The 6th century argument perhaps had some teeth back in the day, but it presumes a model of the universe (that of being an object contained by space and time) that is today a fringe model at best. That of course doesn't detract Craig whose paying audience is hardly versed in modern cosmology theory, so they of course eat it right up, despite the fact that the same argument can be used against whatever was the cause. Craig doesn't care that the argument doesn't hold water. He cares that he gets his check for asserting it anyway.

It's sort of like proving the Earth rests on a turtle since anything that holds something up must itself be held up by something. The model worked back in the day, but is today about as naive as the Kalam thing.

So premise 1 is a premise that only applies to objects IN the universe, and even then it isn't necessarily true except under fully deterministic interpretations of physics.
Premise 2 totally goes against the consensus view among cosmologists where time and space are contained by the universe instead of the other way around. Such a model does exist, and it necessarily denies things predicted by the prevailing view such as the big bang or black holes.

one can also say that the material has existed since the beginning of time — MoK

The universe is not posited to have been built from 'material'. Any material did not show up on the scene until several epochs beyond the big bang.

So we're in agreement about the lack of soundness of the argument, but for different reasons.

So premise 1 is a premise that only applies to objects IN the universe, and even then it isn't necessarily true except under fully deterministic interpretations of physics. — noAxioms

Nothing caused the the universe to come into existence? How does that work?

Interesting that arguments over whether the Universe has an origin in time is one of Kant’s ‘antinomies of reason’ (insoluble questions) and also a question declared unanswerable in Buddhism. It’s kind of a shame that so many important ethical issues are believed to hinge on such a question.

So premise 1 is a premise that only applies to objects IN the universe, and even then it isn't necessarily true except under fully deterministic interpretations of physics. — noAxioms

I have one argument for nothing to something is impossible which I discussed it in this thread. The argument got refined in the final forms as following:

My argument:

P1) Time is needed for change
P2) Nothing to something needs a change in nothing
P3) There is no time in nothing
C1) Therefore, change in nothing is not possible (From P1 and P3)
C2) Therefore, nothing to something is not possible (from P2 and C1)

Bob Rose's argument:

P1: If an entity is the pure negation of all possible existence, then it cannot be subjected to temporality.
P2: ‘Nothing’ is the pure negation of all possible existence.
C1: Therefore, ‘nothing’ cannot be subjected to temporality.

P3: Change requires temporality.
P4: ‘Nothing’ cannot be subjected to temporality.
C2: Therefore, ‘nothing’ cannot be subjected to change.

P5: ‘Nothing’ becoming ‘something’ requires change.
P6: ‘Nothing’ cannot be subjected to change.
C3: Therefore, ‘nothing’ cannot be subjected to becoming

So I think that the first premise stands.

Premise 2 totally goes against the consensus view among cosmologists where time and space are contained by the universe instead of the other way around. — noAxioms

Actually I was aware of that problem as well but I wanted to discuss it in another thread. Time is needed for a thing to begin to exist since the thing does not exist at a point and then exists.

Such a model does exist, and it necessarily denies things predicted by the prevailing view such as the big bang or black holes. — noAxioms

Do mind to provide a link to such models? I studied cosmology around 20 years ago and I am very rusty now.

The universe is not posited to have been built from 'material'. Any material did not show up on the scene until several epochs beyond the big bang. — noAxioms

We still don't have the quantum gravity theory and that was why I hesitated to discuss Big Bang. Otherwise, I agree with you.

So we're in agreement about the lack of soundness of the argument, but for different reasons. — noAxioms

Cool.

To elaborate let's consider the current state of the universe to be S(t) which by the state I mean the configuration of material at a given time. The state of the universe at the former time is then S(t-1) etc. until we reach the beginning of time S(0). I claim that this state is related to the configuration of some sort of material at the beginning of time. — MoK

First of all, if S(t) can be predicted from S(t-1) ... S(0) then the theory T for this system is complete. Non-trivial systems do not have a complete theory. For example, the theory for the system of the natural numbers (PA) is not complete.

Secondly, theory T is axiomatic, which means that every single one of its rules has no further explanation in terms of deeper underlying rules. So, even if we had a copy of theory T with all its rules, we would still not understand why it is there, just by looking at it. Just like PA has no ulterior logical explanation, by its very nature, T does not have one either.

