People aren't interested in conversations where everybody agrees on the issues and perhaps differ only in nuances. Nope. A heated debate is what people want to follow. Even here in PF this is evident: the threads where people disagree get the most comments. — ssu
Indeed not only Merkel has NOT admitted what he claims she has, but it can not even be inferred from what she actually said or equated with what she actually said: reinforcing Ukrainian military not only is not incompatible with pursuing a cease-fire but it could also be instrumental to preserving a cease-fire. — neomac
The 2014 Minsk agreement was an attempt to give time to Ukraine. It also used this time to become stronger as can be seen today. — Merkel
“From my point of view, the Minsk agreements were born dead,” said Volodymyr Ariev, an MP from Poroshenko’s party. “The conditions were always impossible to implement. We understood it clearly at the time, but we signed it to buy time for Ukraine: to have time to restore our government, our army, intelligence and security system.” — The Guardian
Concerning "bad faith" accusations, apparently it's more plausible that Putin (arguably an expert in disinformatia) was duped by the Europeans (however interested in pacifying the conflict to come back to do business as usual with Russia, reason why they have been already rejecting/postponing NATO membership for Ukraine all along), than that Europeans were taking countermeasures against Putin's palpable bad faith back then (having Putin already violated various international and bilateral treaties by illegally annexing the Crimean peninsula and committing acts of armed aggression against Ukraine, and being very much interested in keeping a conflict in Donbas alive, to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO, or to allow further annexations). LOL. — neomac
You have already quoted the parts of the paper that make clear that it is analysing a course of action where the US intensifies it's efforts. I'm not sure who you're trying to fool by now acting like the paper was an analysis of the existing US policy. Yourself? — Echarmion
Expanding U.S. assistance to Ukraine, including lethal military assistance, would likely increase the costs to Russia, in both blood and treasure, of holding the Donbass region. — RAND
Risks
An increase in U.S. security assistance to Ukraine would likely lead to a commensurate increase in both Russian aid to the separatists and Russian military forces in Ukraine, thus sustaining the con- flict at a somewhat higher level of intensity.20 Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, the former commanding general of U.S. Army Europe, argued against giving Javelin anti-tank missiles to Ukraine for precisely this reason.
Alternatively, Russia might counter-escalate, committing more troops and pushing them deeper into Ukraine. Russia might even preempt U.S. action, escalating before any additional U.S. aid arrives. Such escalation might extend Russia; Eastern Ukraine is already a drain. Taking more of Ukraine might only increase the burden, albeit at the expense of the Ukrainian people. However, such a move might also come at a significant cost to Ukraine and to U.S. prestige and credibility. This could produce disproportionately large Ukrainian casualties, territorial losses, and refugee flows. It might even lead Ukraine into a disadvantageous peace. — Extending Russia ,RAND
The reinterpretation of what she said as somehow to support a ceasefire through strength, is memory holing the whole episode. — boethius
The paper is an analysis of existing US policy: — boethius
Point of all this being: US policy makers knew what their policy was leading to and that the cost to Ukraine to be used as a tool to extend Russia would be enormous. — boethius
the policy of drip feed of weapons systems to Ukraine is simply irrefutable evidence that the policy isn't and never was for Ukraine to "win" (otherwise you'd pour in everything they could use from day 1) but simply to calibrate the conflict at a "somewhat higher level of intensity" to inflict costs on Russia and, even more importantly than that, profit immensely in terms of arms and gas. — boethius
without even need to get into the US policy clearly to arm the most extreme Nazi groups in Ukraine — boethius
fascist boots on the ground to deal with any Ukrainian resistance to the policy to march to war with a far more powerful neighbour which would obviously harm the country immensely and get a great many Ukrainians killed. — boethius
Why are you so convinced that you alone have correctly understood what she was referring to? — Echarmion
'm genuinely confused whether you just don't understand English grammar or whether you're just doubling down to avoid admitting that you overstated your case.
"Would" implies a conditional. Doing A would lead to B. Not (currently) doing A leads to B. — Echarmion
Expanding U.S. assistance to Ukraine, including lethal military assistance, would likely increase the costs to Russia, in both blood and treasure, of holding the Donbass region. — RAND
Risks
An increase in U.S. security assistance to Ukraine would likely lead to a commensurate increase in both Russian aid to the separatists and Russian military forces in Ukraine, thus sustaining the con- flict at a somewhat higher level of intensity.20 Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, the former commanding general of U.S. Army Europe, argued against giving Javelin anti-tank missiles to Ukraine for precisely this reason.
