I’ve posted quotes from CPR proving this is not the case. — Mww
--- CPR, p.1That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse our powers of understanding into activity, to compare to connect, or to separate these, and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called experience?
In fact, when we (rightly) regard the objects of the senses as mere appearances, we thereby admit that they have a thing in itself as their ground—·namely, the thing of which they are appearances·. We don’t know what this thing is like in itself; all we know is its appearance, i.e. how this unknown something affects our senses. I
A thing-in-itself is the concept of an object which we cannot know anything about: so it necessarily is an object. You make it sound like it is purely abstract — Bob Ross
It seems like you agreed with me, so I am not following why you do not believe in a priori knowledge. If your representative faculties must already know how to do certain things and already has certain concepts at its disposal, then it must have a priori knowledge — Bob Ross
You cognition must have more than a mere belief to know how to do what it does. E.g., your cognition has a priori knowledge on how to construct objects in space because it clearly does it correctly (insofar as they are represented with extension). The necessary precondition for the possibility of experiencing objects with extension is that your brain knows how to do that. — Bob Ross
and the vast majority of people are naive realists — Bob Ross
The process of perception begins with an object in the real world, known as the distal stimulus or distal object. By means of light, sound, or another physical process, the object stimulates the body's sensory organs. These sensory organs transform the input energy into neural activity—a process called transduction. This raw pattern of neural activity is called the proximal stimulus. These neural signals are then transmitted to the brain and processed. The resulting mental re-creation of the distal stimulus is the percept.
To explain the process of perception, an example could be an ordinary shoe. The shoe itself is the distal stimulus. When light from the shoe enters a person's eye and stimulates the retina, that stimulation is the proximal stimulus. The image of the shoe reconstructed by the brain of the person is the percept. Another example could be a ringing telephone. The ringing of the phone is the distal stimulus. The sound stimulating a person's auditory receptors is the proximal stimulus. The brain's interpretation of this as the "ringing of a telephone" is the percept.
The different kinds of sensation (such as warmth, sound, and taste) are called sensory modalities or stimulus modalities.
Indirect realism is broadly equivalent to the scientific view of perception that subjects do not experience the external world as it really is, but perceive it through the lens of a conceptual framework. Furthermore, indirect realism is a core tenet of the cognitivism paradigm in psychology and cognitive science.
Maybe laymen and philosophers, but that's not the view of those who study perception scientifically. — Michael
it makes no sense to say that the thing-in-itself is not the object which impacted our senses….. — Bob Ross
Whatever "rational" grounds you might have for believing in naive realism, it is incompatible with physics, biology, neuroscience, and psychology. — Michael
And of course this tired claim has been shown to be unsupportable any number of times in the recent thread — Leontiskos
This more aristocratic illusion concerning the unlimited penetrative power of thought has as its counterpart the more plebeian illusion of naive realism, according to which things "are" as they are perceived by us through our senses. This illusion dominates the daily life of men and of animals; it is also the point of departure in all of the sciences, especially of the natural sciences.
they tend to still think that how we perceive reality is predominantly a reflection of reality in-itself. — Bob Ross
Whatever "rational" grounds you might have for believing in naive realism, it is incompatible with physics, biology, neuroscience, and psychology.
Besides, the belief that science can adjudicate the Kantian question just belies a misunderstanding of the Kantian question, not to mention the science.
Its because it is an abstract. There is nothing to observe.
The point that I disagree with in apriori is that we can have knowledge without experience.
…
“You cognition must have more than a mere belief to know how to do what it does. E.g., your cognition has a priori knowledge on how to construct objects in space because it clearly does it correctly (insofar as they are represented with extension). The necessary precondition for the possibility of experiencing objects with extension is that your brain knows how to do that.”
Correct, and this aspect of apriori I agree with
Notice in the text it’s “objects which affect our senses”, not thing-in-themselves. Which is to say things-in-themselves are not that which affects our senses.
Then I’d love to know, for you to inform me, what sensation I would receive from a thing-in-itself.
If I receive a sensation in conjunction with the sensory device being impacted, then I should be able to smell, hear, taste, etc., a thing-in-itself. How, then, do I distinguish it from a thing?
are you saying that the thing as it is in-itself does NOT excite our senses such that we perceive something? — Bob Ross
I am pretty sure it also says it outright in the CRP…. — Bob Ross
And of course this tired claim has been shown to be unsupportable any number of times in the recent thread — Leontiskos
The thing as a whole excites such that we perceive, but it isn’t the whole thing we intuit from that perception. The thing as a whole is not the same a a thing in itself. — Mww
Scientific investigations of how we perceive already, to some extent, presuppose the a priori modes by which we intuit and cognize objects, being that we must study the intuited and cognized version of our own representative faculties, and so the Kantian question is still very much alive and puzzling. — Bob Ross
Let's take the words of Albert Einstein as an example — Michael
There is nothing wrong with doing this….. — AmadeusD
…..but you would need to make this make sense outside of that for it to hold much water. — AmadeusD
The thing as a whole excites such that we perceive, but it isn’t the whole thing we intuit from that perception. The thing as a whole is not the same a a thing in itself.
What do you think the thing-in-itself actually is, what concept is being represented by those words?
As far as that goes, what do you think the Big Picture is for CPR?
And why, exactly, is it that the thing-in-itself ends up as one of the necessary limitations proved for this particular, albeit theoretical, method of human cognition and empirical knowledge?
And make no mistake: by his own admission, but in modern venencular, Prolegomena is “CPR For Dummies”, so if one wishes to critique the one, he must set aside the other.
I am saying it is the thing which excites our senses — Bob Ross
The persistent error I see with this, is the idea that the ding an sich is a 'thing behind the thing', that it's 'the real thing' as opposed to 'the apparent thing'. And the reason why I think that's an error is that it attempts to take a perspective from which you're able to compare them, which, according to Kant, you can never do. — Wayfarer
Can you put in simple terms what you think it is? — Bob Ross
It represents an object in reality as it is in-itself—i.e., qua itself—i.e., independent of any experience of it — Bob Ross
outlining the limits of reason; especially as it relates to rationalism vs. (british) empiricism. — Bob Ross
Because something representational requires something which was not representational — Bob Ross
I am still not understanding what you are claiming the thing-in-itself is: I am saying it is the thing which excites our senses. Can you put in simple terms what you think it is?
What do you think the thing-in-itself actually is, what concept is being represented by those words?
It represents an object in reality as it is in-itself—i.e., qua itself—i.e., independent of any experience of it — Bob Ross
If 'the thing in itself' denotes the thing "independent of any experience of it" then how can it be "the thing that excites our senses"? To say that is to contradict yourself. — Janus
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