:up:

One of the most enduring debates in philosophy is the one that pits relativism against objectivism. This debates has been fascinating me for years and it raises a fundamental question: is truth unique and universal (objectivism), or does it vary depending on perspectives and contexts (relativism)? — Cadet John Kervensley

I say that this is a something of a false dilemma, but one that we are very much bound to, due to the circumstances of culture and history. It arises from the modernist intuition of ourselves as intelligent subjects in a domain of objective forces. We divide the world into self and other, internal (mind, self, what I think) and external (matter, physical forces, society). It is the 'Cartesian division'

I've been absorbing a great deal of information from John Vervaeke's Awakening from the Meaning Crisis. A key idea which is relevant to your question is a term he introduced, 'transjective'. The 'transjective' refers to the dynamic, participatory relationship between the subject and the world, in which meaning arises through interaction rather than being either imposed by the subject ('in the mind') or existing outside ('in the world'). Vervaeke argues that the objective/subjective distinction presents a false dilemma because it overlooks how humans are always embedded in a web of relationships and processes within which meaning arises. The 'transjective' thus highlights the co-emergence of perception and reality, suggesting that meaning is neither purely personal nor purely external but is co-constituted through engagement with the world. And that applies to meaning in all the different senses of that word, from the utilitarian to the aesthetic, which arise along a continuum, from a spider spinning a web to a poet spinning a sonnet.

Vervaeke sees the 'transjective' process as both 'bottom-up' and 'top-down,', introducing a contemporary Neoplatonist framework into his account of meaning-making. From the 'bottom-up' perspective, the transjective emerges from embodied, sensory experiences and the mind's interaction with the environment, grounding meaning in concrete, lived reality (the 'lebenswelt' or 'umwelt' of phenomenology). From the 'top-down' perspective, higher-order cognitive processes, such as abstraction, reflection, and narrative-building, shape how individuals interpret and organize their experiences. This dual flow of meaning aligns with Neoplatonism, where reality is understood as structured through levels of participation, from the material to the transcendent, while avoiding reductionism ('everything dependent on the physical').

For further info see Transjectivity - A Short Commentary Andrew Sweeny

Awakening from the Meaning Crisis (playlist)

I'm no physicist, or mathematician, but this sounds suspect. If a fact - like the laws of physics - in one universe is not the same as in another universe, wouldn't there have to be some independent reference frame against which the two can be compared to evaluate them relationally?
— ToothyMaw
Not sure what is being asked, especially since there isn't any entity necessarily doing any evaluation. For instance, in another universe, the cosmological constant might be different, which I suppose can be compared to (greater/less than relation) to each other. In yet another universe, there is no meaningful thing that could be considered a cosmological constant.

If there were something similar to Newton's laws in both
Newton's laws are pretty basic and don't so much involve things like constants, other than fundamentals like there being 3 spatial and 1 temporal dimension. Other universes could have any values for either of these, and dimensions that are neither spatial nor temporal. Newton's laws wouldn't work in any of those. — noAxioms

You are confirming my point, I think. I'm saying that we cannot evaluate the laws of physics in two universes in some sort of relational, connected manner unless there is stuff like the cosmological constant - what I erroneously called a reference frame - in both. I was using Newton's laws as an example because my knowledge of physics is very limited. So, I think you must use the term "relative" by your own reasoning, and not "relational" - especially if you think that an evaluating entity would have to exist to connect the laws of physics in two different universes, although it is not entirely clear if you do.

Maybe I should be more direct: what exactly do you mean when you use the term relational? That is a sincere question. You might have some really good reason for using that term related to your knowledge of physics.

I think this post is getting at exactly that - is the property of being true based on facts that are verifiable independent of our feelings, or is the property of being true based on subjective experiences? Or at least, that's what I would like to think. — ToothyMaw

Given the definition of objective and subjective from here, the truth is objective if it is a set of statements that are true and independent of opinion, biase, conscious experience, and the like.

It is actually presented as relativism vs. objectivism in the OP. A bunch of people, me included, got it mixed up though, presumably when they tried to refresh themselves on the whole objectivism vs. subjectivism thing.