Alternatively, Russia might counter-escalate, committing more troops and pushing them deeper into Ukraine. Russia might even preempt U.S. action, escalating before any additional U.S. aid arrives. Such escalation might extend Russia; Eastern Ukraine is already a drain. Taking more of Ukraine might only increase the burden, albeit at the expense of the Ukrainian people. However, such a move might also come at a significant cost to Ukraine and to U.S. prestige and credibility. This could produce disproportionately large Ukrainian casualties, territorial losses, and refugee flows. It might even lead Ukraine into a disadvantageous peace. — Extending Russia ,RAND
Conclusion
The option of expanding U.S. military aid to Ukraine has to be evaluated principally on whether doing so could help end the conflict in the Donbass on acceptable terms rather than simply on costs it imposes on Moscow. Boosting U.S. aid as part of a broader diplomatic strategy to advance a settlement might well make sense, but calibrating the level of assistance to produce the desired effect while avoiding a damaging counter-escalation would be challenging. — Extending Russia ,RAND
Do you genuinely believe US policy makers are so good that they can predict future events with perfect accuracy? Noone, except perhaps the Russian planners, "knew" what would happen in 2022 years in advance. — Echarmion
Real world policies of states are not monoliths. — Echarmion
The goals you're listing are not mutually exclusive. — Echarmion
A policy you made up. — Echarmion
An interesting fantasy but don't you think the fascist boots crossing the border from Russia are a much more effective motivation? — Echarmion
The West had no problem reporting this interpretation and portraying the Minsk agreements as a brilliant move by Ukraine and the West to prepare for an amazing job in the bigger war that was ongoing and understood to be essentially already won by Ukraine at the time. — boethius
support to Nazis to shell civilians — boethius
I am responding to your statement that the authors aren't analyzing US policy at the time at all. — boethius
They consider the possibility of expanding that policy to inflict even greater costs and recommend not doing that. — boethius
In other words, the authors get it exactly right: inviting escalation (which includes not even doing anything yet) — boethius
The US, since the paper was written, supplied arms to Ukraine, eschewed negotiations, reiterated Ukraine would join NATO — boethius
provoke a "somewhat higher level of intensity" in the fighting (aka. a giant war). — boethius
are actions that would very likely provoke a larger war between Ukraine and Russia, a war that Ukraine would almost certainly lose at great cost to Ukrainians. — boethius
No where do I state the likely consequences (such as the likely consequences of different policy decisions that the RAND paper explains) are somehow "certain", — boethius
Experts put significant effort into explaining "doing this will result in that" and then US Policy makers go and do this and the that results. The argument that somehow they thought something else would happen is just dumb. — boethius
If US policy makers actually thought Ukraine could prevail and actually wanted that to happen then they would not drip feed weapons systems — boethius
Escalate to what? Obviously Ukraine actually winning. — boethius
Which is why I have no hesitation to really believe that Zelensky really did want to prevent the war from breaking out in doing things like trying to control the Nazis, but other factions in Ukraine prevailed (such as those very Nazis just straight-up telling Zelensky they wouldn't do what he says), and I'd have no problem believing many elites in Europe didn't want this war either but didn't prevail against US proxy politicians in Europe as well as US pressure and direct actions (such as stating Ukraine would join NATO, those 12 or so CIA bases in Ukraine, direct arms supply to Ukraine and so on). — boethius
Not made up, I'll go repost the Western media's own investigations into this issue if you really want me to. — boethius
The policy is super duper clearly provoke a larger war between Russia and Ukraine and therefore in total consistency with that policy the Nazis are supported as they not only do the most provocative things like shell civilians but are also a provocation by just being their wholesome Nazi selves. — boethius
Again, I can repost the West's own reporting on these Nazis and their effect on the Ukrainian political process. — boethius
Indeed not only Merkel has NOT admitted what he claims she has, but it can not even be inferred from what she actually said or equated with what she actually said: reinforcing Ukrainian military not only is not incompatible with pursuing a cease-fire but it could also be instrumental to preserving a cease-fire. — neomac
Just gaslighting apologetics. What does Merkel say:
The 2014 Minsk agreement was an attempt to give time to Ukraine. It also used this time to become stronger as can be seen today. — Merkel
Now this is well into the war. If she wanted to say that the goal of making Ukraine stronger was to deter Russia and so avoid a war ... she would have said that! She's not a moron. — boethius
Back in autumn 2022 the Western narrative was that Russia was weak, Russia was falling apart, Russia was losing and Ukraine was in the process of inflicting a brilliant victory. The Western talking heads and officials were in a circle jerk of patting each other on the cock in celebration of this brilliant geopolitical strategy, in which the Ukrainian build up, with Western assistance, since 2014 was to credit for Ukraine's extraordinary prowess on the battlefield. Various politicians and officials, in both the West and Ukraine, were taking credit for the brilliant move of using Minsk as a cover to build up Ukraine to defeat Russia.
Merkel in this statement was buying into this narrative of Ukrainian victory and taking a bit of the credit.
