5.132 If p follows from q, I can infer p from q; conclude from q to p.
The method of inference is to be understood from the two sentences alone.
Only they themselves can justify the inference.
Laws of inference, which - as in Frege and Russell - are to justify the conclusions are meaningless and would be superfluous. — Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein on the Judgment Stroke, by Floor Rombout, 57
On Redrawing the Force Content Distinction, Christian Martin — Pierre-Normand
This analogy seems problematic for the following reason: A mimetic gesture can indeed be performed as a basis for another act, while it can as well be performed without providing the basis for anything further. In contrast, an assertoric gesture is not such that it merely can occur as a basis for a further act. For if it were, it would amount to a forceless while logically contentful act on its own, which is exactly what seemed problematic about the Fregean conception. — On Redrawing the Force Content Distinction, by Christian Martin, 184
I am pointing to a fourth point, and it requires moving from the equivocity of the indicative mood to the univocity of statements. The idea is that we never handle statements independent of assertions, even when we are not asserting them. In that way a statement is like a tool with only one purpose. — Leontiskos
By assuming that assertoric gestures can either occur “with” or “without” being assertoric acts Kimhi has subscribed to a view that allows for the occurrence of logical acts – namely, mere assertoric gestures – which, albeit generically tied to assertoric force, are not qua particular acts tied to an overarching logical act whose force they actually partake in. — On Redrawing the Force Content Distinction, by Christian Martin, 186
At this point I very much want to know what motivates you to have faith in Kimhi. Or more precisely, "Suppose Kimhi's arguments fail. How would you try to salvage his project, and what would the aim be?" What's the target here, for you? — Leontiskos
To begin at the end, my overall judgment is that although Thinking and Being is indeed a
first-rate and perhaps even brilliant piece of philosophy, and although it has genuine
historico-philosophical import, in that, in my opinion, it effectively closes out a 100+
year-long tradition in modern philosophy, namely, the classical Analytic tradition,
nevertheless, all its central theses are false. — Robert Hanna,
I guess that's the target you asked about. — J
It's not at all clear what "classical" analytic philosophy might be, nor what the argument(s) against it might be, and certainly not that they succeed. Nor is it clear that there is any substantial point here against formal logic as it now stands, nor what any alternative might look like.it effectively closes out a 100+ year-long tradition in modern philosophy, namely, the classical Analytic tradition, — Robert Hanna,
The efficacy of false theses — Leontiskos
I think that in order for the critique to make sense it must be linked up to some goal of Kimhi's. Kimhi must be made to say, "This point in the OP matters because it can be linked up to my larger concern of X." — Leontiskos
What is Frege's notion of assertoric force, and how was it mucked up, and did subsequent developments of the notion of "force" not address those problems, and how is any of this so central to "Classical" analytic philosophy that it undermines it?So we have Kimhi's proximate thesis: Frege mucked up assertoric force. — Leontiskos
Frege's notion of assertic force is to do with the judgment stroke, it was further developed in different directions by model theory and Oxbridge linguistic philosophy, both of which became ubiquitous. — Banno
I can't quite figure out if you want to claim that the notion of assertoric force is so obscure and muddled that we ought to entirely dispense with it or if you rather want to claim that it is so clear and well understood that you can't fathom what the problem might be with it. — Pierre-Normand
(2) also fineOver the course of its history, analytic philosophy has associated different modes of non-existence with different components of a simple proposition. One of the early contributions of the tradition was the construal of non-existence claims as concerning the extensions of predicates through the use of quantifiers.
(3) an eyebrow is raisedOnce issues of non-existence that could be understood in terms of empty extensions of predicates were set aside, the interest of analytic philosophers turned to the mode of non-existence associated with the singular term in a simple proposition, and hence to issues such as the status of vacuous names and fictional entities
(4) a fateful decisionWhile the problems of intentionality and non-existence, analytic philosophers remained notably untroubled by the problems under discussion here— ones that arise in connection with the proposition as a whole. [ The grammar here evades me, and we may be missing a word. ]
(5) and this is the resultThe adoption of the force / content distinction allowed them to construe that which is true / false or is / is-not the case (e.g., a thought, a sentence, a state of affairs) as having its own existence independent of that conferred upon it through the veridical use of the verb “to be.” [ That is, the use of it to mean "is the case". ] Hence they were assured by the force / content distinction that the existence of the underlying propositional whole is guaranteed.
(6) which we decryAnalytic philosophy thus became completely unconcerned with the problem of non-existence associated with the propositional whole—hence with the difficulties raised by Parmenidean puzzles.
