OK, so you support what I said then. Your use of "arguably" indicates exactly my point, we really have no consensus on what warrants "knowing". — Metaphysician Undercover
Abiogenesis is simply a theory of how life came from non-life, what’s woo-woo about that ? It’s just a word for a type of process(es) that occurred 3.5 billions of years ago during the inception of life. How can it be supported by science when we’re not privy to the conditions and events that transformed non living matter to living one 3.5 billions of years ago.
In the absence of alternative theories abiogenesis is just a label of how life came from non-life. You may dismiss it as woo-woo but it still remains a valid theory although it doesn’t have the answers of exactly how life came about, you have the right to remain sceptical about it. — kindred
You realize - yes? - that you're talking nonsense here. E.g., if a thing exists that is not an actual thing, and then it "manifests as an actual thing," then it is either the same thing or a different thing, and in-as-much as it goes from being a not-actual thing to an actual thing, then it's hard for me to see how it is the same thing. And as to the claim of the existence of not-existing things, it's incumbent on you to make clear just how that can be.No my claim is that something exists before it manifests as an actual thing in the world, in this case intelligence. — kindred
Perhaps you will read the Wikipedia article on abiogenesis. You will see that what life is, is not-so-easy to say, and that intelligence is a very long way down the evolutionary road. That is, that life and intelligence are not the same thing and should not be confused. Life seems to be a kind of ordinary process, which I think is inevitable given the right conditions. Maybe also intelligence, but maybe too with that some luck required.Inanimate matter could have continued to remain inanimate yet it didn’t because we have life (intelligence) so something happened to it which we can’t explain, we call this process abiogenesis. — kindred
Afaik, Spinoza is an acosmist² and not a "pantheist"¹ like (e.g.) Hegel.My view is pantheistic more than anything and probably Spinozist. — kindred
You realize - yes? - that you're talking nonsense here. E.g., if a thing exists that is not an actual thing, and then it "manifests as an actual thing," then it is either the same thing or a different thing, and in-as-much as it goes from being a not-actual thing to an actual thing, then it's hard for me to see how it is the same thing. — tim wood
And as to the claim of the existence of not-existing things, it's incumbent on you to make clear just how that can be. — tim wood
Abiogenesis is simply a theory of how life came from non-life, what’s woo-woo about that ? It’s just a word for a type of process(es) that occurred 3.5 billions of years ago during the inception of life. How can it be supported by science when we’re not privy to the conditions and events that transformed non living matter to living one 3.5 billions of years ago. — kindred
You may dismiss it as woo-woo but it still remains a valid theory... — kindred
Anyway, know-how has not been the focus of my part in the discussion, but rather 'knowing that' or what is called 'propositional knowledge'. We can warrant that we know things via empirical observation and logic. We cannot warrant that we know anything propositional in any other way I can think of. If you can think of an example that involves and demonstrates another way of knowing-that then why not present it for scrutiny? — Janus
Thanks wonderer that makes more sense, although abiogenesis is unsatisfactory at this time in terms of providing answers or conclusive explanation of how non-life to life happened it at least gives us something to work on. — kindred
What hypothesis of the origin of life is better than abiogenesis? Genuinely asking,It is through recognition that the pervading hypothesis is incorrect, and through examining the evidence of those failures, that we move along to better hypothesis. — Metaphysician Undercover
You narrow down the definition of "knowledge", to make the word refer only to one specific type of what is commonly called "knowledge", to produce an argument which supports your prejudice. — Metaphysician Undercover
What hypothesis of the origin of life is better than abiogenesis? Genuinely asking, — Patterner
No, I apply the word 'knowledge' only to those cases where we can clearly explain how it is that we know. It is obvious that we know things propositionally via observation and via logic. If you can point to another mode of knowing (other than know-how and the knowing of acquaintance or recognition, because those are not the subjects at issue) then do so. — Janus
As far as I'm concerned, any hypothesis about the origin of life on earth is better than abiogenesis, because abiogenesis is really nothing other than the lack of an hypothesis. It basically says that since we have no idea where life came from, or how life came about, let's just assume that it sprang from nothing (spontaneous generation). See, it's really a lack of hypothesis, more than anything else. The flying spaghetti monster is a better hypothesis, because at least it hypothesizes something — Metaphysician Undercover
You’re misconstruing what abiogenesis is, it is the emergence of life from non-life via natural processes not spontaneous generation. Therefore it remains a valid hypothesis though it may not have all the answers we are looking for. — kindred
No problem. :up:I gotcha. I misinterpreted your post that I initially responded to. — Patterner
I could interpret what you say here in two ways: One. In other words, you are supporting physicalism. If there's never been an account of how the first-person nature of lived experience arises from the objective source, then wouldn't that tell you that maybe it's because it can be sufficiently explained through physicalism alone?Ah, materialist philosophy of mind. I’ll try out some objections. First, you’re up against ‘the hard problem’ - there’s never been a plausible account of how the first-person nature of lived experience arises from the processes described by objective science. Experience has a qualitative dimension which never appears in the equations of physics by design, due to the ‘Cartesian division’ at the origin of modern science, the separation of primary (measurable) and secondary (subjective) attributes. — Wayfarer
