Seems your pickle is one of logical consequences. — creativesoul

All logic is consequential: if this then that. For a logical system, if this then that and from that something else follows.

The implication from your comment is that my logic has consequences it shouldn’t. Be that as it may, I’m ok with my pickle being the consequences of my logic, as long as nothing demonstrates its contradiction with itself or empirical conditions, which is all that could be asked of it.

The difficulty is setting out the ways we're similar, and the ways we're unique. Our own thinking is bolstered by our own complex language use and all that that facilitates. Naming and descriptive practices are key. They pervade our thinking. They allow us to reflect upon our own experiences in a manner that is much more than just remembering.

Other animals cannot do that. — creativesoul

Right. But millions of years ago, our brains took a leap that no other species has yet taken. We were one of many species that had some limited degree of language, or representation, abilities. Presumably, various other species have evolved greater abilities since then. (Maybe whatever species today has these abilities to the least degree is the baseline that all started at. Although even it may have evolved from the barest minimum degree of such abilities.) But our brain gained an ability that was either enough for us to get where we are now by learning and adding to our learning, or that subsequent mutations were able to build upon. It allowed us greater language, and our greater language helped develop our brain. Now we think about things, and kind of things, nothing else thinks about.

The brain's activity could do these things without any subjective experience/consciousness anywhere.
— Patterner
The problem is that your thought-experiment only works if I pretend that I accept this. It begs the question. (This is about the P-zombies, isn't it?) — Ludwig V

No. I really like Chalmers. Most of the time. But PZs are just dumb. A planet that never had consciousness, but had our intellectual abilities, would never come up with three concept of consciousness. They wouldn't ever talk about it, or have words for it.

But why do you disagree? Don't we have robots that perform certain actions when they get certain sensory input?

I do notice the frequent assertions on this forum that, although neuroscience can't yet 'explain consciousness', they will do at some point 'in the future'. I would include that tendency under the same general heading. — Wayfarer

At 32:10 of the video on this page
https://thepanpsycast.com/panpsycast2/episode83-1
Chalmers says:

But that doesn't mean that we have to now sort of put our heads in the sand and say, "Well let's just wait and see." We can start thinking about why is the problem as hard as it is. And what is giving rise to this systematic difficulty. — Chalmers

No. I really like Chalmers. Most of the time. But PZs are just dumb. A planet that never had consciousness, but had our intellectual abilities, would never come up with three concept of consciousness. They wouldn't ever talk about it, or have words for it. — Patterner

OK. The PZs are supposed to be indistinguishable from normal humans, so that case is not relevant. You get much closer to that with your planet. I don't know of any reason to suppose that's possible, so I have no opinion to give.

Don't we have robots that perform certain actions when they get certain sensory input? — Patterner

It depends. If they have sensory input, they are conscious, so I don't accept that we have robots like that. But I agree that we can strap a camera to a computer (or input an image) and program it to respond in certain circumstances. I understand also that we often call that seeing or calculating or speaking. But it's by extension from human beings, not in their own right. Getting it to do everything that we do is a different matter. I don't rule out the possibility that one day there might be a machine that is conscious, but I have very little idea of what it would be like. But I also don't think that consciousness is on/off, like a light and sometimes there may be no definitive answer.

Now we think about things, and kind of things, nothing else thinks about. — Patterner

.. and yet we are still animals.

Sadly, I don't know enough to understand your attempt. I'm reading all kinds of things. Haphazardly, since I'm just singing it. So probably unproductively. But maybe I'll get there. SEP seems helpful.

However, the difference between neural activity/consciousness and moving feet/walking is vast. I can't even see any common ground. — Patterner

I intentionally picked a frivolous and perhaps imperfect parallel to sharpen the issue. Perhaps it would go easier with an example from physical sciences, such as the relationship between fluid dynamics and molecular dynamics. But let's just leave it.

