, and individual perspectives. What is true for one person or culture might not be true for another. For instance, in matters of morality, what is considered right or wrong can vary depending on cultural or historical contexts, reinforcing the idea that truth is relative. — Cadet John Kervensley

It's not just context, cultural beliefs, and individual perspectives that matter. Here's what Immanuel Kant has to say in "Critique of Pure Reason."

Space is a necessary a priori representation that underlies all outer intuitions. One can never forge a representation of the absence of space, though one can quite well think that no things are to be met within it. It must therefore be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances, and not as a determination dependent upon them, and it is an a priori representation that necessarily underlies outer appearances...

...We dispute all claim of time to absolute reality [absolute Realität], namely where it would attach to things absolutely as a condition or property even without regard to the form of our sensible intuition. Such properties, which pertain to things in themselves, can also never be given to us through the senses. Therefore herein lies the transcendental ideality of time, according to which, if one abstracts from the subjective condition of our sensible intuition, it is nothing at all, and can be considered neither as subsisting nor as inhering in the objects in themselves (without their relation to our intuition). — Immanuel Kant - Critique of Pure Reason

So, according to Kant, space and time are not objective not because of context, cultural beliefs, and individual perspectives but because of our fundamental nature as human. Konrad Lorenz, the famous ethologist, had this to say.

In... the Critique of Pure Reason [Kant] wrote:

If one were to entertain the slightest doubt that space and time did not relate to the Ding an sich but merely to its relationship to sensuous reality, I cannot see how one can possibly affect to know, a priori and in advance of any empirical knowledge of things, i.e. before they are set before us, how we shall have to visualize them as we do in the case of space and time.

What a biologist familiar with the facts of evolution would regard as the obvious answer to Kant's question was, at that time, beyond the scope of the greatest of thinkers. The simple answer is that the system of sense organs and nerves that enables living things to survive and orientate themselves in the outer world has evolved phylogenetically through confrontation with an adaptation to that form of reality which we experience as phenomenal space. This system thus exists a priori to the extent that it is present before the individual experiences anything, and must be present if experience is to be possible. But its function is also historically evolved and in this respect not a priori. — Konrad Lorenz - Behind the Mirror

And Relativism?
In contrast, relativism claims that truth is subjective and dependent on context, cultural beliefs, and individual perspectives. What is true for one person or culture might not be true for another. — Cadet John Kervensley

And therefore if relativism is true for some and not others, then it is self-refuting as a claim (i.e. relativism is relative ... "truth is subjective" is subjective ... :roll:). This is incoherent, of course, and not a viable, or reasonable, alternative to 'objective truth' (so the OP's poll is a false choice).

For instance, in matters of morality, what is considered right or wrong can vary depending on cultural or historical contexts, reinforcing the idea that truth is relative.

This doesn't follow since "right and wrong" are use-claims (i.e. evaluations, selections, preferences (re: plurality)) and not truth-claims (i.e. propositions (re: objectivity)) – not to be confused with "relativism", pluralism is objective (i.e. many different paths through / maps of the same terrain, or many different perspectives on / aspects of the same thing). Btw, there are reasonable conceptions of 'objective morality' such as (e.g.) moral naturalism¹.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/857773 [1]

For instance, in matters of morality, what is considered right or wrong can vary depending on cultural or historical contexts, reinforcing the idea that truth is relative.

What is considered true or false also varies depending on cultural or historical context. Does the fact that many people throughout history thought that the Earth was flat constitute good evidence that the shape of the Earth varies with social context?

Anyhow, on the original question:

1. The problem with asserting a completely relativistic notion of truth is that such an assertion is straightforwardly self-refuting. Such a claim will itself only be "true" relative to some social context, "language game," etc. Not to mention that such a notion of truth seems entirely implausible in the face of sense experience. As J.S. Mill once quipped, "one would have to have made some significant advances in philosophy to believe it."

2. The problem with many formulations of the "objective view," is that truth is properly absolute. The absolute is not reality as set over and against appearances. Being absolute it must include all of both reality and appearances. Plato gets at this in the Republic when Socrates presents Glaucon with the tripartite distinction between:

A. Things that are good only relative to something else;
B. Things which are good in themselves, and;
C. Those which are both.

