I'm puzzled by what seems an unnecessary multiplication of p's... I'd understood Wittgenstien's notion to be that understanding p and understanding ~p amount to the very same thing, but that judging p or ~p was undertaking a further step. That step I would put in terms of intent, well before the much less lucid notion of force. So proceeding the judgement of the cat not to be on the mat is the separation of cats from mats within a suitable form of life, together with the intent of representing thing in that way.The unembedded negative thought ~p must therefore be tied to a logical act with a non-assertoric negative force of its own, and judging that not p, accordingly, consists in rejecting the actualization of the possibility to judge that p.
I baulked at Martin's paper mostly because I found the notion of force used throughout to be unclear. Facetiously, again, it's worth noting that nothing (at least nothing physical..) is moved by an assertoric force. Further, the example in the conclusion, that p has no force while ~p has a force all it's own seems fraught:
"The unembedded negative thought ~p must therefore be tied to a logical act with a non-assertoric negative force of its own, and judging that not p, accordingly, consists in rejecting the actualization of the possibility to judge that p."
I'm puzzled by what seems an unnecessary multiplication of p's... — Banno
I'd understood Wittgenstien's notion to be that understanding p and understanding ~p amount to the very same thing, but that judging p or ~p was undertaking a further step. That step I would put in terms of intent, well before the much less lucid notion of force. So proceeding the judgement of the cat not to be on the mat is the separation of cats from mats within a suitable form of life, together with the intent of representing thing in that way.
That is, I'm not seeing "force" as overly helpful here.
...special forces... — Pierre-Normand
Called in the nukes. Cheers. — Banno
Not at all sure what "symbolic and actual" is doing here. — Banno
It's worth asking what sort of thing a "Law of thought" might be. Presumably a Law of thought must be such that it hold true in all cases. — Banno
it's not about the view from nowhere, but about the view from anywhere. — Banno
The dilemma can be solved as follows: If an unembedded thought and its embedded counterpart must both be distinct and identical-in-content, while their distinction cannot be accounted for in purely logical terms, namely, by recourse to further logically complex thoughts into which p is embedded, the embedded thought p must be the very same thought as the unembedded thought p, but logically identified in a way that takes recourse to a nonlogical factor. Accordingly, what is distinctive about the embedded thought p is that it must be indirectly identified by recourse to that non-logical factor. If that is so, any unembedded thought p, insofar as it is logically embeddable, must itself be such as to allow for indirect identification, by recourse to some non-logical factor or other which it comes along with. For reasons that will hopefully become clearer in a moment it is apt to call such a non-logical factor which a thought comes along with a “real guise”, a “sign” or “an expression” of that thought. — Martins, On Redrawing The Force Content Distinction
If I judge P true, and so do you, aren't we making something we'd want to call "the same judgment"?
If I infer Q from P, and so do you, aren't we making something we'd want to call "the same inference"?
We can go further.
Suppose I forget to "carry the 1" in a piece of simple arithmetic, and so do you. Aren't we making "the same mistake"?
How far can this analogy go? Couldn't we have the same taste in music? The same fear of snakes?
Or is there some reason all of these things aren't just as objective as Frege's propositions? — Srap Tasmaner
If I infer Q from P, and so do you, aren't we making something we'd want to call "the same inference"?
Suppose I forget to "carry the 1" in a piece of simple arithmetic, and so do you. Aren't we making "the same mistake"?
. You both seemed happy to pick and choose which things get Forms and which don't, but I think you'll be stuck with a Form for "disappointment with the last season of Game of Thrones". — Srap Tasmaner
But it's about judgment. Kimhi wants to show there is no "logical gap" between P and "We who think P are right — Srap Tasmaner
Could you give me some more words on that please, or a link to where you've previously spelled it out? — fdrake
What have I said which has given you the impression that I like the forms? — fdrake
The thing is, this thread is about what sort of thing the judgment of a proposition is. I mistook it, for some time, to be about "assertion" in a speech-act or language-game sense, because of the phrase "assertoric force", — Srap Tasmaner
This had not occurred to me, though it might be obvious to the rest of you. And I think it's very much in Kimhi's neighborhood. The judgment he wants restored to its rightful place is not some subjective thing, but third-realm just like propositions. — Srap Tasmaner
Can we think of an example where no amount of precision can create a genuine synonymy between, say, two mistakes? If the precision is only about the object of the mistakes, then yes, I think so. Here's one that occurs to me offhand as a candidate: Jack misidentifies a note in music as a G# (it's really a G natural), Jill misidentifies it as an Ab. As you may know, G# and Ab refer to the same note, under different music-theoretic circumstances, rather like Morning Star and Evening Star. So have Jack and Jill made the "same mistake"? Arguably, no amount of precisifying about the note itself is going to resolve this, since Jack and Jill are making their respective mistakes for different reasons. But then again, they're hearing the exact same tone and being wrong about it with the same result. I want to say it's two different mistakes. This is perhaps a cousin of the "carrying the 1" example. — J
Either Kimhi is underselling the rigidity with which Frege's system excludes psychology, or what he Kimhi means by 'psychology' might not be what people think. — Srap Tasmaner
I just think we should quit throwing around 'proposition' and 'judgment' and 'inference' in ways that allow people to give those words their preferred reading. Frege is a Laws of Thought guy. I don't think you get to tweak his position by pulling in a little "social context" here and there, for example. — Srap Tasmaner
An assertoric gesture is analogous to a mimetic gesture that displays an act without being it. […] A mimetic gesture can be performed as basis for another act, as when we threaten someone by tracing a finger slowly across our neck. Similarly, an assertoric gesture occurs as a basis for the display of another repeatable, for example, p in not-p. An assertoric gesture is an occurrence of a repeatable – a propositional sign – that can occur either as a gesture or as a self-identifying display
And where's Kimhi? There's something about bringing psychology and logic back together, so he's messing about with the core of Frege's worldview, his platonist anti-psychologism. Does he bring them back together by ditching the platonism? That's not the impression I've gotten but I don't think I've stumbled on him addressing it either way. — Srap Tasmaner
The idea that thought is inherently forceful can only become an insight if it is concretely shown how that idea is compatible with the fact that embedded thoughts and dependent acts of thinking must do without a force of their own. If thoughts as such are tied to some force or other, while embedded thoughts (e. g. p qua part of not-p) do not directly come along with a force of their own, it must be clarified how the indirect connection to force, which embedded thoughts must indeed come along with, is to be understood. That is, it must be clarified how dependent logical acts that have an embedded thought as their content, and the overarching logical act that does indeed bear a force of its own interlock with each other such as to provide for the unity of a propositionally complex thought." — Pierre-Normand
Jack identifies it as G#
Jill identifies it as Ab.