I see where I need to make what I said clearer (or at least, my idea of physicalism).Practical illustration. You arrive home to discover your house and everything in it has burned down. If there was an instrument that could capture your precise neuronal and physiological state at that instant, it might capture data from which a suitably-trained user might be able to infer a state of acute emotional distress, and which would be an objectively accurate account. But on the basis of that data no matter how detailed, there would no way to determine how it feels and what it means to you. Saying that this is ‘neuronal’ or ‘physical’ might be objectively accurate but it would also be meaningless in the absence of the first-person perspective - namely, yours - which you bring to it. — Wayfarer
Propositional knowledge is a form of know-how. So your dismissal of "know-how" is unjustified. And, as I said, you want to reduce "knowledge" in general, (which would include all forms of know-how) to one specific type, knowing how to explain things through the use of propositions, to serve your purpose. That's not productive, we need to go the other way, to see what all the different types of knowledge have in common, if we want to understand "knowledge". — Metaphysician Undercover
If there's never been an account of how the first-person nature of lived experience arises from the objective source, then wouldn't that tell you that maybe it's because it can be sufficiently explained through physicalism alone? — L'éléphant
I think we make a mistake when we take physicalism as an epistemic theory, rather than an ontological theory. If it could demonstrate (and I think it does pretty well) that all things supervenes on the physical structure, then it has done its job. — L'éléphant
What I think is difficult for us to reconcile with accepting the truth of physicalism is that we, by default, feel defeated by the notion of the "mechanical". But if you follow Aristotle's 4 causes, it theorizes that we're not just machines in motion, but could be affected by changes in our environment, the efficient cause. — L'éléphant
But it isn't explained through physicalism alone. Physicalism explains physical things. If atoms are mainly empty space, how are solids solid? Why is water the universal solvent? How do things that are heavier than air fly? How does a plant get energy from the sun? we know how things like mass, charge, electron shells, and gravity explain these things.If there's never been an account of how the first-person nature of lived experience arises from the objective source, then wouldn't that tell you that maybe it's because it can be sufficiently explained through physicalism alone? — L'éléphant
This further question is the key question in the problem of consciousness. Why doesn't all this information-processing go on "in the dark", free of any inner feel? Why is it that when electromagnetic waveforms impinge on a retina and are discriminated and categorized by a visual system, this discrimination and categorization is experienced as a sensation of vivid red? We know that conscious experience does arise when these functions are performed, but the very fact that it arises is the central mystery. There is an explanatory gap (a term due to Levine 1983) between the functions and experience, and we need an explanatory bridge to cross it. A mere account of the functions stays on one side of the gap, so the materials for the bridge must be found elsewhere. — David Chalmers
I haven't seen where any scientist contradicts him, explaining how those features and the mathematical description does the job. I've tried reading Tse and Damasio, on the recommendation of @wonderer1. I've looked at other sources. But I have not seen any theory or hypothesis that addresses why it doesn't all take place "in the dark.". There just seems to be an unspoken acceptance that, when you put enough mental functions, like the ones I just mentioned, together, it just happens.And within that mathematical description, affirmed by decades of data from particle colliders and powerful telescopes, there is nothing that even hints at the inner experiences those particles somehow generate. How can a collection of mindless, thoughtless, emotionless particles come together and yield inner sensations of color or sound, of elation or wonder, of confusion or surprise? Particles can have mass, electric charge, and a handful of other similar features (nuclear charges, which are more exotic versions of electric charge), but all these qualities seem completely disconnected from anything remotely like subjective experience. How then does a whirl of particles inside a head—which is all that a brain is—create impressions, sensations, and feelings? — Brian Greene
I'm not jumping on board for any hypothesis or theory of how non-living matter became living, because, even though we can stack the deck any way we want, we haven't managed it. — Patterner
Now I've challenged you to come up with some other kind of purported knowledge, and to explain how it is that you know that it is knowledge. — Janus
What is the science which supports the premise of immaterial Forms which are prior to, and the cause of material existence? Is there some -ology?Your phrasing ("how non-living matter became living") betrays an underlying misunderstanding of the problem. Classical ontology premises immaterial Forms which are prior to, and the cause of material existence. In this ontology, there is no issue of non-living matter becoming living matter, there is an immaterial form of life, which became a material form of life.
