Yep. He and I might agree with you. Here he is perhaps looking at common misuses of "know".But as I understand it looking closer could never provide Wittgenstein with justification for knowledge, and thus it is odd to say that "looking closer" will somehow yield justification. — Leontiskos
Yep. Do you think Wittgenstein would agree that "the ultimate justification for empirical knowledge is usually thought to be sense data"? I doubt it. I can't imagine him using such a construct. it's the sort of thing he found so disagreeable in the Vienna Circle.The oddity is that the ultimate justification for empirical knowledge is usually thought to be sense data, and so for Wittgenstein to say that sense data does not count as a justification seems to commit him to the view that knowledge of this kind does not exist at all. — Leontiskos
Would it help if we noticed that Wittgenstein is acknowledging uses of "know" that he subsequently argues are illegitimate? — Banno
hence were there is no proposition to supply the justification, one cannot be properly said to know. — Banno
Trouble is, this text is not a whole. It is an incomplete process, a work in progress. Sam26 and I have pointed this out repeatedly. — Banno
The act of thinking, both for the writer and the interpretive reader, takes place without sight of the finish line. There may, in fact, be no finish line.
It is within the space and tension of interpretive uncertainty that we engage the text, whether it is a completed whole or not.
No. It is a prompt towards seeking justification - "Can't you see it?. Look closer". — Banno
Notice that (7) does not include the word "Know"? — Banno
7. My life shows that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there ...
You’re making Wittgenstein’s point for him. He sees Moore’s raising of his hand as a performance which is grounded in a picture of the world which cannot be proved more correct than any other. To doubt the truth of this picture is to substitute a different picture, a different language game, just as doubting the picture of the world implied by the rules of chess is to no longer be playing chess. Moore’s demonstration convinces doubters of its certainty by bringing them to look at the world in a different way, not by satisfying them of its correctness. — Joshs
If Moore knows, that would mean there's a sense of "know" that amounts to being unable to doubt. And per Hume, you can't prove what you can't doubt. So Moore would have some kind of unprovable knowledge, which doesn't sound right. — frank
Why can't there be other ways of clearing up philosophical confusion other than describing how words are ordinarily use. — Richard B
And does he maintain this position despite his later arguments? That's kinda the point. — Banno
How is "look closer" propositional justification?
— Fooloso4
It's not. Again, that's the point. — Banno
PI 66. ... look and see whether there is anything common to all ... [emphasis in the original]
To repeat: don’t think, but look!
And the upshot of these considerations is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: similarities in the large and in the small.
PI 122 A main source of our failure to understand is that we don’t have an overview of the use of our words. a Our grammar is deficient in surveyability. A surveyable representation [übersichtliche Darstellung] produces precisely that kind of understanding which consists in ‘seeing connections’. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate links.
I am not interested in constructing a building, so much as in having a perspicuous [durchsichtig] view of the foundations of possible buildings. (CV, p. 7)
(Zettel 461)(I once read somewhere that a geometrical figure, with the words "Look at this", serves as a proof for certain Indian mathematicians. This looking too effects an alteration in one's way of seeing.)
I'd argue that it is possible for us to accept that our notions of truth are inextricably bound up in malleable social practices and language games without jettisoning the idea that there is something external to human social practices grounding such notions, that our language games are not arbitrary, nor are they determined by "nothing but" social practices (i.e., the principles of social practice are not self-contained and subsistent, nor arbitrary and untinelligible). So, we can agree that claims as basic as "I have hands," require the use of some language game, that they always take place in the context of such a game, without having to conclude that our having hands or not is merely a matter of language games. All such systems have first principles, but this only implies a sort of deflation if one assumes first principles are arbitrary — Count Timothy von Icarus
“The "objects" to which our performances must be held accountable are not something outside discursive practice itself. Discursive practice cannot be understood as an intralinguistic structure or activity that then somehow "reaches out" to incorporate or accord to objects. The relevant "objects" are the ends at issue and at stake within the practice itself. The practice itself, however, already incorporates the material circumstances in and through which it is enacted
No, just in general. Is there something you think is being lost? — frank
Hegel seems to me to be always wanting to say that things that look different are really the same. Whereas my interest is in showing that things which look the same are really different. I was thinking of using as a motto for my book a quotation from King Lear: ‘I’ll show you differences.’
Looking/seeing stands over/against/ beside propositional justification — Fooloso4
I do disagree with your formulation that the world is "nothing but social practice," and "social practices all the way down."…” contingent existence is always relative existence, essentially referred, qua existing to another.” To be intelligible—to not be arbitrary—social practice must have its explanation in something other than itself since its essence does not explain its existence. On the view that the world is intelligible, such an explanation must be possible. — Count Timothy von Icarus
the biology of the human eye, its lack of sensitivity to UV light, can only be considered a "social practice," if we use the term equivocally. Eyes are something humans have by nature, not an activity they engage in (except to the extent that all form is activity). — Count Timothy von Icarus
Connections often obscure differences. When differences are taken into account the problem of what this guy is saying and what it means is compounded by what that guy is saying and what it means. — Fooloso4
Seeing as in the visual sense? Or seeing as something the mind does, as in "I see your point." — frank
How is what Moore is doing, by holding up a hand and pointing to it and saying "Here is one hand" making a conceptual point only? Is this not a way of establishing the truth, or the correctness of what he is saying? Moore is not trying to describe the language game "I know", he trying to get the language game of "I know" right — Richard B
Not all beliefs have justification. If a belief is to count as a piece of knowledge, then according to the usual account, it must be justified. Hence unjustified true beliefs on that account do not count as knowledge.Must the justification for a belief that is true be in the form of a proposition? — Fooloso4
If A justifies B, presumably the truth of A justifies B. I don't know what could count as a justification that could not be put into propositional form and take a truth value. — Banno
7. My life shows that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on. - I tell a friend e.g. "Take that chair over there", "Shut the door", etc. etc.
In the end the only thing that justifies it is not a proposition but finding the key on the table. — Fooloso4
It is not only that propositional justification is not necessary but that a proposition cannot serve as justification. — Fooloso4
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