Well, your criterion is clear. It's also clear because it justifies saying of a person that they are rational or not - because it relies on a capacity, ability or skill. It's just that it's not very useful - for the purposes of thinking about various problems, including the one of this thread.I was trying to clarify the correct use of the concept "rational" from the muddled way. — Corvus
I agree. One can (and most people do) use language in irrational ways. But language does open up the possibility of articulate reason. It's necessary, but not sufficient.Having ability of using language or knowing meanings of some words doesn't make one rational, nor does ability or preference eating sushi. — Corvus
That's a bit odd, at least for me. I start from the justified true belief account of knowledge, so for me, knowing something means being able to justify it, which would require some rationality, wouldn't it?Knowing something is not also being rational. — Corvus
The trouble is that there is nothing to prevent people using the word "rational" in different ways.More important, should we assume all humans are rational thinkers or must they learn the higher order thinking skills to be rational? Is believing and defending a myth, rational thinking? — Athena
I posted by accident and had run out of time. I hope you don't mind that I'm back.Whew!! Thanks for editing me out, saves me any more time trying to figure out how to respond. — Mww
Well, I'm very much in favour of adopting whatever approach most suits the subject-matter, so I don't have a problem with that. I've lost what I said before about Heidegger, but I expect you'll remember that it was about his distinction between present-at-hand and ready-to-hand.Epoché; the bracketing. A method for removing the necessity for the human cognitive system to operate in a specific way for every occassion. In other words, a method for disassociating the subject that knows, from that which it knows about. — Mww
I don't doubt it. But there are others who maintain the opposite, as you notice.. The question is which experience is veridical. One has to bear in mind that our experience is laden with skills and expectations. Many people think that there is a way of shrugging all that off and experiencing the true experience. But that involves shedding all those skills and expectations. Demonstrating that one has succeeded in that is, let us just say, difficult. I'm not even convinced that there is a truth of the matter, although I do favour the "no-self" view, or more accurately my self = Ludwig = me.namely, the experience of the world and self that one has if one determinedly seeks to experience the “I”; and, Hume notwithstanding, such an experience is possible…. — Mww
That's perfectly possible. On the other hand, I can only recognize myself when I can recognise the other.And how one meets and greets, and gets lost in, the other. — Mww
That makes sense, and I didn't mean to imply that it couldn't be called a science at all. But the epoche does set on one side the "hard" sciences, doesn't it? That's why phenomenology has to have a method of its own. — Ludwig V
Yes. You may be thinking of fantasy stories. But those rely on hand-waving - magic or future technology - to keep plausibility going. — Ludwig V
Epoché; the bracketing. A method for removing the necessity for the human cognitive system to operate in a specific way for every occassion. In other words, a method for disassociating the subject that knows, from that which it knows about.
That being said, what opinion might you hold regarding this IEP entry:
“….It is important to keep in mind that Husserl’s phenomenology did not arise out of the questioning of an assumption in the same way that much of the history of thought has progressed; rather, it was developed, as so many discoveries are, pursuant to a particular experience, namely, the experience of the world and self that one has if one determinedly seeks to experience the “I”; and, Hume notwithstanding, such an experience is possible….” — Mww
It needs no mention of course, that my position must be that experiencing the “I” is impossible, if only the “I” is that which experiences. And why I have so much trouble finding favor with post-Kantian transcendental movements, insofar as those movements make necessary different kinds of “I”’s, or different forms of a single “I”, which makes epoché bracketing predicating one such movement, even possible.
Details. Devils. And how one meets and greets, and gets lost in, the other. — Mww
I'm not making any judgement about whether phenomenology yields valid or reliable knowledge. — Janus
I would think phenomenology would necessarily be rather poor at yielding reliable knowledge about the experience of people in general, given the neurodiversity of people. — wonderer1
Emptiness is a mode of perception, a way of looking at experience. It adds nothing to and takes nothing away from the raw data of physical and mental events. You look at events in the mind and the senses with no thought of whether there's anything lying behind them.