So your phrasing, instead of questioning whether immaterial forms became material forms, or, non-living matter became living matter, already excludes the former, and assumes the latter as a starting point. However, there is no science which supports this exclusion. — Metaphysician Undercover
The argument from Aristotle is that a body is an organized existence, and an agent is required for any type of organization, as the organizer. Therefore the agent as organizer, is prior in time to the existence of the body. Of course abiogenesis is the basis for a denial of the secondary premise, but as the op points out, it's not a justified denial. — Metaphysician Undercover
What is the science which supports the premise of immaterial Forms which are prior to, and the cause of material existence? Is there some -ology? — Patterner
I haven't read Aristotle, or much of anything else. So I don't know what I don't know. This may be universally understood in a specific way, but I'm not aware of it. Is the agent not organized, therefore needing it's own agent/organizer? Are you talking about the uncaused cause?The argument from Aristotle is that a body is an organized existence, and an agent is required for any type of organization, as the organizer. Therefore the agent as organizer, is prior in time to the existence of the body. Of course abiogenesis is the basis for a denial of the secondary premise, but as the op points out, it's not a justified denial. — Metaphysician Undercover
Is the agent not organized, therefore needing it's own agent/organizer? — Patterner
The problem with the question as posed in the thread title, is that ‘pre-existing’ is a temporal description, referring to something that existed before everything else existed in time. Whereas classical theism, as a model, has the ‘ground of being’ as omnipresent and eternal, meaning, outside of time altogether. It’s ‘before’ the existing world not in the sense of temporal order, but in terms of ontological priority as first principle or ground of being. — Wayfarer
Material things cannot be organized?"Organized" refers to material existents. The term therefore is not applicable to the cause of material existence which, being prior to material existence, is necessarily immaterial. — Metaphysician Undercover
Sure, not very useful until well defined. Still, I don't see how you could not be talking about an uncaused cause. Immaterial and uncaused. No?And the terminology of "uncaused cause" is not very useful unless well defined, due to the multitude of distinct ways that "cause" is used. — Metaphysician Undercover
Mind isn't in atemporal's vocabulary. If you're talking atemporal, then you're not talking sentience; if you're talking sentience, then you're not talking atemporal. Isn't intelligence something that mind can do (or possess, be capable of)? — jorndoe
Material things cannot be organized? — Patterner
Sure, not very useful until well defined. Still, I don't see how you could not be talking about an uncaused cause. Immaterial and uncaused. No? — Patterner
I thought I understood. But I had a typo. I meant "immaterial." I just wanted to verify that you are saying only material things can be organized.Material things cannot be organized?
— Patterner
I suggest you reread that. I said "organized" refers to material things. The cause of existence of material things is cannot be material (is immaterial) and therefore cannot be called "organized". "Organized" refers to a spatial ordering, a concept which cannot be applied to the immaterial. — Metaphysician Undercover
It does explain that the processes such as the consciousness are made possible by the physical bodies that we possess.But it isn't explained through physicalism alone. — Patterner
I am guessing this is a typo. Last time I checked, you are opposed to this.Physicalism can even explain mental functions, like how we perceive different wavelengths of electromagnetic radiation, differentiate between different wavelengths, and move to avoid things that will harm the body. — Patterner
A claim without support.No, because the fact of one's own being is neither a physical fact, nor can it be denied (cogito ergo sum). — Wayfarer
Another claim without support.And here, 'supervenes' is able to be defined in just such a way as to paper over any current or even newly-discovered inadequacies in physicalism. — Wayfarer
I don't know what to make of this. Did you read his 4 causes?Well, speaking of Aristotle, he distinguishes artifacts (i.e. machines) from organisms on the basis that the latter are self-organising and their parts all work together to maintain the whole. Whereas machines are manufactured, their principle is external to them, and each part performs only the role designated by manufacturer. — Wayfarer
All I see here is a "no". But you didn't provide a convincing argument for why you are opposed to it.No, I'm opposed to physicalism because I think it's an illusion, something like a very influential popular myth. Because we're bedazzled by science and technology (and hey I'm no different in that respect) we see the world in those terms, but matter has no ultimate, mind-independent reality. Tangential to the original post, but there it is. — Wayfarer
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