:)

One attempt to escape genuine normativity is Quine's approach: what appears to be normative is really just convention-following. The counter argument is something like this:

"The attempt to avoid the claims of normativity by treating the normative as a matter of convention is a sham, even in connection with science. The language of this proposal, with words like “better” as well as notions like coherence, and even consistency, is normative through and through. Moreover, the argument uses, explicitly or implicitly, intrinsically normative concepts such as “concept” itself. The notion of error, obviously, is intrinsically normative. At the end of every argument we wind up with justifications, which are the essence of the normative. None of this can plausibly be naturalized, as Quine thought epistemology might be naturalized into neurophysiology. There is thus no escaping normativity by this route – even the minimal level of self-reflection forces us to acknowledge the indispensability of normativity for talking and reasoning about the world." -Explaining the Normative, pg. 62, Stephen P Turner

The idea (as I understand it) is that if convention-following explained normativity, then we should be able to escape normative language. We can't escape it, therefore: we must accept genuine normativity (whether we have an explanation for it or not).

Do you agree with that?

As is always the case in such philosophical quandaries, it is fruitless trying to achieve the grounding of an external perspective. The only epistemic route is internalism. That is, we are free to form our axioms, hypotheses, or other statements of certainty. Then we see how they fare in practice. We observe and measure to reduce our uncertainty about those grounding principles.

So normativity is fine as expressing what some community of thinkers has come to agree over time. The norm works to the degree that the community can measure or care. They find it possible to doubt in principle but not doubt in their hearts.

Truth is a measurable or quantified lack of uncertainty about some claim made in a spirit of complete certainty. You can't escape knowledge internality. But you sure as heck can get rigorous about the internal structure of belief systems.

I don't know.

I can say this: I see normativity all over the place. I think logic is normative. I recently claimed elsewhere that there is a normative dimension to truth, namely that you should believe what is true and should not believe what is false. I think everything to do with rationality is normative.

But I'm nowhere near deciding whether this can be explained or explained away or anything like that.

As I argued in the other thread, what I think is essential to normativity is authority. There is no normativity without authority, or at least the perception of authority. What makes an authority a real authority (if there even is such a thing), and not just a perceived authority, is another question. And this is what differentiates a true argument from authority from a fallacious one.

A thread on normativity would potentially be pretty interesting. Is it like truth: can't do without it, but can't discover any conceptual scaffolding under it?
— Mongrel

Perhaps some form of game theory (or some other grammar) underwrites the "conceptual scaffolding".

I would have thought authority would have derived its legitimacy from morality, not vice versa.

...we should be able to escape normative language... — Mongrel

Irony underlined.

what I think is essential to normativity is authority. — Metaphysician Undercover

The Pope would endorse that.

The idea (as I understand it) is that if convention-following explained normativity, then we should be able to escape normative language......
Do you agree with that? — Mongrel

It seems to me that convention-following does explain normativity, but that nevertheless we cannot escape it, because language can only be understood if conventions are followed.

There is no normativity without authority, or at least the perception of authority. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's true for stoplights but what about math? Should we agree that 2+2=4 because we're commanded to?

Irony underlined. — Wayfarer

I think the advocate of genuine normativity would deny irony. His point is that normative language is ubiquitous.

It seems to me that convention-following does explain normativity, but that nevertheless we cannot escape it, because language can only be understood if conventions are followed. — andrewk

I agree the convention theory is a tidy package. I don't think it's explaining genuine normativity. It's denying it.

Maybe it's in the realm of morality that convention becomes unsatisfactory. Tradition is not infallible.

(Y)

I would have thought authority would have derived its legitimacy from morality, not vice versa. — darthbarracuda

No, I don't think that's the case. In order that one acts in a way which is consistent with social customs and conventions, morally, one must learn to act in this way. To learn something, there must be a demonstration of it, and the learner must respect the demonstrator as an authority. Generally, the parents are observed as authorities when the child is learning. If the parent is not respected as an authority, the child will not learn what the parent teaches. Therefore no morality without authority. You can argue that the capacity to be moral is prior to authority, but this is not the same as morality, which is being moral.

Should we agree that 2+2=4 because we're commanded to? — Mongrel

Yes exactly, that's what we actually do, don't you think? The teacher is seen as the authority on this subject, mathematics, so we follow the teacher's lead. The teacher says there is an order, 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10, that (order) makes sense to us, so we learn to count. After learning the expression of order, counting, then "2+2=4" makes sense, so we agree. Fundamentally, within our intuitions and instincts, order makes sense. So we are inclined to see the one who gives order, or expresses order as an authority. Authority is a display of understanding order, so the one who demonstrates an understanding of order is naturally received as an authority

Teachers are often wrong.

Right, but the fact that they are wrong doesn't mean that they are not authorities. That's why the appeal to authority may be a considered a fallacy.

What about Euthyphro, do the gods love what is just because it is just or is it just because the gods love it?

If morality derived its legitimacy from authority, then there would be no reason to be moral if there was no authority to enforce morality. But that's wrong. Morality tells us to act in a certain way even if there's nobody there to make sure we do.

For certainly if morality required authority to be legitimate, then it really doesn't exist. It's just authority, or rather, sheer power.

What about Euthyphro, do the gods love what is just because it is just or is it just because the gods love it? — darthbarracuda

I don't see your point. Say "the gods" are the authorities. There would be no such question as the one you are asking, without assuming the existence of the authorities in the first place. So the question of Euthyphro already assumes the existence of authorities, and there would be no such question without the assumed existence of authorities. The question involves how morality relates to the assumed authorities, not whether authorities are necessary for morality, authorities are already assumed.

If morality derived its legitimacy from authority, then there would be no reason to be moral if there was no authority to enforce morality. But that's wrong. Morality tells us to act in a certain way even if there's nobody there to make sure we do. — darthbarracuda

I don't see why you say "that's wrong". If there were no authorities to teach people what's moral and immoral, then the decision would be made by each individual without any learned principles. Each person's morality would be what one wants as "moral".

Furthermore, you misrepresent authority, by claiming that authority enforces morality. Authorities teach morality, they cannot enforce it because morality must be chosen by one's own free will. It must be learned, and one chooses to accept what is taught. Morality derives its legitimacy through education, not through enforcement. The educated person acts morally of one's own free will, according to one's own knowledge. The authorities educate the individuals concerning morality, they do not "enforce" morality, as enforcement is in itself contrary to morality. Once the person is educated the individual no longer has the need for authorities, but may proceed to act as an authority.

I don't think it's explaining genuine normativity — Mongrel

What do you have in mind with the term 'genuine normativity'? Is it the phenomenon of somebody making normative claims - that X is true, or that people should do Y - and believes those claims to be true in some absolute, objective, mind-independent sense?

If so, my attempt to explain that would be to observe that many people either do not agree that normative claims are a matter of convention, or they have never even thought about it, and so hold an unexamined belief that such claims relate to some sort of mind-inependent truth.

Do you think norms are part of the game or do you think they define the game?

it the phenomenon of somebody making normative claims - that X is true, or that people should do Y — andrewk

The latter.

I think norms define the game.

But do you think math is a game?

Sure

The idea (as I understand it) is that if convention-following explained normativity, then we should be able to escape normative language. We can't escape it, therefore: we must accept genuine normativity (whether we have an explanation for it or not). — Mongrel

I am very interested in norms. But I haven't understood the basic notion. In what way is 'convention' different from 'normativity', and therefore potentially an 'explanation' of it, rather than just a redescription?

Perhaps the difference between the speed limit as convention, and driving 10 miles over the speed limit as normative.

Normativity has to do with judgment: good and bad (or good and evil.)

Convention is just the way things have been and are being done.

If you act per convention because you think you ought to, there is normativity to your convention adherence. If your general outlook is that people should look to convention to discover goodness, righteousness, and error free living, you would be squashing the two concepts together to the point that you'd probably have difficulty pulling them apart. The name for people like that is conservative.

That is not what Quine had in mind. It might help to consider that he was playing with meaning nihilism.

Thanks.

In what way is 'convention' different from 'normativity', and therefore potentially an 'explanation' of it, rather than just a redescription? — mcdoodle

Those who subscribe to 'natural law' ethics believe that norms aren't simply a matter of convention but are real independently of convention. Social convention then is supposed to mirror or embody the natural law. I believe Thomism is an example.

f you act per convention because you think you ought to, there is normativity to your convention adherence. If your general outlook is that people should look to convention to discover goodness, righteousness, and error free living, you would be squashing the two concepts together to the point that you'd probably have difficulty pulling them apart.

Norms and conventions merge at points. The driver may speed because it is the norm, but the same person will stop at on a red light because this convention is self enforcing. The goal with conventions and norms is social equilibrium. establishing what "you think you ought to do" as part of the majority's social pattern, like stopping at a red light.

How norms evolve (or perhaps emerge) is not clear. Some social rules are complied to faster, and work better than others. I think the force of these types of rules is due to their ability to self enforce. It is in the general public interest that everyone stops at a red light, because violators risk accidents, rancor from others, as well as civil punishments.

Kant never tried to prove morality, he accepted that it is integral to society.

Those who subscribe to 'natural law' ethics believe that norms aren't simply a matter of convention but are real independently of convention. Social convention then is supposed to mirror or embody the natural law. I believe Thomism is an example. — Wayfarer

Thanks Wayfarer. I suppose the Quine argument is a secondary or tertiary derivative of this: that norms will eventually be traceable back to a naturalistic explanation. In a sense everything living has norms: this is what we eat, these are my kind of fellow-creatures, this is the kind of place I nest in.

Then we can try to trace norms back to the thread I missed on holiday, started by un: what is a 'social construct' and what is just naturally 'there'? (Of course 'natural' is a construct in itself, this is a hermeneutic circle)

I was just at my old gits' philosophy group today talking about Peter Singer, and talk turned, as it does, to cannibalism. There's an interesting norm: the cannibalism of others was often exaggerated to justify calling them 'savages'. I gather Henry Salt said humans are cannibals who only refuse to eat the noblest meat of all (or something like that).

It's all normative, of course. Things find there genesis in the individual, but become normative through repetition. They become incorporated by the norm, and repeated again and again. The ones not doing this repetition, that are incapable for whatever reason, are abnormal, deviants, and this is not judged as inferior or superior except through the normative, through repetition. The judgment, and continuation of better and worse always happens, and continues from the normative. The fringe, the at risk of perishing at the edges, or near the boundaries, to the extent that it isn't normative, being repeated is always at the greatest risk of annihilation, the most normative, the most repeated is always the safest place for survival.

The only way for the abnormal, the deviant to survive is to be adopted by the normative, and repeated there. So that what is better and worse, and all meaning and convention finds its spiritual but not genetic origin in the normative.