The brain's activity could do these things without any subjective experience/consciousness anywhere. And I'm sure we're making robots that prove the point. But let's say we add another system into the robot. Let's call it a kneural knet. The kneural knet observes everything the robot is doing, and generates a subjective experience of it all. We built and programmed the kneural knet, and we know it absolutely does not have any ability to affect the robot's actions.

Isn't this what epiphenomenalism is saying? — Patterner

This is more towards philosophical zombies.

Oh, I don't think it is all that simple-minded. It is an attempt to gain a rhetorical advantage by labelling the phenomenon in a prejudicial way. If I'm feeling charitable, I try to ignore the label for the sake of the argument. — Ludwig V

Well, I think it's either simpleminded or dishonestly tendentious. "Trying to gain a rhetorical advantage" seems a strategy more suited to sophistry than to philosophy.

I'm not that bothered about that supposed failure. It's a bit like complaining that a photograph doesn't capture the reality of the scene. — Ludwig V

I'm not bothered by it either, so it wasn't a complaint, but merely an acknowledgement. I see it as a good thing to acknowledge our limitations.

But not by reporting facts. Language has resources beyond that. — Ludwig V

It's not clear to me what you are wanting to get at here.

Well, I think it's either simpleminded or dishonestly tendentious. "Trying to gain a rhetorical advantage" seems a strategy more suited to sophistry than to philosophy. — Janus

Yes, it is exactly the kind of thing Plato had in mind. But, to be fair, those effects are not always being consciously manipulated.

It's not clear to me what you are wanting to get at here. — Janus

Perhaps it's not relevant. Let's not pursue it here.

But, to be fair, those effects are not always being consciously manipulated. — Ludwig V

Right, but then isn't that the "simpleminded" case?

Perhaps it's not relevant. Let's not pursue it here. — Ludwig V

:cool:

I'm very ambivalent about the analytic mainstream — Ludwig V

As am I, make no mistake! But Nagel, in particular, has the advantage of being dissident inside that mainstream, so at least he is paid attention, even if it's often hostile.

But that doesn't mean that we have to now sort of put our heads in the sand and say, "Well let's just wait and see." We can start thinking about why is the problem as hard as it is. And what is giving rise to this systematic difficulty. — Chalmers

Right - his first book was 'towards a science of consciousness', but note his exploration of the requirement for a 'first-person science', i.e. science which takes into account the reality of the observer, instead of viewing the whole issue through an 'objectivist' lens. He's part of, and in some ways an instigator of, a sea change in philosophy of mind, which recognises this change in perspective, which his opponent Daniel Dennett resolutely refuses to do (ref).

Right - his first book was 'towards a science of consciousness', but note his exploration of the requirement for a 'first-person science', i.e. science which takes into account the reality of the observer, instead of viewing the whole issue through an 'objectivist' lens. — Wayfarer

Don't we already have, and have had for a long time, that "first-person science" in the form of phenomenology?

Of course that is one of the major sources. Joshs alerted me to Dan Zahavi who is one of them. But that is ‘continental’ as distinct from ‘Anglo-american’.

I'm not concerned about labels. I just don't understand the call for a "first-person" science given that we already have phenomenology and (I forgot to mention) psychology.

I mean you can't incorporate the first person into the study of chemistry, biology, geology, botany, or even physics and so on. That said it should be obvious enough to acknowledge that all those sciences are carried out by persons and that they are dependent on human perception and judgement. I can't imagine anyone being silly enough to deny that.

OK. The PZs are supposed to be indistinguishable from normal humans, so that case is not relevant. — Ludwig V

My point is there couldn't be such a thing. As I've said before, just because we can say the words, doesn't mean we can conceive of them. Like a square circle.

It depends. If they have sensory input, they are conscious, so I don't accept that we have robots like that. But I agree that we can strap a camera to a computer (or input an image) and program it to respond in certain circumstances. I understand also that we often call that seeing or calculating or speaking. But it's by extension from human beings, not in their own right. Getting it to do everything that we do is a different matter. I don't rule out the possibility that one day there might be a machine that is conscious, but I have very little idea of what it would be like. — Ludwig V

Are you contradicting yourself? Or am I reading it wrong?

But I also don't think that consciousness is on/off, like a light and sometimes there may be no definitive answer. — Ludwig V

I agree.

Now we think about things, and kind of things, nothing else thinks about.
— Patterner
.. and yet we are still animals. — Ludwig V

I have literally never heard anyone try to deny that anywhere, at any time in my life.

I mean you can't incorporate the first person into the study of chemistry, biology, geology, botany, or even physics and so on. — Janus

The target of Chalmer’s argument is those who attempt to apply those methods to study of consciousness, such as Dennett.

It is more than ‘labels’. There are major differences between Continental and Anglo philosophy on these issues, although it might suit you to ignore them.

Certainly the brain can be studied by empirical science. Consciousness as such though is not an observable phenomenon. Dennett recommends an approach he terms 'heterophenomenology' which is an attempt to combine empirical science with first person reports.

Do you think we can be confident that introspection and reflection on experience may yield reliable information about the nature of consciousness?

What are some of the major differences you see between Continental and Anglo philosophy?

This is more towards philosophical zombies. — SophistiCat

This robot would have consciousness, thanks to the kneural knet. PZs don't have any consciousness.

Obviously, something like a kneural knet would be found only in scifi. I'm just using it as an example off epiphenomenology. It gives subjective experience, but has no casual ability. If the robot acts without it, as robots we currently have do, then the addition of it would be true epiphenomenality (is that a word??).

Dennett recommends an approach he terms 'heterophenomenology' which is an attempt to combine empiricalbb science with first person reports. — Janus

We’ve been through all this before e.g. here .

According to Ray Monk, the Continental-Anglo divide stems from the period of Gilbert Ryle’s dominance of Anglo philosophy. I would try to summarize it but I’m typing via iPhone so am limited but the article is here . But a couple of differences that could be observed are between existentialism and phenomenology, on the Continental side, and the emphasis on language, logic and science and the generally ‘scientistic’ tendencies in a lot of Anglo-American philosophies. Whereas Anglo materialism tends to look to science, Continental materialism tends more towards Marxist or economic theory.

OK. I'm not denying that so-called analytic and continental approaches to philosophy are concerned with different things. Its too complex a topic to bother trying to address here, and it really has little to do with the OP in any case.

I think it's worth noting that in that three-year-old conversation you linked I said I approve of a plurality of approaches because we cannot pre-emptively decide what each will turn up. I havent changed my mind on that. You seem to be much more intent on polemicising the issue.

As am I, make no mistake! But Nagel, in particular, has the advantage of being dissident inside that mainstream, so at least he is paid attention, even if it's often hostile. — Wayfarer

I can recognize that I should not lump him in with the materialist mainstream - nor Chalmers. At present, I'm inclined to think that he is not dissident enough. I need to take a closer look. When the closer look will happen, I do not know. In the mean time, I can perhaps moderate my rhetoric.

According to Ray Monk, the Continental-Anglo divide stems from the period of Gilbert Ryle’s dominance of Anglo philosophy. — Wayfarer

I don't think that's historically accurate. I have the impression that the divide was well embedded before WW2. Indeed, it goes back to Hegel and beyond. Some people seem inclined to blame Ryle for everything, but I don't think that's fair.

Don't we already have, and have had for a long time, that "first-person science" in the form of phenomenology? — Janus

But I thought that Husserl specifically developed phenomenology to be something quite distinct from science - unless you define science as anything that attempts to achieve objectivity.

Which prompts me to complain that this entire discussion is scientistic and ignores the possibility that disciplines that do not aim to emulate science may be (I think are) essential to understanding consciousness. History, Literary and Cultural Studies, Sociology, some branches of Psychology etc. - not to mention Marxism and Psychoanalysis which might well have something to offer. But, of course, it all depends how you define "science".

