I considered that part irrelevant, insofar as we know nothing of a thing by its effect on our senses, except that is “…an undetermined something….”. To say we know how they affect our senses is already given by sensation, which only informs as to which sense it is, but nothing whatsoever about the thing, except its real existence. — Mww

I don't understand what you're trying to say here.

It is not a contradiction to say that the only thing we know about the magnetic field is how it affects the behaviour of metal (although it may be false).

And it is not a contradiction to say that the only thing we know about distal objects is how they affect our sensory experience (although it may be false).

Agreed, to some extent. By physical, I do not mean material: I mean mind-independent.

Even if we could not even know that it is mind-independently existing; the thing as it is in-itself is not purely logical (in that case): we are talking about some ‘thing’ which exists—we are talking in concreto. — Bob Ross

Agreed. But what exactly are we proving? All we can prove is that there is something mind-independent. That's it. And we can only prove there is something mind independent because we have experiences that contradict what our mind wants to believe about reality. We only know that there have been contradictions and that there may continue to be contradictions. We don't know what's causing it.

Now, once it has that capacity, of course, I agree it still has to learn how to walk; but this is disanalogous. — Bob Ross

My point is that capacity is not knowledge. Knowledge is learned through experience. Can you cite something we could say is knowledge that did not require any experience to gain it? And if you can, how is it knowledge and not a belief?

https://acidmath.com/blogs/news/here-s-how-bees-and-butterflies-see-flowers-no-wonder-they-love-them

As you can see in the above article, how a bee or a butterfly knows a flower is very different from how we do. So what is a flower apart from any observation? Is it actually a flower as we think of it? Is it an evil demon manifestation? Can we even call it a 'flower'? Or is it the part of something more? We just can't know. And that's all the 'thing in itself' is. Its an unknowable outside of the mind existence.

I’m saying, the effect of objects on our senses is necessary, but not sufficient, for knowledge about them.

It is necessary for the human cognitive system, in whatever form it actually is, to do something with that effect, within its intrinsic capacities, sufficient to relate the effect the object imparts, to a cognition of it, such that what was initially given as mere appearance can be known as a certain particular object.

C’mon, Bob

I sincerely am not trying to straw man nor misrepresent your view: I just don’t get it (: .

You distinguish between the Real and the Existent; and that makes no sense to me. Traditionally, as far as I can tell, the term ‘real’ refers to the same thing as ‘existent’. If it is real, then it exists; and if it exists, then it is real. This clearly does not hold in your schema.

I’ve never denied the existence of things-in-themselves, for to do so is to question the very existence of real things, insofar as the mere appearance of any such thing to human sensibility is sufficient causality for its very existence, an absurdity into which no one has rightfully fallen.

How is this not the same thing as saying “I’ve never denied that things-in-themselves are real, for to do so is to <…>”? I don’t get it.

Do you really believe that all objects in reality are possible objects of sense for humans? — Bob Ross

Why would you not?

Two reasons:

1. Sensibility has an a priori structure for sensing; so it follows that any given sensibility may be limited such that it cannot sense a particular object; and
2. We are scientifically aware of many objects which are real (i.e., exist) but cannot be sensed by certain species. E.g., humans cannot hear certain wavelengths that dogs can, dogs and humans cannot sense the atoms that comprise a chair, etc.

I don’t understand why one would limit reality to what we or (more generally) any sensibility can sense. Don’t you agree that we have knowledge of things which we cannot sense? Do you think we can sense electrons?

Hmmmm. Might this be backwards? If, instead, you take existence as the totality of reality, there remains the possibility of existences that are not members of reality, hence not members of that which is susceptible to sensation in humans, i.e., dark energy. Quarks. And whatnot.

I think it would help if you elaborate on your distinction between the Real and the Existent; because I don’t see how quarks, e.g., are not real—just like electrons. Are you saying that anything that we can’t sense, but of which we know exists, isn’t real?!?!? Is an electron not real to you?

Ehhhh…not so sure about that. According to spatial-mathematical relations is a form of knowledge, which flies in the face of what was already given as the case, re: there is no knowledge in regard to representation in space.

Objects are already represented in space by intuition, and are called phenomena. The in order, then, for these first two, is for the possibility of empirical knowledge, or, which is the same thing, experience.

Don’t you think that cognition has to play a role in mathematically mapping and constructing objects to have particular relations to each other within our spatiotemporal (outer) experience? I don’t see how intuition could intuit all that without the faculty of understanding. E.g., to represent this particular cup with these particular dimensions on a table, the brain would have to make judgments on how to do that—no?

