I am very sympathetic to phenomenology but have a limited understanding of it.

I would say that I am a person. I am conscious and bodily to be sure, but I am not a mind or a body, and I don't have a body. — Kurt Keefner

No body either? Not sure if using 'person' is much help. What counts as a person? What elements does this appellation unify or make coherent? You may as well say you are a being. Personhood can be quite an elaborate and contested area. Is a person in a coma for 10 years still a person? Is a fetus? Etc.

I am interested in why this is important. If you are a whole, conscious physical unit, what does being a person assist you with in the world? What relationship does physical have to body in your view?

A "person" is the true entity that I am. It is the "chunk" that humanity comes in. It's more specific than "being."

Here's my definition of "person": a conceptually, conscious physical unit, living and moving in a directly perceived world with other entities and people.

That might be more of a summary of my theory on the subject, rather than a true definition, but you get the idea. I know it's got a lot of moving parts, and we can discuss them one by one.

A person is a person if they are asleep or if they are in a coma they might wake up from. If they have severe brain damage and can never be conscious again, then they are not a person. I suspect a fetus past a point in its development might count as a person, but I don't pretend to know the answer to that question. In any case, I am not worried about outliers.

What I am concerned with is how people experience emotions, physical activity, sex, eating, etc. All of these things are affected by what you think you are, if you have let it sink in. For example, if you believe you are a soul, created by God and tethered to a physical body, you might believe sex is a sin.

I have been working on these ideas for many years, and I hope to publish an essay on the subject in the near future.

Welcome to the forum.

This means simply that the perceiving mind is an incarnated body, or to put the problem in another way, he enriches the concept of the body to allow it to both think and perceive. It is also for these reasons that we are best served by referring to the individual as not simply a body, but as a body-subject. — Kurt Keefner

Here's how I think about it, based on introspection. As I experience it, my self - my identity, I, me, my soul, my spirit - is my experience of the world. I am my thinking, feeling, remembering, perceiving, imagining, what else? That includes my experience of my body. Does that answer the question? Is that what the text I've quoted above is saying? I'm not sure.

What can you be yourself without?
Lose your possessions, relationships, status, occupation - you're still yourself, though a less effective self.
Lose a leg or an arm, your hearing, sight, health - you're still yourself, though in need of support.
Lose the power of locomotion, continence, memories - you're still yourself, only much reduced.
Lose your consciousness; suffer a traumatic enough injury to your brain - you're nobody.
Self as you identify it at the height of your powers is all those things: body, physical and mental faculties, accomplishments and acclaim.
Self as identified at the beginning and end of life is something very much smaller and more primitive, but still wholly dependent on a functional brain.
Put that brain in a vat of saline solution, hooked up to pumps for blood and oxygen, you'd still be a self, though probably insane in short order.

I think this somewhat misses what dualism is getting at, but that aside, I think its correct that talking about a separate mind (in the physical sense) is not right or helpful. That said, I am not a committed materialist, so I'm at least open to that type of thing.
My issue is that Your body literally does not think. There are dead bodies everywhere. This seems to contradict even the symbolic use of this conflation.

you'd still be a self, though probably insane in short order. — Vera Mont

Hehe :smirk:

I am not a soul, and I am not my brain. I am a whole, conscious, physical unit. — Kurt Keefner

I think the etymology of 'soul' is relevant. Originally in Greek it was 'psuche', roughly equivalent to our 'psyche' but with a broader set of meanings. It really meant something like an animating principle, or 'breath of life', and indeed was translated into Latin as 'anima' (root of 'animal' and 'animation'.)

Over history, of course, these terms changed their meaning, especially because of the religious appropriation of the term via the rubric of the immortal soul, meaning that in today's secular culture the term is considered archaic or problematic. But I take 'soul' to mean precisely 'the whole being'. Not 'person', as such, because 'person' is derived from 'persona' which were the masks worn by actors in Greek drama. It corresponds to 'ego', which is, we can say, the self's idea of itself, and refers to what we are consciously aware of as ourselves, who we ourselves think that we are.

But as depth psychology has pointed out, we also comprise sub- and un-conscious aspects which are often not available to conscious introspection, but which are also vital aspects of the whole being. It is really impossible to delimit exactly the extent of that, as a sage once said, 'The mind is a vast abyss (profunda abyssus est homo), and no man knows its depths.' Added to which there's the 'collective unconscious' which imbues us with a cultural memory and sense of identity, carrying forward memories which have been formed through many generations. Then also there are inborn proclivities, talents, dispositions, and so on, not all of which are beneficial, but which appear strongly ingrained in people. (Whence musical prodigies, for instance? Or those with other uncanny talents?)

So I take 'soul' to mean precisely 'the whole being' in that sense, comprising, but not limited to, the conscious mind. Which I think is conveyed in the popular description of shallow or merciless or mercenary types as being 'soul-less' (even if we don't nowadays believe in the soul.)

I will add, I think the phenomenological attitude is one of avoiding theoretical explanations of these factors, but exploring them through awareness of how they appear in actual life. Not trying to create a kind of theoretical superstructure to account for them.

I am conscious and bodily to be sure, but I am not a mind or a body, and I don't have a body.

While we're at it, I am not a soul, and I am not my brain. I am a whole, conscious, physical unit. — Kurt Keefner

Welcome to the Forum.

I'm not quite clear about how you can be conscious and bodily--all that requires flesh, blood, nerves, digestive juices, et al--and not be or have a body. If you have no body, then are you not a nobody? Not your brain? Well, where exactly are you, then?

Getting away from mind/body dualism is a very good idea. The idea that there is a mind, on the one hand, and a body on the other and maybe a soul on the third hand, strikes me as false, BEAUSE (this is my take) we all are bodies, period, which is in no way a diminution of personhood. Persons have bodies. Everything we are -- eating, breathing, drinking, pissing, shitting, thinking, poetry scribbling, sex seeking metabolic machines is physical body business.

Because we are physical, we experience the joys and sufferings of this world first hand, in the flesh, and that's real.

If one believes we are created by God, then we are creatures of God -- and embodied in animal flesh.

The idea that there is a mind, on the one hand, and a body on the other and maybe a soul on the third hand, strikes me as false — BC

Not to hijack the thread, but I always want to drill into this. What do you think mind is on that account?

I don't "have" a body, because to do so would require that I am separate from my body. I am not the car that I own.

My point of view is difficult to see outside of the context of my whole theory, but I think we have to shift the focus away from minds and bodies to a more comprehensive and substantive entity. That's what I mean when I use the term "person."

You can say things about persons: They're conscious. They have volume and mass. They have physical life functions. They live in a world they perceive directly. Minds and souls aren't entities. They are just grammatical conveniences. The brain is an entity, but it is conceptually, organically, and functionally subordinate to the whole person.

I have provisional answers to the "would I still be me if I had a limb amputated?" question, but I don't have a good formulation, so I'll have to beg off. For now.

Some people think that 'mind' is separate from the body. Apparently, they accept all the brain activities that are connected with managing the body--the brain's primary function--but hold that 'thought'--thinking about being, beauty, truth, baloney, etc--doesn't go on in the brain.

I think "mind" is what the brain and body does, and brain and body are intimately connected in the body-enclosure. The body's sensory organs deliver more or less satisfactory input to the brain, given a properly functioning body. If eyeballs and optic nerves, ear drums and inner ears, skin and sensory nerves, etc. are not in good order, then the information the brain has to work with is decreased. People who have always had poor vision or poor hearing, for instance, are missing information they would otherwise have, and this affects thinking. Of course we can compensate for deficient input. Whatever is going on in the body -- disease, chewing on a chicken leg, smoking dope, or drinking gin and tonics -- affects how the body functions, and that includes how the brain gets along.

The relationship between language and thought perhaps underlies some of the ideas about disembodied mind. An infant and its new brain acquire language from a ubiquitous exterior environment. To the extent that the external language is acquired, thought becomes possible for the new brain. So, in a sense, 'thought' is external.

It seems like separating "mind" and "body" requires some sort of unseen and unseeable world where mysterious thinking occurs. It's too 'otherworldly' for my taste.