The aim of this work is to show that the very notion of a forceless truth-bearer is an illusion through and through, and hence that the difficulties of non-existence associated with the propositional whole—precisely those which are at issue in those puzzles— are inescapable.
You seem to treat it as fairly transparent. So what is it? — Banno
(As variously Aristotle, Leontiskos and I have suggested.) — Srap Tasmaner
The adoption of the force / content distinction allowed them to construe that which is true / false or is / is-not the case (e.g., a thought, a sentence, a state of affairs) as having its own existence independent of that conferred upon it through the veridical use of the verb “to be.”
What problem? The sort of thing addressed by free logic or possible world semantics? But then it would not be fair to say it was ignored...Analytic philosophy thus became completely unconcerned with the problem of non-existence associated with the propositional whole
So we are talking about illocutionary force — Banno
So in what way does a proposition "exist"? — Banno
What problem? — Banno
Only as an abstract object, immanent in an actual use. What I think so far. — Srap Tasmaner
A) An extensional analysis of rejection regarding a statement p( x ) must rely on the following claim: asserting the statement ¬p( x ) is equivalent to rejecting p( x ).
B) The equivalence in ( A ) requires that an asserter of p( x ) would commit themselves to all and only the same claims that a rejecter of ~p( x ) would.
A) An extensional analysis of R regarding a statement p( x ) must rely on the following claim: being in relation R to statement r(p( x )) is equivalent to being in relation S to s(p( x )).
B) The equivalence in ( A ) requires that being in relation R to s(p( x )) would commit someone to all and only the same claims that being in relation S to r(p( x )) would.
But you can note that they share other things - when someone judges that snow is white, they would also judge that schnee ist weiß. When someone would reject that snow is white, they would also reject that schnee ist weiß.
I don't know if it helps with Banno's cat. — Srap Tasmaner
For example, it is widely accepted, to the point that it is almost a dogma of contemporary [ analytic ] philosophy, that we must acknowledge a radical difference between the occurrence of p in extensional truth-functional complexes (such as “~p”) and its occurrence in intensional non-truth-functional complexes (such as “A thinks that p”). Given the way this distinction between logical contexts is usually understood, it has the consequence that, if one wants to answer our above question (what is it for p to occur in propositions of both of these sorts?), one must conclude that the p in question possesses the logically prior character of being something which is in and of itself true or false. — p. 11
I think this heterogenous, but still orderly, collection are the forces we're speaking about. They're baked into the expression like the truth condition is alleged to be.
Whereas the illocutionary force concept is not baked into the commonalities between sentences whose factual content is equivalent. It operates on sentences with a given factual content. Forces seem aligned with the conditions that allow us to grasp an expression's content - content as affirmation, content as rejection. Illocutionary forces are means of operating on an expression's content, content as factual, rejection as practical. — fdrake
The idea of logic as normative crops up more in everyday speech, I would say. "You're not being logical!" is a normative reprimand; the idea is that a good arguer ought to use correct logic. More generally, we seem to believe that in most cases, logic represents a template or set of guidelines for good reasoning, and it's all too easy not to use them. We aren't forced to think logically, in the way that, say, we're forced to digest food using [whatever the heck we digest food with]. — J
I just don't think anyone other than a few stray mystics is ever truly illogical. . . . Statements of logic, like the LONC, are indubitable. You don't really have any choice in that. — frank
Am I missing the point here? — frank
In short, if you take this detour through intensional complexes, you get a specific failure of atomicity, which extensional complexes just require. — Srap Tasmaner
So how does that lead to "in and of itself true or false"? I think it's just the claim that for p to work in an extensional context it has to be ready to provide a truth value. In particular, that truth value cannot depend on the truth value of any other proposition, so --- atomicity. — Srap Tasmaner
In a sense, this claim alone solves the Parmenides puzzles! Or at least the second one. By speaking, we can bring into existence an atomic proposition; we need only say that something is or is not the case. There is no reliance on anything else here, nothing that would be needed to support the existence of our atomic proposition (no "negative fact" for instance, no missing truthmaker). It is entirely within our power. — Srap Tasmaner
Most competent speakers would have no trouble explaining it. We would say, “ ‛Assert’ can mean ‛say something that is true,’ or it can mean ‛say something purporting to be true’. It depends on the context, and usually it’s clear which meaning is intended.”
Which meaning does Frege have in mind with the judgment stroke? — J
Frege is not merely attributing a belief to a subject with his judgment-stroke, — Leontiskos
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