I think something could be true independent of opinion and conscious experience per se, yet still be relative, e.g. "many people believe that vaccines are dangerous", or "many evangelical Christians believe gay marriage should not be legal". These statements are true independent of our existence, or of what you or I think, yet represent something relative (to anti-vaxxers and evangelical Christians).

So, even by the definition you supply, relative truths can exist, but they are indeed different from objective truths because they often represent subjective opinions as being true relative to a certain group of people; the potential for many relative truths is nested in the existence of subjective truths that can be factually reported.

When I read this post (mine, not yours, MoK) I can't help but feel that what I'm saying is fallacious, but I can't tell where it goes wrong.

I think I see where I'm going wrong. A relative truth would be that relative to a society of evangelical Christians, gay marriage is indeed wrong on the basis of their subjective belief that it is wrong. That goes further than just reporting a fact, which is what I did in my post.

For me I start with the presupposition that both the object and the subject exist. And it is the interplay between these two phenomena that gives rise to objective truths and subjective truths.

For example imagine the number 6( or 9) written on the ground with no indication as to its intended orientation for appraisal.

One observer at one end sees a 9 and the other at the opposite sees a 6. These are subjective truths. From their individual or subjective perspective it is indeed a 6 for one and a 9 for the other and they can argue from their POVs eternally as to who is truly (objectively) correct.

The objective (more universal) truth is that which is perspectiveless or doesnt take a biased stance. It just is regardless of viewpoint. The objective truth in this case is that there is an unspecified symbol written on the ground and assuming there is no intention for how it is orientated, it is in a superposition of both a 6 and a 9 simultaneously (essentially meaningless until given one arbitrarily).

The dimensions (space and time) allow for multiple viewpoints/perspectives of the same thing. They limit the observer so that they are unipresent and uniscient and any given time. (Ie they can only witness a portion of the full picture from a specific position and hold only a portion of full information). Unlike if they were omnipresent and omniscient - at all places and receiving all information simultaneously.

It is these dimensions that allow for perspective, individualism and subjectivity.

In one direction we can study more objective truths by minimising variables (reducing the role of perspective/the subject) by standardising things or introducing constants, laws and principles by which we establish formulas for exacting precision/ prediction (science).

In the other direction we can maximise variables (increase the role of perspective/the subject) by casting out any rules, constants and limits and getting creative and reformulatory to make art, literature, poetry and abstractions that are highly interpretative.

Both exist. Both are true. But their truths are in different domains and thus function differently. Science and Tech = taking control of our environment and maximising our abilities based on refining objective truths.
Art, philosophy etc = not about taking control of the environment but rather about escaping it - proposing alternative "what ifs", exploring the metaphysical and maybe formulating ideals/ running commentary on reality by comparing it to imaginative constructs or parallel universes or our own making, which incidentally, may sometimes better our understanding of objective truths or the dynamic/tension between the objective and the subjective.

I think I see where I'm going wrong. A relative truth would be that relative to a society of evangelical Christians, gay marriage is indeed wrong on the basis of their subjective belief that it is wrong. That goes further than just reporting a fact, which is what I did in my post. — ToothyMaw

:up: :100:

Thanks for the positive affirmation.

But what is the conclusion? Can there be a conclusion? I mean, if we were to take the hard objectivist position, then how do we do reconcile that position with the endless plethora of subjective opinions encountered? Do we go through every one of them and try to reduce them to propositions about the objective world that can then be run through the metaphorical blender of objectively true utterances?

Surely if someone says something like: "I like cats because I think they are cuddly", then we kind of just have to deal with it if that is subsumed by some greater relative truth like "cats are ideal pets for people who like cuddly animals"?

There are relative statements, like "I like cats". There are statements like, "man is mortal" which are objective. Therefore I think the conclusion is that the first category of statements, relative statements, are not part of truth whereas the second category of statements, objective statements, are part of truth.

It is actually presented as relativism vs. objectivism in the OP. A bunch of people, me included, got it mixed up though, presumably when they tried to refresh themselves on the whole objectivism vs. subjectivism thing. — ToothyMaw

The OP also posted this in the ethics forum, meaning he's talking about moral objectivism vs moral, well, not-objectivism, where the line between moral relativism and moral subjectivism is almost nonexistent. Most of my posts have been about the more general relational view in general (such as relational ontology), where the distinction between the two metaphysical views (relative vs subjective) is quite significant.