The image of truth as the "view from nowhere," leads to the incoherent conclusion that a complete view of truth would be "knowing the world as one would know it without any sense organs and without a mind."

Appearances are not unrelated to things. Appearances are the appearances of things. Consider the word for form used by Aristotle—eidos—"image." Yet the eidos of a thing, it intelligibility, is what is "most real" in it. Form has priority over matter. The latter is mere potency; form is act. The quiddity—whatness—of things is tied to their appearances. Indeed, if being is to mean anything, it must refer to that which is given to phenomenal awareness, the intelligibility of things. And things' forms are accessible to us, as appearance.

I never found Kant's arguments here particularly convincing. It always seemed to me like a strange twist on the Aristotlean conception of space and time motivated by the English empiricists' conflation of the sign and the sign vehicle, which led folks like Locke to the conclusion that "we only know our ideas/experiences of things, not things." The mistake here is missing that experience is "that through which we know," not "what we know."

The other mistake I see in the empiricists is their preferencing of knowledge of "things in themselves." What things are outside of all interaction with anything else is not only epistemically inaccessible, but also makes no difference to the rest of the world. The old scholastic doctrine that "act follows on being," has to be true for anything whose being or not being makes any difference in the world.

Hence, space and time exist in nature fundamentally, but not actually:

It has to come as a surprise to the new student of Aristotle to learn that time and space for Aristotle exist in nature only fundamentally. Formally and actually time and space exist as the action of thought completes nature by creating in memory a series or network of relations which constitute the experience of time and space. Thus the “continuum of space and time” belongs neither to the order of being as it exists independently of the human mind nor to the order of what exists only as a consequence of human thinking, but exists rather objectively* as one of the most intimate comminglings of mind and nature in the constitution of experience.

Let us begin with time, that ever mysterious “entity” in which we live out our lives. What is time? How does time exist? According to Aristotle, apart from any finite mind, there is in nature only motion and change and the finite endurance of individuals sustained by their various interactions, as we shortly consider in more detail.

Enter mind or consciousness. Now some object changes its position or “moves in space”, and the mind remembers where the local motion began, sees the course of the movement, and notes where it terminates: the rabbit, for example, came out of that hole and ran behind that tree, where it is “now” hidden. The motion was not a “thing”; the rabbit is the “thing”. The motion exists nowhere apart from the rabbit’s actions – nowhere, that is, except in the memory of the perceiver which preserves as a continuous whole the transitory movement of the rabbit from its hole (the “before”) to the tree (the “after”).

John Deely - Four Ages of Understanding

* It's worth noting that Deely uses "objective" according to its meaning in classical metaphysics, derived from "objects," the things experienced in the umwelt. The term "objective" morphing into meaning something like "mind-independent" or "noumenal" being fairly unhelpful, and at the very least very far from its original meaning, similar to how "substance" for Descartes has become something entirely different. It's almost like A Canticle For Leibowitz, where an apocalypse (or in this case the Reformation) had people using the terminology of science with no real understanding of the system it was created for.

Anyhow, your second quote would not be strictly Kantian, no? For Kant, evolutionary biology tells us absolutely nothing about the noumenal world. It tells us what is true within experience. It can shed no light outside the realm of phenomenal awareness.

I can see perfectly well why people aren't willing to follow Kant on this however. However, I do not understand why he is frequently credited like this with the idea that our sense organs/minds shape how we experience the world. This is a very old intuition. It's in Aristotle for one. It's an old scholastic doctrine as well, "everything is received in the manner of the receiver." If anything Kant confuses this insight by placing knowledge of the processes underlying experience out of the reach of man (which is precisely the reason why attributing this insight to him can be misleading, the quality insight gets packaged with a dualism people might be less keen on).

In contrast, relativism claims that truth is subjective — Cadet John Kervensley

subjective, or relative — Jack Cummins

While objectivism and subjectivism clash — ToothyMaw

It's not clear to me that "relativism" and "subjectivism" mean the same thing, e.g. Catholic Church doctrine is that abortion is absolutely wrong, but many other churches don't agree. The Catholic position is absolute, but only relatively.

Not all true statements have an objective justification, but some do.

