Damn! On Amazon for MUCH less: 8 dollars for the Kindle version. Don't know how much it would be in Australia.

My paperback was around 30 bucks, while not cheap, is worth it given it's a rare reprint type of thing.

Also, there is a free version of the book online:

https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo2/A30630.0001.001?view=toc

It's quite readable. But I'm with you on preferring to read philosophy in physical form, for the most part.

It's quite readable. But I'm with you on preferring to read philosophy in physical form, for the most part. — Manuel

I will definitely have a look at it. That said, I find 17th philosophy quite challenging to read, as the style is difficult. But from what I've read of the Cambridge Platonists, they're definitely 'kindred spirits', so to speak. Someone with the appropriate scholarly skills would do well to publish an updated 'Cambridge Platonist Reader', in my view.

Oh man... they are torture... But once you find the good stuff, then you get top tier idealism.

Yes, they should, though Burthogge is not a Cambridge Platonists. He has certain strong Platonist elements.

Thanks for giving them a shot- as always if you have something you think I'd like, I'd be happy to take a look.

:victory:

I thought the issue was what you are calling 'human exceptionalism', that is, you are contesting the view that the human capacity for reason and language entails a categorical distinction between humans and rest of the animal kingdom. — Wayfarer

That's the inevitable outcome of using words according to their actual meaning. I was attempting to correct a misapprehension that resulted from a biased definition.

Myself along with several others are saying that there is a real distinction to be made, that h.sapiens are fundamentally different in some basic respects to other creatures. — Wayfarer

Yes, I've been aware of that. The evidence I've followed contradicts that assertion.

I'm saying that conceptual thought is dependent on language. — Wayfarer

Why? How do you know? How does 'conceptual thought' differ from 'rational thought'? And if they do differ, why have you shifted the discussion from rational thought, which was the thread topic, to conceptual thought, which has not been defined as anything beyond 'thought that needs human language to perform'? I have not shifted from rational thought - i.e. purposeful, practical identification and planned action to solve a problem.

I thought you were saying that it is not dependent, — Wayfarer

The definition of reason and rational thought does not include language as a prerequisite.
Reasoning:

the action of thinking about something in a logical, sensible way. Oxford

the process of thinking about something in order to make a decision. Cambridge

It [rationality] encompasses the ability to draw sensible conclusions from facts, logic and data. In simple words, if your thoughts are based on facts and not emotions, it is called rational thinking. Rational thinking focuses on resolving problems and achieving goals.

If there is any objective way to test or measure this faculty, other than the setting of problems that do not occur in the subject's customary environment, I'm unaware of it. Granted, I have not read ever with post with close attention.

In my book, however, this is not a simple empirical question. As far as I can see, it is fair to say that our paradigm (NOT definition) of a person is a human being (under normal circumstances). Animals are like human beings in certain respects such that it seems most reasonable to think that they are like people. — Ludwig V

All people are human beings. All human beings are people. Two names for the same thing. If animals are like all human beings in certain respects, then all people are like animals in certain respects.

Makes sense.

Crucially, it is clearly possible for human beings to form relationships with animals that are, or are like, relationships with people. But it's a balance. Some people do not go far enough and treat them as machines which can easily result in inhumane treatment. Other people go too far and get accused, sometimes rightly, of anthropomorphization. — Ludwig V

The thing to be avoided is a conflation between kinds, a blurring of the differences between the capabilities of humans and other creatures. Innate and learned. A lack of knowing what sorts of thought requires which sorts of prerequisites results in an inherent inability to draw and maintain the necessary distinctions. These differences are afforded to us by dumb luck. Are we lucky in that regard? I think so. It's not like it's something that we had to work hard for. It is not as a result of our own actions that we were born replete with wonderful capabilities that only humans have. We don't pick out all the different biological structures/machines within us. The crows don't either. They are lucky in the same way. Perhaps luckier, in some cases. Ontologically objective biological structures allow all of us to have uniquely individual subjective experiences.

We do not pick the socioeconomic circumstances we're born into. Those help shape the way we look at the world. We do not pick the most influential people around us while we're very young. They are often mimicked, for good or bad. We do not pick the cultural atmosphere. Those are nurtured - or not. Today seems lacking. I digress...

We do not pick the world we're born into. Nor do dogs. We can pick to do good while in it, for the sake of doing good. Dogs... not so much.

The aforementioned biological structures(biological machinery) were there long before we discovered them. We have come to acquire knowledge of the role they play within all verifiable individual subjective human experiences. It's a role of affordance. Allowance. Facilitation. Efficacy.

Other critters share objective and subjective aspects of experience. All subjective aspects of experience are existentially dependent upon physiological sensory perception. Physiological sensory perception is ontologically objective. I digress...



Looking forward to this Thursday is something that all sorts of people do, for all sorts of different reasons. It is looking forward to a sequence of events and this requires not only the objective influence that time passing has on life, but also the subjective private, personal - all that which is subject to individual particulars. Hence, it requires a creature with certain capabilities. Being able to keep track of the time between one week and the next - by name - is a bare minimum. Developing, having, and/or holding expectation about a construct of language seems to be required. I see no reason to believe that any other creature could do that.

Thursdays are creations of man. Cosmological systems/cycles, not so much.