And it wasn't just Merkel, plenty did a little victory lap of how Ukraine "outplayed" the Russians and Minsk was part of that deception. — boethius
A version of events proudly asserted by Ukrainian politicians even before the larger 2022 war even started:
“From my point of view, the Minsk agreements were born dead,” said Volodymyr Ariev, an MP from Poroshenko’s party. “The conditions were always impossible to implement. We understood it clearly at the time, but we signed it to buy time for Ukraine: to have time to restore our government, our army, intelligence and security system.” — The Guardian — boethius
Now, before the war started it would have been controversial for Western politicians to join this narrative, but a few months into the war when the West understood Ukraine and itself to have won, then saying that Minsk was about building up Ukraine into the strong modern nation that is spanking Russia on the battlefield was simply being part of the cool winning club. Seemed at that time (if you believed what you saw everywhere on Western mainstream and social media was even partially correct, that it can't be pure invention) that this duplicitous strategy was working and the people in Ukraine that wanted only to buy time for a big war were correct. — boethius
.You need to reach into the memory hole and dig out what the Western media was essentially playing on loud speaker, on repeat without interruption for months: Ukraine was winning, fighting for the "right to join NATO" (even when you can't actually join NATO because NATO doesn't let you in) is brilliant politics, Russia would collapse any day, and so on, the war was in no way regrettable but "teaching Russia a lesson", and that the West was pure and righteous and never did anything wrong and Ukraine was our innocent child finally taking flight from under our wing and learning to soar on the winds of angelic victory (just as we do since centuries) — boethius
A core element of Minsk was disarming the Nazi groups who literally burned their political rivals (aka. normal fucking people) aline in a building and were constantly shelling civilians. — boethius
Western countries had to literally pass laws that arms were not to be transferred to organizations their own governments viewed as Nazi terrorists (which they obviously were). These laws were passed because it's hard to vote against a ban on weapons for Nazis but journalists went regularly to demonstrate the West was not following its own laws much less Ukraine trying to implement Minsk by disarming these non-state groups. — boethius
You may say "that's what friends do" but the Nazi's aren't "Ukraine's friends", Zelensky even tried going to talk to them to get them to follow orders from the president and they just told him no. Now, had the West put pressure for the disarmament of these groups (i.e. no more weapons until their disarmed and removed from the front lines and the situation on the front professionalized) then that would have actually supported Zelensky's attempt to avoid a war, which I have no problem believing was genuine but it is in fact undermined by not only the West tolerating the arming of literal Nazis but that was clearly the policy in order to "calibrate" a conflict to imposes costs on Russia as the RAND documents happily explains to us. — boethius
Concerning "bad faith" accusations, apparently it's more plausible that Putin (arguably an expert in disinformatia) was duped by the Europeans (however interested in pacifying the conflict to come back to do business as usual with Russia, reason why they have been already rejecting/postponing NATO membership for Ukraine all along), than that Europeans were taking countermeasures against Putin's palpable bad faith back then (having Putin already violated various international and bilateral treaties by illegally annexing the Crimean peninsula and committing acts of armed aggression against Ukraine, and being very much interested in keeping a conflict in Donbas alive, to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO, or to allow further annexations). LOL. — neomac
I can't even parse what you're even trying to say ... that concerning bad faith actions Putin was pseudo-duped by European pseudo-bad faith actions? — boethius
Indeed, the dude overly indulges in trolling tactics: framing facts through manipulative labels ("Nazi problem", "Western coup", "Russia legitimate security concerns", "Western propaganda"), misreporting sources and interlocutors' claims, and take others' objections just as a pretext to loop once more into framing facts and distorting others' claims.standard troll tactic — Echarmion
I don't remember anything of the sort. — Echarmion
You're switching back to full on propaganda here. — Echarmion
Deciding what your interlocutor is saying sure makes arguing easier. — Echarmion
You have already quoted the parts of the paper that make clear that it is analysing a course of action where the US intensifies it's efforts. I'm not sure who you're trying to fool by now acting like the paper was an analysis of the existing US policy. Yourself? — Echarmion
Or she didn’t say that because just a moron would have thought that buying time was an admission by Europeans that Minsk agreements were deceivingly meant to arm Ukraine in order to initiate/pursue a war against Russia. — neomac
Nowhere Merkel is talking about Ukrainian victory in that comment. That's your rhetoric manipulation. — neomac
Then you're obviously not really following events and are just wasting time and space. — boethius
When the Western media believed Ukraine was "winning" the conversation (in the Western media) was very different than it was now. The faction in Ukraine that wanted to war and for which Minsk was just to buy time to prepare for the inevitable war seemed completely validated by the West and the Western cheerleaders for the war essentially presented these people as geniuses, both diplomatic and militarily. — boethius
Now, I suppose you could argue that yes there was and are Nazis and yes the shelling of civilians was a regular feature of the Donbas war but it was actually moderate regular forces that were shelling civilians. If you're taking this position then I am happy to present the argument of why that is a terrible position to take and in contradiction with the available evidence. — boethius
You're literally accusing me of trying "fool" someone by stating the paper analyses existing US policy.