This is a fundamental tenet in mathematics.

According to Godel's incompleteness theorem, some true statements in arithmetic theory are provable but the vast majority is not.

("Arithmetic" being standard Peano arithmetic or similar)

In the set of true arithmetical statements, the unprovably true statements vastly outnumber the provable ones.

For example, the laws of physics or mathematical truths are often cited as examples of objectivism in action. — Cadet John Kervensley

If a statement is provable in arithmetic, then it is true in all "models" ("interpretations") of arithmetic.

The reverse is not true.

It is not because a statement in arithmetic is true that there would be an objective justification for it ("proof").

In that case, the statement is true in one interpretation ("model") of the theory but false in other interpretation(s).

If there is no objective justification for an allegedly true statement, there does not need to be a consensus on its truth.

How can you even be sure that it is true, since there is not even a common understanding on why that would be the case?

Some small proportion of arithmetical reality is provably true. Most of it, however, is unprovably true.

Therefore, arithmetical reality is generally not objectivist. Only a very small part is.

I never found Kant's arguments here particularly convincing. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm with Kant on this. A broader perspective recognizes the nature and extent of a priori knowledge applies to more than just space and time. Perception of color begins in the eye itself and grows to include a big piece of real estate in the brain. Babies are instinctively attracted to human voices and faces before they have had a chance to learn to make the categorization. There is also strong evidence that infants in the first months of life have inherent moral and numerical senses. If you have any interest in this subject, I recommend Konrad Lorenz's "Kant's Doctrine of the A Priori in the Light of Contemporary Biology." Its much shorter than the book I referenced. Here's a link.

https://archive.org/details/KantsDoctrineOfTheAPrioriInTheLightOfContemporaryBiologyKonradLorenz

What things are outside of all interaction with anything else is not only epistemically inaccessible, but also makes no difference to the rest of the world. — Count Timothy von Icarus

If our a priori knowledge is dependent on our biological makeup, what could be more relativistic than that. As Lorenz shows, it has a profound impact on what we know and how we learn - all of our psychology.

Now some object changes its position or “moves in space”, and the mind remembers where the local motion began, sees the course of the movement, and notes where it terminates: the rabbit, for example, came out of that hole and ran behind that tree, where it is “now” hidden. The motion was not a “thing”; the rabbit is the “thing”.

There is evidence that perception of motion is also affected by instinctive, genetic mechanisms in the nervous system. It's not learned after birth.

I do not understand why he is frequently credited like this with the idea that our sense organs/minds shape how we experience the world. This is a very old intuition. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm confused. Given this understanding, I don't see why you reject the position I'm describing.

The laws of physics are not necessarily the same from one universe to the next, so that would be an example of relativism (or relational, as I tend to use the word, to distinguish it from Einstein's relativity theory, which is something else). — noAxioms

I think you're stretching the meaning of the word "relativism" here. "Universe" means everything. We only have access to this scope of being, dimension or whatever you want to call it. If we ever gain access to some other hypothetical world, the meaning of "universe" will change.

The problem with asserting a completely relativistic notion of truth is that such an assertion is straightforwardly self-refuting. Such a claim will itself only be "true" relative to some social context, "language game," etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

And therefore if relativism is true for some and not others, then it is self-refuting as a claim (i.e. relativism is relative ... "truth is subjective" is subjective ... — 180 Proof

I don't understand the logic of this. Of course a relativistic position is relativistic. Not all self-reference is self-contradictory. 180 Proof, I know you have an understanding of metaphysics similar to mine. Relativism and objectivism are metaphysical positions.

For example, is the sum of 3 and 5 equal to 8, or is that just a property of our universe? Mathemaical 'truths' are often held as objective, but proving that is another thing. — noAxioms

Yes, if there is no objective justification ("proof") then there won't be (an objective) consensus on whether it is true or not, rendering such truth subjective. Even in arithmetic, most truth is unprovable and therefore lacking objectivity.

Indexical utterings like "I'm the prime minister of Sweden" will typically be true for one person (or none) and false for others.
I suspect that's not quite what's meant here by "Relativism" though.

Doesn't "Objectivism" and "Real" go together here?
If there is a "Real Nature of Truth" would it not be objective?