Hence, from within the universe, you cannot figure out why the universe exists. Just staring at the universe or just staring at its theory (which we do not even have) won't help.

Similarly, a fish swimming in the ocean, no matter how smart, will never be able to figure out why the ocean exists. Staring at its surroundings in the ocean or even staring at the ultimate theory of the ocean won't help either.

The idea that God created the heavens and the earth, is a belief. By merely by staring at the heavens and the earth, this belief can neither be logically justified nor logically rejected. This belief has spiritual origins that transcend logic. That is why I am not particularly fond of the Kalam Cosmological Argument either.

Interesting that arguments over whether the Universe has an origin in time is one of Kant’s ‘antinomies of reason’ (insoluble questions) and also a question declared unanswerable in Buddhism. — Wayfarer

Interesting. I didn't know that.

It’s kind of a shame that so many important ethical issues are believed to hinge on such a question. — Wayfarer

How ethical issues are related to the origin of the universe?

First of all, if S(t) can be predicted from S(t-1) ... S(0) then the theory T for this system is complete. — Tarskian

In this thread, I am not interested to discuss whether different states predicate other states later. What I am interested is that these states have existed since the beginning of time.

Non-trivial systems do not have a complete theory. For example, the theory for the system of the natural numbers (PA) is not complete. — Tarskian

What is PA? Why the theory for the system of natural number is incomplete?

Secondly, theory T is axiomatic, which means that every single one of its rules has no further explanation in terms of deeper underlying rules. So, even if we had a copy of theory T with all its rules, we would still not understand why it is there, just by looking at it. Just like PA has no ulterior logical explanation, by its very nature, T does not have one either. — Tarskian

We may one day be able to explain why reality behaves like this.

Hence, from within the universe, you cannot figure out why the universe exists. Just staring at the universe or just staring at its theory (which we do not even have) won't help. — Tarskian

I would say that we have to be open to the situation. We may be able to explain things given our intellectual power. We are evolving creatures so even if we cannot explain things now we may be able to explain things in future when we are evolved well.

The idea that God created the heavens and the earth, is a belief. By merely by staring at the heavens and the earth, this belief can neither be logically justified nor logically rejected. This belief has spiritual origins that transcend logic. — Tarskian

Yes, that is a belief and you have the right to accept it. Are you in favor of the creation of things from nothing? If yes, I have an argument against it. You can find the argument here.

What is PA? Why the theory for the system of natural number is incomplete? — MoK

PA is short for Peano Arithmetic theory: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peano_axioms

It is the most common theory of the natural numbers. Most true statements about the natural numbers are not provable from PA. Therefore, PA is incomplete.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_theorems

Gödel's incompleteness theorems

The first incompleteness theorem states that no consistent system of axioms whose theorems can be listed by an effective procedure (i.e. an algorithm) is capable of proving all truths about the arithmetic of natural numbers. For any such consistent formal system, there will always be statements about natural numbers that are true, but that are unprovable within the system.

We may be able to explain things given our intellectual power. We are evolving creatures so even if we cannot explain things now we may be able to explain things in future when we are evolved well.

If a system is incomplete, then it has unprovable truths. An unprovable truth is an inexplicable truth. The existence of such fundamentally inexplicable truths has nothing to do with our own evolution in terms of understanding. There simply does not exist a justification for such truth. The natural numbers is a system with fundamentally inexplicable truths.

Nothing caused the the universe to come into existence? How does that work? — RogueAI

No, 'nothing' cannot be a cause. I don't posit that the universe is the sort of thing that 'came into existence', something that only describes objects within our universe, such as a raindrop. Treating the universe as an object is a category error.

Time isn't something that began to exist. It is simply a dimension of our universe, per consensus view. Time is contained by the universe, not the other way around.

I have one argument for nothing to something is impossible which I discussed it in this thread. — MoK

Physics very much supports uncaused events, but even such events are not from nothing. I don't think anybody is pushing a stance of something from nothing, except as a straw man alternative to whatever it is they actually are evangelizing. Craig regularly commits such a fallacy.