Avoiding the fallacy of attributing uniquely human things, features, properties, creations, attributes, characteristics, etc., to that which is not human requires knowing which group of things are uniquely human and which are not. We know that no other known creature is capable of knowingly looking forward to Thursday. We cannot check to see if that's the case. But we can know that it is.

That kind of thought/knowledge requires naming and descriptive practices. All naming and descriptive practices are language. Deliberately, rationally, and reasonably looking forward to Thursday is an experience that can only be lived by a very specific type of language user. Us. Knowing how to use the word is required for having the experience.

All humans are extremely complex rational creatures, if by that I mean that our actions are influenced by our worldviews and societal constructs, and those are very complex systems.

All humans are also simply rational. We look for lost items where we think they may be. We believe that our actions will help bring about some change in the world. Language less creatures can do the same. Language less creatures can learn how to take action in order to make certain things happen. They cannot know that they are. They cannot say that. We can.

In defense of personification...

I've not read enough beautiful anthropomorphic terminological baptisms. I've not read enough graceful words bouncing in pleasing cadence; bringing smiles for all the right reasons. The personification of things not human can make for some of the most beautiful reflections.

The only way to avoid anthropomorphism is to know the differences and similarities, between human thought, belief, behaviour, and experience and other creatures'.

Language less rational thought must be meaningful to the thinking creature. The process of becoming meaningful must be similar enough to our own in order to bridge any evolutionary divide between language users' thought and language less creatures' thought(I'm 'ontologically nihilistic' on meaning/there is no meaning where there is no creature capable of drawing correlations between different things).

All thought is meaningful to the thinking creature. Some language less creatures form, have, and/or hold thought. Not all meaning emerges via language use. This demands a notion of meaning capable of bridging the evolutionary gap between learning how to open a gate and knowing how to talk about what one has just done. The gate is meaningful to all the creatures that know how to open it.

To believe that only humans are capable of any rational thought requires not believing one's own eyes.

The difficulty it seems lay in how to best go about taking proper account of all this.

The evidence I've followed contradicts that assertion. — Vera Mont

You've yet to cite any.

The definition of reason and rational thought does not include language as a prerequisite.

Reasoning:
the action of thinking about something in a logical, sensible way. Oxford
the process of thinking about something in order to make a decision. Cambridge
It [rationality] encompasses the ability to draw sensible conclusions from facts, logic and data. In simple words, if your thoughts are based on facts and not emotions, it is called rational thinking. Rational thinking focuses on resolving problems and achieving goals. — Vera Mont

I agree that these are the definitions of 'rational'. But I'm also saying that rational and conceptual thought and language are strongly related. Animals and other organisms plainly exhibit problem-solving behaviours etc, but I don't agree that they rely on abstract thought and reasoning to do so. If we can impute that to them, it's because we ourselves rely on it for explanations of all manner of phenomena. In saying that, I'm not denying that animals communicate, as they do so by all kinds of means. But they lack language in the human sense, which is based on an hierarchical syntax and the ability to abstract concepts from experience. Crucial distinction.

To believe that only humans are capable of any rational thought requires not believing one's own eyes. — creativesoul

But doesn't that contradict what you've said here?:

We know that no other known creature is capable of knowingly looking forward to Thursday. We cannot check to see if that's the case. But we can know that it is.

That kind of thought/knowledge requires naming and descriptive practices. All naming and descriptive practices are language. Deliberately, rationally, and reasonably looking forward to Thursday is an experience that can only be lived by a very specific type of language user. Us. Knowing how to use the word is required for having the experience. — creativesoul

Language less rational thought must be meaningful to the thinking creature. The process of becoming meaningful must be similar enough to our own in order to bridge any evolutionary divide between language users' thought and language less creatures' thought( — creativesoul

What is the evidence that there is any such thing? What, about animal behaviour, cannot be described in behaviourist terms, i.e., when confronted by such and such a stimuli, we can observe such and such behaviour.

I've seen cats, for example, gauging whether they can make a leap up a height or across a stream. They'll pause for a few seconds, their eyes will dart about, sometimes moving back and forth a little. They'll be weighing the leap up before acting. But I don't see any justification to say that this implies they're thinking.

By studying the DNA we know when wild dogs became fully domestic. Dogs are not the only animals that can be domesticated — Athena

Yes. I didn't mean to suggest that we know absolutely nothing. The DNA evidence is good enough for me. So is the evidence from archaeology. But I also think that the details of how, exactly, it happened, don't have good empirical backing. Yet we can develop reasonable speculations on the basis of what we know about dogs and humans now. I'm just saying we do well to remember how thin the evidence is.

That is so interesting! When teaching bonobo how to communicate with a picture board maybe this reaction of following a point plays into the learning? Do you have more information about this? — Athena

I certainly think that the ability to (be taught to) follow a pointer is the basis for some very interesting learning/teaching opportunities, which the subject may or may not be capable of. I'm afraid you seem to have a good deal more information about empirical studies of animals than I do.

Not unlike human children, until their culture teaches them not only to tolerate but to cultivate and promote double- and triple-think. — Vera Mont

Yes, I know. Double-think is often a great nuisance and yet seems inescapable.

What counts as thinking? What counts as rational thinking? — creativesoul

The lack of clear definitions does indeed make this debate much more difficult. But there's no easy way round it. Someone who doesn't see rationality in animals will define it in one way, likely by appealing to "language", which is assumed to apply only to languages of the kind that humans speak. Someone who empathizes with animals will be more inclined to a more flexible definitions.