Ignoring indexicals for a moment, it seems clear enough that there are independent truths.
Say, "The Sun burned less brightly 4 billion years ago" holds true (or false) regardless of whatever you or I may think ("brightly" can be translated to physics).
Doesn't seem particularly controversial.

Not all self-reference is self-contradictory. — T Clark

Of course; but I didn't claim or imply otherwise. There are virtuous circles and vicious circles, and the latter are self-refuting ones (e.g. OP's definition of "relativism").

Relativism and objectivism are metaphysical positions.

Well maybe, TC, but the OP posits epistemological positions (on "truth"), not metaphysics.

Relative and subjective are different. The example of the Catholic idea of abortion shows this because to Catholics it is absolute. Nevertheless, there is a relationship between relativism and subjectivity because one can stand back looking at the various relative positions and say that it amounts to all positions being subjective.

I would love to hear your thoughts on this issue. Which position do you take in the debate between relativism and objectivism, and why? How does this debate influence your own conception of truth and reality? — Cadet John Kervensley

I don't consider it particular important to have a view of truth or reality. Apart from a basic correspondence pragmatically, truth is often elusive. Truth is an abstract; it's not a property that looks the same wherever it is found. Truth is established in different ways for different matters. Eg - mathematical truth, geographic (empirical), historical, legal, philosophical.

I think the search for the really real or the truly true is often a god surrogate and a hope for finding some form of transcendence. We seem to want access to knowledge of something outside of human experience that is in some way immutable.

I believe we can pragmatically say things are good or bad in relation to the harm they prevent or cause. I am not sure we can do much more than that. All humans really have access to is a conversation about their values and what kind of world we want to build.

But even if you hold the view that there are objective facts, this does not end debate or resolve any problems between people's values. All we have then is the ceaseless debate about which set of 'objective' facts are the 'true' facts.

Pluralism for me please!

:up:

I'm with Kant on this. A broader perspective recognizes the nature and extent of a priori knowledge applies to more than just space and time. Perception of color begins in the eye itself and grows to include a big piece of real estate in the brain. Babies are instinctively attracted to human voices and faces before they have had a chance to learn to make the categorization. There is also strong evidence that infants in the first months of life have inherent moral and numerical senses. If you have any interest in this subject, I recommend Konrad Lorenz's "Kant's Doctrine of the A Priori in the Light of Contemporary Biology." Its much shorter than the book I referenced. Here's a link.

https://archive.org/details/KantsDoctrineOfTheAPrioriInTheLightOfContemporaryBiologyKonradLorenz

As I noted above, you can't be, strictly speaking, a Kantian and claim that neuroscience, evolutionary biology, and the like are telling you things about the causes of the structure of experience. For Kant, the natural sciences can only ever tell you about the world of phenomenal awareness, not what lies prior to it. This firewall needs to be in place so that he can hide "free will ," as he understood it, in the noumenal realm, while maintaining the phenomenal world is rigidly deterministic (see the end of the Prolegomena).

So I see the position you are advocating as:

A. Dropping core elements of Kant's thought;
B. Largely revolving around ideas that are neither unique to Kant nor new with him.

What I remain unconvinced by is not that "whatever is received is received in the manner of the receiver," that, as you say, "color has to do with the eye and brain," but rather the claim that it is impossible to say that space and time exist fundamentally (but not actually) in nature, or that it is impossible to apply the findings of neuroscience, genetics, etc. to anything outside that which lies inside phenomenal awareness.

If the view you like is one where evolutionary biology and neuroscience is telling us about the mind-independent world and the causal origins of the contents of experience then you are also closer to Aristotle than Kant (or at least as Kant as most people interpret him).

There is evidence that perception of motion is also affected by instinctive, genetic mechanisms in the nervous system. It's not learned after birth.

It's both for many animals. Sew a cat's eye shut from birth and it will go blind in that eye, even after the eyelid is allowed to open again. After birth there is still a "critical period," in most mammals where stimulus is required for a sensory organ to develop properly.

But obviously there is also a formal component, having to do with genetics, etc., as well, i.e. the essential versus the accidental. The genes of a fern or flower will never produce a functioning eye regardless of the environment.

