Why will we not say that the dog is hoping to meet Ueno? — Ludwig V

Do you mean a decade after Ueno died? I'd bet your description of the dog's behavior is accurate when Ueno was alive. If the dog continued to act the same way a decade later, I would have a difficult time labeling its thinking as rational. It might be rational for the dog to keep it up for a while after Ueno stopped getting off the train. At least days. I'd think there's still hope weeks later. But how many months of no positive reinforcement at all need to go by before rational thinking tells the dog to pack it in? The number of times Ueno did not get off the train outnumbers the number of times he did in a year. After no-Ueno outnumbers Ueno by two, three, four, five times, how rationally is the dog thinking?

The child named the balloon.
— creativesoul
Exactly. It was the balloon that he named - our description, our concept, not his. — Ludwig V

He did not name your description. He named the balloon. The balloon consists of rubber. It was flying away. Your descriptions... your concepts... they do not fly away, nor do they consist of rubber.

Sigh.

Draughts indeed. Ludwig...

...I've enjoyed our discussions over the past couple years. I would suggest toning down the passive aggressive personal pokes and jabs. I'm very slow to anger... as they say. You will be biting off more than your position can even get in its mouth, let alone chew.

Does the dog believe the train arrives at 5 o'clock?
— creativesoul
Does the dog believe that no train arrives at 5 o'clock?

"5 o'clock" is an abstract entity. Abstract things are not directly perceptible. All things meaningful to the dog are directly perceptible. Abstract things are utterly meaningless to dogs. 5 o'clock is utterly meaningless to the dog.

The dog cannot feel guilty. It did not eat the tuna. It may be fearful. Especially if it has been falsely accused in past or punished for something that it does not understand for a lack of recognizing the causal relationship. — creativesoul

That's very plausible.

it may have a simplistic sense of what it's allowed to do and what it's not allowed to do(acceptable/unacceptable behavior). — creativesoul

But if the dog understands what it is allowed to do and what it is not allowed to do, how is that not a simplistic moral sense?
I'll tell you what - in my view, cats have absolutely no moral sense at all. There are certain behaviours, which I have observed in dogs, which I have never observed in cats, that lead me to differentiate.

The glaring falsehood though, is the very last claim. As if a dog is capable of thinking about your beliefs about him. — creativesoul

That's just dogmatic.

It acquires this groundwork for rule following by drawing correlations between its own actions and the praise/condemnation that follows. — creativesoul

As do we all.

You claimed in past, on more than one occasion, that beliefs are reasons for action. Now, I think that may be better put as "belief" is a term you use to explain behavior/action. — creativesoul

Well, suppose I said that belief is a term we use to explain behaviour/action by giving reasons.
One difference is that reasons justify what they are reasons for, while causes do not.
Another difference is that reasons play a part in teleological explanations, while causes do not.

Are you claiming that beliefs are not real or that beliefs do not effect/affect/influence? — creativesoul

Of course not. If I were to say that "infinity" or "49" or "love" is not an object, would you think I was saying that infinity or 49 or love are not real and do not effect/affect/influence?

...I've enjoyed our discussions over the past couple years. I would suggest toning down the passive aggressive personal pokes and jabs. I'm very slow to anger... as they say. You will be biting off more than your position can even get in its mouth, let alone chew. — creativesoul

Oh, dear. I'm sorry. We are getting a bit heated. I'll sign off and go away and cool down.

After no-Ueno outnumbers Ueno by two, three, four, five times, how rationally is the dog thinking? — Patterner

I agree. People admired the dog's loyalty, but I'm not sure that loyalty is entirely rational. There has to be some doubt about what motivated him.

Why will we not say that the dog is hoping to meet Ueno? — Ludwig V

Because the dog is not expecting Ueno to arrive while knowing he may not. Expectation is shown. Hope is articulated in the face of knowing that what one expects to happen may very well in fact... not.

Oh, dear. I'm sorry. We are getting a bit heated. I'll sign off and go away and cool down. — Ludwig V

Oh no. I'm not heated. Thank you for the considerate apology. No need though. I just don't enjoy personal slights, and you've begun them. I'm just warning you that I'm quite capable of cutting deeply with words. I avoid doing as much as possible nowadays. However, I will not take too many jabs before parrying and countering with an overhand left.