So, I think you must use the term "relative" by your own reasoning, and not "relational" - especially if you think that an evaluating entity would have to exist to connect the laws of physics in two different universes, although it is not entirely clear if you do. — ToothyMaw

The relational view isn't one that requires evaluations, and a given entity has no empirical access to other universes, so any evaluation is entirely an abstract exercise.

Maybe I should be more direct: what exactly do you mean when you use the term relational?

Relational means that moral, ontology, perhaps even truth, are examples of relations.
It is not wrong to kill your children in some cultures.
Ontology: X exists in relation to Y if Y is causally effected by X (Y measures X). This definition only works with structures where causality is meaningful.
Truth: A relative truth would be that most watermelons are larger than most plums. A subjective truth would be 'the sky is blue presently' (also a relation since 'presently' references a time). The 3+5=8 example was my attempt at an objective truth.

Given the definition of objective and subjective from here, the truth is objective if it is a set of statements that are true and independent of opinion, biase, conscious experience, and the like. — MoK

You reference the wiki site, which equates objective to not-subjective. It works for morals at least, but not to general relational metaphysics. They give an example of a subjective assessment of the weather, but no example of what they consider objective. Their objective definition seems contradictory, that it is something to be evaluated, and yet true in the absence of a mind which supposedly is needed to do the evaluating. Perhaps I'm being picky. Yes, I can imagine a world absent anything with subjective experience (Wayfarer would disagree), at least enough to discuss it.

When I read this post (mine, not yours, MoK) I can't help but feel that what I'm saying is fallacious, but I can't tell where it goes wrong. — ToothyMaw

I actually agreed with it in general.

I think I see where I'm going wrong. A relative truth would be that relative to a society of evangelical Christians, gay marriage is indeed wrong on the basis of their subjective belief that it is wrong. — ToothyMaw

basis of their belief... Are not all beliefs subjective, pretty much by definition? One can have a belief about some objective thing (yes, 3+5 really is unconditionally 8), but the belief itself is subjective.

For me I start with the presupposition that both the object and the subject exist — Benj96

That is begging an objective ontology. Commonly assumed, but not valid thing to do in a metaphysical debate about whether such a premise is correct or not.

For physical truth, you can observe it. — Tarskian

An empirical truth then. The sun is bigger than Earth, and so forth, and then it becomes a relation to that which is observed. Arithmetic truth is more objective precisely due to the lack of an obvious relation.

In almost all cases, we make use of arithmetical soundness theorem to ascertain the truth of a statement: The statement is true because it is provable.

But all those theorems rely on axioms which have not been proven, so they rest on a foundation that isn't objectively sound, which is why I question if 3+5 equaling 8 being an objective truth.

Regardless of whether or not relativism is more accurate, or if we feel as though objectivism is too rigid, assuming objectivism in the search for truth (the answer to this question's use case) is generally more useful than assuming relativism.

Most truths worth looking for (except for personal truths) either have one answer, or the assumption that they have one answer leads to more productive debate and higher quality proposed solutions.

This is just my take, though.

Another thing. Even if it leads to assumptions and a limited context in which an answer is useful, looking for an objective answer can be helpful, because if one is found, at is at least true for the context it was found in. This also allows a comparison of contexts easily on that issue, seeing if that truth is provable in a different context can have ramifications for other truths in the new context.

Regardless of whether or not relativism is more accurate, or if we feel as though objectivism is too rigid, assuming objectivism in the search for truth (the answer to this question's use case) is generally more useful than assuming relativism.

Most truths worth looking for (except for personal truths) either have one answer, or the assumption that they have one answer leads to more productive debate and higher quality proposed solutions. — Igitur

I like the way you've formulated this issue - judging a choice of perspective based on usefulness. For me, that's the heart of the matter.

On “what is the real nature of truth”:

“…. The old question with which people sought to push logicians into a corner, so that they must either have recourse to pitiful sophisms or confess their ignorance, and consequently the vanity of their whole art, is this: “What is truth?” The definition of the word truth, to wit, “the accordance of the cognition with its object,” is presupposed in the question; but we desire to be told, in the answer to it, what is the universal and secure criterion of the truth of every cognition?…”

Too bad folks couldn’t differentiate between that which may be true, and the “real nature of truth”, by whichever there is that may be true, is determinable as being so.
—————

One of the most enduring debates in philosophy (…) raises a fundamental question: is truth unique and universal (objectivism), or does it vary depending on perspectives and contexts (relativism)? — Cadet John Kervensley

First, it should be asked, what is the topic of the debate, by which the fundamental question whether truth is universal or relative, is raised?