G# and Ab are the same frequency.
Since G# and Ab are the same frequency, they're extensionally equivalent in terms of sound frequencies.
The note will be identified mistakenly when and only when it is not heard as G — fdrake
The thing that would let you see Jack and Jill's mistake as the same is the final principle there, right - the fact that the note will be identified mistakenly when and only when it is not heard as G. — fdrake
If Jack always identified every enharmonic equivalent in the sharp form, and Jill always identified every enharmonic equivalent as the flat form, the means by which they make the mistake would be a little different. — fdrake
I think there's a way of mucking with it. I'm not sure why I'm mucking with it at this point though. — fdrake
The role "the laws of thought" in Frege plays, Kimhi keeps an analogue of it, but they're less ironclad logical laws and more tight constraints on thought sequences/acts of thinking. I don't know what their nature is, or how they work, but Kimhi seems to want to notice expansive regularities in them. — fdrake
This is what drives him crazy -- how can we unify what appears to be a hopeless gap between the psychological and the formal? How can we bring "I judge p rightly" into some kind of entailment relation with what is the case about the world? — J
No no, I'm not accusing [@fdrake] of platonism — Srap Tasmaner
The problem is, the reasons for seeing judgment and inference as objective would apparently vouchsafe the objectivity of just about anything. — Srap Tasmaner
A mind and a thought just are related correctly or incorrectly. — Srap Tasmaner
I find reading Kimhi pretty unpleasant — Srap Tasmaner
For Kimhi, the key concept is affirmation and denial, not positive or negative predication. — J
But I insist it's worth it. — J
The old war still rages, — Srap Tasmaner
the role "the laws of thought" in Frege — fdrake
But then there's the other sense of "law" which refers to something that doesn't necessarily hold true in all cases, but ought to. Kimhi says that this normative sense of "law" is characteristic of a dualistic understanding of how thought relates to being. Using the PNC as his example, he argues that if non-contradiction is supposed to be a principle of being, a statement about how things are in the world ("either A or not-A"), then the psychological version is "a normative requirement: that one should not contradict oneself." He doesn't think it has to follow from the ontological version. Which is part of why he rejects the whole dualistic model. — J
the magnitude of the platonism at issue. The old war still rages — Srap Tasmaner
Perhaps that was Plato's belief, though I doubt it, but it needn't be ours. It doesn't sound as if your thoughts about hylomorphism would rule out talk of abstracta in a less reified way. — J
rule out talk of abstracta in a less reified way — J
I am unsure why Evans would be committed to this atomistic thesis or to take it to be an indispensable feature of an extension of Frege's notion of sense as applied to object dependent thoughts. So, I don't quite understand what motivates Kimhi's rejection of Evan's account. — Pierre-Normand
There's something quite amiss in this, to do with the absence of a clear account of "force". One simply can attend to the cat and the mat, and understand the predication, entirely without making a judgement as to the truth of "the cat is on the mat".Just to be clear, Martin claims that when one asserts the propositionally complex content ~p, one does not thereby engage in a separate act of entertaining the truth value of p (with its own force) separate from the special force that attaches to the overarching content ~p. Rather, on Martin's account, when one claims that ~p, p is presented for the sake of rejection within the overarching negative judgment. — Pierre-Normand
My point was in part to show that "modus ponens inference" is not singular; it's at best a group of loosely related activities which are not fundamental to logic.a symbol, such as when we show the modus ponens inference — J
Even something as abstract as a "view from anywhere" implies that someone, some consciousness, is going to step into that place and attain the view. — J
while the view from nowhere solipsisticly centres on the self, the view from anywhere is eccentric, looking to account for what others say they see, while seeking broad consensus. — Banno
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