:wink:

I'm good. Just trying to end any possible increase in personal rhetorical slights.

This is about the words/positions/linguistic frameworks... not the authors.

Words don't play games.

I'll do better to depersonalize my replies.

Right. The dog's behavior all those years after Ueno died is obviously not the result of rational thinking. Why not? If it has the ability to think rationally, why isn't it doing so for a stretch of many years?

The dog's behavior all those years after Ueno died is obviously not the result of rational thinking. Why not? If it has the ability to think rationally, why isn't it doing so for a stretch of many years? — Patterner

Well.

The dog's behavior could be the result of rational thinking that belongs to a creature incapable of adjusting its belief based upon facts, or the motivations are no longer include the human's arrival... as you've been saying. Started going for all sorts of 'reasons', including the human's arrival, and continued going for all sorts of the same reasons aside from the human's arrival, in addition to new ones, also not the arrival of the human.

it may have a simplistic sense of what it's allowed to do and what it's not allowed to do(acceptable/unacceptable behavior).
— creativesoul
But if the dog understands what it is allowed to do and what it is not allowed to do, how is that not a simplistic moral sense? — Ludwig V

It is.

Yes. If it was originally showing up for a rational reason, and it was showing up for the same reason years later, the reason was no longer rational. The dog's thinking was not rational. If that's the case, then I would suggest it wasn't thinking rationally in the first place. There was a different reason it was showing up.

If the reasons changed, and the dog was showing up years later for different reasons, then it may have been thinking rationally at all points.

The glaring falsehood though, is the very last claim. As if a dog is capable of thinking about your beliefs about him.
— creativesoul
That's just dogmatic. — Ludwig V

No... it's not.

I've painstakingly explained, on more than one occasion throughout this thread, how thinking about belief is a metacognitive endeavor which requires language/proxy use; naming and descriptive practices. The dog has none. Since metacognition is existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices, and the dog has none, then the dog is incapable of metacognition. Hence, not dogmatic.

Yes. If it was originally showing up for a rational reason, and it was showing up for the same reason years later, the reason was no longer rational. The dog's thinking was not rational. If that's the case, then I would suggest it wasn't thinking rationally in the first place. There was a different reason it was showing up.

If the reasons changed, and the dog was showing up years later for different reasons, then it may have been thinking rationally at all points. — Patterner

Can I take this as evidence that your criterion for what counts as "rational" includes something like based upon fact/events/what's happened and/or is happening?

Well-grounded? Warranted?

Another difference is that reasons play a part in teleological explanations, while causes do not. — Ludwig V

Which would explain why I don't employ "reason" voluntarily.

:wink:

I think you can think rationally despite having wrong information. But, depending on the situation, you might run into problems. If you do, then rational thinking will force you to reevaluate. People were told heavier bodies fall faster than lighter bodies. Someone could rationally come up with a plan to do something or other, maybe make some invention, based on that "fact." But then they try to test the invention, and it fails. Rational thinking would lead them to examine the whole thing, and the actual fact about falling bodies would be discovered. Rational thinking would see them embracing the newly discovered fact.

Are you claiming that beliefs are not real or that beliefs do not effect/affect/influence?
— creativesoul
Of course not. — Ludwig V

That's not making sense. You charged me with reifying belief.

I think you can think rationally despite having wrong information. But, depending on the situation, you might run into problems. If you do, then rational thinking will force you to reevaluate. People were told heavier bodies fall faster than lighter bodies. Someone could rationally come up with a plan to do something or other, maybe make some invention, based on that "fact." But then they try to test the invention, and it fails. Rational thinking would lead them to examine the whole thing, and the actual fact about falling bodies would be discovered. Rational thinking would see them embracing the newly discovered fact. — Patterner

Hmmm. That's a fairly tall order to fill. It seems to require a creature capable of testing/comparing the world to it's own beliefs about the world, and excludes all creatures incapable of metacognition.