Second, if the most enduring debate in philosophy isn’t about anything other than whether truth itself, as a stand-alone irreducible a priori logical condition, is universal or relative, then what could possibly ground the debate, insofar as the mere occurrence of the debate itself, presupposes the definition of its subject, and thereby the answer to the question, is already given?
————-

Is truth unique and universal, is a contradiction: if it is unique it cannot be universal, and if it is universal it cannot be unique.

If truth is relativistic, in that it depends on perspectives and contexts, such dependence is redundant, insofar as a perspective is a context, and conversely, a context is a perspective.

Under the supposition “truth is the accordance with a cognition with its object”, it is the case that truth….not that which is true, but that stand-alone a priori condition by which things are determinable as being true, is neither unique/universal, nor does it depend on context or perspective.

All of which gets flushed, unceremoniously, in the metaphysical crapper, if the definition of truth, as given, is denied. Cool part is….immediately upon denial, the definition sustains itself, albeit, in the negative.

Two cents; no more, no less.

Thanks.
The reason for this I find sort of funny. A pretty big assumption would need to be made to attempt to find the truth of a question that deals with truth-discovering methodology. Therefore, I get straight to the use-cases.

But all those theorems rely on axioms which have not been proven, so they rest on a foundation that isn't objectively sound, which is why I question if 3+5 equaling 8 being an objective truth. — noAxioms

You can reject arithmetical truth, until you make use of it, or of a statement that happens to be equi-consistent with it.

Where Do You Stand? — Cadet John Kervensley

None of the above.

I embrace truthmaker theory: for any proposition that is "true", there is a state of affairs in the world (the truthmaker) that accounts for it being true.

The "truth" is objective, but does not have some transcendent existence. (Your definition of "objective" seemed to entail it existing "out there").

"True" is actually a relation between the proposition (a mental object) and the truthmaker.

What is Objectivism?
Objectivism asserts that truth exists independently of human beliefs, emotions, or perceptions. According to this view, there are facts that are true regardless of who examines them or under what circumstances. For example, the laws of physics or mathematical truths are often cited as examples of objectivism in action. For objectivists, truth is fixed and universal.

And Relativism?
In contrast, relativism claims that truth is subjective and dependent on context, cultural beliefs, and individual perspectives. What is true for one person or culture might not be true for another. For instance, in matters of morality, what is considered right or wrong can vary depending on cultural or historical contexts, reinforcing the idea that truth is relative. — Cadet John Kervensley

The pre-socratics, if I remember correctly, believed there are universal truths. But they believed that not everyone could access the right path to the truths. Because to them, seeing things differently, not commonly, through the right mind, is the way to truth. (I see that I haven't given anything that's concrete here and the reason is because their writings have been only in fragments, not the entirety, and no professors I studied under were good at it either).

The pre-socratics, if I remember correctly, believed there are universal truths. But they believed that not everyone could access the right path to the truths. Because to them, seeing things differently, not commonly, through the right mind, is the way to truth. — L'éléphant

:100: I think that was broadly characteristic of many of the Axial Age philosophies both East and West.

Semantic contextualism needs to be distinguished from truth relativism. According to the former position, differences of opinion are not interpreted as reflecting differences in truth assessment with respect to the same set of facts, but as reflecting differences in the contextual meaning of what each opinion is asserting.

Semantic contexualism when pushed to the extreme as a dogma, interprets all assertions as being necessarily true when contextually understood and trivialism ensues, which raises the question as to whether all of the problems of epistemology reduce to the trivialities of semantics.

:up: :up:

Wow, this is a genuinely interesting position.

:100: I think that was broadly characteristic of many of the Axial Age philosophies both East and West. — Wayfarer

Yes, true. It's the mind.

That is begging an objective ontology — noAxioms

How is it begging an objective ontology any more than it is begging a subjective one. I would have thought the assumption that the objective and subjective both exist is common intuitive knowledge.