I then demonstrate that the paper quite clearly is analyzing existing US policy and its benefits and risks as well as considering different directions US policy could go. — boethius
The paper describes all these policies as already provocative to Russia and potentially soliciting a Russian escalation (without even doing anything more), — boethius
as well as withdrawing from INF. — boethius
The US then does all those things and you want to just keep denying what the paper clearly says in plain English. — boethius
a major strategic victory that Russia would then need to consolidate, — boethius
ignoring disproportionate losses for Ukrainians (often by just repeating Ukrainian loss estimates for both sides) and the fact Russia would likely be more conservative with spending lives (giving Ukraine a temporary advantage in the area of willingness to sustain losses, which Russia could easily compensate in other areas such as air power, artillery and building a sophisticated defensive line, but did allow Ukraine to "compete" for a time those losses were indeed available to lose), — boethius
The paper was not an analysis of existing US policy but an analysis of a series of future possibilities. — Echarmion
You have already quoted the parts of the paper that make clear that it is analysing a course of action where the US intensifies it's efforts. I'm not sure who you're trying to fool by now acting like the paper was an analysis of the US policy. Yourself? — Echarmion
I am responding to your statement that the authors aren't analyzing US policy at the time at all. — boethius
Deciding what your interlocutor is saying sure makes arguing easier. — Echarmion
After identifying Russia’s perceived anxieties and vulnerabilities, we convened a panel of experts to examine the economic, geopoliti- cal, ideological, informational, and military means to exploit them. Drawing on these expert opinions and on current policy debates, we developed a series of potential measures that could extend Russia. After describing each measure, we assessed the costs and risks associated with each and the prospect of success. Could the measure impose a disproportional burden on Russia, and what are the chances of it doing so? — Extending Russia, RAND
Rather than returning to compliance with the INF Treaty, Russia might instead interpret U.S. R&D as a sign that the United States is preparing to unilaterally breach or withdraw from the treaty, the way it did in 2002 with the ABM Treaty. — Extending Russia, RAND
73 Terence Neilan, “Bush Pulls Out of ABM Treaty; Putin Calls Move a Mistake,” New York Times, December 13, 2001. — Extending Russia, RAND
The maxim that “Russia is never so strong nor so weak as it appears” remains as true in the current century as it was in the 19th and 20th.1 In some respects, contemporary Russia is a country in stagnation. Its economy is dependent on natural resource exports, so falling oil and gas prices have caused a significant drop in the living standards of many Russian citizens. Economic sanctions have further contributed to this decline. — Extending Russia, RAND
Some analysts maintain that Russia lacks the resources to escalate the conflict. Ivan Medynskyi of the Kyiv-based Institute for World Policy argued, “War is expensive. Falling oil prices, economic decline, sanctions, and a campaign in Syria (all of which are likely to continue in 2016) leave little room for another large-scale military maneuver by Russia.”22 According to this view, Russia simply cannot afford to maintain a proxy war in Ukraine, although, given Russia’s size and the importance it places on Ukraine, this might be an overly optimistic assumption. — Extending Russia, RAND
Most of the steps covered in this report are in some sense escalatory, and most would likely prompt some Russian counter-escalation. In addition to the specific risks associated with each measure, there- fore, there is additional risk attached to a generally intensified competition with a nuclear-armed adversary to consider. Consequently, every measure needs to be deliberately planned and carefully calibrated to achieve the desired effect. Finally, although Russia would bear the cost of this increased competition less easily than the United States, both sides would have to divert national resources from other purposes. Extending Russia for its own sake is, in most cases, not a sufficient basis to consider the steps outlined here. Rather, these need to be considered in the broader context of national policy based on defense, deterrence, and—where U.S. and Russian interests align—cooperation. — Extending Russia, RAND
US decision makers (i.e. whoever is calling the shots in the Biden administration) obviously know all this because they or their assistants read these kind of RAND papers.
It's also just common sense that doing things like military and covert assistance to Ukraine, like building 12 CIA bases in Ukraine, are provocative actions, along with withdrawing from INF and doubling down on Ukraine joining NATO, refusing to discuss, much less any real negotiation, for a broader European security architecture are provocative.
The US own top tier analysis says all this is provocative, that Ukraine will lose significantly in an escalation, that Russia will likely prevail, that the end result is also bad for US policy and prestige, and that obviously you can't go too far in intensifying a conflict with Russia because they have nuclear weapons.
Now, propagandists such as @Echarmion just want to deny the obvious fact that the US knew it's actions were provoking a larger war in Ukraine and that the US knew the super duper likely result of Russia winning such an escalation at significant cost to Ukraine in both lives and territory. Why this denialism is so important as to get to the absolutely stupid situation that @Echarmion needs to then deny his denialism only to go onto deny his denialism of his denialism is that it is so obvious.
You cannot read this RAND paper and then have even a cursory knowledge of the facts (not only arms supply to Ukraine military but to Nazi groups that Western journalists go and verify for us is definitely happening despite Western laws past to make that explicitly illegal), CIA bases in Ukraine, withdraw from INF, being vocal about Ukraine joining NATO "oh ... someday", and so on, and conclude there's not only no provocation but the facts are simply inline with someone reading this RAND report and then simply pushing on all of the buttons the authors identify as likely to provoke a Russian escalation in Ukraine.
You can also not read this paper and conclude that the policy since the war started of drip feeding arms to Ukraine was somehow due to an honest belief that the expert opinion as represented in the RAND paper was somehow wrong and that Ukraine could in fact prevail in a larger war with Russia. The policy of drip feeding weapons to Ukraine is not compatible with the belief Ukraine can "win" despite the extreme disadvantageous position the RAND paper points out, but rather represents the "calibration" of support the paper describes to increase costs on Russia while avoiding an out of control escalation (such as nuclear exchange); of course, a calibration of the conflict far beyond what the authors recommend but nevertheless implementing their basic framework of controlling the escalation so as not to get out of hand.
Likewise, US decision makers are clearly cognizant of the risk of nuclear escalation and their policies clearly reflect avoiding nuclear escalation ... by drip feeding weapons to Ukraine and forbidding Ukraine to use Western weapons to strike deep in Russia, which is another way of saying that US policy makers "calibrate" the conflict at "Ukraine loses" so as to avoid the risk of nuclear escalation.