I don't think "rational" is about a single thing, but about the multifarious language games that a language consists of; they have different criteria of meaning and truth. "Rational" refers to thinking that gets us the right results. In some cases that's truth of some kind, in others it's actions that are successful by the relevant criteria.

So here's my answer for this context. Meaning and concepts are shown in meaningful behaviour, which includes both verbal and non-verbal applications of the relevant concepts. This means that to attribute concepts to animals is perfectly meaningful, though not capable of the formal clarity beloved of logicians.

Someone who doesn't see rationality in animals will define it in one way, likely by appealing to "language", which is assumed to apply only to languages of the kind that humans speak. Someone who empathizes with animals will be more inclined to a more flexible definitions. — Ludwig V

Sentimentality, you mean ;-)

Especially as opposed to through emotion. — Patterner

I'm afraid that opposition is under severe pressure. There's a lot of research these days into the relationship (intertwining) of them. For example:-
Cognition and Emotion Journal

Still, I make that judgement. It's entirely subjective, after all. I think our intelligence and consciousness (I believe the two are very tightly intertwined) is the most extraordinary thing we are aware of, and capable of more wonders than we can imagine. — Patterner

"Subjective" is a much more complex concept than traditional philosophies want to recognize. In particular, assessing something to be extraordinary, if it is to be meaningful, requires a context that defines what is ordinary. That is, it depends on your point of view. There are points of view that see human achievements as extraordinary (good sense) and as extraordinary (bad sense). There are points of view that see human achievements as different in kind from anything that animals can do and points of view that see human achievements as developments of what animals can do. All of these have a basis. What makes any of them "better" than the others? I'm not sure. But I think the point of view that insists on the continuities between humans and animals is more pragmatic than the others. Stalemate. Pity.

The precise point we're at right now, is whether animals, such as dogs, can form concepts in the absence of language. I'm saying that conceptual thought is dependent on language. I thought you were saying that it is not dependent, and I was questioning you on sources for that contention. — Wayfarer

I am indeed saying that conceptual thought is not solely dependent on language. The concepts we have are revealed (better, expressed) in our use of language - i.e. in verbal behaviour. So it is no great stretch to say that concepts are revealed just as surely in non-verbal behaviour as in verbal behaviour.

Dogs (I'll stick to the concrete example, if I may) have concepts, but not language. Their concepts are shown in their (non-verbal) actions - as are ours, if you recognize meaning as use. — Ludwig V

A rather bold statement, is it not? Dogs, and other lesser animals sufficiently equipped with vocalizing physiology, seem to communicate with each other, albeit quite simply, which carries the implication of a merely instinctive simple skill. — Mww

Not particularly. As I said above:- The concepts we have are revealed (better, expressed) in our use of language - i.e. in verbal behaviour. So it is no great stretch to say that concepts are revealed just as surely in non-verbal behaviour as in verbal behaviour.
Why do you assume that only vocal behaviour is linguistic?
In any case, iInstinctive skills are not necessarily simple. Someone brought up the Monarch butterflies' ability to navigate, which is clearly not learned, yet is, one would have thought, quite complex.

And with that, the notion of discursive rational thought, the construction of pure a priori logical relations as contained, theoretically, in the human intellect, falls by the wayside in those lesser, indiscernible, intellects. — Mww

To be sure, animals do not indulge in our logic games and, likely, do not engage in our theoretical practices. Nonetheless, both theory in general and logic in particulate depend on, and grew from, our way of life (if you believe Wittgenstein, and I do - but that's another argument). I also believe (though I can't claim any authority from Wittgenstein) that, since we are animals, it seems most reasonable to suppose that our way of life is a one variety of the many varieties of animal ways of life.

Differences in degree do indeed produce differences in kind. — javra

Homo Sapiens is a species of an utterly different kind than that of any other species on Earth with which we co-inhabit (most especially with all the other hominids that once existed now being extinct). — javra

There's a dissonance between those two statements - not exactly a contradiction, but close. How do you get from one to the other?

I'll hasten to add that our species is nevertheless yet tied into the tree of life via an utmost obtainment, else utmost extreme, within a current spectrum of degrees - this as, for example, concerns qualitative magnitudes of awareness, of forethought, and the like. But this in no way then contradicts that we humans are of an utterly different kind than all other living species on Earth. — javra

That looks very like trying to have your cake and eat it.

I know of more than a few anecdotes of lesser animals giving all appearances of having a sixth-sense, as it's often termed. — javra

Yes. Whether there is anything substantial behind it is an interesting question. But if they do, they are superior to us in that respect. Just as homing pigeons and other migratory species have superior navigational abilities to us (in that they don't require elaborate technologies to find their way about the globe). So why do you insist that they are lesser?

Sentimentality, you mean ;-) — Wayfarer

No, I mean sensitivity, which can be excessive, just as insensitivity can be excessive.

There was a major fuss at one point in the seventies, when people realized that unsentimental scientists were testing the toxicity of certain products by dropping them into the eyes of rabbits. Their criterion for a dangerously toxic dose was that 50% of the rabbits died. Hence the test was known as "LD50". In the process, the rabbits often suffered extreme pain (or at least the scientists knew that a human would have suffered extreme pain, which was why they were testing the products on rabbits). So the rabbits screamed in agony. In an effort to be objective, they described this behaviour as vocalizing. The public thought differently, and controls on vivisection were, eventually, strengthened.