And a minor supplement: justified true beliefs…assuming one grants such a thing in the first place….are given as stated, but in relation to a priori principles and conceptions is close to overstepping the purview of understanding, which, as afore-mentioned, is for the behoof and use of experience alone.

What do you take a priori knowledge to be then? If you were to explain it to @Philosophim, what would you say?

Agreed. But what exactly are we proving? All we can prove is that there is something mind-independent. That's it. And we can only prove there is something mind independent because we have experiences that contradict what our mind wants to believe about reality. We only know that there have been contradictions and that there may continue to be contradictions. We don't know what's causing it.

I am not following how we only know through contradictions (between our experiences and reality). I can imagine perfectly fine a person who infers correctly, without contradiction, that their conscious experience is representational; and then proceeds to correctly identify that there must be a thing-in-itself which excites the senses which, in turn, begins the process to construct the conscious experience which they are having.

Where does the contradictions come into play, there?

Can you cite something we could say is knowledge that did not require any experience to gain it?

The most basic example that comes to mind is mathematical knowledge. Your brain necessarily has to already know how to perform math to construct your conscious experience; and this is why mathematical propositions, in geometry, are applicable and accurate for experience: the axioms of geometry reside a priori in our brains, and so does the standard operations of math (like addition, subtraction, etc.). Mathematical knowledge, insofar as it pertains to how our brains cognize, is independent of any possible experience.

Of course, as I noted before, our self-reflective knowledge of math is learned (usually in school).

And if you can, how is it knowledge and not a belief?

Mathematical propositions are valid in virtue of being grounded in how our brains cognize; and they are only valid for human experience. They are true, justified, beliefs about experience—not reality.

Perhaps that’s where the confusion was: the a priori knowledge we have is not knowledge about reality, but about how we cognize it.

So what is a flower apart from any observation

I would say that we merely say that there is some thing which is exciting our senses, and of which we represent as what we normally perceive as a flower.

And that's all the 'thing in itself' is. Its an unknowable outside of the mind existence.

Agreed; but that’s not a purely abstract thing, then. It is a concrete—unknown.

Traditionally, as far as I can tell, the term ‘real’ refers to the same thing as ‘existent’. If it is real, then it exists; and if it exists, then it is real. This clearly does not hold in your schema. — Bob Ross

Does the first law of motion exist? Do numbers exist? Does the law of the excluded middle exist? Point to any of those, and you're indicating a set of symbols - f=ma, 2x2=4, etc. But the symbol is only a representation of a concept. And in what sense do concepts exist? Why, in the mind, you might say. Yet they seem to give a great deal of traction over the world at large, they seem to straddle the relationship of mind and world. I say that that such 'intelligible objects' as they are called (although the term 'object' is a little misleading) are real, but they're not existent qua phenomena. They're real as objects of thought - which is the original (as distinct from Kantian) meaning of noumenal.

Platonic Ideas and Forms are noumena, and phenomena are things displaying themselves to the senses... This dichotomy is the most characteristic feature of Plato's dualism; that noumena and the noumenal world are objects of the highest knowledge, truths, and values is Plato's principal legacy to philosophy ¹.

Which is what Kant picked up on, but then he altered the meaning of it to conform better to his schema.

Nevertheless, the basic point remains: if concepts such as number and logical laws are included, then the scope of 'what is real' far exceeds the scope of 'what exists'. That this idea is no longer intelligible to us, is due to the cultural impact of empiricism, which generally identifies what is real with what is existent, to its detriment. (See also Augustine on Intelligible Objects.)

the scope of 'what is real' far exceeds the scope of 'what exists'. — Wayfarer

I have to say, this is entirely intelligible to me and (linguistically) solves a problem I've had for some time - there are clearly non-physical objects of experience. They are real, but do not exist. Thank you for clearing this up for me so succinctly.

Another one of these threads.

The trouble is that the folk arguing so vehemently against direct realism have not understood where it stands. Those here of a scientific bent are talking about something quite different to those of a philosophical bent.

The SEP article is detailed and broad, and ends with the following:

The question, now, is not so much whether to be a direct realist, but how to be one. — The Problem of Perception

How can it be?

Edit: Added "here". Philosophers who are arguing for direct realism are not always at odds with the science. The comment is directed at those hereabouts insisting that they are. Response to .

