I don't think there's a 'proper' way to 'do philosophy'. But I think there are 'proper boundaries' to kinds of philosophy. Analytic could be a type, but so too could 'logical inference' so I'm being purposefully vague here because of facts like my (almost wholesale) rejection of Continental Philosophy as helpful, coherent or relevant. Yet, i see things as egregious within something like philosophy of colour, so meh.. Can't bring myself to think anyone is doing philosophy 'properly' but I can bring myself to think some do it 'improperly'.

So, would you consider the proper way of doing philosophy mostly conceived as with the analytic school, as philosophy proper or are we still struggling with how philosophy should be done? — Shawn

While I might agree that there can be wrong ways to do things, I can't see how philosophy can have a 'correct' way. It sounds too prescriptive and unimaginative. Zealots generally think it's their way or the highway.

Can't bring myself to think anyone is doing philosophy 'properly' but I can bring myself to think some do it 'improperly — AmadeusD

Indeed. :up:

So, would you consider the proper way of doing philosophy mostly conceived as with the analytic school, as philosophy proper or are we still struggling with how philosophy should be done? — Shawn

Years ago a sharp cultural divide distinguished approaches to philosophy in the English speaking world from those in Europe , dubbed the Analytic-Continental split. Philosophy isnt nearly so polarized these days. There are lots of thinkers who cross over between the two styles of philosophizing.

:up: :up:

As a meta/discursive practice, imo, philosophy is a 'toolkit' consisting of (e.g.) rhetorical, logical, conceptual & methodological 'tools' (techniques) and schools (paradigms / fashions ... (e.g.) analytic, dialectical-critical, hermeneutical, synthetic)) of 'tool-usage', etc.

It's muddled to think of analytic philosophy as a way of "doing" philosophy.

It's more a set of tools.

And there is a reason it is ubiquitous. They are useful tools.

(Just noticed beat me to it.)

Using Logic is pretty useful. Other than that ... I dunno?

Analytic philosophy is a toolkit and not a school of philosophy? Then why do analytic philosophers tend to focus on the same basic set of problems? Or else, why do we call people "analytic philosophers" at all? Is that a misnomer?

I don't think the practice of philosophy nowadays is some sort of handmaiden or blacksmith for the sciences and fields it has created, as philosophy has its own purpose. Although it is often regarded by postmodernists and pragmatists that philosophy could be seen as a 'tool'.

I still find the refuge of thinking philosophically as a form of therapy, still.

It would be interesting to ask the analytic school, as to what remainder of pure philosophy, as what can be called "ethics", has to offer.

The analytic school of philosophy is the dominant way of doing philosophy, nowadays. — Shawn

Analytic method is all too prone to mistake oversimplification for clarification, banality for exactitude, and imaginative narrowness for intellectual rigor; moreover, its typical modus operandi is as often as not an unhappy combination of speculative timidity and methodological overconfidence. I do not know whether all of this is just an accident of philosophical history, and therefore corrigible within analytic tradition itself; I know only that Anglophone philosophy has produced at once the most copious and most frequently fruitless literature on the so-called mind-body problem. — Hart, David Bentley. All Things Are Full of Gods: The Mysteries of Mind and Life (pp. 18-19). Yale University Press. Kindle Edition.

Contrast with:

Pierre Hadot, classical philosopher and historian of philosophy, is best known for his conception of ancient philosophy as a bios or way of life (manière de vivre). ... According to Hadot, twentieth- and twenty-first-century academic philosophy has largely lost sight of its ancient origin in a set of spiritual practices that range from forms of dialogue, via species of meditative reflection, to theoretical contemplation. These philosophical practices, as well as the philosophical discourses the different ancient schools developed in conjunction with them, aimed primarily to form, rather than only to inform, the philosophical student. The goal of the ancient philosophies, Hadot argued, was to cultivate a specific, constant attitude toward existence, by way of the rational comprehension of the nature of humanity and its place in the cosmos. This cultivation required, specifically, that students learn to combat their passions and the illusory evaluative beliefs instilled by their passions, habits, and upbringing. — Pierre Hadot, IEP

I know only that Anglophone philosophy has produced at once the most copious and most frequently fruitless literature on the so-called mind-body problem. — Hart, David Bentley. All Things Are Full of Gods: The Mysteries of Mind and Life (pp. 18-19). Yale University Press. Kindle Edition.

I take it as analytic philosophers recognizing that the mind-body problem is not one which philosophy should grapple with anymore, and is best left to the scientist to elucidate such matters in terms of what can be said intelligibly.

Regarding Hadot, I don't think you can disagree with him; but, how is one to practice philosophy in such a manner? We are a longs way from the days of ancient philosophy.

Analytic philosophy is a toolkit and not a school of philosophy? — Leontiskos

It's both, and nothing I've writtrn here is inconsistant with that.

I take it as analytic philosophers recognizing that the mind-body problem is not one which philosophy should grapple with anymore, and is best left to the scientist to elucidate such matters in terms of what can be said intelligibly. — Shawn

that is truly, unintentionally, hilarious. As regards Hadot, I agree that it seems challenging, but I'm a subscriber to both Medium and Substack, and they're teeming with threads dedicated to revivifying ancient philosophy in the modern world. Some of them are also really good scholars as well. My interpretation is that something about modern culture is intrinsically antagonistic to what was traditionally understood as philosophy, for various deep and intertwined reasons.

- Fair enough. I now see you were saying something a bit different than Banno.

:up:

- A characteristically punchy quote from Hart, but on point. :up:

The analytic school of philosophy is the dominant way of doing philosophy, nowadays. — Shawn

Is it? It holds a large share of English-speaking philosophy, but it is largely ignored outside that limited area.

As regards Hadot, I agree that it seems challenging, but I'm a subscriber to both Medium and Substack, and they're teeming with threads dedicated to revivifying ancient philosophy in the modern world. — Wayfarer

It seems like psychologists, instead of philosophers, are the go-to for the majority of whatever you want to call it, people. I once heard a priest talk about how awful this is and yada-yada.

There's that one guy, Jordan Peterson who seems like some guru on life matters.

Applying one of the basic analytic tools, it's not at all clear here what "analytic philosophy" might be.

Maybe we can find some facts. The PhilPapers survey asked about method, allowing multiple choices. The highest rating went to "conceptual analysis". It ranked 71% overall, 69% in The USA, and, in Continental Europe, ten percent higher at 79%. Ranked next was 'Empirical Philosophy", then "Formal Philosophy", again ranking higher in Continental Europe than in anglophone countries. Out of 1733 respondents, fully 24 mentioned phenomenology. Make of that what you will.

Take a look at the web page for the ESAP. Alive and thriving, associated with over a dozen national analytic philosophy organisations and as many research centres. Hardly insignificant.

Nor is analytic philosophy equivalent to linguistic philosophy.

SEP has no article on "Analytic Philosophy". The IEP has an historical essay, tracing the developments in anglophone philosophy until the sixties, when analytic philosophy became ubiquitous. "On account of its eclecticism, contemporary analytic philosophy defies summary or general description."

Where does this lead? Nowhere. Like this thread.

Like this thread. — Banno

I'm glad you like this thread.

Nevertheless if one refers to ‘analytic and continental philosophy’ it is a well-understood division even if as noted above, no longer hard and fast.

o, would you consider the proper way of doing philosophy mostly conceived as with the analytic school, as philosophy proper or are we still struggling with how philosophy should be done? — Shawn

I follow the idea that philosophy is "soft science". It requires a starting point that is abstract, lacking rules and logic, creatively critical, like a stream of consciousness around a certain topic, bouncing back and forth between the specific and the holistic.

But then it needs rigor and structure. If the ideas that flow cannot flow down into a more concentrated logic and find a grounded state, then it has to be dismissed.

A problem with the analytical school or similar methods can be that it demands so much initial logic that it limits how the brain finds new paths of ideas. It's one of the reasons behind Einstein's "thought labs". A place to play with ideas before solidifying them with proof, logic and math. Philosophers who get stuck in just the analytical rarely find new paths forward in their thinking.

The problem with other methods are that they seem to feature an inherit contempt for the analytical and thus they abandon all logic and apply a kind of "anything goes", inviting all sorts of biases and fallacies.

Most debates seem to just be about the methods rather than the subject being discussed. One interlocutor criticizing the other's way of conducting philosophy based on the above problems, and no common ground is found.

I think the "method" needs to be formed around how our brains actually work. We do not come up with anything analytical from the get go. We form abstractions and wild, illogical concepts through creativity and only when we've reached a point of confusion do we apply rigorous analytical logic to test our ideas.

It's only when we let go of our analytical side that we can think freely, but it's only when we apply our analytical side we can establish concepts as closer to truth.

There are no "best schools" of thought. There's only one way our brain works and it's better to follow that and then apply the analytical tools that exist in order to present ideas to the world that has sound logic for all and not just yourself.

Like this thread.
— Banno

I'm glad you like this thread. — Shawn

:lol: :up:

Is there philosophy proper? Of course, just like there is pseudo-philosophy.

Wherever phenomena, or the relation between an effect and its cause, is not obviously explained by available evidence, there is opportunity for pseudo-philosophy to fill in the gaps. It thrives in new-age or business-cults, or in practices such as health care, education, sports, or fine arts.

I don't think the differences between analytic, hermeneutical or continental, or eastern philosophies has much to do with whether the philosophy is proper. I suppose they can all be proper. However, they are all susceptible to pseudo-philosophy (e.g. scientism, obscurantism, mysticism). Humans are susceptible to pseudo-philosophy because it is rational to interpret seemingly coherent explanations charitably until they have been proven to be unwarranted.

