The justification is that you found the key on the table. Everything that follows the word "that" is a proposition. — frank

Finding the key on the table is not a proposition. Saying I found the key on the table is.

This sounds like you're misunderstanding what a proposition is. — frank

Perhaps. What is it about a proposition that I misunderstood?

Perhaps. What is it about a proposition that I misunderstood? — Fooloso4

They don't have to be uttered. Propositions are the primary truth bearers.

I think what Witt is saying there is that he demonstrates confidence in the existence of a certain chair by his behavior. Isn't that what you see there?

They don't have to be uttered. — frank

Yes, but the point is, they can be expressed.

I think what Witt is saying there is that he demonstrates confidence in the existence of a certain chair by his behavior. Isn't that what you see there? — frank

He does say:

7. My life shows that I know or am certain ...

he goes on to say:

8. The difference between the concept of 'knowing' and the concept of 'being certain' isn't of any
great importance at all, except where "I know" is meant to mean: I can't be wrong.

I think what Witt is saying there is that he demonstrates confidence in the existence of a certain chair by his behavior. Isn't that what you see there? — frank

We have to be careful to recognize distinctions in the sense of ‘existence’. For instance, if we ask ‘does this chair exist?’, we might mean , does it persist as relatively self -identical over time for me when I observe it. Or we might mean, does it exist objectively such that its existence does not depend on an observer. The kind of certainty of existence that Wittgenstein has in mind with respect to the chair is the certainty of the intelligibility of the scheme of understanding underlying any and all senses of the word ‘existence’. Put differently, it doesnt matter what we mean by the ‘existence of the chair’ for Wittgenstein. There can be 10 people in a room and all have a different sense of what the existence of the chair means. But all can be equally certain of their pronouncement that this is a chair, despite the fact that there is no correct proposition here to arrive at.
Built into the pronouncement is a set of rules or criteria for correctness , and it is these rules and criteria that are certain in a relative sense , for a period of time, not any particular fact concerning chairs that are framed by the criteria.

Is that a rabbit or a duck I see in that drawing? If I say I’m certain of the existence of a rabbit there, in Wittgenstein’s sense certainty here means only that I’m certain that I interpret the pattern of lines in that particular way rather than another way.

Right. He's not getting metaphysical. It's along the lines of phenomenology.

He does say:

7. My life shows that I know or am certain ...

he goes on to say:

8. The difference between the concept of 'knowing' and the concept of 'being certain' isn't of any
great importance at all, except where "I know" is meant to mean: I can't be wrong. — Fooloso4

Yes. But he's just very confident about the chair. There isn't any sort of justification for some metaphysical position.

Yes. But he's just very confident about the chair. There isn't any sort of justification for some metaphysical position. — frank

I agree.

:up:

I think Hume was the first to point out that there are things we're really confident about, but there's no empirical or logical justifications for it. Just sayin. :blush:

If I say "the key is on the desk"...the only thing that justifies it is not a proposition but finding the key on the table. — Fooloso4

If you say "I know the key is on the desk" and asks how you know, asks for a justification for your claim, do you think Frank will find "Because I will find it there when I go in" satisfactory?

No.

"I left it there and no one has been in the room" is a justification for your claim. And a proposition.

This sounds like you're misunderstanding what a proposition is. — frank

Yep.

7. My life shows that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on. - I tell a friend e.g. "Take that chair over there", "Shut the door", etc. etc.

But

12. - For "I know" seems to describe a state of affairs which guarantees what is known, guarantees it as a fact. One always forgets the expression "I thought I knew".

We have to be careful to recognize distinctions in the sense of ‘existence’. For instance, if we ask ‘does this chair exist?’, we might mean , does it persist as relatively self -identical over time for me when I observe it. Or we might mean, does it exist objectively such that its existence does not depend on an observer. The kind of certainty of existence that Wittgenstein has in mind with respect to the chair is the certainty of the intelligibility of the scheme of understanding underlying any and all senses of the word ‘existence’. — Joshs

I suspect that this sort of philosophical meandering would not have impressed Wittgenstein. Frank is right; there is a chair over there if it can be moved, sat on, sold at auction and so on. But this is not about phenomenology, not just about perceptions. It is about the interactions between you, the chair and the folk around you.

If you say "I know the key is on the desk" and ↪frank asks how you know, asks for a justification for your claim, do you think Frank will find "Because I will find it there when I go in" satisfactory? — Banno

No. That would not be an adequate justification. That is my point. The justification would be to go to the desk and find it. To show it to him.

"I left it there and no one has been in the room" is a justification for your claim. And a proposition. — Banno

It is an attempt to justify my knowing that that is where it is. But it will not suffice. It might, after all, not be there. It is not justified by a proposition. Do you have a proposition that will justify it?