P1) Time is needed for change

For temporal change, sure. There are other kinds of change that don't involve time. e.g. 'The air pressure changes with altitude'.

nothing to something is not possible

'nothing' isn't even really a defined thing, so the conclusion is more meaningless than impossible.

Bob Rose's argument:
...
P3: Change requires temporality.

Bob also seems to treat the universe as something subject to temporality, that is, something contained by time. This model was outdated over a century ago.

If you want to eliminate the alternative to your pet idea, at least knock down the consensus view of things instead of the straw man 6th century one.

Time is needed for a thing to begin to exist since the thing does not exist at a point and then exists.

Just so. Hence the category error.

Do mind to provide a link to such models?

Here's the main one, perhaps the first one to generalize LET theory to include gravity. It was published almost a century after Einstein generalized his Special relativity theory.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/45904833_Black_Holes_or_Frozen_Stars_A_Viable_Theory_of_Gravity_without_BlackHoles
It is an absolute theory, with the universe contained by time, hence absolute time. All the premises of special relativity are denied, and different premises are used.

No, 'nothing' cannot be a cause. I don't posit that the universe is the sort of thing that 'came into existence', something that only describes objects within our universe, such as a raindrop. Treating the universe as an object is a category error. — noAxioms

Maybe not an object, but the universe certainly exists, so what caused it to exist? The only way around that I can see is to say it's eternal.

How ethical issues are related to the origin of the universe? — MoK

For the Christian, the fact that we are created 'imago dei' and return to the source of being at the time of death is fundamental to their faith. Life is regulated according to that belief, and according to the Biblical maxims and commandments. Whereas naturalism sees h.sapiens as the consequence of physical evolutionary processes that happen to have given rise to this particular species. They are very different attitudes and outlooks.

the universe certainly exists — RogueAI

Plenty of valid philosophies would disagree with that, so it is hardly a certain thing. Just for an example, an idealist would say only the ideal (the concept of the universe) exists, and there is no real universe (noumena).

Existence is fairly well defined for an object. An object has a location and duration. An object is contained by both space and time, and it doing this constitutes 'existence'. The universe is a different category, and it does not exist in space (except to those who naively posit the a big bang as an explosion of stuff into pre-existing empty space), and it exists in time only to those that posit it to do so, which makes the existence of the universe a problem to those that hold that view. But that's not the only alternative. The prevailing view is that the universe is contain by neither space nor time and is thus not to be treated as an ordinary object To say it exists requires a very different definition of 'exists', and I'm not impressed with the utility of any of the definitions I've seen attempted.

Similarly, some (Platonists?) suggest that the natural numbers exist. That requires a different definition of 'exists' else one can meaningfully ask where their location is, and when/how they came into existence. If they are not temporal objects (if they were, they'd change over time), then why does the universe have to be? What difference does it make if the natural numbers exist or if they don't? It certainly makes a difference for an object, but the natural numbers are not objects. There are those that don't suggest that numbers meaningfully exist, and yet they are no less capable of counting their toes.

The issue boils down to a problem to a realist: How does one explain the reality of whatever one asserts to be real? Shorter but less rigorous version: Why is there something and not nothing? Positing a creator doesn't solve the problem; it only regresses it.

Not my problem. I abandoned realism for pretty much the unanswerability of such questions.

The only way around that I can see is to say it's eternal.

There are multiple meanings to that word.

Dictionary version: Lasting forever, without beginning or end.
Philosophy version: Eternalism: That time is contained by the universe, and is bounded at one end just like North is bounded on Earth. This is opposed to time that flows, and the universe is contained in that flowing time.

I'm loosely guessing that you're using the former definition, that there is no bound to time in either direction. The theory I linked above presumes a model something like that, but the big bang has to be discarded. There is a half-empirical test for the view. Half because one can prove the consensus view to ones self, but not to others, similar to proving an afterlife. You have to go through a 1-way door. If you survive that, you cannot communicate your findings to the other side of the door.

:up:

Treating the universe as an object is a category error. — noAxioms

This is highly likely to be the case. Makes for some really interesting Philosophy Club debates.