You may also like to consider:-

I started a thread a while back on something I had read that Descartes used to flay dogs alive, assuring onlookers that their cries of agony were due only to mechanical reactions, not any genuine feeling of pain. During the course of the thread, I did more research, and discovered that this was not true, and that at one point, Descartes had a pet dog which he treated with affection. However, the anecdote was not entirely devoid of fact, because students at a Dutch university who were followers of Descartes' mechanical philosophy did, in fact, perform those dreadful 'experiments', and it is true that Descartes believed that animals were automata without souls, as he identified the soul with the ability to reason. — Wayfarer

However, I do have serious trouble attributing these concepts to bacteria and amoeba. Insects also seem to me to be too mechanical to qualify - Wittgenstein says somewhere that "the concept of pain does not get a foothold in the case of a wriggling fly. Yet I also think that tearing the wings off a fly is cruel torture. Fish in general are also too alien to impact much on me, though I'm pretty sure that lobsters feel pain (partly because they have the same kind of nerve cells as the ones that register pain in human beings) and so think that the practice of boiling them alive is cruel. There are lines to be drawn here, and it's not easy.

I'm not here to win a contest for my knowledge of philosophy. At present I am discussing matters of psychology.
— wonderer1

Probably just as well ;-) — Wayfarer

And probably just as well that you realize that your knowledge of philosophy doesn't make you particularly insightful into other people's psychology, or sadly, even your own.

So the rabbits screamed in agony. In an effort to be objective, they described this behaviour as vocalizing. The public thought differently, and controls on vivisection were, eventually, strengthened. — Ludwig V

I know about that story - but what is the point? I've never claimed anywhere in this thread that animals are insensitive, or even that they lack intelligence. What is at issue is whether they're rational. And despite all the bluster and whataboutism, very little is being said about that by yourself or the other defenders of the view that they are.

There's a book I'm aware of, although I haven't read all of it, by Noam Chomsky, the famous linguistic philosopher, and Robert Berwick, a computer scientist, called Why Only Us? Language and Evolution. The first point to note is that Chomsky is adamant that only humans possess language (hence the title!) I've found an online presentation by Berwick who presents a synopsis, and he points to something called "Wallace's Problem". This refers to the issue raised by Alfred Russel Wallace, co-discoverer of the theory of natural selection, concerning the apparent disconnect between human intellectual abilities and the evolutionary pressures that could have led to their development. Wallace argued that certain uniquely human traits—such as higher reasoning, artistic creativity, complex language, mathematical and abstract thought—seemed to far exceed what would have been necessary for survival in the early human environment.

Wallace believed that natural selection could not fully explain these advanced cognitive faculties because they seemed disproportionate to the practical demands of survival in hunter-gatherer societies. He speculated that some form of higher intelligence or spiritual intervention might be responsible for these traits, which led to a divergence from Charles Darwin, who maintained that natural selection alone could account for the full spectrum of human abilities (see his Darwinism Applied to Man). This was one of the factors that caused a rift between Darwin and Wallace, with the former wishing to stick to a strictly Enlightenment-rationalist account, while Wallace fell into Victorian spiritualism.

In any case, Chomsky's book does acknowledge that the development of language is a very difficult thing to account for in naturalistic terms, but this is what the book tries to do. In pointing to what is unique about human language (and I think this applies to reason also). From a review of his book:

The starting point is a radical dissimilarity between all animal communication systems and human language. The former are based entirely on “linear order,” whereas the latter is based on hierarchical syntax. In particular, human language involves the capacity to generate, by a recursive procedure, an unlimited number of hierarchically structured sentences. A trivial example of such a sentence is this: “How many cars did you tell your friends that they should tell their friends . . . that they should tell the mechanics to fix?” (The ellipses indicate that the number of levels in the hierarchy can be extended without limit.) Notice that the word “fix” goes with “cars,” rather than with “friends” or “mechanics,” even though “cars” is farther apart from “fix” in linear distance. The mind recognizes the connection, because “cars” and “fix” are at the same level in the sentence’s hierarchy. ...

Animal communication can be quite intricate. For example, some species of “vocal-learning” songbirds, notably Bengalese finches and European starlings, compose songs that are long and complex. But in every case, animal communication has been found to be based on rules of linear order. Attempts to teach Bengalese finches songs with hierarchical syntax have failed. The same is true of attempts to teach sign language to apes. Though the famous chimp Nim Chimpsky (already mentioned) was able to learn 125 signs of American Sign Language, careful study of the data has shown that his “language” was purely associative and never got beyond memorized two-word combinations with no hierarchical structure.

Berwick and Chomsky develop a theory about a genetic mutation that enabled an ability called 'merging' which is enables the kind of heirarchical syntax decribed above. I'm not able to summarise that, as it's quite an intricate theory. But the main point remains, which is that they see a difference iin kind between human and animal communication.

This is why I pointed back to the Aristotelian notion of 'nous' (rational intellect). The philosophical point is that reason is able to grasp universal terms, such as 'man' or 'dog' or 'energy'. That itself relies on the ability to abstract, to grasp that very disparate objects belong to a class or group. Of course that comes so naturally to us, it is so innate to how our minds work, that we don't notice (and don't need to notice) that we're doing it. But that ability to abstract particulars into general forms, is also a key differentiator of the human intellect from animal sensiblity.