This mode is called emptiness because it's empty of the presuppositions we usually add to experience to make sense of it: the stories and world-views we fashion to explain who we are and the world we live in. Although these stories and views have their uses, the Buddha found that some of the more abstract questions they raise — of our true identity and the reality of the world outside — pull attention away from a direct experience of how events influence one another in the immediate present. Thus they get in the way when we try to understand and solve the problem of suffering.
Say for instance, that you're meditating, and a feeling of anger toward your mother appears. Immediately, the mind's reaction is to identify the anger as "my" anger, or to say that "I'm" angry. It then elaborates on the feeling, either working it into the story of your relationship to your mother, or to your general views about when and where anger toward one's mother can be justified. The problem with all this, from the Buddha's perspective, is that these stories and views entail further suffering. The more you get involved in them, the more you get distracted from seeing the actual cause of the suffering: the labels of "I" and "mine" that set the whole process in motion. As a result, you can't find the way to unravel that cause and bring the suffering to an end.
If, however, you can adopt the emptiness mode — by not acting on or reacting to the anger, but simply watching it as a series of events, in and of themselves — you can see that the anger is empty of anything worth identifying with or possessing. As you master the emptiness mode more consistently, you see that this truth holds not only for such gross emotions as anger, but also for even the most subtle events in the realm of experience. This is the sense in which all things are empty. When you see this, you realize that labels of "I" and "mine" are inappropriate, unnecessary, and cause nothing but stress and pain. You can then drop them. When you drop them totally, you discover a mode of experience that lies deeper still, one that's totally free. — Emptiness, Thanissaro Bhikhu
That's a bit odd, at least for me. I start from the justified true belief account of knowledge, so for me, knowing something means being able to justify it, which would require some rationality, wouldn't it? — Ludwig V
I don't see any other explanation having an easier time. One neuron? Two? A thousand? A million?I think it's the sorites problem. One bit of information processed doesn't mean anything. Many bits of information processed is more persuasive. But it's more than just processing information. It's reacting to it in complex ways, and, it's not just responding to information, but initiating action based on information as well. — Ludwig V
This is false. Chimps can cooperate and problem solve, as can chickens. The latter may be mere 'programming' but I would not say we can state one way or another what we mean by 'language' to begin with. — I like sushi
Imo, a young Japanese macaque, was the first to wash her food, a sweet potato, in 1954:
Hundredth monkey effect - Wikipedia
The reason I am arguing so strongly is we learn how to think and we should not expect everyone to think rationally without training. We should not take thinking for granted. — Athena
The trouble is that there is nothing to prevent people using the word "rational" in different ways.
The truth is that even we humans are not rational simplicter. We are a mixture. Our starting-point is the ability to learn - this happens automatically from the moment we are born. There's a range of skills involved and there's no guarantee that everyone will learn all of them.
The word "thinking" is very, very difficult to pin down. We distinguish explicit thinking from acting, forgetting to notice that thinking is something we do, and so is also an action - thought sometimes thoughts just occur to us and we aren't deliberately doing it and sometimes it is not under our control. So is more like breathing - it can be automatic, and it can be under voluntary control.
But we can act without explicit thinking beforehand, and I don't think there is any reason to say that all such actions are non-rational. But it is complicated. Habitual actions, for example, are a bit marginal; we often do them, as we say, without thinking - that's when the habit doesn't adjust to unusual circumstances. We can also react very fast in an emergency and these actions can be more like a reflex than a true action. (True actions need to be under our conscious control.)
I hope I'm not confusing you. I'll stop there. — Ludwig V
Thinking, Fast and Slow is a 2011 popular science book by psychologist Daniel Kahneman. The book's main thesis is a differentiation between two modes of thought: "System 1" is fast, instinctive and emotional; "System 2" is slower, more deliberative, and more logical. Wikipedia
Yes, children's brains undergo significant changes around the age of eight, including the development of new neural circuitry:
Frontal cortex
The frontal cortex, which controls thinking and logic, begins to develop, allowing children to think more complexly and reason.
Integration
Children can now process two things at once, which makes them more reasonable and less impulsive.
Cognitive development
Children can mentally combine, separate, order, and transform objects and actions. They can also apply logic and reason, and focus their attention.
Creativity
Children develop creative skills through writing, acting, inventing, and designing.
Interest
Children begin to collect things and develop an interest in projects. They also develop a sense of right and wrong, and care about fairness.