Sort of aside the point, this finding is consistent with a lot of philosophies of perception.

I'm confused. Given this understanding, I don't see why you reject the position I'm describing.

I'm pointing out that your position isn't Kantian. Kant also was not a relativist. The mind does not varry between individuals the way your initial post implies, which is why for Kant we can discover laws of nature that are universally applicable for all observers across phenomenal awareness. I've even seen readings of Kant where the "mind" is more a global/shared Avoresean agent intellect (although this seems to be a stretch).

Consider ethics for instance. The rational agents all come to embrace the same maxims, the good will willing itself is not relativistic.

the OP posits epistemological positions (on "truth"), not metaphysics. — 180 Proof

Why do you say that? Isn't truth a metaphysical concept?

there is a relationship between relativism and subjectivity — Jack Cummins

I agree, although I think in the context of this discussion, the difference is important.

you can't be, strictly speaking, a Kantian and claim that neuroscience, evolutionary biology, and the like are telling you things about the causes of the structure of experience. For Kant, the natural sciences can only ever tell you about the world of phenomenal awareness, not what lies prior to it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't consider myself a Kantian and I can use those of his ideas I find valuable without having to accept everything he says. As Lorenz wrote in the quote I included in my post - "What a biologist familiar with the facts of evolution would regard as the obvious answer to Kant's question was, at that time, beyond the scope of the greatest of thinkers." Besides that, as I noted, the idea of a priori knowledge being a manifestation of biological processes developed by Darwinian evolution is much broader than just Kant's formulation. I like to use Kant because it makes me seem all smart and stuff.

So I see the position you are advocating as:

A. Dropping core elements of Kant's thought;
B. Largely revolving around ideas that are neither unique to Kant nor new with him. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As for A, I don't have to accept everything Kant says to find his thoughts valuable. And B - I don't see how this makes any difference.

the claim that it is impossible to say that space and time exist fundamentally (but not actually) in nature — Count Timothy von Icarus

I didn't say it is impossible or unreasonable to see time and space that way, only that it is reasonable to see them otherwise. As I noted, I used Kant's vision of time and space as an example, not the only instance of the phenomena I am describing.

It's both for many animals. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, but I never said experience didn't have a role. Perhaps I should have made that clearer.

The genes of a fern or flower will never produce a functioning eye regardless of the environment. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Some plants respond to light with movement and growth. There's no reason that mechanism couldn't eventually evolve into an eye if there were an evolutionary reason to do so.

The mind does not varry between individuals the way your initial post implies, which is why for Kant we can discover laws of nature that are universally applicable for all observers across phenomenal awareness. — Count Timothy von Icarus

While it's true that the biological and genetic phenomena I'm describing are present for all fully-functioning humans, humans are not the only perceivers and, possibly, not the only conscious perceivers.

Isn't truth a metaphysical concept? — T Clark

Whether or not it is (I don't think it is), the OP clearly doesn't use "truth" that way.

This firewall needs to be in place so that he can hide "free will ," as he understood it, in the noumenal realm, while maintaining the phenomenal world is rigidly deterministic (see the end of the Prolegomena). — Count Timothy von Icarus

The "firewall" properly goes back to Hume though, Kant's innovation was to introduce synthetic a-priori truths.

or that it is impossible to apply the findings of neuroscience, genetics, etc. to anything outside that which lies inside phenomenal awareness. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It is difficult to get around the conceptual wall around phenomena. Of course, it's just as difficult to explain why one should care in the first place. Whether you're a metaphysical realist or just adopting realism as a practical consideration only makes a difference in some very specific circumstances.

Really whenever one asks a metaphysical question, one should first consider the question "why do I want to know".

If the question is "what is truth" - well, why do you want to know?

If by "Cadet" you mean you're a student of some kind, and if by your OP you have meant to charm us into providing for you thoughts and material for a paper of yours, then you have done a marvelous job. And lucky you, you shall receive some of mine.

There ain't no such thing as truth. "Truth" is a reified adjective masquerading both as an ordinary noun (person, place, or thing) and an abstract noun (a something not a person, place, or thing). There are statements that are true (the adjective), but always w.r.t. some context; the being true of a true statement a quality of that statement. Abstracting that quality and generalizing it yields truth, a useful concept, but nothing at all in itself. So don't look for it and don't worry about it. Worry instead if you must about what is true, and how and why.