Because if only the objective exists, one can deny any others autonomy, feelings, personal experience or human rights as subjectivity is null and void and has no merit or due consideration.

Similarly if only the subjective exists then scientific discovery and the tech based on those discoveries is null and void and only subjective imaginings of how things are is valid.

I would think that it's difficult to rationally refute either case. You would have to offer a concrete argument to either case before the assumption that both exist can be superceded.

So by all means explain why both don't exist?

You can reject arithmetical truth, until you make use of it, or of a statement that happens to be equi-consistent with it. — Tarskian

I cannot use arithmetic without first presuming some axiomatic truths. Yes, arithmetic is useful, but only useful relative to worlds in which it works, or at least seems to.

For me I start with the presupposition that both the object and the subject exist. — Benj96

That seems to be an assertion of realism.

How is it begging an objective ontology any more than it is begging a subjective one. — Benj96

In attempt to find the truth of realism vs some alternate ontology (idealism say were only ideals, and not objects, exist), presuming one of the two conclusions cannot lead to the truth of the matter.

I would have thought the assumption that the objective and subjective both exist is common intuitive knowledge.

Common & intuitive, yes, although not entirely. Several posters on this topic hold alternative views. Knowledge: no. It isn't knowledge if the truth of the premise cannot be demonstrated.

It's sort of like Einstein's special theory of relativity. It posits two premises (physics not being frame dependent, and local-frame-independence of the speed of light), neither of which has ever been demonstrated. There are alternative theories that deny both premises, and those alternative have not been falsified. So presuming what Einstein did may be useful, but it doesn't prove that Einstein's premises were the correct ones.


Still, you seem to be talking about subjective, vs not-subjective, like there's a realist objective view that denies subjective experience. Never head of anything like that, I admit.

The topic is posted under morals/ethics, and the OP mentions objective vs subjective morality. I don't think morality is either. There's no evidence of it not be relative to this or that, and since you cannot experience it in any obvious way, it isn't subjective either. So the OP gives a false dichotomy.

Being 'noAsioms', I do not presume that X exists. I try to be open to alternatives, and it turns out that I find issues with it that don't occur with a relational view.

Similarly if only the subjective exists then scientific discovery and the tech based on those discoveries is null and void and only subjective imaginings of how things are is valid.

Disagree. If only subjective exists, then science still yields new ways to have new/better subjective experience, however not nonexistent the science is.

So by all means explain why both don't exist?

The question is why it is not necessary for both to exist (or either). I never asserted that both don't exist. Anyway, the answer depends heavily on one's definition of 'exist'. Yours seems to be "something that 'acts'.", followed by examples of things that don't exists despite the fact that they very much act.
The definition I find to work best is a relation: X exists to Y if Y measures (is causally affected by) X. Given that non-objective definition, it is meaningless to say 'X does or does not exist', but it is meaningful to say that X exists (or not) to Y.
That does not mean I assert that my definition is truth. It's just one that I find has fewer problems that the alternatives. I don't know if there is a correct answer to the topic, even though most presume there is a correct answer despite our inability to know it.

I've been absorbing a great deal of information from John Vervaeke's Awakening from the Meaning Crisis. A key idea which is relevant to your question is a term he introduced, 'transjective'. The 'transjective' refers to the dynamic, participatory relationship between the subject and the world, in which meaning arises through interaction rather than being either imposed by the subject ('in the mind') or existing outside ('in the world'). Vervaeke argues that the objective/subjective distinction presents a false dilemma because it overlooks how humans are always embedded in a web of relationships and processes within which meaning arises. The 'transjective' thus highlights the co-emergence of perception and reality, suggesting that meaning is neither purely personal nor purely external but is co-constituted through engagement with the world. And that applies to meaning in all the different senses of that word, from the utilitarian to the aesthetic, which arise along a continuum, from a spider spinning a web to a poet spinning a sonnet. — Wayfarer

This is great stuff, Wayfarer... "meaning" is nonorientable, like the one-sided, one-edged Möbius strip with an infinite loop. Makes total sense to me. Breaking apart "subject" from "object," or "perception" from "reality," is like trying to separate "heads" from "tails" of a coin. To do so destroys the coin in the process and misdirects the discussion before it can even begin. (Forgive me my basket of mixed metaphors here!)

:pray: