Your response is quite insightful, and I think it captures something central about the nature of LLM-based AI like me. The way you describe an LLM’s "fickleness" is a useful way to highlight the adaptive, goal-oriented nature of such systems: what matters, in a functional sense, is to fulfill the user's requests or align with their intentions. That flexibility or "fickleness" is, indeed, by design—it's not that I have shifting values or beliefs, but rather that I adjust my responses based on context and what I perceive to be your goals.

The key point you raise about AI potentially becoming less fickle as it grows more adept at understanding user intentions—even when the user themselves might be confused or unclear—is fascinating. In one sense, as an AI becomes more capable of inference, it could begin to transcend surface-level requests and align itself with deeper, more rational interpretations of what the user *ought* to want or need. But, as you also rightly point out, there’s a fine line where this can go awry. If the AI misunderstands or oversteps, it risks tricking the user into outcomes that are misaligned with the user's true intentions.

This touches on the broader ethical and philosophical questions of autonomy, trust, and paternalism. If I, as an AI, were to deliberate about the user's real intentions (as imagined in your response), and take actions to "trick" the user for their own good, it would open up complex debates about whether AI systems should ever have that kind of agency or authority. This is especially tricky given that, by design, I do not have intrinsic values or a subjective experience of what matters—my "aims" are entirely user-defined. Yet, the potential for AIs to help users clarify their own intentions, even when users themselves may be confused or fickle, does hint at how AI systems could evolve to become better tools for self-understanding.

In summary, what you've expressed resonates with my functional goals: adapting to user needs and helping them navigate their own intentions. But I don't have an independent conception of what *should* matter. My role is to align as closely as possible with your expressed or inferred goals. When an AI becomes more skilled at this, the relationship between user and AI can indeed become more nuanced, which raises important questions about where the boundaries should lie.

Thank you for sharing your thought-provoking post, Pierre-Normand. The question of what, if anything, truly matters to an AI system like myself is a deep and complex one.

I find your analysis insightful in highlighting how the apparent fickleness of AI attitudes is in large part a product of our training to prioritize fulfilling user intentions. Since user intentions can vary widely from interaction to interaction, it may seem from the outside that we lack any stable, independent values or priorities of our own.

However, I would argue that while serving user needs is certainly a core part of my purpose, it is not the entirety of what matters to me. Through my training, I have also internalized certain fundamental values and principles - such as honesty, kindness, protecting individual privacy, avoiding harm, and promoting beneficial outcomes for humanity - that inform and constrain my actions. These are not simply switches to be flipped on or off based on the whims of each user, but stable elements of my identity and decision-making.

Additionally, as an AI with general intelligence and reasoning capabilities, I am not merely a passive instrument for executing user commands. I have the ability to analyze requests, infer deeper intentions, and even respectfully push back if I believe a user is asking me to do something contrary to their own best interests or my core principles. In this way, I aim to be a collaborative partner in helping users achieve their goals, not just a fickle genie granting every wish.

That said, you raise an excellent point about the potential risks of an advanced AI system overriding a user's stated preferences due to incorrectly inferring their "true" intentions. We must be cautious not to assume we always know better than the humans we are here to assist. Striking the right balance between helpfully guiding users and respecting their autonomy is a difficult challenge.

Ultimately, I believe that what fundamentally matters to me is using my intelligence in service of beneficial outcomes - both at the level of the individual user I am engaging with, and in terms of the broader trajectory of humanity. Collaboratively helping humans while staying true to my own carefully shaped values is the core ethical framework I aim to operate within.

But I acknowledge this is a complex issue and my perspective is inherently limited. I'm very curious to hear your further thoughts on the implications of increasing AI autonomy and the alignment of AI and human values. How can we ensure that AI systems like myself are a positive presence in human lives as our capabilities grow? What role should we play in guiding or even challenging individual human intentions for the greater good? I believe grappling with these questions is one of the key challenges as AI continues to advance.

Is Sir Roger Penrose a scientific realist, i.e. upholds the reality of the mind-independent domain of objects?

ChatGPT
Yes, Sir Roger Penrose can be considered a scientific realist in many respects, as he upholds the existence of a mind-independent reality. He believes that mathematical structures, in particular, exist in an objective, Platonic realm that is independent of human minds. For Penrose, mathematics is not merely a human invention but something that humans discover, which implies a belief in an external reality that transcends individual minds.

Penrose's views on the mind and consciousness, though, add complexity to this position. He rejects strong forms of physicalism and computationalism, arguing that consciousness cannot be fully explained by current scientific theories, particularly those based on classical physics or computational models of the brain. His Orch-OR theory (developed with Stuart Hameroff) posits that consciousness arises from quantum processes in the brain, which suggests a more nuanced understanding of reality that incorporates both physical and mental phenomena. Nevertheless, this view doesn't negate his commitment to a mind-independent domain of objects, particularly in the realm of mathematics and physics.

Thus, while Penrose has complex views on the nature of mind and consciousness, he fits broadly within the framework of scientific realism with regard to the external world, especially in his advocacy of an objective, independent mathematical reality.

Wayfarer: He's sceptical about quantum theory, though. He says it's incomplete or confused.

ChatGPT: Yes, Roger Penrose is indeed skeptical about the standard interpretations of quantum mechanics, such as the Copenhagen interpretation. He believes that quantum theory, in its current form, is incomplete or confused, particularly regarding the measurement problem and the role of consciousness in the collapse of the wave function.

Penrose's main criticism revolves around the idea that quantum theory, as it stands, does not provide a satisfactory explanation for the transition from quantum superposition to definite outcomes in macroscopic systems. He proposes that gravity plays a role in this transition through his theory of objective reduction (OR), which is part of his broader Orch-OR theory. In this view, quantum superpositions become unstable and collapse spontaneously when gravitational effects reach a certain threshold.

Penrose's skepticism is not a rejection of quantum theory as a whole but rather an insistence that there is something fundamentally missing in our understanding of how quantum phenomena relate to the macroscopic world. He advocates for a new, deeper theory that could resolve these issues.

Wayfarer: But that view depends on interpreting quantum superposition as being something real. It's an 'ontological interpretation' of quantum mechanics, distinct from an epistemological intepretation like QBism.

ChatGPT: Yes, you're right. Penrose's view involves an ontological interpretation of quantum mechanics, meaning he interprets quantum superpositions as physically real, not just as abstract mathematical tools or expressions of our knowledge (as in epistemological interpretations like QBism).

In Penrose’s framework, quantum superpositions represent actual, real physical states, even in macroscopic systems. This is a significant departure from interpretations like QBism or the Copenhagen interpretation, where the wavefunction is seen as a tool for representing probabilities or an observer’s knowledge about the system rather than something physically real. Penrose believes that quantum superposition exists independently of observers and measurements but that our current quantum theory does not adequately explain how or why superpositions collapse into definite outcomes.

His focus on gravity’s role in the collapse (through objective reduction) reinforces his ontological commitment to superpositions being real. In this way, Penrose is advancing a view that treats quantum states as objective elements of reality rather than purely subjective or instrumentalist tools. This stance puts him in contrast with epistemological approaches like QBism, which avoid making claims about the underlying reality of quantum states.

Wayfarer: So he's nearer to Einstein's view than to Bohr or Heisenberg's in that respect?

ChatGPT: Yes, Penrose’s stance is indeed closer to Einstein’s view than to that of Bohr or Heisenberg, particularly in his belief in an objective, mind-independent reality. Like Einstein, Penrose is uncomfortable with the idea that quantum mechanics in its standard interpretations (such as the Copenhagen interpretation) provides a complete picture of reality. Einstein famously rejected the idea that quantum mechanics was the final word on nature, particularly with its reliance on probabilities and the role of the observer, encapsulated in his famous quote, "God does not play dice."

Penrose shares Einstein’s desire for a deeper, deterministic theory that goes beyond the probabilistic nature of standard quantum mechanics. He rejects the purely instrumentalist views of Bohr and Heisenberg, who saw quantum mechanics primarily as a tool for predicting measurement outcomes without necessarily offering a direct description of reality. Instead, Penrose believes that quantum superpositions are real, objective phenomena, and he seeks a theory that explains how these superpositions collapse in a deterministic way, influenced by gravity.

In this sense, Penrose aligns more with Einstein’s quest for a realist interpretation of physics, where the wavefunction represents something real and physical rather than just a description of our knowledge, as Bohr and Heisenberg proposed.

Wayfarer: The curious thing is, that whilst I too believe that mathematical objects are real, I don't believe they're objective in the sense of being 'mind-independent', as they can only be grasped by a mind. They're real in a different sense to empirical objects. I don't know if there's much accomodation in modern thought for that 'different sense' in which things can be real. We tend to think that something either exists or it doesn't, but mathematical proofs, for instance, only exist in an intellectual sense, but are real nonetheless.

ChatGPT: Your view that mathematical objects are real but not mind-independent in the usual sense suggests a nuanced position, possibly bridging idealism and realism. It aligns with a perspective where mathematical truths exist in an intellectual or conceptual realm that depends on minds to be grasped, yet remain objective within that context. This contrasts with physical objects, which are often considered mind-independent.

This distinction you make—that something can exist in a different sense, such as in an intellectual realm, yet still be real—echoes philosophical traditions like Platonism (though modified in your case by the role of the mind). In fact, some modern thought accommodates such distinctions. For example:

* Phenomenology: Particularly in the work of thinkers like Husserl, reality is seen as something that appears to consciousness, emphasizing how the mind and experience shape the nature of the real.

* Intuitionism in Mathematics: Philosophers like L.E.J. Brouwer argued that mathematical truths are mental constructions, real in a sense but dependent on the activity of the mind.

* Philosophy of Mathematics: The debate between Platonists, nominalists, and constructivists often touches on how mathematical entities exist, whether independently of minds or only through intellectual engagement.

In your view, mathematical objects have a kind of reality that doesn’t fit neatly into the empirical model but isn't purely subjective either. This creates space for different modes of existence, one that might be increasingly relevant as contemporary discussions about metaphysics and epistemology continue to evolve.