But
12. - For "I know" seems to describe a state of affairs which guarantees what is known, guarantees it as a fact. One always forgets the expression "I thought I knew". — Banno

Right. Taking a seat or shutting the door is not a state of mind. If I was wrong and there is not a chair or a door I could not take the chair that is not over there or shut the door that is not there.

Frank is righ; there is a chair over there if it can be moved, sat on, sold at auction and so on. — Banno

You are confirming my point! Where is the propositional justification?

There is a difference between knowing the key is on the desk and being certain that the key is on the desk.

That's kinda the topic of On Certainty.

The justification for a claim to knowledge is the answer to "How do you know?" It will not do here to simple repeat your claim - I know the key is on the table because the key is on the table; I know this is a hand because it is a hand.

This is what is being said in the first few pages of On Certainty. Moore is unjustified in claiming that he knows this is a hand. Yet, it is true that this is a hand; and he is certain that this is a hand. The remainder of the book is an exploration of this oddity.

There is a difference between knowing the key is on the desk and being certain that the key is on the desk.

That's kinda the topic of On Certainty.

The justification for a claim to knowledge is the answer to "How do you know?" It will not do here to simple repeat your claim - I know the key is on the table because the key is on the table; I know this is a hand because it is a hand.

This is what is being said in the first few pages of On Certainty. Moore is unjustified in claiming that he knows this is a hand. Yet, it is true that this is a hand; and he is certain that this is a hand. The remainder of the book is an exploration of this oddity. — Banno

Nicely put. How about I know this is a hand because I am pointing to it, we both see it, and we both understand what I am talking about.

There is a difference between knowing the key is on the desk and being certain that the key is on the desk. — Banno

Again:

8. The difference between the concept of 'knowing' and the concept of 'being certain' isn't of any
great importance at all, except where "I know" is meant to mean: I can't be wrong.

It will not do here to simple repeat your claim — Banno

Right. The justification is showing that the key is on the table. Showing that the key on the table - pointing to it, picking it up - is not a propositional justification. What would stand as a propositional justification?

The justification is showing that the key is on the table. — Fooloso4

Again, the justification for "I know the key is on the table" cannot be "The key is on the table"; that's just a repetition of the claim.

How about I know this is a hand because I am pointing to it, we both see it, and we both understand what I am talking about. — Richard B

Thanks.

There are two ways to know - explicit and implicit, knowing that and knowing how. In PI Witti deals in knowing that – with propositional knowledge. But arguably Moore was dealing with knowing how – setting out how we use words like "here" and "hand" and "is".

And I don't think this is at odds with what Wittgenstein has to say.

So "I know this is a hand" might be more like "I know how to ride a bike" than "I know the distance to the shops".

The justification for "I know how to ride a bike" is getting on the bike and riding it.

Again, the justification for "I know the key is on the table" cannot be "The key is on the table"; that's just a repetition of the claim. — Banno

I agree. But that is not what I said.

Previously you said:

Wittgenstein takes it as read that knowing requires justification, and hence were there is no proposition to supply the justification, one cannot be properly said to know. — Banno

If you still hold to this claim then it is not enough to say a propositional justification is and must be possible. If you cannot provide propositional justification then why should we assume that there is one? Why isn't showing the key on the table sufficient to conclude that I knew where the key is?

I suspect that this sort of philosophical meandering would not have impressed Wittgenstein. Frank is right; there is a chair over there if it can be moved, sat on, sold at auction and so on. But this is not about phenomenology, not just about perceptions. It is about the interactions between you, the chair and the folk around you. — Banno

Perception is fundamentally about interactions between us and the world, seeing as a form of doing, as phenomenologists such as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty showed. And Wittgenstein’s copious analyses of perceptual phenomena in PI reveal an intricate link between his notion of ‘seeing as’ with respect to perceptual phenomena like the duck-rabbit and certainty pertaining to material objects.

The concept of 'seeing' makes a tangled impression. Well, it is tangled.—I look at the landscape, my gaze ranges over it, I see all sorts of distinct and indistinct movement; this impresses itself sharply on me, that is quite hazy. After all, how completely ragged what we see can appear 1 And now look at all that can be meant by "description of what is seen".—But this just is what is called descrip­tion of what is seen. There is not one genuine proper case of such description—the rest being just vague, something which awaits clarification, or which must just be swept aside as rubbish.
Here we are in enormous danger of wanting to make fine distinc­tions.—It is the same when one tries to define the concept of a material object in terms of 'what is really seen'.—What we have rather to do is to accept the everyday language-game, and to note false accounts of the matter as false. The primitive language-game which children are taught needs no justification; attempts at justification need to be rejected.

Take as an example the aspects of a triangle. This triangle
can be seen as a triangular hole, as a solid, as a geometrical drawing; as standing on its base, as hanging from its apex; as a mountain, as a wedge, as an arrow or pointer, as an overturned object which is meant to stand on the shorter side of the right angle, as a half parallel­ogram, and as various other things.