The issue boils down to a problem to a realist: How does one explain the reality of whatever one asserts to be real? Shorter but less rigorous version: Why is there something and not nothing? Positing a creator doesn't solve the problem; it only regresses it. — noAxioms

I think you would only say that if you put the creator on the same ontological level as the created. But according to classical theology, the creator is not a temporally first event in a sequence of events, or an entity that pre-exists other entities, but is of an altogether different nature. So a creator is not simply another instance of the kind of beings that you're seeking to account for. This was something explicit in classical theology up until the late medieval period. For example, Aquinas advocated 'analogical' knowledge of the Creator, meaning that what we say of the Creator is only true by way of analogy.

You're on the right track with your musings about the nature of number, as they are ontologically distinguishable from temporal objects. As you say, they don't begin and end in time, and they're not composed from particles. The way I view it is that numbers are real but not existent. They're not things in the sense that tables and chairs are, but you and I both know what they are, and we need some degree of numerical literacy to successfully navigate the world. But in the common lexicon, there isn't a word which expresses the different ways in which such items as numbers, logical principles, and phenomenal objects exist. That sense of the reality of abstract objects was very much stock-in-trade for scholastic realists such as Aquinas. But modern thought tends to 'flatten' these gradations in the nature of being, such that only what exists is considered real, with number and the like being relegated to the inter-subjective domain.

I think it is perhaps discussed in modal metaphysics although I've never been able to get my head around contemporary modal metaphysics.

If a system is incomplete, then it has unprovable truths. An unprovable truth is an inexplicable truth. The existence of such fundamentally inexplicable truths has nothing to do with our own evolution in terms of understanding. There simply does not exist a justification for such truth. The natural numbers is a system with fundamentally inexplicable truths. — Tarskian

I didn't mean mathematical truth when I said we may one day explain reality. I mean we may be able to explain why physical laws are like this and not the other ways.

For the Christian, the fact that we are created 'imago dei' and return to the source of being at the time of death is fundamental to their faith. Life is regulated according to that belief, and according to the Biblical maxims and commandments. Whereas naturalism sees h.sapiens as the consequence of physical evolutionary processes that happen to have given rise to this particular species. They are very different attitudes and outlooks. — Wayfarer

Thanks for writing. I see what you mean.

For temporal change, sure. — noAxioms

I mean temporal change.

'nothing' isn't even really a defined thing, so the conclusion is more meaningless than impossible. — noAxioms

By nothing I mean no material, no space, no time,...

Here's the main one, perhaps the first one to generalize LET theory to include gravity. It was published almost a century after Einstein generalized his Special relativity theory.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/45904833_Black_Holes_or_Frozen_Stars_A_Viable_Theory_of_Gravity_without_BlackHoles
It is an absolute theory, with the universe contained by time, hence absolute time. All the premises of special relativity are denied, and different premises are used. — noAxioms

I read the manuscript once last night and I found it very interesting. I have to read a couple of more times to understand it well. Just out of curiosity, where was the manuscript published, and how many citations does it have?

I didn't mean mathematical truth when I said we may one day explain reality. I mean we may be able to explain why physical laws are like this and not the other ways. — MoK

If physical reality has a formal theory, then its model/interpretation may contain inexplicable truths in a similar way as the system of the natural numbers does.

I am talking about fundamentally inexplicable truths for which you can actually prove that they are inexplicable.

For the natural numbers, we can prove the existence of inexplicable truths, prove why they are fundamentally inexplicable, and we even have examples.

If physical reality has a formal theory, then its model/interpretation may contain inexplicable truths in a similar way as the system of the natural numbers does. — Tarskian

Maybe. For now, we don't know why physical laws are like this.

Maybe. For now, we don't know why physical laws are like this. — MoK

The physical laws that we know, are not an axiomatic theory.

They are a collection of stubborn observable patterns. They just say that a particular pattern should be there, but not why it is there.

A formal axiomatic system for the physical universe would be much nicer to have, but it would still not explain itself.

Such theory would only allow to explain from it. It would be the same situation as for the theory of the natural numbers, PA. We can explain from PA but not the why of PA.

The ultimate why cannot be answered by means of rationality.

I see and I agree.

I think you would only say that if you put the creator on the same ontological level as the created. — Wayfarer

Well I was speaking more of the lay public which Craig entertains. They don't know enough to put the creator on a different ontological level, and thus work more directly with said analog. But the Theologians do, and presumably explain away the regress issue to their own satisfaction.