And most of the objections to that are, as I say, mere sentimentality. As if it's cruel or discriminatory to say that humans are capable of a kind of intelligence that animals are not.

And, for what it's worth, I agree with Alfred Russel Wallace, against Darwin. Not that there is a literal 'spirit' guiding evolution, but that evolutionary and neo-Darwinian theory does not account for the higher intellectual, artistic and contemplative achievements available to h. sapiens. Darwinism does not, in other words, account for a Mozart. Terribly non-PC, I acknowledge, but a position I'm quite happy defending.

However, I do have serious trouble attributing these concepts to bacteria and amoeba. Insects also seem to me to be too mechanical to qualify — Ludwig V

Another point - I'm coming around to the view that organic life is 'intentional' from the get-go. The quotes are because it's not intentional in the sense of acting in accordance with conscious intent, as rational agents do, but that as soon as life exists, there is already a rudimentary sense of 'self' and 'other', as the first thing any living organism has to do, is maintain itself against the environment, as distinct from simply dissolving or being subsumed by whatever processes are sorrounding it. So right from the outset, living organisms can't be fully explained in terms of, or reduced to, physical and chemical laws. This is an idea I'm trying to explore through a couple of difficult books, Terrence Deacon's 'Incomplete Nature' and Evan Thompson's 'Mind in Life'. (Pretty slow going, though :yikes: )

Wallace believed that natural selection could not fully explain these advanced cognitive faculties because they seemed disproportionate to the practical demands of survival in hunter-gatherer societies. He speculated that some form of higher intelligence or spiritual intervention might be responsible for these traits, which led to a divergence from Charles Darwin, who maintained that natural selection alone could account for the full spectrum of human abilities (see his Darwinism Applied to Man). — Wayfarer

Can you cite Darwin claiming that natural selection alone can account for the full spectrum of human abilities? After all, Darwin recognized distinctions in selective processes such as sexual selection and artificial selection.

Wallace argued that certain uniquely human traits—such as higher reasoning, artistic creativity, complex language, mathematical and abstract thought—seemed to far exceed what would have been necessary for survival in the early human environment. — Wayfarer

The social environment has always been a very significant component of the human environment, and higher reasoning, artistic creativity, complex language, mathematical and abstract thought facilitate thriving in human social environments.

Perhaps those with the ARHGAP11B mutation, with so much brain power to spare for making music and wooing the ladies, were just much sexier than those without?

The concepts we have are revealed (better, expressed) in our use of language - i.e. in verbal behaviour. — Ludwig V

Of course; not one of my contentions. Expression is objectified representation of conceptions, but not necessarily of rational thought, which is a certain form of representation of its own, re: propositional. All that says nothing about the origin of our conceptions, which has nothing whatsoever to do with the expression of them, but is always presupposed by it, and thereby legitimizes the death of the “meaning is use” nonsense, insofar as it is quite obviously the case we all, at one time or another and I wager more often than not, conceptualize….think rationally….without ever expressing even a part of it via “verbal behavior”.

Why do you assume that only vocal behaviour is linguistic? — Ludwig V

Where did I say or hint at that? All representation of thought in humans is linguistic, whether vocal or otherwise. It is thought itself, that is not, in that humans think in images, THAT being my major metaphysical contention from which all else follows.

Ever considered how hard it is to express an image? Why else would there even be a language, other than to both satisfy the necessity to express, and overcome the impossibility of expressing in mere imagery? And there’s evolution for ya, writ large.
————-

Nonetheless, both theory in general and logic in particulate depend on, and grew from, our way of life (if you believe Wittgenstein, and I do)….. — Ludwig V

……and I do not, not that it matters. In general, theory and logic depend on an intellect capable of constructing them. That to which each is directed, the relations in the former or the truths in the latter, may depend on our way of life, but method always antecedes product.

I know about that story - but what is the point? I've never claimed anywhere in this thread that animals are insensitive, or even that they lack intelligence. What is at issue is whether they're rational. And despite all the bluster and whataboutism, very little is being said about that by yourself or the other defenders of the view that they are. — Wayfarer

That explains a good deal that was puzzling me. I suppose that's an example of how one tends to get over-focused in these discussions. On the other hand, it may be that people felt that neither was equivalent to rationality and so left it on one side.

One of the problems about discussing intelligence is that it is not easy to grasp a definition of it that is amenable to philosophical discussion. However, I found the the following in an article on intelligence in "Psychology Today" that might provide a starting-point. "IQ" and "Giftedness" were proffered as one-word summaries. Then I found

Reading a road map upside-down, excelling at chess, and generating synonyms for "brilliant" may seem like three different skills. But each is thought to be a measurable indicator of general intelligence or "g," a construct that includes problem-solving ability, spatial manipulation, and language acquisition that is relatively stable across a person's lifetime.

For the record, I'm extremely dubious about the construct "g", but happy to think about more specific skills, with some reservations about "problem-solving ability" - surely much will depend on the kind of problem? My question is, then, what is the relationship between intelligence and rationality? It seems to me that all the skills cited involve rationality - intelligence is about the difference between being good (better than average) at these skills or not. So my next question is why you think that someone can be intelligent but not rational?