I have literally never heard anyone try to deny that anywhere, at any time in my life. — Patterner

You didn't mention it in your account of how different humans are from animals. Mind you, I don't mention what you emphasize in my accounts of how similar they are. Perhaps it comes down to "glass half full/empty" - a difference in perspective rather than a disagreement about the facts. Then we need to tease out why that difference in emphasis is so important.

Are you contradicting yourself? Or am I reading it wrong? — Patterner

Yes, it does look peculiar. I didn't put the point carefully enough.
I think that "sensory input" is already a recognition that consciousness and experience are present. I also think that there is no a priori reason to rule out in advance the possibility that conscious beings might have bodies of plastic and silicon. Does that help?

My point is there couldn't be such a thing. As I've said before, just because we can say the words, doesn't mean we can conceive of them. Like a square circle. — Patterner

That's exactly why I can't do anything with your thought-experiments.

Right, but then isn't that the "simpleminded" case? — Janus

Yes, I guess it is. Perhaps that simple-mindedness is a fault. One can't, for example, describe an unborn baby as a foetus and pretend not to know what kind of context that sets up.

I'm not bothered by it either, so it wasn't a complaint, but merely an acknowledgement. I see it as a good thing to acknowledge our limitations. — Janus

Well, I certainly agree that it is a good thing to recognize the difference between a picture and a description and being there. Whether "limitations" is appropriate for that is another question.

I have the impression that the divide (continental/analytic) was well embedded before WW2. — Ludwig V

Not really. It is well established that prior to WWI, German idealism was still highly influential in English and American philosophy departments. That began to wane with GE Moore and Bertrand Russell’s criticism of idealism in the 1920’s, but recall at the time, phenomenology as such was just beginning and Heidegger had only just began to publish. The article I linked to ascribes the rift to Gilbert Ryle’s hostility to Husserl and Heidegger in the 1940’s and onwards, and also Ryle’s dominance of English philosophy at that stage (he was editor of Mind from 1949-71 and had a lot of say in who got philosophy chairs in Britain). That period was when the division really shows up. (Ray Monk was biographer of both Wittgenstein and Russell, although the latter bio is not very well regarded.)

I can perhaps moderate my rhetoric. — Ludwig V

Your rhetoric always seems quite circumspect to me, for what it’s worth.

Take a look at this review of Nagel’s 2012 book Mind and Cosmos, The Heretic - it’s a very good thumbnail sketch of what Nagel said and why it provoked such hostility from a ‘Darwinist mob’.

(Ray Monk was biographer of both Wittgenstein and Russell, although the latter bio is not very well regarded.) — Wayfarer

Yes. I have read the Wittgenstein biography, but not the Russell one. As I remember it, the Wittgenstein book rather stole a march on Brain McGuiness and there was some bad blood. I read McGuiness' as well and it was the better book. But it stopped half way.

The article I linked to ascribes the rift to Gilbert Ryle’s hostility to Husserl and Heidegger in the 1940’s and onwards, and also Ryle’s dominance of English philosophy at that stage (he was editor of Mind from 1949-71 and had a lot of say in who got philosophy chairs in Britain). — Wayfarer

Yes. There were problems, but I just don't feel strongly about it - perhaps because I have always been very sympathetic to his project. I can understand the hostility to Heidegger - there's still an issue about his venture into public life in the 30's. Some people still want him "cancelled". In the context of WW2 so soon after WW1, it would be surprising if there were not some hostility. It looks unreasonable now, I grant you. But we're 70 years, at least two, perhaps three, generations, further away from those times.

Your rhetoric always seems quite circumspect to me, for what it’s worth. — Wayfarer

You don't know how much I delete before posting. When I read others indulging themselves, I don't like it, so...

I've saved the review for later. Thanks.

(Of course, now you say it, I do understand the hostility to Heidegger due to his Nazi associations, which has been discussed a lot here.)