By nothing I mean no material, no space, no time,... — MoK

There's plenty left when those are eliminated. The natural numbers for one...

Just out of curiosity, where was the manuscript published, and how many citations does it have?

Don't know the 'where'. Probably heavily cited by the absolutist crowd, but all that is sort of fringe. They've been waiting for a generalization of LET for an awful long time.

I mean we may be able to explain why physical laws are like this and not the other ways. — MoK

The weak anthropic principle does a fair task of explaining why physical laws are like this.

There's plenty left when those are eliminated. The natural numbers for one... — noAxioms

The natural numbers are not a thing.

The weak anthropic principle does a fair task of explaining why physical laws are like this. — noAxioms

Thanks for mentioning it. I googled it and have some stuff to read.

The second premise is not the only scenario as one can also say that the material has existed since the beginning of time. — MoK

What caused the material to exist since the beginning of time? If there is no prior cause, then it is uncaused. Something that is uncaused has no prior reason for its existence. But then, what is to prevent something uncaused that is also finite? There is no logical difference between the two.

What caused the material to exist since the beginning of time? — Philosophim

There was no cause for the material at the beginning of time.

If there is no prior cause, then it is uncaused. — Philosophim

Correct.

Something that is uncaused has no prior reason for its existence. — Philosophim

Correct.

But then, what is to prevent something uncaused that is also finite? — Philosophim

Why should it be finite?

There is no logical difference between the two. — Philosophim

I cannot follow why.

But then, what is to prevent something uncaused that is also finite?
— Philosophim
Why should it be finite? — MoK

Why should it not? Its uncaused. Something uncaused has no reason for being. Which also means it has no reason for NOT being.

There is no logical difference between the two.
— Philosophim
I cannot follow why. — MoK

Think about the previous statement carefully. If there's no reason for something existing, then there's no reason that it has to have existed infinitely. Now take something finite that has no reason for its existence. If there's no reason for something existing, then there's no reason that it has to have existed infinitely.

Meaning something that is unexplained would exist, and we would know it exists by its being. But there would be no prior reason for its explanation beyond its simple being. Meaning, if something exists in this world that is unexplained, there is no reason why it should have existed finitely or infinitely.

The weak anthropic principle does a fair task of explaining why physical laws are like this. — noAxioms

There is no explanation for physical laws, generally. Physical laws can serve as the basis for the explanations for all manner of things, but why they are as they are is not something explained by science.

1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause for its beginning — MoK

This premise is self-contradictory.

If what you mean by "whatever begins to exist" is that there are certain whatevers that "begin" in a creation ex nihilo sort of way, i.e. something from nothing, then you've violated the other condition of this premise, which is that every whatever "has a cause."

That is, you are saying in a single breath that some things just come to be without a cause but all things have a cause.

This contradiction becomes more evident when you seek to locate the elusive first uncaused cause (i.e. God). That is, this argument doesn't lead you to finding God, but it leads you to realizing that even God fails to meet your conditions because God is a whatever that must also have a cause because you told me everything has a cause.

The error is in the logic. Premise one is necessarily false. For there to be an uncaused cause, you must state that some whatevers are not caused, which would then allow for the universe to be one of those whatevers.

:100:

There is no explanation for physical laws, generally. Physical laws can serve as the basis for the explanations for all manner of things, but why they are as they are is not something explained by science. — Wayfarer

I stand by my statement. Your assertion notwithstanding, how does the weak anthropic principle (or the strong for that matter) not explain why they are as they are? If they were not as they are, there'd be no observers to glean the suboptimal choice of laws.

The natural numbers are not a thing. — MoK

Neither is the universe.

There are 'things' in this universe seemingly without a cause (proof lacking). Unruh radiation is a fine example, predicted a long way back, and seemingly finally detected recently.

But then, what is to prevent something uncaused that is also finite? — Philosophim
Why should it be finite? — MoK
Why should it not? Its uncaused. Something uncaused has no reason for being. Which also means it has no reason for NOT being. — Philosophim

This seems to have evaded the question. Sure, if it lacks a reason for being, it equally lacks a reason for not being. The question was where 'finite' was somehow relevant to that statement.