Sensitivity. I take it that you have in mind the ability to see, hear, etc, in the same ways as we do (roughly) and with all due deference to any possible sixth sense. So my dog can see (and recognize) me and respond appropriately to my return home, can hear her meal being prepared in the kitchen and present herself in good order, and so forth. Would that be fair? We can agree also that it shows intelligence (in the more generic sense of "understanding"). But what grounds are there for withholding the accolade of rationality? That she doesn't speak English? I don't think so.

I can only agree with you that it would have been helpful if someone had paid more careful attention to what you said.

Still, I make that judgement. It's entirely subjective, after all. I think our intelligence and consciousness (I believe the two are very tightly intertwined) is the most extraordinary thing we are aware of, and capable of more wonders than we can imagine.
— Patterner
"Subjective" is a much more complex concept than traditional philosophies want to recognize. In particular, assessing something to be extraordinary, if it is to be meaningful, requires a context that defines what is ordinary. That is, it depends on your point of view. There are points of view that see human achievements as extraordinary (good sense) and as extraordinary (bad sense). There are points of view that see human achievements as different in kind from anything that animals can do and points of view that see human achievements as developments of what animals can do. All of these have a basis. What makes any of them "better" than the others? I'm not sure. But I think the point of view that insists on the continuities between humans and animals is more pragmatic than the others. Stalemate. Pity. — Ludwig V

Not sure what you mean by the part I bolded. My take would be you want subjective preferences to be chosen for practical reasons?

Why do you assume that only vocal behaviour is linguistic?
In any case, iInstinctive skills are necessarily simple. Someone brought up the Monarch butterflies' ability to navigate, which is clearly not learned, yet is, one would have thought, quite complex. — Ludwig V

If the ability is not learned (I don't see how it could be), then it is instinctive. And it is complex. Therefore, instinctive skills are not necessarily simple.

I take it that you have in mind the ability to see, hear, etc, in the same ways as we do (roughly) and with all due deference to any possible sixth sense. So my dog can see (and recognize) me and respond appropriately to my return home, can hear her meal being prepared in the kitchen and present herself in good order, and so forth. Would that be fair? We can agree also that it shows intelligence (in the more generic sense of "understanding"). But what grounds are there for withholding the accolade of rationality? — Ludwig V

Try explaining the concept ‘prime number’ to her.

I can only agree with you that it would have been helpful if someone had paid more careful attention to what you said. — Ludwig V

Why that’s very courteous of you! An anecdote: the first undergrad essay I ever submitted was in psychology, on the subject of intelligence testing. I wrote an essay along the lines that intelligence was not something that can be tested. I got an F with the comment ‘wrong department’ (the implication being it was a philosophy essay.) It was the only essay I ever failed. Served me right, too.

But what grounds are there for withholding the accolade of rationality?
— Ludwig V

Try explaining the concept ‘prime number’ to her. — Wayfarer

Although the concept of prime numbers shows that there are areas of thought that humans have that other species do not, I don't see how it disproves dogs thinking rationally. Does being able to think rationally mean you can understand all possible things? I'm not saying they can, just saying I don't think that proves they can't.

For the record, I'm extremely dubious about the construct "g", but happy to think about more specific skills, with some reservations about "problem-solving ability" - surely much will depend on the kind of problem? — Ludwig V

Yeah "g" is a simplistic/expedient way of treating the subject, and there is much diversity to the way individuals go about solving problems that is not captured with attempts to measure g.

Unfortunately, testing to develop a more fine grained understanding of an individual's cognitive strengths and weaknesses (such as the WAIS test) is much more involved and requires a lot of one on one interaction between the individual conducting the test and the test taker. (Although I suppose soon computers might be able to take over a lot of what a human conducting such a test does.)

Perhaps it is worth pointing out, that most psychologists probably strongly agree with your view on "g".

The first point to note is that Chomsky is adamant that only humans possess language (hence the title!) — Wayfarer

Yes. Note that Chomsky and I part ways at this point. The definition begs the question whether animal communication systems count as languages. I'll let that pass for the sake of the argument.
Let's suppose that language learning is a case of human exceptionalism. I've already admitted that humans, as a distinct species, will be exceptional in some respects. One would have to show that this is an exception of more significance that the ability of Monarch butterfly to migrate back to the summer home of its ancestors without ever having been there.

For perspective, try this article from Scientific American.
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/evidence-rebuts-chomsky-s-theory-of-language-learning/

Wallace believed that natural selection could not fully explain these advanced cognitive faculties because they seemed disproportionate to the practical demands of survival in hunter-gatherer societies. — Wayfarer

I wouldn't discount that possibility. But it seems normal now to allow for that situation and to posit that selections other than survival, for example sexual selection, would kick in at that point. The story of the Irish elk is of interest. (It was first identified in Ireland from the large number of remains found there, but its has been found across Western Europe to Lake Baikal in Siberia. This variety of elk grew huge antlers, far bigger than could be of use in a fight. That first though to be an example for Wallace, but now the favoured explanation is that sexual selection enabled this. But, the story goes, they grew so big that they became a hindrance in normal life. The result was the species became extinct about 7,700 years ago.

The philosophical point is that reason is able to grasp universal terms, such as 'man' or 'dog' or 'energy'. — Wayfarer

Are you suggesting that my dog does not know the difference between humans (and between men and women and children) and dogs, not to mention many other things? That one won't fly. I grant you that she probably lacks a concept of energy. But that doesn't affect the question whether she's rational or not.