Now, considering the paper is pretty clear doing all this is bad for US foreign policy, the choice is that US policy makers are just stupid with a kindergarten level intellect (as always promoted in the Western mainstream media when Western policy is counter-productive to any reasonable understanding of Western interests) or then they know what they are doing, as they can read these kinds of papers and know there's no "counter analysis" out there that says differently, but their priority is not some arguably objective US, or West in general, interest.
If you're goal is to have another war to:
1. Distract from the disastrous ending of the last wars and avoid any introspection or accountability.
2. Keep the gravy train of military spending flowing.
3. Sell gas to Europe.
4. Have a "rally around the flag" effect that comes with a righteous war.
And you simply do not care about US long term interests, just making bank for your friends and backers and winning the next election (i.e. the policy need not be "successful" just appear to be successful until 2024), then it would make complete sense to read the paper and then simply push all the buttons that maximize escalation with Russia but nevertheless still calibrate things short of a nuclear war (since fortunately, and credit where credits due, you are not so pathologically insane as to actually want a nuclear exchange with Russia).
If your goals are partisan and special interest, as outlined above, you would not ask yourself the question "can Ukraine prevail so that it's no embarrassing for US policy and prestige?" but rather "can Ukraine seem to prevail, at least 'enough', to get to election 2024? afterwhich we can drop them like a hot pierogi and move onto the next war, as, yeah, sure, maybe 'losing' war after war is 'bad' for the US in the long term but it's highly profitable in the meantime".
Providing lethal aid to Ukraine would exploit Russia’s greatest point of external vulnerability. But any increase in U.S. military arms and advice to Ukraine would need to be carefully calibrated to increase the costs to Russia of sustaining its existing commitment without provoking a much wider conflict in which Russia, by reason of proximity, would have significant advantages. — Overextending and unbalancing Russia Brief, RAND
The paper is not discussing things in some sort of hypothetical vacuum but takes as it's starting point existing relations with Russia and analyses those existing policies as a basis to then consider different policy moves and the benefits and risks of those moves. — boethius
However, it also considers the benefits and risks of the existing policies, such as the Donbas war already imposing a cost on Russia and that Russia may anyways decide to preempt US actions and counter escalate. — boethius
2. Then you can't deal with the direct citations of the paper analyzing the existing US foreign policy of the time (of which I only provided a couple of examples, which is sufficient to disprove your claim the paper doesn't do so) — boethius
Notice they are basing their work on "current policy debates" which, if you can read English, is another way of saying "analysis of existing US policy", which is what current policy debates are about. — boethius
Which is a demonstration of doing what they say they will do "drawing on these expert opinions on current policy debates" in literally citing these experts they are drawing on (i.e. analyzing the existing policy as a starting point). — boethius
Yes, obviously. As I pointed out normally this is common sense that does not need pointing out. — Echarmion
It doesn't. There is no chapter in the paper analysing the contemporary situation, nor does the paper state anywhere what the risks and benefits of the current policy are. — Echarmion
I have no idea what the text looks like in your mind, but the text that I read has no "direct citations analysing the existing US policy". — Echarmion
Yes, obviously. As I pointed out normally this is common sense that does not need pointing out. — Echarmion
The paper is not discussing things in some sort of hypothetical vacuum but takes as it's starting point existing relations with Russia and analyses those existing policies as a basis to then consider different policy moves and the benefits and risks of those moves — boethius
I have no idea what the text looks like in your mind, but the text that I read has no "direct citations analysing the existing US policy". — Echarmion
Importantly, due to space and resource constraints, we do not quantitatively cost out each measure to extend Russia; instead, we relied on more-qualitative judgments of the researchers. While we believe that these judgments accurately capture whether each measure would be cost-imposing or cost-incurring for the United States, future analysis would benefit from estimating the dollar amounts involved more rigorously. — Extending Russia, RAND
This is just false. "Current policy debates" does not refer just to "debates about the current policy". It's more broad and would include both debates about current policies as well as debates about possible future policies. — Echarmion
A note more relevant to the actual situation: — Echarmion
As various commentators have pointed out, the change is clearly intended to make the doctrine more vague. It's also pretty much a direct warning to not allow Ukraine to strike targets on Russian territory using western weapons. — Echarmion
This seems a fairly big step for Russia, which seems to indicate that they're really concerned about possible long range strikes. It also demonstrates the bargaining power Russia's nuclear capabilities still represent. — Echarmion
Ultimately I agree with the view that, no matter what Russia says their nuclear doctrine is, there is just nothing to be gained from using nuclear weapons over Ukraine. Nuclear weapons are a powerful threat to a country's population and infrastructure, but their direct military use is limited unless you intend to absolutely obliterate an area. Something Russia really cannot afford to do in Ukraine. — Echarmion
The conversation is just dumb — boethius
To take the Paris example — boethius
1. Ukraine is in the collapse phase on the losing end of a war of attrition, which was entirely foreseeable. — boethius
2. Striking infrastructure and civilian populations deep inside Russia is essentially the only military move or point of leverage Ukraine has left. — boethius
Notice how at no point does the West have any problem with Israel "escalating" with Western weapons to the point of levelling entire apartment blocks filled with civilians.