An interesting topic. To be sure I'm understanding you, let me pose this question: Are you saying that the question of "philosophy proper" or "a proper way of doing philosophy" can receive an answer that is non-philosophical or outside philosophy? Or would any answer assume, or reveal, a particular conception of what philosophy is?

Are you saying that the question of "philosophy proper" or "a proper way of doing philosophy" can receive an answer that is non-philosophical or outside philosophy? — J

Sure, I see why not.

Or would any answer assume, or reveal, a particular conception of what philosophy is? — J

I'm no authority, so have at it.

SEP has no article on "Analytic Philosophy". The IEP has an historical essay, tracing the developments in anglophone philosophy until the sixties, when analytic philosophy became ubiquitous. "On account of its eclecticism, contemporary analytic philosophy defies summary or general description."

Where does this lead? Nowhere. Like this thread — Banno

I have always thought of Analytic philosophy as a way of interpreting an era of Continental philosophy via a range of stylistic moves. It is not as though Analytics ignored Continental philosophers as a whole. Rather, they concentrated on the era spanned by Leibnitz, Hume and Kant, producing work that elaborated on metaphysical themes consistent with this group, and either ignored or were actively hostile to Hegel and post-Hegelian Continental philosophy. This is why Rorty referred to post-analytic writers like Quine, Sellars, Davidson, Putnam and himself as the new Hegelians.

OK, I'll posit that there is no non-philosophical way of raising the question of what philosophy is, or should be. Both Analytic and Continental philosophers are surely aware of this, but I would say that on the whole the (best) Continentals are slightly more skilled at performing the necessary self-reflection involved. Analytic philosophers can get very hung up on being right about things -- which (see above) reveals a certain conception of what philosophy ought to be doing.

That said, I agree that there are a lot of interesting "bridge" figures between the two schools, and we shouldn't make a huge deal about some supposedly irremediable divide.

I would say that on the whole the (best) Continentals are slightly more skilled at performing the necessary self-reflection involved. — J

Have you read Nagel's essay Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament? He makes a similar comment in that essay. I know you're interested in his writings, you can find a copy here.

There's only one way our brain works — Christoffer

Is that so? Got a manual?

Nice quip.

Sure. It's not so common now, given the aforementioned "eclecticism"– more of historical interest. Many years ago I made an attempt to consolidate the Wiki article on Analytic Philosophy, but gave it away as a bad job. I could not find a framework that gave a neat contemporary account, and now think that none can be given. Rather, the historical approach found in IEP is the only option.

Some folk supose that the turn against linguistic philosophy marked the end of analytic philosophy, but that would be to exclude the likes of Davidson, Kripke, Putnam... all of whom rely on the formal logic and linguistic analysis that grew from Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein and so on. It seems better to think of analytic methods as being more widely applied since the seventies.

A recent article analysed a few thousand papers to see who cited who, expecting to see tow group, roughly analytic and continental. But instead it found three, the third being a group who focus more on empirical method and science. I think these three groups can be seen in the posts hereabouts.

Rather, the historical approach found in IEP is the only option. — Banno

I thought the IEP article was pretty good, actually. One paragraph that jumped out at me was this:

Even in its earlier phases, analytic philosophy was difficult to define in terms of its intrinsic features or fundamental philosophical commitments. Consequently, it has always relied on contrasts with other approaches to philosophy—especially approaches to which it found itself fundamentally opposed—to help clarify its own nature. Initially, it was opposed to British Idealism, and then to “traditional philosophy” at large. Later, it found itself opposed both to classical Phenomenology (for example, Husserl) and its offspring, such as Existentialism (Sartre, Camus, and so forth) and also “Continental”’ or “Postmodern” philosophy (Heidegger, Foucault and Derrida).

In other words, defined by what it is opposed to. The Brits, in particular, had many very clever fellows - oh, and some gals - who's logical skills were forensic. (Didn't Ayer and Austin work for British Intelligence during the war?) So they're forensic experts in slicing and dicing substantive philosophical ideas. Withering blights. That article I once linked to, by Ray Monk, about how Gilbert Ryle took over Oxford philosophy after Collingwood's early death, and the ripple effect from that - 'no ear for tunes'. I found at UniSyd that kind of Oxbridge positivist mentality reigned supreme under D M Armstrong. Which is why I absconded to the Comparative Religion department (a.k.a. the Depatment of Mysticism and Heresy.)

(Acually, Putnam I've begun to warm to a bit. He's one of the names I've become familiar with since joining forums.)

Have you read Nagel's essay Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament? — Wayfarer

Yes, an excellent piece. That's one of the reasons I appreciate Nagel so much -- he refuses to be doctrinaire about the type of philosophy he was trained in.

I thought the IEP article was pretty good, actually. — Wayfarer

Yes, I agree. A bit hard on Ryle. Monk has his own issues.