The brain's development is a complex process that continues into early adulthood. The early years of childhood are especially important for brain development, as experiences during this time strongly influence the development of sensory and perceptual systems.
https://www.google.com/search?q=brain+nureons+change+at+age+8&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS926US926&oq=brain+nureons+change+at+age+8&gs_lcrp=EgZjaHJvbWUyBggAEEUYOTIJCAEQIRgKGKABMgkIAhAhGAoYoAEyCQgDECEYChigATIJCAQQIRgKGKABMgkIBRAhGAoYoAEyCQgGECEYChirAjIHCAcQIRiPAjIHCAgQIRiPAtIBCjE0MzUzajBqMTWoAgiwAgE&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8
Critical thinking is a higher-order thinking skill. Higher-order thinking skills go beyond basic observation of facts and memorization. They are what we are talking about when we want our students to be evaluative, creative and innovative.
When most people think of critical thinking, they think that their words (or the words of others) are supposed to get “criticized” and torn apart in argument, when in fact all it means is that they are criteria-based. These criteria require that we distinguish fact from fiction; synthesize and evaluate information; and clearly communicate, solve problems and discover truths.
https://cetl.uconn.edu/resources/design-your-course/teaching-and-learning-techniques/critical-thinking-and-other-higher-order-thinking-skills/
The question is which experience is veridical. — Ludwig V
One has to bear in mind that our experience is laden with skills and expectations. — Ludwig V
I can only recognize myself when I can recognise the other. — Ludwig V
A proudly human linguistic reification of an idea. — Janus
One experiences phenomena by perceiving them. How does on experience oneself? — Janus
It should be noted that animals have cultures, traditions and can pass on knowledge to others. There scope is limited compared to ours though. All elements of human language (spoken/written/signed) can be seen in the rest of the animal kingdom, it is just that we happen to possess them all. Does rationality suddenly emerge because of this? Maybe that is your argument, I do not know? — I like sushi
I would be thunderstruck to learn this is true. Two examples jump quickly to mind, but I'm sure there are others.All elements of human language (spoken/written/signed) can be seen in the rest of the animal kingdom, it is just that we happen to possess them all. — I like sushi
I don't see how. There is no need to think about one's own beliefs about future events in order to have beliefs about future events.
— creativesoul
I'm waiting on the platform for the 5 pm train; it is 4.58; I expect (believe) that the train will arrive shortly. It doesn't. I am disappointed. Is it correct to say that I now recognize that my belief that the train will arrive shortly is false? — Ludwig V
It is correct to say that that constitutes a belief about a belief?
Why would it be incorrect to substitute "the dog" for "I" in that story?
I think you would reply that it is incorrect because the dog is unable to speak English.
I would be thunderstruck to learn this is true. Two examples jump quickly to mind, but I'm sure there are others. — Patterner
Seems your pickle is one of logical consequences.
— creativesoul
All logic is consequential: if this then that. For a logical system, if this then that and from that something else follows. — Mww
The implication from your comment is that my logic has consequences it shouldn’t.
Be that as it may, I’m ok with my pickle being the consequences of my logic, as long as nothing demonstrates its contradiction with itself or empirical conditions, which is all that could be asked of it.
The difficulty is setting out the ways we're similar, and the ways we're unique. Our own thinking is bolstered by our own complex language use and all that that facilitates. Naming and descriptive practices are key. They pervade our thinking. They allow us to reflect upon our own experiences in a manner that is much more than just remembering.
Other animals cannot do that.
— creativesoul
Right. But millions of years ago, our brains took a leap that no other species has yet taken. We were one of many species that had some limited degree of language, or representation, abilities. Presumably, various other species have evolved greater abilities since then. — Patterner
(Maybe whatever species today has these abilities to the least degree is the baseline that all started at. Although even it may have evolved from the barest minimum degree of such abilities.) But our brain gained an ability that was either enough for us to get where we are now by learning and adding to our learning, or that subsequent mutations were able to build upon. It allowed us greater language, and our greater language helped develop our brain. Now we think about things, and kind of things, nothing else thinks about.
