‛The grass is green’ displays the assertion, and at the same time, under the right circumstances, makes it. — J
Surely we can look at a statement like ‛The grass is green’ as occurring in other contexts besides logical arguments, and when we do, we discover that assertoric force is by no means absent. — J
Have I succeeded in raising a genuine challenge to Frege — J
3. It begins to look as though the contemporary neglect of the old puzzles rehearsed by Wittgenstein is far less revelatory of the nature of these puzzles than of the current state of philosophy. The groundbreaking lesson of Kimhi's reflections is that this diagnosis may well be sound. Our sense that we have put these old puzzles behind us bespeaks a "misplaced confidence", one that "stems from our present conceptions of logic and language" (2). The task of addressing these puzzles must be confronted anew. Given that the Parmenidean account of the unity of thinking and being lands us in an aporia, what is required is a diagnosis of what stands in the way of an alternative account of this unity
But aren’t there two different ways in which “occurrence of an assertion” can be understood? An assertion can be displayed, perhaps as an integral part of a proposition, without being an “actual assertion.” Or better, let’s stipulate that to display force is not the same thing as to assert. Let’s add a nuance to the vocabulary so that we can now claim to be able to discover the force of ‛p’ without actually asserting it. — J
And again, the natural rejoinder is that the context of which you speak includes someone asserting this. You haven't actually shown why we ought to think force is part of logical form. Have you? — Srap Tasmaner
Fun thread. — fdrake
writing or saying the sentence counts as an assertion, — fdrake
First, it's not clear to me what your argument is. — Srap Tasmaner
it's a particular kind of argument you want to make: not so much that Frege is wrong or something, but that some other framework might prove more useful, or more perspicacious, might make easier to see something that Frege's framework makes hard to see, — Srap Tasmaner
‛The grass is green’ displays the assertion, and at the same time, under the right circumstances, makes it.
— J
That doesn't sound like an argument; it sounds like you (ahem) asserting your proposed conclusion. Even so, the natural rejoinder is that the circumstances in question involve someone, you know, asserting it. — Srap Tasmaner
‛The grass is green’ is not neutral as to force — J
But for now, what do you all think? Have I succeeded in raising a genuine challenge to Frege, or does the Fregean have an obvious counter-argument? — J
In Quine’s hands, however, the principle takes on a purely descriptive meaning, stating merely what kind of entities a given theory presupposes to exist – namely those that can figure as values of bound variables in that theory. In other words, the Principle features in Quine as his famous criterion of “ontological commitment”, which, since language has been purged of all directly referring expressions, lacks any a priori connexion to reality and becomes rather a matter of pragmatic choice. — Lukáš Novák, Can We Speak About That Which Is Not?, 166-7
And that’s what Kimhi’s book is about. — J
But does it? Were you asserting it, just now when you wrote the sentence? — J
I know you clarify this later, but in this OP I’m claiming that much depends on exactly what we mean by “assertion” so I’m being finicky here.
The Fregean picture is more like “p would or could be an assertion under the right illocutionary circumstances (thanks, Banno), but unless it’s actually being asserted, p has nothing in the way of force.” That’s what I’m challenging. — J
↪Srap Tasmaner says that there is no (counter)-argument being offered, and this is true at least insofar as there is no counter-argument which adopts Fregian presuppositions. What is being questioned is the presupposition. — Leontiskos
a "pragmaticizing" of logic, which destroys the idea of ontologically superior logics at its root — Leontiskos
The odd part of it seems to be "I" conjures an asserter. Which isn't the person who writes the sentence (me), it's the person in the sentence. — fdrake
It looked to me like the argument form here was something like this:
A: Fs are not Gs.
B: But in a way they are.
That's a disagreement, I guess, but I wouldn't call it an argument. And yes maybe it's a disagreement over presuppositions, but what's the argument for dropping the presupposition? — Srap Tasmaner
If we find that there are multiple frameworks for analyzing the symbol systems of humans and their utterances, and each is useful for particular purposes, we might consider the possibility that the speakers of a language also have at their disposal multiple frameworks for thinking about the utterances of their fellows. The distinction between between force and logical form might not be a fact, so much as a strategy, something people do because for some purposes it's very useful to do so. — Srap Tasmaner
Kimhi defines — Leontiskos
Frege did not consider his system to be a strategic, pragmatic deployment. Specifically, the system was meant to capture logic in its entirety. — Leontiskos
I don't think "logic in its entirety" is a thing. — Srap Tasmaner
Frege thought it was more than that and it seems he was wrong. — Leontiskos
Do you think logic is a thing? — Leontiskos
When one sees that Frege's system is insufficient it at the very least must be demoted to the level of a "tool." — Leontiskos
What's the plan here? What do we think we're doing? — Srap Tasmaner
I'm not sure how damning it is to describe something as merely useful, but you've got a hobby horse to ride and I'll not stop you. — Srap Tasmaner
Are we to proceed as if there is a fact of the matter here? Do we expect to discover that force is or is not part of a sentence's logical form, as we might discover, I don't know, humans reached North America tens of thousands of years earlier than we thought? — Srap Tasmaner
for Frege the ontological question is not moot, and Frege did not consider his system to be a strategic, pragmatic deployment. — Leontiskos
Existence [for Frege], in other words, is dependent on logical identification, not the other way round. Once you have named something, you can say whether it exists or not. — Julian Roberts, The Logic of Reflection