"You can think now of this now of this as you look at it, can regard it now as this now as this, and then you will see it now this way, now /j-." — What way? There is no further qualification. But how is it possible to see an object according to an interpretation? — The question represents it as a queer fact; as if something were being forced into a form it did not really fit. But no squeezing, no forcing took place here. (PI p.200)

I know" is meant to mean: I can't be wrong

yet

One always forgets the expression "I thought I knew".

Wittgenstein juxtaposes these two statements, showing that knowledge must admit to the possibility of doubt.

So "I left the keys in the room and no one has been in there" is a justification, for "I know the keys are on the table" - there is room for doubt. But "The keys are on the table" is no justification for "I know the keys are on the table". Yet if the keys are on the table, then we can be certain that "The keys are on the table" is true.

Why isn't showing the key on the table sufficient to conclude that I knew where the key is? — Fooloso4

Good question, despite the mixed tense.

13. For it is not as though the proposition "It is so" could be inferred from someone else's utterance: "I know it is so". Nor from the utterance together with its not being a lie. - But can't I infer "It is so" from my own utterance "I know etc."? Yes; and also "There is a hand there" follows from the proposition "He knows that there's a hand there". But from his utterance "I know..." it does not follow that he does know it.

Supose that you had guessed that the key was on the table. Then "the key is on the table" is not sufficient evidence to conclude that you knew where the key is. A guess will not suffice - it is not a justification for your claim to know.

But moreover, this is the sort of puzzle that Wittgenstein is trying to unknot.

Sure. The big difference is the Wittgenstein rejects the solipsism of phenomenology by insisting on the place of perception as communal activity.

The big difference is the Wittgenstein rejects the solipsism of phenomenology by insisting on the place of perception as communal activity. — Banno

It’s a bit of both. The internal aspect can’t just simply be communal activity. Communal activity activates neural networks, but there’s more to it than purely experience arranging neurons.

↪Joshs Sure. The big difference is the Wittgenstein rejects the solipsism of phenomenology by insisting on the place of perception as communal activity — Banno

Does this sound solipsistic to you?

” My friend Paul and I point out to each other certain details of the landscape; and Paul's finger, which is pointing out the church tower, is not a finger-for-me that I think of as orientated towards a church-tower-for-me, it is Paul's finger which itself shows me the tower that Paul sees, just as, conversely, when I make a movement towards some point in the landscape that I can see, I do not imagine that I am producing in Paul, in virtue of some pre-established harmony, inner visions merely analogous to mine: I believe, on the contrary, that my gestures invade Paul's world and guide his gaze. When I think of Paul, I do not think of a flow of private sensations indirectly related to mine through the medium of interposed signs, but of someone who has a living experience of the same world as mine, as well as the same history, and with whom I am in communication through that world and that history.”(Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.471)

“ In the experience of dialogue, there is constituted between the other person and myself a common ground; my thought and his are inter-woven into a single fabric, my words and those of my interlocutor are called forth by the state of the discussion, and they are inserted into a shared operation of which neither of us is the creator. We have here a dual being, where the other is for me no longer a mere bit of behavior in my transcendental field, nor I in his; we are collaborators for each other in consummate reciprocity.

The internal aspect can’t just simply be communal activity. — schopenhauer1

I think we would find it very hard to explain "internal" here, apart from contrasting it with "communal".

Does this sound solipsistic to you? — Joshs

No. but this does:

We have to be careful to recognize distinctions in the sense of ‘existence’. For instance, if we ask ‘does this chair exist?’, we might mean , does it persist as relatively self -identical over time for me when I observe it. Or we might mean, does it exist objectively such that its existence does not depend on an observer. — Joshs

You might instead have said something about the chair being constituted at least in part by a common dialogue. Then there may have been some agreement.

I think we would find it very hard to explain "internal" here, apart from contrasting it with "communal". — Banno

I’m just saying you need that capacity for senses a priori, the community might shape it, but community alone, without these a priori capacities doesn’t seem to be the case. There is some cognitivist aspects to this. This also isn’t controversial afaik.

...capacity for senses a priori... — schopenhauer1

I don't see how to put these ideas together coherently. The a priori is theoretical, the supposed stuff we do prior to observation. The capacity to sense is biological. If the claim is that we need neural nets and sense organs before we can make observations, that's fine - but a priori seems to signify something logical, presumably something like that Kantian stuff about space being a priori intuition. I just find this line of thinking unproductive.

Might leave it there.

Prior to learning, the capacities to sense are there. The “place of perception” isn’t just from communal activity. The ability to sense has to be there too. Inevitably this leads to p-zombie conversations but it need not. It’s simply recognizing that subjectivity is not purely about communal learning. There is “something it’s like to be” something prior to it.

I do want to comment on what I was saying about hinges in relation to Godel's proofs. All I was trying to say is that instead of looking at certain axioms within a particular system as something that can't be proven within the system, we could look at them as endpoints not needing proof or justification, like Witt's hinges. — Sam26

But we don't choose to 'look at axioms' as 'something that can't be proven within a system' – that is what axioms are (it is simply what the word 'axiom' means). The unprovable statements – or 'Godel sentences' – theorised in Godel's incompleteness theorems are not axioms.

Axioms are indeed something like Wittgenstein's 'hinges', in that we accept them without proof and they form the basis of a system of reasoning. But that has nothing to do with Godel or his theorems.

It also seems on the face of it very strange to describe 'hinges' as 'endpoints'. The whole idea of a 'hinge' is that it stays in place so something else can productively move or turn. If Wittgenstein had meant to conjure up the idea of an endpoint, he could surely have chosen a better metaphor than 'hinge'.

I think this idea has ramifications beyond epistemology. I think it solves the problem posed by Godel's two theorems. These hinge beliefs seem to exist in any system where proofs are required, whether epistemological or mathematical. This of course goes beyond anything Witt talked about in OC, but I think it has merit. — Sam26

I'm not sure what 'problem' you suggest is being solved here. What is the 'problem' posed by Godel's theorems? As I understand, the theorems are in fact quite useful and have practical applications in fields like computer science. No doubt, Godel's work poses problems for earlier mathematical projects like Hilbert's programme. But in contemporary mathematics, as far as I understand (not being a mathematician myself), Godel's work is not really a 'problem' to be 'solved'.

Further, the semantic counterpart to the unprovable statements in Godel's incompleteness theorems would not be anything like a 'hinge belief'. It would be something more like the liar's paradox – a self-referential statement that cannot be both true and provable at once. Godel himself used the example of the liar's paradox in the introductory section of his paper advancing the incompleteness theorems. Wittgenstein responded to that example directly in his 'Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics'.

As my understanding goes, contemporary mathematicians generally do not consider Wittgenstein's reading of Godel useful. I am not a mathematician and cannot claim to understand the mathematical implications of Godel's work or the validity of Wittgenstein's response. But I am cautious of philosophical theories that claim to 'solve', refute, or have other decisive implications for complex theories in fields like physics or mathematics.

My interpretation of Wittgenstein and hinge propositions is that hinges are neither true nor false, i.e., hinges have a role similar to the rules of a game. I’m specifically referring to the use of true and false as something verified by facts, i.e., something justified within an epistemological system. “If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, nor yet false. If someone asked us ‘but is that true?’ we might say ‘yes’ to him; and if he demanded grounds we might say ‘I can’t give you any grounds, but if you learn more you too will think the same (OC 205, 206).” One can use “true,” but note it’s not an epistemic use of the concept as justified true belief. Rational discourse requires that there be these basic beliefs for rational discourse to function.

If someone asked, someone who is just learning chess, “Is it true that bishops move diagonally?” I would answer “Yes.” And if they further asked, “How do you know (an epistemological question)?” I might respond “It’s just one of the rules of the game.” In this case, the use of true is not justified, it’s just accepted as a basic belief without any grounding.

“But it isn’t that the situation is like this: We just can’t investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put (OC 343).”

Not only do hinges make it possible for rational discourse, but they also set the limits of what can be reasonably doubted.

The biology of the human eye is not a social practice, but it is a practice. The eye exists by functioning, and its functioning takes place within an integrated internal and external milieu which continually shape how it functions, in a way not unlike the way that linguistic practices shape the meaning of concepts for humans. We know now that environmental factors directly shape genetic structures, so any attempt to locate a pre-cultural explanation for the origin of an eye will be lacking.

I don't have any problem with the general description, because it seems to pretty much the insight that "act follows on being," that the eye has a function as part of a being, etc. However, exchanging "act" for "social practice" seems to introduce an equivocal usage of "practice" and "social," or "normative."

The "not unlike" highlighted above is important because, if how rocks interact with flowing water in riverbeds is "normativity all the way down," it is so in a way that apparently uses the term "normativity" in a way disconnected from what it normally means (or at the very least the likeness is not at all apparent). The likeness between say "river bed evolution and language evolution" seems at best analogical, but I am not even sure what the analogy is supposed to be because these things only seem "not unlike" each other in the very general sense that all things might be said to have something in common.



Same with the usage of "culture" wed to "environment" below. TBH, it seems like trying to say two different things at once. In what sense is a physical enviornment a "culture." The claim that environments effect genes or subatomic processes seems pretty uncontroversial, but what is "culture" even supposed to add here?

This doesn’t mean that linguistic practices directly influence the nature of DNA functioning in rats. It means that the physiological and environmental culture within which genes operate influence how they operate, and the environment within subatomic processes occur shape the nature of those processes and even their ‘lawfulness’.