I appreciate this, but this misunderstands what the 'objection' is trying to do. Disagree, as you have, for sure.
But It is no help to simply say science takes one view, and philosophy takes another, though this is obviously true. In discussion, trying to make them cohere seems a reasonable thing to try to do. That said, it probably doesn't butter any bread for what you're saying, just seemed worth noting.

As regards the SEP article, that conclusion on follows if you accept the writer's positions. If you refer to 3.3.1 of that page, it seems pretty clear that what's being done is recasting the indirect realist in a way that it can be subsumed under an extended version of 'direct realism'. I don't really have a problem with this. It allows for what (I think, anyway) my position is and I'd claim indirect realism of some form.

That said, if this page is read in conjunction with the Sense Data page several issues presented actually somewhat fall away. For instance, where it treats Robinson's more recent takes on Sense Data, none of the objections go through: The empirical fact that light takes X time to reach us from objects which no longer exist can't be beaten in the way a lot of 'indirect' perceptual takes can be. There's no philosophical fanangaling which can make a star exist at the time the light reaches our eyes without seriously altering the definition 'exist' (or, importantly, that can make colour inhere in the surface of an object. There simply is nothing but intuition to this). The conclusion is quite telling, in contrast to the one you've quoted:

"Finally, although treatment of color as a primitive property that literally inheres in sense data (whether such data are considered to be surface portions, mental objects, or third things) is not widely favored, it is also true that, metaphysically, there is no settled home for phenomenally experienced color. The endeavor to account for the phenomenal characteristics of objects and their properties is ongoing."

This either contradicts, in some indirect way, that conclusion that there's no longer a debate between the two views (because, indeterminate) or it requires that we're talking about both positions within a concept that can include both. And that may be something more akin to a language problem, the way you seem fairly committed to. However, the conclusion above makes it quite clear: there is no theory which accounts for experience from objects without pretending our perceptual systems aren't as tehy are. Hence, the dichotomy between the scientific, and philosophically-inclined versions of hte discussion. Luckily, neither page gives any logical conclusion on the positions. Rather, several and IBE's it's way to something of a consensus. All very well.

I have to say, this is entirely intelligible to me and (linguistically) solves a problem I've had for some time - there are clearly non-physical objects of experience. They are real, but do not exist. Thank you for clearing this up for me so succinctly. — AmadeusD

The single most important thing one can learn from philosophy in my view.

it seems pretty clear that what's being done is recasting the indirect realist in a way that it can be subsumed under an extended version of 'direct realism'. — AmadeusD

Yes, something like this is argued in Semantic Direct Realism that I often quote. There's phenomenological direct realism, or naive realism, that indirect realism opposes (consistent with the scientific evidence), and then there's semantic direct realism which agrees with the indirect realist's rejection of naive realism but calls itself direct realism anyway.

I see something like that here as well, where some accept the existence of mental representations but still call it direct realism even though representationalism is indirect realism.

I think part of the problem is that some here think that "I see a tree" and "I directly see a tree" mean the same thing, when in fact the adverb "directly" modifies the verb "see".

And in what sense do concepts exist?

Depends on your metaphysical views. For me, I would say concepts exist in minds; and those concept reference existent things when those things really exist. I don’t see anything problematic here nor puzzling. My concept of an apple exists in my mind, as I have formulated it, and it references something which does exist (beyond that mere concept) which is called an apple.

Numbers exist a priori.

Your response does help though, as you seem to be using a similar schema to @Mww. Perhaps Mww’s point is that the ‘real’ for him is phenomenal, and existence is noumenal (roughly speaking).

Nevertheless, the basic point remains: if concepts such as number and logical laws are included, then the scope of 'what is real' far exceeds the scope of 'what exists'.

Ehhhh, I don’t buy that. If you take a platonic account (like you did in your quote here), then numbers, e.g., exist in a supersensible realm. For plato, numbers are real and exist; and specifically are real and exist in the sense that they are abstract objects in a supersensible realm. I think trying to separate ‘real’ from ‘existent’ adds unnecessary confusion: I think you could easily convey your point by noting that these abstract objects would not exist in the universe.

If it is real, then it exists; and if it exists, then it is real. This clearly does not hold in your schema. — Bob Ross

Too simplistic. For that which is real its existence is given; a real thing cannot not exist (necessity). For that which exists, whether or not it’s real depends on experience; a thing may exist without ever being a real thing of experience (contingency).

Sensibility has an a priori structure for sensing…. — Bob Ross

No, it doesn’t. Sensibility has an a priori structure for representing; sensing is entirely physiological, real physical things called organs being affected by real physical appearances, called things.

Technically, though, the a priori structure of sensibility itself, as the faculty of empirical representation, resides in reason, insofar as the matter of sensation is transcendental. But with respect to the operation of the empirical side of human cognition, the transcendental aspect has no influence.

We are scientifically aware of many objects which are real… — Bob Ross

Or is that we are scientifically aware of second-hand representations of those objects? We don’t perceive electromotive force, re: voltage, as a real thing, but do perceive its manifestations on devices manufactured to represent it. Even getting a real shock is only our own existent physiology in conflict with a force not apprehended as such.
————-

Are you saying that anything that we can’t sense, but of which we know exists, isn’t real? — Bob Ross

If we can't sense it, can’t indicating an impossibility, how would we know it exists? if follows that if an existence is impossible to sense, it is then contradictory to say that same existence is real. That which is impossible to sense cannot be thought as real. That which is as yet not sensed, indicating a possible existence, holds a possible reality in conjunction with it.

Anything else is merely logical inference given from direct represention of an indirectly perceived, hence contingent, existence.
————

Don’t you agree that we have knowledge of things which we cannot sense? — Bob Ross

No, I do not. We can think things we cannot sense, which is to say we can conceive things we cannot sense, from which the logical inference for the possibility of things we cannot sense, but in its strictest relation, there is no experience, hence no empirical knowledge, of things we cannot sense.

Such knowledge is the conclusion of a system’s function in its entirety, which makes explicit if the system does not function in its entirety, there is no possibility of a conclusion given by it, which is sufficient reason justifying that in the absence of sensed things the system has nothing on which to direct its function, so not only does it not function in its entirety, it doesn’t function at all, with respect to empirical conditions.
————-

What do you take a priori knowledge to be then? — Bob Ross

Well….that’s just the system functioning without regard to empirical conditions. In this case, the entirety of it is not required, which is fortunate on the one hand and awful damn convenient on the other, because in the case of a priori cognitions, there isn’t anything given to sensibility for the remainder of the system to use.

Technically, though, empirical knowledge is the synthesis of conceptions derivable from intuition, whereas a priori knowledge is the synthesis of internally constructed conceptions, without the input from intuition, re: mathematical symbology and geometric figure, logical principles, axioms, imperatives, and the like.

This is relevant, in that with this distinction in method and initial conditions, comes the justification for distinguishing between the real, and the merely valid.
————-

I sincerely am not trying to straw man nor misrepresent your view — Bob Ross

Oh, I know, Bob. It’s just that this stuff is so obviously reasonable to me, yet I cannot get either inkling nor epiphany from you from its exposition. Which means I’m not presenting it well enough, or, you’re of such a mindset and/or worldview it wouldn’t matter what form the exposition takes. Nobody’s at fault, just different ingrained perspectives.

one can trust their experience enough to know that (1) they exist — Bob Ross

Well...

One thing is to state this within an everyday context of tables and chairs and going to work and going to sleep and the whole routine thing. This is the given.

But in the empirical world, there are no certainties, only grades of confidence. They can be quite high (I know what I am experiencing at this moment) to medium (I don't know if that person is pretending to be in pain) to low (am I dreaming?).

You can't prove objects exist. We take it for granted for the sake of convenience, but the proof is not established. It may sound excessively skeptical, but is nonetheless a serious issue.

If not Kant himself, then his predecessors are on the right track, the world is representation (Kant, Schopenhauer), notion (Burthogge), or anticipation (Cudworth).

We can then say we have high confidence that our notions are real things in us. But as to the objects which cause these anticipations, we know very little if anything.

We take it for granted for the sake of convenience, but the proof is not established. — Manuel

Well said.

Otherwise is Hume’s “constant conjunction”. Never once have I put a cup in the cupboard, come back later and NOT found that cup just where I left it. Hence, my claim that I know that stupid cup is right where I left it, even without seeing it, is proven?

Nahhhhh….it’s just easier on my poor ol’ brain to think the vanishing impossibility that it isn’t there, suffices for proof that it is.

Quite. For all we know the cup could have vanished from existence, or turned into a basketball or anything you can imagine. Quite unlikely, but we can't say for certain - at least I can't.