Let's say that we're reporting upon our neighbor's belief to our significant other. Let us also say that we're aiming at accuracy. We want our report to match their belief. Assuming sincerity and typical neurological function of the neighbor, the actual words that the believer would use to describe their own belief are not only relevant. They are the benchmark. They are the standard. — creativesoul

If they were the benchmark (the standard), first person reports of beliefs would be irrefutable and irreplaceable. But they are neither, though they are relevant and important. — Ludwig V

:yikes:

A sincere typical neurologically functioning person who tells you what they believe cannot be wrong about what they believe. Their words are the standard. Now, when talking about an insincere candidate, it's another matter altogether. Luckily, there is no such thing as an insincere language less creature. I do not see the relevance/benefit of invoking first, second, and third-person accounting practices

A creature that can't test things might still be able to notice things. Like a dog can notice X happens every single day at a certain time, and base its actions on that fact. But if it doesn't notice that X no longer happens every day at thatvcertain time, and has not happened once in several times as long as it originally happened, then I don't see evidence of rational thinking.

A creature that can't test things might still be able to notice things. Like a dog can notice X happens every single day at a certain time, and base its actions on that fact. But if it doesn't notice that X no longer happens every day at thatvcertain time, and has not happened once in several times as long as it originally happened, then I don't see evidence of rational thinking. — Patterner

At that time then, right?

I'm neither agreeing nor disagreeing. Rather, I'm just trying to understand the sense of "rational" you're practicing.

Rationality can't fly in the face of facts. You might have inaccurate information at some point, and think rationally based on that. But once you have accurate information...

One must be able to differentiate between inaccurate and accurate information then? Basically, rationality boils down to that capability?

I don't know what else it could mean. Walking off a cliff because you don't think gravity will affect you isn't rational. Going to a train station at a certain time every day for ten years, expecting to see a certain man get off the train, even though that man has not gotten off the train once in the 3,650 days you were there in the last ten years, is not rational.

What if we did not have a system for numbering things and a system for telling time? What if our experience of life were the same as other animals without our thinking systems? How would that affect our sense of reality and our sense of importance in the scheme of things? — Athena

Our experience is the same on a basic level. All experience consists of correlations drawn between different things. All thought follows that same process/system. The exact things matter, as does the ability/inability to perceive them prior to/while drawing correlations.

Removing naming and descriptive practices would remove metacognition. Removing metacognition belief content to directly perceptible things. We would lose all aspects of our sense of Self that emerge via language use. There would be no sense of importance. There would be no schemes.

I don't know what else it could mean. Walking off a cliff because you don't think gravity will affect you isn't rational. Going to a train station at a certain time every day for ten years, expecting to see a certain man get off the train, even though that man has not gotten off the train once in the 3,650 days you were there in the last ten years, is not rational. — Patterner

I'm not sure that I disagree.

:up:

I don't know what else it could mean. Walking off a cliff because you don't think gravity will affect you isn't rational. — Patterner

What if you don't know about gravity and have no idea of the life threatening situation?

Can you think of a scenario with a rational thinker who doesn't know about gravity?

I'm good. Just trying to end any possible increase in personal rhetorical slights. — creativesoul

Fair enough. Point taken.

This is about the words/positions/linguistic frameworks... not the authors. — creativesoul

Absolutely

Words don't play games. — creativesoul

Not sure what you are getting at here. If you think I'm just playing games here, better tell me.

I'll do better to depersonalize my replies. — creativesoul

So will I.

But I'm afraid I can't reply to you just now. It's late and I need to be up early. I'll be back tomorrow.

You didn't quite say that. — Ludwig V

I was trying to give you a simple example of even a simplest most basic daily life knowledge has a ground to be rational when examined.

On the other hand, you could be talking about the case when I attribute knowledge to someone else. That is indeed a bit different. But there are still simple cases and more complex ones. In a simple case, I know the person quite well and know that they are in a position to know and are reliable, and then I will say just that. — Ludwig V

I am still not sure what your exact point is. You cannot attribute being rational to someone or something just because you know what type of the person is, or what the thing does. Being rational means that belief, knowledge, perception or action, or proposition can demonstrate in objective manner the ground for being rational when examined or reflected back.