It was very good. Thanks.

Gotta love Ferguson’s Andy Rooney-vibe.

:wink:

What are some of the major differences you see between Continental and Anglo philosophy? — Janus

First and foremost, and from which all relevant distinctions evolve, the presence in continental, the absence in analytic philosophy, of theoretical system metaphysics.

Probably isn’t a single all-consuming response, but I read this one somewhere, seemed to cover more bases.

It is well established that prior to WWI, German idealism was still highly influential in English and American philosophy departments. That began to wane with GE Moore and Bertrand Russell’s criticism of idealism in the 1920’s, — Wayfarer

That's true. I was placing Husserl a bit earlier than I should have done. I just wanted to point out that their characterization of what they were doing might have been a bit partial. A rebellion was also going on in Germany, which they didn't like, of course. But Bentham and the two Mills had continued the empiricist tradition through Hume from Berkeley and Locke through the 19th century. I think the divide can be traced back to rationalism (Descartes and others, on the other side of the Channel) and empiricism (Berkeley, Locke, Hume, in England).


You see, sometimes I go too far the other way and insist on calling a spade an agricultural implement.

What are some of the major differences you see between Continental and Anglo philosophy? — Janus

First and foremost, and from which all relevant distinctions evolve, the presence in continental, the absence in analytic philosophy, of theoretical system metaphysics.
Probably isn’t a single all-consuming response, but I read this one somewhere, seemed to cover more bases. — Mww

It certainly covers some of them. Russell, Moore, Wittgenstein and Carnap made it clear that theoretical system metaphysics was their primary target. This was a not an unfair characterization of the German Idealism, based on Hegel, and Kantian tradition which were indeed dominant in the whole of Europe at the time, But a rebellion (Husserl, Heidegger) was also going on across the Channel at the same time. Analytic philosophers mostly didn't like them, but they were not simply a continuation of metaphysics.

Coming from the math thread. Do animals have rational thinking? Do animals have communication skills? Is intuitive thinking rational or maybe something better? — Athena

When someone has rational thinking, he / she must be able to reflect, analyse, criticise, and ask questions on the thinking. Just because a hawk has hunted his meals, or dog has opened door to go out for whatever don't mean they have rational thinking. They are just instinctual survival and habitual response by the animals.

If you trace back to the origin of rational thinking, then it would be the ancient Greeks. How did they start? They started by asking what is the world made of, and debating and analysing on the world linguistically. Then Socrates came to the scene asking how one should live to be good, and followed by Aristotle who asked and propounded what happiness is.

No animals can do rational thinkings like the way they did. If someone had rational thinking on why he went to a shop, then he should be able to explain the reason why when asked the reason why.

Suggesting animals have rational thinking is a gross confusion on the concept.

Would you be inclined to agree that although the prevalence of the continental tradition writ large has declined, at least it couldn’t be said to have killed itself, as the infusion of OLP and LP eventually self-destructed the analytic?

Would you be inclined to agree that although the prevalence of the continental tradition writ large has declined, at least it couldn’t be said to have killed itself, as the infusion of OLP and LP eventually self-destructed the analytic? — Mww

No. For a number of reasons.
The OLP advocated that philosophy should analyze, but wanted to analyze in a different way- in Ryle's terms, informal logic as opposed to formal logic or untechnical as opposed to technical concepts - and tried to carve out an arena for philosophy which avoided awkward conflicts with more technical disciplines - though he also thought that philosophy's arena was "more fundamental\" than the technical disciplines' one other feature was abandonment of the idea that it is philosophy's task to reform and regulated language. Philosophy of Language (that is what you mean by LP?) was rather different, and was, I would say, a development of the idea that philosophy's primary method was logical analysis.
Actually, I don't think that analytic philosophy has self-destructed. My perception is that it is alive and kicking strongly - even though some people are very critical of it and are announcing it is over.