Some animals eat what they can find."Greater" abilities??? I'm not sure what that means — creativesoul
I used a couple of specific examples to illustrate the very broad categories. I'd be surprised if there are examples is any non-human language of the broad categories of talking about the past or future.They were talking more broadly though than you I think ;) — I like sushi
I don't suspect we could ever learn what actually happened. Especially if it's the second scenario, that our brain gained an ability that subsequent mutations were able to build upon. We couldn't ever know the series of mutations, and what each one gave us.I wouldn't disagree with that or what I think it means. It could use a healthy unpacking. — creativesoul
If humans think in ways no other species does, such as thinking of our own death in the (hopefully) distant future, what are the common elements with the thoughts of whatever critter has the least activity that can be called thinking?Do all thought and belief share a set of common elements, such that they are the exact same 'thing' at their core? — creativesoul
OK. "Myths and metaphysical speculations and religions" all belong in a very special category. I'll express this by saying that they are pre-rational and foundational. By which I mean that they give the people who accept them their framework for explaining and understanding the world. It's misleading, in my view, to say that people believe them, because that places them alongside believing that an earthquake is happening or that the harvest is bad - everyday facts.I am not sure if you would count them as fantasy stories but I was thinking more specifically of myths and metaphysical speculations and religions. That is conjectures which count themselves to be non-fictional. — Janus
Well, I disagree with the "mere" in "mere idea", because some ideas (including "I") are what set the framework within we can identify facts, experiences, etc. On the other hand, I agree that many people (try to) reify that idea. But that is a misunderstanding of language, which is not built in to, but results from imposing a limited model of language on our linguistic practices.Yes, perhaps the "I" is nothing more than a mere idea which we hold as an overarching unifying principle. If that were so it would be a kind of metaphysical or ontological illusion. A proudly human linguistic reification of an idea. — Janus
I don't see how the dog can't know that it itself is in pain, for example. Call it a pre-conceptual sense if you like, but there's no way for us to recognize it except in language or in how we respond.That said we have a sense of self (or is it just a sense of being?) which seems to be pre-conceptual. If it is just a sense of being it is also a sense of being different (from everything else) it seems. I don't doubt that (at least some) animals have this kind of sense. — Janus
That's a good point. I don't know how a phenomenologist would respond. But it seems pretty clear that they think they are talking about what is built in to any experience whatever. It seems better to say that what we are looking for when we try to understand those phenomena is an account that makes sense of them by interpreting them in a framework that rationalizes them.I haven't looked into phenomenology much, but I'd think it a poor basis for understanding the experience of someone with schizophrenia of someone with bipolar disorder who is in a manic state. — wonderer1
It seems that the idea of raw data is a necessary illusion for empiricism. But it is an illusion, since the raw data would be "a blooming, buzzing confusion" - except even recognizing that is to interpret the phenomena. But the next two paragraphs show that that's not what is meant. The proposition does not require dropping the entanglements, but not getting entangled in them in order to see them from a different perspective. Bear in mind, that I'm already distorting this explanation, because I'm not considering it within it's intended context of the actual aims of the practices of mndfulness/meditation, which is not the theoretical context posited by philosophy practiced here.Emptiness is a mode of perception, a way of looking at experience. It adds nothing to and takes nothing away from the raw data of physical and mental events. You look at events in the mind and the senses with no thought of whether there's anything lying behind them. — Emptiness, Thanissaro Bhikhu
I agree that it is close, and might enable us to learn something. But I think we have to see what the actual practice of phenomenology is.I believe this is near to both the meaning of the 'phenomenological suspension'/ epochē and also to the original meaning of skepticism in ancient philosophy (a very different thing to skepticism in modern terms). Ancient skepticism was grounded in 'suspension of judgement of what is not evident' (ref), namely, the entailments and entanglements that arise from emotional reactivity. That is where the similarity with epochē becomes clear. — Wayfarer
If I understand what you are saying I think I agree. — Janus
the experiencer cannot be itself the object of experience, with the analogy of the eye that cannot see itself being invoked. However the eye is a real object which can be seen, so I think it is a rather weak analogy. — Janus
Either using tools is something that can be done by a mindless creature(a creature completely absent of thought and belief), or not only humans are rational creatures. Your position forces you to explain the former….. — creativesoul
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