Why? Because the West wants Israel to "win" and therefore do whatever is necessary to "win" (I put win in quotes as Western leaders may not have a clear idea of what a winning end-state would be, but whatever seems like winning and Israel wants to do is fully supported). — boethius
Why maintain the asymmetry that Russia can disable Ukrainian infrastructure across the entire country but Ukraine can't do likewise to Russia is to "calibrate" the conflict at a "somewhat higher level of intensity" without escalating too far (i.e. escalating to a point where Ukraine maybe winning on the battlefield).
As I've pointed out since the beginning of the conflict, the reason the West does not "escalate" to actually threatening Russia (in terms of battlefield loss in Ukraine or damaging Russian infrastructure on a mass scale) is nuclear weapons. — boethius
It may surprise you but at the start of the war many here, and elsewhere, argued that Russian nuclear weapons were of essentially no meaning in the conflict and did not shape Western policy and shouldn't shape Western policy: i.e. I argued that Russian nuclear weapons does and obviously should deter Western escalation, while others argued it doesn't and it shouldn't ("we cannot let them get away with nuclear blackmail!" was the battle cry of this camp).
Nearly 2 years later and this is not the common sense position even in the Western mainstream media that nuclear weapons are indeed a significant deterrent to "winning". — boethius
First, you literally just made the point that "It also demonstrates the bargaining power Russia's nuclear capabilities still represent" so obviously they are useful as leverage, and they are useful as leverage because they can be practically used in response to different actions (such as a large attack on Russian infrastructure). — boethius
Russia is therefore making it clear that if the West were to organize such a major missile strike, intended to cause systemic damage to Russian infrastructure, that Russia will start nuking the NATO infrastructure that supports such missile supply and operation. — boethius
The basic problem, as I've elaborated on many times since the first phases of the war, is that the West would be unable to strike Russia with nuclear weapons in-kind without that escalating to a general nuclear exchange. — boethius
So, it is a lose-lose situation. If they organize a large scale missile strike on Russia and Russia then nukes a NATO base and the US does not respond with nuclear weapons, that would be definitely losing the exchange, and if the US does respond with nuclear weapons that would very likely lead to a general nuclear exchange which isn't exactly good for the US just right now. — boethius
Therefore, the threat of nuclear weapons effectively deters the West from causing any significant harm, or even risk of significant harm, to Russian state power in Ukraine or indeed in Russia. — boethius
The US does not face similar escalation risks in the middle-east and therefore it is not effectively deterred and so places similar constraints on the use of Western arms by Israel. — boethius
Why? Because the West wants Israel to "win" and therefore do whatever is necessary to "win" — boethius
Oh I agree wholeheartedly. — Echarmion
From my perspective what's happening here is that you're showing me a guide to the city of Bordeaux and telling me it's a guide to the city of Paris. When I point out that the guide is about Bordeaux and not Paris, you keep pointing out all the places where the guide talks about how to get to Bordeaux from Paris, or where it compares locations in the two cities. — Echarmion
The paper was not an analysis of existing US policy but an analysis of a series of future possibilities. — Echarmion
You have already quoted the parts of the paper that make clear that it is analysing a course of action where the US intensifies it's efforts. I'm not sure who you're trying to fool by now acting like the paper was an analysis of the US policy. Yourself? — Echarmion
The paper is not discussing things in some sort of hypothetical vacuum but takes as it's starting point existing relations with Russia and analyses those existing policies as a basis to then consider different policy moves and the benefits and risks of those moves. — boethius
As I pointed out normally this is common sense that does not need pointing out. — Echarmion
If Russia nukes a NATO base Russia is at war with NATO. Even if a general nuclear exchange is somehow averted, at the very least any russian troops in Ukraine would be flattened by the combined NATO airforces and the russian leaders responsible would shortly after drop from a window.
Do you think that if Russia uses a nuke on NATO territory everyone will just shrug and do nothing? — Echarmion
You don't need a successful first strike scenario for nuclear weapons to be a threat. During the cold war, one of the pillars of nuclear deterrence was that no side could develop an effective missile defense system.
The deterrent effect from nuclear weapons isn't based on the fact that they make you win the war. It's based on the fact that they'll make your enemy lose.
And this is also the reason why the west doesn't "want Ukraine to win" as you understand it. — Echarmion
And this is also the reason why the west doesn't "want Ukraine to win" as you understand it.
The US does not face similar escalation risks in the middle-east and therefore it is not effectively deterred and so places similar constraints on the use of Western arms by Israel.
— boethius
Oh? Didn't you write earlier:
Why? Because the West wants Israel to "win" and therefore do whatever is necessary to "win"
— boethius — Echarmion
Because you were unable to deal with the obvious fact that Russia was extremely very likely to prevail in Ukraine if there was an escalation — boethius
Your first bad faith propaganda strategy was to just keep denying that the US did anything escalatory between the paper being written and the larger war in 2022 — boethius
as the authors make clear that Russian may escalate anyways — boethius
Now, I understand that your aim was to engage in stupid quibbling that the US didn't arm Ukraine "even more" between 2019 and 2022, and simply ignore the US being more vocal about Ukraine joining NATO (one other major escalatory action the authors describe) — boethius
Rest assured it is quite easy to demonstrate that the US policy decisions between 2019 and 2022 are exactly the kind of escalatory action the authors describe — boethius
Therefore, the purpose of provoking the war — boethius
Why would this happen? How exactly would Russian troops be flattened in Ukraine? — boethius
Even if we ignore the fact that nuclear use would make NATO conventional war on Ukraine less, rather than more, likely — boethius
NATO would have the exact same problem, just a lot worse, that the Russian airforce had in 2022 and 2023 (and still has in 2024, just less) in that surface to air missiles (A2/AD bubbles in the modern parlance) are highly effective against airplanes and not many are needed to deny access to an airspace.
Stealth is not some magical invisible technology and Russians have had decades to develop systems to defeat US stealth systems. — boethius
Then there's the problem that the Russians in Ukraine are in basements and bunkers and dugouts and spread out and you still need to actually find them to be able to drop bombs on.
In other words, even if we pretended Russian anti-air assets had zero effectiveness (which would not be the case), air supremacy doesn't win wars anyways: right now Israel can drop US bombs at will on Lebanon and Gaza and that has not delivered victory. — boethius
If your response to a NATO base getting nuked is conventional, Russia can just nuke more things. — boethius
And in all of these strikes and counter-strikes a general nuclear exchange would be on a knifes edge as each side would be paranoid of the other side launching first. Planes and missiles flying everywhere are not going to reduce tensions.
At the end of the day, Europe, and the US for that matter, knows that the US is less committed to the conflict than is Russia and that the US has no interest in even a major risk of a general nuclear exchange with Russia. Even if European leaders were willing to have nuclear strikes on their territory for the sake of defending "Ukrainian sovereignty", which honestly many Europeans seems dumb enough to actually want, they know that the US doesn't actually want that: that Ukraine as a useful proxy force to accomplish some objectives for a time and at no point is the US going to "risk anything" for Ukraine.
Therefore, if the US did escalate to the point of Russia using a nuclear weapon to reestablish deterrence both the US and the Europeans know that the US has no rational response. — boethius
In this scenario, the situation, at the end of the day, would be US and NATO (mostly the UK) firing missiles at Russian critical infrastructure, an attack Russia needs to respond to, with nuclear weapons if that is the only option. Therefore, the solution would be for the US and NATO to stop attacking Russia to end the nuclear war. The only other option would be to simply continue the nuclear war; Russia would be in the same position of needing to resort to nuclear weapons to reestablish deterrence and therefore the only actual alternative to the US stopping the cycle of escalation would be to simply escalate to a nuclear war.
Actually attacking Russia is no longer deterrence it is simply straight-up attacking Russia resulting in Russia needing to respond to reestablish deterrence. — boethius
Which is why at the end of the day US elites do follow the RAND paper basic framework of "calibrating" the intensity of the conflict to avoid unwanted escalation; the intensity of violence needing to calibration to achieve that is Russia prevailing in Ukraine without systemic risk to Russian critical infrastructure.
The Russians can tolerate NATO weapons being used in Ukraine because at the end of the day they choose to be there, Russian critical infrastructure is not impacted, and defeating those weapons and prevailing in Ukraine has some advantages (from the Russian imperial perspective). — boethius
As mentioned above, if you are attacking the other sides critical infrastructure (what the Ukrainians want permission to do with NATO missiles) — boethius
The difference in the situation being that Iran has no nuclear deterrence vis-a-vis the US. — boethius
Why would this happen? How exactly would Russian troops be flattened in Ukraine? — boethius
Apparently Putin announced a few days ago that Russia is planning to change it's nuclear doctrine:
AP News: Putin lowers threshold of nuclear response
As various commentators have pointed out, the change is clearly intended to make the doctrine more vague. It's also pretty much a direct warning to not allow Ukraine to strike targets on Russian territory using western weapons.
This seems a fairly big step for Russia, which seems to indicate that they're really concerned about possible long range strikes. It also demonstrates the bargaining power Russia's nuclear capabilities still represent. — Echarmion
Palpable hand wringing as the clowns refuse to face the music. — Tzeentch
You keep saying that the west is content to see Ukraine lose. And although you keep stretching the evidence far beyond what it actually supports, there is an element of truth in this. The west faces no existential risk over the outcome of the Ukraine war and so it's determination to support Ukraine remains limited. — Echarmion
He was right! — some might then proclaim
He stood up to them all and showed them!
Why would I be unable to deal with that? Yes most everyone assumed that Russia would easily prevail over Ukraine if it committed serious resources (at least initially). — Echarmion
But it turned out that Ukraine had more teeth than most anyone assumed. — Echarmion
Likely Ukrainian Initial Responses to Full-Scale Invasion
The Ukrainian military will almost certainly fight against such an invasion, for which it is now preparing. Whatever doubts and reservations military personnel might have about their leaders or their prospects, the appearance of enemy mechanized columns driving into one’s country tends to concentrate thought and galvanize initial resistance. It collapses complexities and creates binary choices. Military officers and personnel are conditioned to choose to fight in such circumstances, and usually do, at least at first. There is no reason to think the Ukrainian military will perform differently in this case. — FORECAST SERIES: Putin’s Likely Course of Action in Ukraine, Understanding War
The operation to establish a land bridge from Rostov to Crimea is likely the most attractive to Putin in this respect. It solves a real problem for him by giving him control of the Dnepr-Crimea canal ,which he badly needs to get fresh water to occupied Crimea. It would do fearful damage to the Ukrainian economy by disrupting key transportation routes from eastern Ukraine to the west. He could halt operations upon obtaining an important gain, such as seizing the canal and the area around it or after taking the strategic city of Mariupol just beyond the boundary of occupied Donbas. — FORECAST SERIES: Putin’s Likely Course of Action in Ukraine, Understanding War
Russia does not adhere to American counter-insurgency doctrine, to be sure, but the counter-insurgency ratio identified in that doctrine was derived from the study of many insurgencies, not just those in which America was engaged. That ratio—of one counter-insurgent per 20 inhabitants—would suggest a counter-insurgency force requirement on the order of 325,000 personnel just for those cities. — FORECAST SERIES: Putin’s Likely Course of Action in Ukraine, Understanding War
Putin certainly could find ways to govern a conquered Ukraine, and he might well decide to pay the prices and take the risks considered above in return for completing this vital part of his legacy. But such decisions would be fundamental deviations from the patterns of thought, behavior, and action he has pursued for two decades. — FORECAST SERIES: Putin’s Likely Course of Action in Ukraine, Understanding War
They would be, in many respects, irrational, driven by an ideological need and psychic urge to take real risks and pay real prices for abstract benefits. People change, of course, especially toward the ends of their lives. But we should look for solid evidence that Putin’s thought process and calculations really have changed so fundamentally that he would either overlook these problems or accept these costs before accepting at face value the invasion plan he is ostensibly pursuing. — FORECAST SERIES: Putin’s Likely Course of Action in Ukraine, Understanding War
We continue to assess for all these reasons that Putin does not, in fact, intend to invade unoccupied Ukraine this winter despite the continued build-up of Russian forces in preparation to do so. — FORECAST SERIES: Putin’s Likely Course of Action in Ukraine, Understanding War
A full-scale Russian invasion would consist of numerous discrete operations, almost every one of which could also be conducted independently of the others to achieve more limited objectives at lesser cost and risk. The most salient of those operations include, in order from most- to least-likely:
• Deploying Russian airborne and/or mechanized units to one or more locations in Belarus that would support a planned attack on Ukraine as well as pose other threats to NATO member states;
• Deploying Russian mechanized, tank, artillery, and support units overtly into occupied Donbas;
• Breaking out from occupied Donbas to establish a land bridge connecting Russian-occupiedCrimea with Russian territory near Rostov along the northern Sea of Azov littoral, as well as seizing the Kherson region north of Crimea and securing the Dnepr-Crimea canal;
• Conducting airborne and amphibious operations to seize Odesa and the western Ukrainian Black Sea coast; and
• Launching a mechanized drive to seize the strategic city of Kharkiv in northeastern Ukraine. — FORECAST SERIES: Putin’s Likely Course of Action in Ukraine, Understanding War
That's a strawman. I asked you specifically how the US escalated in Ukraine. You never were able to answer those questions. — Echarmion
Of course, you're just not going to do this very easy demonstration. Because you're lying. — Echarmion
For the 2019 fiscal year, lawmakers allocated $250 million in security aid to Ukraine, including money for weapons, training, equipment and intelligence support. Specifically, Congress set aside $50 million for weaponry. — Trump holds up Ukraine military aid meant to confront Russia, Politico
Russia invaded. — Echarmion
The two biggest airforces on the planet, plus the European air forces? — Echarmion
You've got this backwards though. It is precisely because the US and the west are less committed to the conflict that no rational Russian government would ever use nuclear weapons in this conflict. — Echarmion
You keep saying that the west is content to see Ukraine lose. And although you keep stretching the evidence far beyond what it actually supports, there is an element of truth in this. The west faces no existential risk over the outcome of the Ukraine war and so its determination to support Ukraine remains limited. — Echarmion
If Russia were to use a nuclear weapon, especially if they were to use it directly against NATO, it would create an existential risk. At that point the West would be forced to strain every sinew to eliminate the government responsible for the attack.
It is a very, very bad idea. — Echarmion
But you run into the classic problem: both sides understand the logic of the situation. Both sides know that whoever stops the cycle of escalation loses. And whoever escalates into a general nuclear exchange also loses. The only winning move is not to play. — Echarmion
The point though is that Russia is already achieving that effect with just threats. No-one is even considering a large scale strike at russian critical infrastructure using western weapons. It is the strange logic of deterrence that using a weapon is less effective than threatening it's use. — Echarmion
No, Ukraine wants permission to attack specific military targets (airbases, air defences, supply dumps). — Echarmion
Russia must feel war consequences, says Zelensky amid Ukrainian attack — Russia must feel war consequences, says Zelensky amid Ukrainian attack, BBC
The Ukrainian leader previously called this the "one decision" that could prevent the Russian army from advancing further into Ukraine, adding, "If our partners lifted all restrictions on long-range capabilities, Ukraine would not need to physically enter the Kursk region to protect Ukrainian citizens in the border area and destroy Russia's potential for aggression." — US Maintains Stance on Strikes Inside Russia Despite Ukrainian Pleas
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