But to claim the cup remaining were I last put it proves it exists, no more proves that because I can see an oasis in the distance on a hot sunny day, they must exist in the world as well.

It is easier on the brain. I personally can't get over the fact that what we take for granted (almost) completely is precisely what we put into the object. It's so counterintuitive, goes against every fiber of my instincts that I can't believe it. Yet it must be true.

I think part of the problem is that some here think that "I see a tree" and "I directly see a tree" mean the same thing, when in fact the adverb "directly" modifies the verb "see". — Michael

Yeah. I think it fairly clear (and this from canvassing hte use of 'direct' in all contexts I'm aware of it's usage in) that using 'direct' to cover a literally indirect method of access (we can invoke the Shadow idea, on top of pretending we're Direct Realists proper to illustrate why this is so) is not helpful. But, if the case is such that this means its a 'misuse for a better cause' as it were, and resolves teh problem by accepting this 'indirectness' but not admitting it separates us from the world... fine.

Philosophers who are arguing for direct realism are not always at odds with the science. The comment is directed at those hereabouts insisting that they are. — Banno

Yes, fair. I think that's what I'm groking from your directions (plus some further digging). It doesn't quite shift my position though, as that wasn't quite the motivator for it in the way it seems to be for Michael (although, I'm quite sympathetic there). I don't need direct realists to be in conflict with the science for my position to hold philosophically, I don't think. But it helps, where I can use it.


:up: It is, at this point, feeling that way

For me, I would say concepts exist in minds; and those concept reference existent things when those things really exist. I don’t see anything problematic here nor puzzling. — Bob Ross

Odd, then, that you’ve created a long OP, and engaged in a multi page discussion, about just this fact, with no resolution apparent. Perhaps you're taking too much for granted!

If you take a platonic account (like you did in your quote here), then numbers, e.g., exist in a supersensible realm. For plato, numbers are real and exist; and specifically are real and exist in the sense that they are abstract objects in a supersensible realm. I think trying to separate ‘real’ from ‘existent’ adds unnecessary confusion: I think you could easily convey your point by noting that these abstract objects would not exist in the universe. — Bob Ross

No confusion. A moderately well-educated person will understand that there is the 'domain of natural numbers' yet this is not an 'supersensible realm' in any sense other than the metaphorical. It is not some ethereal ghostly realm. Numbers and logical principles are not physically existent and yet our reason appeals to them at practically every moment to navigate and understand the world.

No confusion. A moderately well-educated person will understand that there is the 'domain of natural numbers' yet this is not an 'supersensible realm' in any sense other than the metaphorical. It is not some ethereal ghostly realm. Numbers and logical principles are not physically existent and yet our reason appeals to them at practically every moment to navigate and understand the world.

I thought you were taking a Platonic stance: I must have misunderstood. It sounds like, then, you believe that numbers are real a priori? Either way, they exist and are real. That's confused and muddied language to make a distinction between what is real and what exists.

You can't prove objects exist. We take it for granted for the sake of convenience, but the proof is not established. It may sound excessively skeptical, but is nonetheless a serious issue.

Depends on what you consider a proof. If you mean a scientific or otherwise empirical verification through an experiment, then obviously no. But it can be proved by empirical evidence in all probability: I don’t have any problem with your idea that our a posteriori knowledge is probabilistic.

If not Kant himself, then his predecessors are on the right track, the world is representation (Kant, Schopenhauer), notion (Burthogge), or anticipation (Cudworth).

Those are all very, very different positions; but you said it like they are all claiming the same thing.

We can then say we have high confidence that our notions are real things in us. But as to the objects which cause these anticipations, we know very little if anything.

The very idea that objects cause these “anticipations” (or more accurately: representations) is itself subjected to your own critique; which you seem to have overlooked.

For that which is real its existence is given; a real thing cannot not exist (necessity)

Is this “real thing” the object which was given to the senses? I am not following.

Why would it be necessary that a cup exists because we experience a cup? I don’t see the necessity you are talking about here.

Sensibility has an a priori structure for representing; sensing is entirely physiological, real physical things called organs being affected by real physical appearances, called things.

The way we sense is prestructured (e.g., neurons) in a certain way to react to stimuli; and I would consider that a priori insofar as, transcendentally, there must be some prestructured way to react to stimuli (i.e., to sense). Otherwise, you are suggesting that somehow our sensibility can sense without any physiological means of sensing.