Another point - I'm coming around to the view that organic life is 'intentional' from the get-go. The quotes are because it's not intentional in the sense of acting in accordance with conscious intent, as rational agents do, but that as soon as life exists, there is already a rudimentary sense of 'self' and 'other', as the first thing any living organism has to do, is maintain itself against the environment, as distinct from simply dissolving or being subsumed by whatever processes are sorrounding it. So right from the outset, living organisms can't be fully explained in terms of, or reduced to, physical and chemical laws. This is an idea I'm trying to explore through a couple of difficult books, Terrence Deacon's 'Incomplete Nature' and Evan Thompson's 'Mind in Life'. (Pretty slow going, though :yikes: ) — Wayfarer

Yes. Skipping whether intentional is the quite the right word for it, the argument is plausible, so far as it goes. Some of the models of autonomous systems that Thompson discusses are very persuasive. People often suggest that feedback loops are also not reducible to conventional causality (what that is, these days). But "reducible" has become a complex concept nowadays, so I reserve my position and watch with interest. It's all a long way from what we're discussing, though.

Try explaining the concept ‘prime number’ to her. — Wayfarer

I hope you are not suggesting that because I don't understand even calculus, I'm not rational. It's not altogether irrelevant (given that we're also discussion the "g" factor) to point out that my school streamed me as sub-calculus in mathematics at the same time as it streamed me in the advanced classes for Ancient Greek and Latin.

It was the only essay I ever failed. Served me right, too. — Wayfarer

It was a bit harsh, given that it was your first essay and nobody warned you about inter-disciplinary boundaries. That's how Kuhnian paradigms are enforced. You don't get to qualify unless you conform - at least until you've qualified in orthodoxy. Nowadays, that's a perfectly respectable issue. I suppose other people swallowed their doubts until they got an academic post and tenure.

Perhaps it is worth pointing out, that most psychologists probably strongly agree with your view on "g". — wonderer1

That's good to know. Years ago, I was part of a team that taught an interdisciplinary course for psychology students. Intelligence was part of the programme and I got to give a lecture on it. I did my best with them, but most of them stuck to the party line - I couldn't criticize them for that. But perhaps I did contribute in a small way to that change.

That's good to know. Years ago, I was part of a team that taught an interdisciplinary course for psychology students. Intelligence was part of the programme and I got to give a lecture on it. I did my best with them, but most of them stuck to the party line - I couldn't criticize them for that. But perhaps I did contribute in a small way to that change — Ludwig V

:up:

But I'm also saying that rational and conceptual thought and language are strongly related. — Wayfarer

I know you've been saying that. I didn't see it demonstrated. In any case, 'strongly related' is not the same as 'dependent on'.

Animals and other organisms plainly exhibit problem-solving behaviours etc, but I don't agree that they rely on abstract thought and reasoning to do so. — Wayfarer

What are they using instead? Is there a demonstrable non-reasoning faculty that exists in other animals that could account for the similarity between their approach to a problem and human subject's?

But they lack language in the human sense, which is based on an hierarchical syntax and the ability to abstract concepts from experience. — Wayfarer

And how does the lack of syntax prevent someone from rational thinking? Communication is not required for solitary activities, such as opening a gate or finding a way to steal the bisquits from the top shelf of a cupboard.

What, about animal behaviour, cannot be described in behaviourist terms, i.e., when confronted by such and such a stimuli, we can observe such and such behaviour. — Wayfarer

What about human behaviour cannot be described in behaviourist terms? (Fortunately, that fad has faded)

Being able to keep track of the time between one week and the next - by name - is a bare minimum. — creativesoul

Why is the name of the day required? Why not an interval? It's possible that other animals have shorter periods of anticipation (as they also have shorter lives) but every dog knows what time his humans are expected home from work and school. My grandfather died on one of his regular trips and never came home again. His dog continued to meet the five o'clock train, hoping.

They'll be weighing the leap up before acting. But I don't see any justification to say that this implies they're thinking. — Wayfarer

Then what, precisely, are they doing? If a human stood on that same bank, assessing the distance and scanning the far shore for safe landing spots, would you doubt that he's thinking?
ETA Moreover, exactly like the man, if the leap is deemed not worth risking, a cat will walk some way up and down along the bank, looking for a place where the water narrows or there is a stepping-stone.

https://www.uh.edu/news-events/stories/2017/november/11012017Buckner-Animal-Cognition.php

https://academic.oup.com/pq/article/74/3/844/7278884

https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-handbook-of-animal-cognition/BDA9DE35B6D696DE312068AF8FA258DE

https://indianapublicmedia.org/amomentofscience/animals-use-reason,-just-like-you.php

Anyway, I think our pragmatic concerns are too different for us to reach aggreement anytime soon. — wonderer1

I think we are in agreement. You made a very good point. I like that the Greeks thought we are political creatures and it is fitting for this thread to question if any other life form is political. Chimps will sort of choose their leader, by ganging up on a leader they want to get rid of. An old leader who lost a fight may be allowed to stay close to the group. I just looked for more information and this link caught my interest.

Chimps use military tactic only ever seen in humans before

Chimps use an ancient military tactic to make decisions and avoid potentially fatal clashes with rival groups, scientists have discovered.

Researchers observed two western chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes verus) communities in Africa take to the hills to carry out surveillance on each other — much like reconnaissance missions used by militaries. They then used that intel to decide when to enter contested territory.