Excuse me, I forgot a good book I read some time back about why we are not our brains. It's called Out of Our Heads and it's by philosopher-neuroscientist Alva Noe. He dismantles some of the old brain-body dualist arguments with the aid of science and argument.


https://www.amazon.com/Out-Our-Heads-Lessons-Consciousness-ebook/dp/B003D0B83M/ref=sr_1_2?crid=3HAAU6MSMU0TY&dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.98JGpD7qfhVLapJsjQ5tRn8ap4zHbrWfAT0FasfA4McA5HE7IAOtSNq8XsNIhLl84y855YBn0dlF9SdyK4FY4mQ303CNfENElEANb5D9B1T1iUISNrn2SCmwLEI_KrUE0HfQK5mWqbNga7Zi8V1H8fJhJwXhQgY0jUXqA6fbD9s4tn9o6SIMKAqqkSGlBtf7S29OfIqwm-aTQ4HD4I8CB_1DqyLgrSm9W4kpCqNohAQ.v9_g46ryJOZM_wDQpasgXLHZx6dQZuJfKwbFYCM14lU&dib_tag=se&keywords=alva+noe&qid=1728448967&sprefix=alva+noe%2Caps%2C83&sr=8-2

I don't have a body. — Kurt Keefner

Yes, rather you are a body (i.e. metacognitivrly self-aware, decaying flesh & bone; once an unviable foetus and not yet a rotting corpse) at the very least.

... 'person' is derived from 'persona' which were the masks worn by actors in Greek drama. It corresponds to 'ego', which is, we can say, the self's idea of itself, and refers to what we are consciously aware of as ourselves, who we ourselves think that we are. — Wayfarer

:clap: :fire:

I think "mind" is what the brain and body does ... — BC

:100:

I think you're correct in bringing sense organs into the discussion. Brains don't see and feel. Brains working with eyes and flesh as a living unit see and feel. The whole person sees and feels.

No doubt someone is going to bring up the possibility of an artificial eye. I would say that if it is organically integrated in you, it's as much a part of you as a transplanted organ. But if it is just a machine hooked up to your optic nerves, then it is no more a part of you than the blind man's cane.

You might find the idea of 'embodiment' useful. It means that personhood is realized as flesh, in a body. The way that we are embodied is an aspect of our personhood, such that a gay person's embodiment is slightly different than a straight persons. A blind person is embodied differently than a sighted person. A body-builder is embodied differently than the slim person. It is not a matter of better or worse, it's a matter of individual difference.

Our individual personhood and our embodiment are one and the same. If your leg is blown off by a land mine, your sense of personhood / embodiment will likely change. If you experience epileptic episodes, or bi-polar disease, your sense of of personhood / embodiment will likely change. Good health is likely to affect our sense of personhood and embodiment.

With respect to "Out of Our Heads..." my brain likes being the location of thought. It seems like a demotion to have thought located somewhere else, and it's insistent on maintaining its status.

It seems like separating "mind" and "body" requires some sort of unseen and unseeable world where mysterious thinking occurs. It's too 'otherworldly' for my taste. — BC

Thank you - appreciate the elucidation.

Fair enough. The brute acceptance of a connection between the two, in lieu of anything to substantiate it, does the same for me. It's either spooky action between two things claimed to be physical, or spooky action between one physical and one non, as far as I can tell. I'm not 'comfortable' with either, though, tbf. Hmm..Perhaps there's a Masters in this lol

While we're at it, I am not a soul, and I am not my brain. I am a whole, conscious, physical unit. — Kurt Keefner

But can you be conscious without your body? Isn't body the precondition for being conscious?

I understood what you meant by "I don't have a body," and I agree. It's all one being. Everything develops together. My mind is what it is because of my body. First, in the general sense, because it is a body. The sensory input we receive in the beginning of our lives plays a huge roll in shaping our minds. Both the things we sense and the brute fact that this kind of input is the foundation. Minds that develop in a different medium - scifi ideas like mechanical or silicon-based - would not necessarily be like our minds.

Second, because of my body's specifics. At 6' 3", I literally think different things than my 5' 2" wife. The fact that I'm male and she's female means we think different ways. And a blind or deaf person and I have different thoughts, and go about most aspects of life in different ways.

But I don't know how much we disagree. Despite the absolute necessity of a body for the development and continued existence of a human mind, the body is not our identity. When asked what I think of John Doe, I don't say, "I really like him. He's a great guy. He's 6' tall, has long blond hair, and great reflexes." Or, I don't say, "I don't much like him. He's 6' tall, has long blond hair, and great reflexes." The physical body is essential for the development and continued existence of the mind, but I don't think of myself, or other people, in terms of the physical body. Despite having played a huge roll in shaping the most important aspects of who I am, my body isn't who I am. A 7' man who loves basketball, plays it with great joy, and treats people well does not in any meaningful way resemble his identical twin brother who hates basketball, doesn't play it, or do anything else, with great joy, and treats everyone work contempt.