I see a relatively clear but restrictive theory proposed as Frege's in ↪J and clarified wonderfully in ↪Banno. I wanted to put some pressure on the restriction in it. The restriction being that an account of a sentence's "logic" ought to solely concern under what conditions is that sentence true. And moreover, in the final analysis, that logical structure of truth conditions spells out all of what is asserted in an assertion and thus how that assertion works whenever it is asserted. — fdrake
When one sees that Frege's system is insufficient it at the very least must be demoted to the level of a "tool." Whether J is arguing for more than this, I do not know. — Leontiskos
"Well if you aren't questioning the distinction tout court, then in precisely what way are you questioning it?" Does Kimhi have a clear answer? — Leontiskos
"I" always refers to the person speaking the sentence, does it not? — Leontiskos
It’s true that this doesn’t moot the ontological question, but it’s a special and severe restriction on what we can say about existence. It’s also a precise description of the order in which Fregeans have to proceed: quantification first. — J
Here I would retort: If “Sachse exists” should mean “The term ‘Sachse’ is not an empty sound but it stands for something”, then it is correct to say that the condition that “Sachse exists” must be satisfied. This, however, is no new premise, but a self-evident presupposition of all our words. The rules of logic always presuppose that the words used are not empty, that the sentences express judgements, that we are not playing with mere words. Given that “Sachse is a man” is an actual judgement, the word “Sachse” has to stand for something; in which case I do not need any further premise to infer “There are men” from that. The premise “Sachse exists” is superfluous, as long as it means nothing over and above that self-evident presupposition of all our thought. Or can you produce an example where a sentence of the form “A is B” is meaningful and true, A being a name of an individual, and yet “There are B’s” is false?[4]
[4] [...] Gottlob Frege, “Dialog mit Pünjer über Existenz” (between 1879 and 1884), in Schriften zur Logik und Sprachphilosophie: Aus dem Nachlass (Meiner Verlag 2001), 99, p. 11–12. [...] — Lukáš Novák, Can We Speak About That Which Is Not?, 157-8
If we attribute any content to the verb “to be”, to the effect that the sentence “A is” is neither superfluous nor self-evident, we shall have to concede that the negation of “A is” is, under certain circumstances, possible, viz. that there are subjects to which being must be denied. Then, however, the notion of “being” generally won’t be suited to be used as an interpretation of the meaning of “there is” any more, according to which “there are B’s” would be equivalent to “some being falls under the concept of B”. For if we applied this interpretation to the sentence “There are subjects to which being must be denied”, we would obtain the sentence “Some being falls under the concept of non-being”, or “Some being is not”. This is unavoidable, as soon as one ascribes any content whatsoever to the concept of being. If the interpretation that “there are B’s” means the same as “some being is B” is to be correct, then it is simply necessary that “being” be understood as conveying something completely self-evident.[5]
[5] [...] ibid., 20-21 — Lukáš Novák, Can We Speak About That Which Is Not?, 159
Newtonian physics is still a powerful tool, despite getting the big picture all wrong. — J
If Frege’s system is insufficient in its basic understanding of how propositions work, how they must be understood within logic, then while it may remain a powerful tool, it’s defective in explanatory power at the metalogical level. — J
I’m suggesting we think of force as something that can be displayed without assertion. And having said that, the question is whether this is just playing with words – whether the nuance I’m proposing really clarifies anything, or would change how we think about logic. To that question I would say, “Kimhi thinks it does, but I’m not clear on it yet.” — J
Both@Leontiskos and Fdrake have concerns about the “I” of assertion. This is very important, in my opinion. — J
I think the answer is no. — J
I have seen analytics fall into this trap of thinking that sentences can float in the ether without any speaker, even a logically remote one. In that sense I would agree with the OP that all sentences have a kind of force, but I would call it an intentional force rather than an assertoric force. — Leontiskos
‛The grass is green’ is not neutral as to force; it is not the making of the assertion that would give it its force. What it displays is a positive predication, which can be affirmed or denied. — J
I don't think this is correct at all. — Leontiskos
The oddity is that fdrake seems to think that there was no asserter prior to the one who was "conjured" by the "I" — Leontiskos
I think the ND review gets it right about Kimhi's debt to Wittgenstein, which he acknowledges. He sees Wittgenstein as a fellow "psycho / logical monist". Is a there a Wittgensteinian response about assertion here that you could offer? (In this context, assertion isn't the same as "reference.") The Indirect Realist challenge is interesting, but I'll leave it alone as my own metaphysics is much closer to direct realism. — J
We shall now enquire into the Sense and Reference of a whole assertoric sentence. Such a sentence contains a thought. Should this thought be seen as its Sense or as its Reference?
Given this evidence it would seem that it is incorrect to claim that for Frege quantification is wider than existence. — Leontiskos
it doesn't strike me as a great approach to lay the charge at Frege's feet that he hasn't sufficiently accounted for non-assertoric forms of locution. This is where I think Srap's critiques are helpful, for they demand more precision as to the actual conclusion being argued for. — Leontiskos
I don't think you understand what I am saying. "I" refers to the person speaking the sentence, and this person is not fdrake. — Leontiskos
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