Plenty of animals look out for danger in their environment, but this is the first time scientists have documented a non-human species making elaborate use of elevated terrain to assess risk in a territorial conflict, according to the new study, published Nov. 2 in the journal PLOS Biology.
https://www.livescience.com/animals/monkeys/chimps-use-military-tactic-only-ever-seen-in-humans-before

It is kind of exciting to think about this and the evolution of social order. I googled if bonobo also use military tactics and I got this...

No, bonobos don't use military tactics, but they do have their own ways of responding to conflict:
Individualistic survival strategies: Male bonobos tend to survive on their own, which may be due to their tendency to follow female groups.
Sociosexual behavior: When faced with conflict, bonobos produce cortisol, the body's main stress hormone, and respond with anxiety instead of aggression. They relieve their discomfort by hugging, kissing, and having brief sexual encounters with group members.
https://www.google.com/search?q=do+bonobo+use+military+tactics&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS926US926&oq=do+bonobo+use+military+tactics&gs_lcrp=EgZjaHJvbWUyBggAEEUYOTIJCAEQIRgKGKABMgkIAhAhGAoYoAEyCQgDECEYChigATIJCAQQIRgKGKABMgkIBRAhGAoYoAHSAQoxODMwN2owajE1qAIIsAIB&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8

Looks like a republican/democrat divide.

Looks like a republic/democrat divide. — Athena

:rofl:

Looks like a republic/democrat divide.
— Athena

:rofl: — wonderer1

Thank you. Hum, do other animals laugh?

a new study shows that humans may not be alone in their love of playing practical jokes. Animals can tease each other too. Together with colleagues, Isabelle Laumer, a post-doctoral researcher at the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA), watched over 75 hours of videos of great apes interacting with each other. Great apes are our closest living relatives, and include orangutans, chimpanzees, bonobos and gorillas. The apes in the study all lived in zoos, and were filmed attending to their daily routines. https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20240223-do-animals-have-sense-of-humour

:chin: I understood play is important to social bonding and establishing social order but intentional humor? From experience, I know humor is very important for humans and that things can go very sour if we lose our sense of humor. In fact, I think humor is so important, we might want to teach it in school. Wouldn't it be nice if our schools produced comedians instead of killers.

If the ability is not learned (I don't see how it could be), then it is instinctive. And it is complex. Therefore, instinctive skills are not necessarily simple. — Patterner

Oops! Typo. Will correct. Thanks.

Thank you. Hum, do other animals laugh? — Athena

Ever read Stranger in a Stranger Land? The protagonist decided that's what separates us. Man is the animal that laughs.

Hum, do other animals laugh? — Athena

I've gotten the impression that pigs, at least when young, have a sense of humor. (A mother pig with a litter of piglets, not so much.)

I prefer Mark Twain's distinction : "Man is the only animal that blushes. Or needs to."

That chimps are aggressive wasn't the point of the Nim Chimpsky experiment. It was an attempt to teach chimps language, and it failed. I now find the experimenter, Herbert Terrace, wrote a book on it, 'Why Chimpanzees Can't Learn Language and Humans Can'. The cover blurb says 'Initially, Terrace thought that Nim could create sentences but later discovered that Nim’s teachers inadvertently cued his signing. Terrace concluded that Project Nim failed—not because Nim couldn’t create sentences but because he couldn’t even learn words. Language is a uniquely human quality, and attempting to find it in animals is wishful thinking at best.' And that is directly relevant to this dicussion. — Wayfarer

That chimps are more aggressive than bonobo needs to be taken into consideration because individual temperament is involved in learning.

Also, I don't think we all have an agreement about what language is. I think we have agreement that animals are capable of communication but does that equal language? Even if it did equal language is that language limited to a few words and what concepts does that serve? I think we are looking at evolution here. A bonobo that learned to sign taught her offspring to sign. In the wild, this is unlikely to happen naturally, but perhaps in a human environment, human socialization is picked up, setting the animal on the path humans took.

An animal's willingness to play with people increases bonding just as play is important in nature and building social connections. Would you please read the quote and tell me what you think? Did Kanzi not only demonstrate an understanding of words but also used a conceptual word demonstrating judgment associated with a word?

[/quote]In a landmark study in the mid-1990s, Savage-Rumbaugh exposed Kanzi to 660 novel English sentences including “Put on the monster mask and scare Linda” and “Go get the ball that’s outside [as opposed to the ball sitting beside you].” In 72 percent of the trials, Kanzi completed the request, outcompeting a 2½-year-old child. Yet his most memorable behavior emerged outside the context of replicable trials. Sampling kale for the first time, he called it “slow lettuce.” When his mother once bit him in frustration, he looked mournfully at Savage-Rumbaugh and pressed, “Matata bite.” When Savage-Rumbaugh added symbols for the words “good” and “bad” to the keyboard, he seized on these abstract concepts, often pointing to “bad” before grabbing something from a caregiver—a kind of prank. Once, when Savage-Rumbaugh’s sister Liz Pugh, who worked at the Language Research Center as a caregiver, was napping, Kanzi snatched the balled-up blanket she’d been using as a pillow. When Pugh jolted awake, Kanzi pressed the symbols for “bad surprise.”
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/bonobos-teach-humans-about-nature-language-180975191/
[/quote]