Technically, though, the a priori structure of sensibility itself, as the faculty of empirical representation, resides in reason, insofar as the matter of sensation is transcendental.

I don’t see how it would be. Our neurons send the sensations to the brain; not vice-versa.

Or is that we are scientifically aware of second-hand representations of those objects? We don’t perceive electromotive force, re: voltage, as a real thing, but do perceive its manifestations on devices manufactured to represent it. Even getting a real shock is only our own existent physiology in conflict with a force not apprehended as such.

Ahhh, so you are a scientific anti-realist; this makes more sense now. I think we have good reasons to believe, e.g., that electrons exist.

Why not, though, just use ‘real’ and ‘existent’ interchangeably and note, instead, that not all the models and concepts we deploy to explain experience necessarily exist in reality (i.e., are not real)?

Why convolute it with an uncommon distinction between two very obvious synonyms?

If we can't sense it, can’t indicating an impossibility, how would we know it exists?

Through empirical tests with the help of self-reflective reason. That’s how we discovered, e.g., germs (even before we could see them with a microscope).

if follows that if an existence is impossible to sense, it is then contradictory to say that same existence is real

Wouldn’t it be “if it follows that if an existence is impossible to sense, it is then necessarily presupposed that it still exists because we stipulated it as an existence which is impossible to sense”?

Anything else is merely logical inference given from direct represention of an indirectly perceived, hence contingent, existence.

It seems like, for you, all that is real is perception. When the Real is usually what is perceived.

We can think things we cannot sense, which is to say we can conceive things we cannot sense, from which the logical inference for the possibility of things we cannot sense, but in its strictest relation, there is no experience, hence no empirical knowledge, of things we cannot sense.

That’s an equivocation. (1) I wasn’t asking just about empirical knowledge and (2) your using the term ‘empirical’ to only strictly refer to what is sensed—that’s not what it usually means.

I know that my car is in my garage even though no one is sensing it. For you, this is invalid knowledge.

Well….that’s just the system functioning without regard to empirical conditions.

Then, representing objects in space is a priori knowledge; which I thought you were denying because it is intuition.

Oh, I know, Bob. It’s just that this stuff is so obviously reasonable to me, yet I cannot get either inkling nor epiphany from you from its exposition. Which means I’m not presenting it well enough, or, you’re of such a mindset and/or worldview it wouldn’t matter what form the exposition takes. Nobody’s at fault, just different ingrained perspectives.

We are getting there (;

Those are all very, very different positions; but you said it like they are all claiming the same thing. — Bob Ross

Not really. Not in this specific case. They are using different words to signal the same general thing: what we have access to are out mental constructions, not external objects.

The very idea that objects cause these “anticipations” (or more accurately: representations) is itself subjected to your own critique; which you seem to have overlooked. — Bob Ross

This is what is being discussed in effect: when we speak about "ordinary objects", we are actually speaking about representations (notions, anticipations) and is what any example we can use to illustrate any point consists of.

The only "help" I can see this offering, as opposed to thinking that we see are objects themselves, is that conscious experience is what we are most confident exists in the universe.

We complicate things considerably if we say that we are confident that objects (which ground) our representations also exist. It's a postulate, which I think makes sense, but now we have to worry about "proving" representationsin addition to objects which stimulate these representations.

The latter is extremely obscure to analyze with much depth.

It sounds like, then, you believe that numbers are real a priori? Either way, they exist and are real. That's confused and muddied language to make a distinction between what is real and what exists. — Bob Ross

I can understand why you would say that, as it seems a strange distinction to make, but the distinction between what is real and what exists is nevertheless a valid one. But I won't take it further at this point.

Something exists if it is in the domain of discourse. Frodo walked into Mordor, therefore there is something that walked into Mordor.

Something is real in contrast to things that are not real - is it real money, or counterfeit? Is that really water, or a mirage? Is that a real argument, or just a vague rant?

Other uses are parasitic.

The thing-in-itself is a cousin of Antigonish.

The poem folds word over on themselves, talking about that about which we can say nothing.

Quite witty, and an object lesson for those philosophers who write page after page about that of which they cannot speak.

Paul Kneirem had a rather good little essay on the topic on the old forum which I think I saved somewhere. Also God does not exist, although you’ll say you knew that already.

Funny how muddled talk of god becomes.

Best avoided.

Perfectly clear to me, but apparently something others do not see.

Perfectly clear to me — Wayfarer

That god is but doesn't exist? Just shows how very special you are...