As to objectivism and relativism - A1 job of defining - the same trick; that is, referral to context. And a key concept for me here is that the objective is not (ever) found "out there," but in here, bootstrapped, so to speak (some of us hate the term). E.g., 2+2=4 is by most folks held to be objectively true, and it would seem to be. But if there is no one to state it?

You can think of Descartes resolving skepticism with his cogito; Kant relativism with his categorical imperative; and Heidegger nihilism with his sorge (due to Michael Gelvin. A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time). Seeming themselves objectively true....

Mr. Clark, above, refers to "metaphysical truths," being the Ur-like beliefs of people that R.G. Collingwood calls absolute presuppositions, and others following Wittgenstein call hinge propositions. These come closest, imo, to objective truths, but the insight is that dug down to the ground of the foundation, they're just beliefs. .

And therefore if relativism is true, then it is true for some and not others, which is self-refuting as a claim (i.e. relativism is relative :roll:). This is incoherent, of course, and not a viable, or reasonable, alternative to 'objective truth' (so the OP's poll is a false choice). — 180 Proof

Doesn't seem valid. Relativism doesn't apply necessarily to truth. Ontology or morality could be relative, but truth is often not considered relative. 3+5=8 seems to be an objective truth, and 'there are no unicorns', while worded in an objective way, is arguably a relational assessment. 'Relativism is true' might refer to moral relativism, which could arguably stand as an objective truth, although it would seem that if it was true, it would only be a property of this universe or that which created both the universe and said morals. A deity defining what is wrong and right is a relation. Objective morals would be something the deity would have to adhere to, rather than something the deity could dictate.

the OP posits epistemological positions (on "truth"), not any metaphysics — 180 Proof

That he does (puts it in opposition to a perspective). We seem to have lost the OP, who has not in any way tended his own topic.
I seem to use more of a metaphysical definition of truth, some of which is relational, but some of which is probably objective.

I'm no physicist, or mathematician, but this sounds suspect. If a fact - like the laws of physics - in one universe is not the same as in another universe, wouldn't there have to be some independent reference frame against which the two can be compared to evaluate them relationally? — ToothyMaw

Not sure what is being asked, especially since there isn't any entity necessarily doing any evaluation. For instance, in another universe, the cosmological constant might be different, which I suppose can be compared to (greater/less than relation) to each other. In yet another universe, there is no meaningful thing that could be considered a cosmological constant.

If there were something similar to Newton's laws in both

Newton's laws are pretty basic and don't so much involve things like constants, other than fundamentals like there being 3 spatial and 1 temporal dimension. Other universes could have any values for either of these, and dimensions that are neither spatial nor temporal. Newton's laws wouldn't work in any of those.

I think you're stretching the meaning of the word "relativism" here. "Universe" means everything. — T Clark

It has multiple definitions. If it always meant 'everything there is' (a global and very objective definition), then 1) the concept of a multiverse would be meaningless, and 2), there are many definitions of 'what is', including relational ones.

We only have access to this scope

A very finite scope in fact. Sufficiently distant things are no more part of that scope than is a unicorn on Earth.

Yes, if there is no objective justification ("proof") then there won't be (an objective) consensus on whether it is true or not, rendering such truth subjective. — Tarskian

I'm using 'objective' in a way that isn't the opposite of 'subjective', but rather as opposed to 'relative'. Objective truths are not a matter of consensus, which is perhaps opinion or some sort of empirical conclusion, but actual truth seems not to depend on proof or even anything being aware of it.
There have been topics on this, and that statement is certainly debatable.

actual truth seems not to depend on proof or even anything being aware of it. — noAxioms

For physical truth, you can observe it. No need for ulterior justification. Arithmetical truth, however, cannot be physically observed. Pure reason is essentially blind.

In almost all cases, we make use of arithmetical soundness theorem to ascertain the truth of a statement: The statement is true because it is provable.

If you genuinely care about the issue, read here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

There's a fantastic summary the post after if needed. It is the combination of objectivity and subjectivity that allows us to have knowledge.