I think it might be a paradox. My body is, to put it mildly, beyond necessary for making me who I am, and for my continued existence. But it is not who I am in any meaningful way.

So I assume, from your OP (welcome, by the way!) and from the responses of others, that non-human animals are persons too? Or have I missed something that would rule them out?

I'm a physicalist, but an emergentist at that, and I've begun to identify not with my body and brain itself, but from the emergent thing that's implemnted by my body and brain.

Not sure how to describe it clearly though. It's almost like a platonic form that's made real by a physical manifestation - but also the platonic form I am now is not the platonic form I was 5 seconds ago... Idk if that makes sense. Probably not.

What if my leg gets amputated and kept alive in a nutrient bath? Am I now less of a person? Is my leg a separate "I"?

Welcome, and thanks for a thoughtful post. Not much to add or disagree with, but this is a bit clumsy:

I don't "have" a body, because to do so would require that I am separate from my body. I am not the car that I own. — Kurt Keefner

No, to have something doesn't necessarily imply that the something is separate from yourself - hence why we say things like "my body" - or, for that matter, "my mind." Yes, you are a whole person, with a body, and its various parts, and a mind, and its various aspects.

Part of my definition of "person" is that one is conceptually conscious, i.e. rational. Some animals seems to have a primitive form of reason, so I suppose they are a borderline case of persons.

Some Christian writer was responding to the claim that "I have a soul." He said "No, you are a soul. You have a body." That was the sense of "have" I meant. For this writer the body was not an essential part of the self. My comment was on the fly, so it was awkward. Thanks for the feedback.

When I did a unit in Indian philosophy as an undergraduate, the lecturer remarked one day that in the West, when someone dies, it is said 'he gave up the ghost'. In India, it is more common to say 'he gave up the body'.

In any case, I am not worried about outliers. — Kurt Keefner

I understand that the outliers are not the subject of your OP, but I do want to point out that this view of personhood, based as it is on a capacity for conceptual rationality, may result in some unpleasant ethical implications. My query about animals was aiming in that direction. And infants, of course . . . But you may not mean that personhood is a requirement for being included in the ethical community.

I think that when we consider personhood and rationality in general we are going to have to deal with borderline cases, and at least some of these will fall into the ethical community. We'll need more that my definition of a person to settle some of these issues.

Good. All too often, a philosopher's conception of personhood is asked to do too much, especially in the ethical area.

No, to have something doesn't necessarily imply that the something is separate from yourself - hence why we say things like "my body" - or, for that matter, "my mind." Yes, you are a whole person, with a body, and its various parts, and a mind, and its various aspects. — SophistiCat

Also @Kurt Keefner. I'm just riffing with both of you, I don't think I really disagree with either of you, your posts were thought provoking so I wanted to share the thoughts I had.

I think that when we use phrases like "my body", it's mostly indexical, and doesn't ned to have much metaphysical import. A reference mechanism to this body, the one which is typing this post, is what "my body" is, regardless of how I otherwise conceive it.

But the phrase does enable unfortunate predications. You might want to say that you move your body, or that you have control over your body, and that kind of phrasing engenders a distinct term - a you - which somehow nevertheless has something like motor control over your body, even though motor control is some kind of part of your body, and thus not distinct from you, control and autonomy, and your body.

I am conscious and bodily to be sure, but I am not a mind or a body, and I don't have a body. — Kurt Keefner

I think this is very true. There are plenty of ways that every person is which are not just bodily or minded, even though the body and mind are involved. Anything the body does is somehow more than the body, but the body is not just a substantive part of the act - the body is not a "substance" of walking.

The person may also be identified with a role they play, irrespective of their body's nature - a barista, a lawyer, a cook. It is the person which is those things, and not the body.

I think that when we consider personhood and rationality in general we are going to have to deal with borderline cases, and at least some of these will fall into the ethical community. We'll need more that my definition of a person to settle some of these issues. — Kurt Keefner

I noticed that you have a strong interest in the work of Ayn Rand. Do you think that her ideas on selfhood are compatible with those of Merleau-Ponty?

What is a body? Can you specify when a body "ends" and a mind "begins"?

I can't. Either mind is part of body, or body is part of mind. The point is the distinction needs to be made as to what the difference between these two are - IF it can be stated.

So, asking am I my body is problematic.