OK, thanks. It's an interesting take on Rorty's part but I'm not sure it's held by too many others. It makes for some strange groupings -- Husserl is meant to have more in common with Quine, on this view, than e.g. Heidegger or Sartre, which seems wrong. But in fairness, I don't think Rorty cared too much about the history of philosophy, and its divisions. His division, as you quote, was between philosophers who wanted to maintain a transcendental method for philosophy, and those who believed there was no boundary named "Objectivity" or "Truth" of this sort.

↪Joshs OK, thanks. It's an interesting take on Rorty's part but I'm not sure it's held by too many others. It makes for some strange groupings -- Husserl is meant to have more in common with Quine, on this view, than e.g. Heidegger or Sartre, which seems wrong — J

I agree with you about Husserl and phenomenology. I think Rorty misread them. I see Husserl’s and Sartre’s work as very much indebted to Hegelianism. But Rorty isn’t the only one who treats Hegel as a crucial philosophical and cultural dividing line. First of all, consider this: can you think of any philosophers generally thought of as Analytic who mentioned Hegel positively, or at all, in their work? The same is not true with regard to Kant, Hume and Leibnitz. In the political world, Hegel has been targeted by conservatives such as Andrew Breitbart, who blamed Hegel for Marx, Relativism, Critical theory, poststructuralism, postmodernism and deconstructionism. And he would be right in that such movements would not have been possible without Hegel.

The PhilPapers survey asked about method, allowing multiple choices... Out of 1733 respondents, fully 24 mentioned phenomenology. Make of that what you will. — Banno

Do you happen to know what group was surveyed?

The meta data is available on the site, and can be broken down by nationality.

can you think of any philosophers generally thought of as Analytic who mentioned Hegel positively, or at all, in their work? — Joshs

Arthur C. Danto is the only name that comes to mind. His early works were certainly Analytic but as he became focused more on aesthetics, his interests broadened. He remained committed to what I would call Analytic rigor, in the best sense. He openly acknowledges his debt to Hegel in his theories about "the end of art" in works like The Transfiguration of the Commonplace and The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art.

Politically, re Hegel, I think you (and Rorty) are right.

Cool, thank you.

OK, I spent a little time with the PhilPapers survey. You did notice that those surveyed were, by a huge majority, English-speaking (mostly US) and identified as Analytic philosophers? The lack of interest in phenomenology is hardly surprising, then.

But it's also fair to say that you might not a get a big tagging of "phenomenology" even among contemporary Continental philosophers. It's my impression that phenomenology as such -- as an actual method of inquiry -- has by now been subsumed into larger contexts, both Analytic and Continental. Not to oversimplify ridiculously, but if you're doing work that emphasizes hermeneutics and the exploration of the objective / subjective boundary, then in some important sense you are standing on the shoulders of phenomenology. Possible comparison: You might identify yourself as working within Kantianism or critical philosophy without thinking to call yourself a practitioner of a "transcendental method." The term has both dissolved and broadened, I think, which isn't necessarily a comment on its usefulness or fecundity.

Full disclosure: History of phil is not my specialty, as may be obvious. I've got no stake in being right here, so feel free to correct.

Perhaps it would have better to say something like "In the early 20th century a split in methods and interests occurred within philosophy, and Husserl was a bellwether." — J

Have a look at How the premature death of Collingwood changed philosophy

Sure, all that is so. But 24 out of 1733.

Here's the data, specifying not just the target group, for those specialising in continental philosophy in Europe. Conceptual analysis comes out higher than the general population. And curiously, linguistic philosophy is popular with European continental philosophers.

22 respondents.

All this by way of positing that if we restrict ourselves to thinking in terms of an analytic/continental divide, it might no be the analytic side that is in difficulty.

So is there any alternative data? A similar survey of the supposed vast ranks of continental philosophers?

First of all, consider this: can you think of any philosophers generally thought of as Analytic who mentioned Hegel positively, or at all, in their work? — Joshs

John McDowell and Robert Brandom.

Yes, forgot McDowell.

So is there any alternative data? A similar survey of the supposed vast ranks of continental philosophers? — Banno

Good question. Anyone know?

A similar survey of the supposed vast ranks of continental philosophers? — Banno

This isn't very fair. The distinction between the "two strands" was done for historical and political, rather than content related reasons. It was also made internally to the demographic of the analytic camp. At this point it's little more than cultural posturing for a culture that no longer exists. You find Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, Heidegger, Gadamer, Boudrillard, Lyotard... - all the names you could ever want to namedrop - all over the humanities, in sociology, nursing, pedagogy... anything human.

This isn't very fair. — fdrake

Yep.

First of all, consider this: can you think of any philosophers generally thought of as Analytic who mentioned Hegel positively, or at all, in their work?
— Joshs

John McDowell and Robert Brandom. — Janus

It’s true that the Pittsburgh school is well versed in Hegel, but I would argue that in embracing Hegel, hermeneutics, and other Continental strands of thought based on a grounding in Hegel, they represent a departure from ‘classic’ Analytic thought. Rorty wasn’t the only one among that group who thought that what they were doing was no longer Analytic philosophy. Putnam said:

“Thus we have a paradox: at the very moment when analytic philosophy is recognized as the "dominant movement" in world philosophy, it has come to the end of its own project-the dead end, not the completion.”

I think that the direction take by the Pittsburgh school was reflective of increasing crosstalk between Analytic and Continental types which has led to a blurring of the boundaries between them , to the point where perhaps these labels are no longer very useful. I want to share this from Quora, because I found it to be so thorough , and also because I’m know. around here for extensive quotes and I didn’t want to let anyone down.

My take on the matter is that it starts from Hegel; Analytic Philosophers, due to very biased (and wrong, I think) readings of german idealism by Russell and Moore, jump from Kant to Frege, leaving them unable to share a common language with Continental Philosophers, which carried on the tradition from Kant through the nineteenth century.

I guess then that in Analytic Philosophy, the bridging has been done by those Philosophers who stumbled upon Hegel; I'm referring to the Pittsburgh School of Philosophy, who enlists Wilfrid Sellars (who said that his major work "empiricism and Philosophy of Mind" were in fact hegelian meditations), Richard Rorty (who bridges Epistemology to Hermeneutics in "Philosophy and the mirror of Nature" and in various essays collected in "Consequences of Pragmatism" and "Essays on Heidegger and Others"; he also engaged very deeply with post-modernism, in the guise of Lyotard and Derrida, coming to strikingly close conclusions), John McDowell (Pittsburgh Epistemologist whose "Mind And World" was defined by himself as propedeutic to the reading of Hegel's Phenomenology of The Spirit, and whose work drew fruitful Epistemological and Metaphisical comparisons of Sellars and Gadamer), and finally Robert Brandom, whose theory of Inferentialism defined in his masterpiece "Making It Explicit" is essentially a Semantic Reading of Hegel (Brandom is actually working on a book on Hegel's Phenomenology).


We have then other Analytic Philosophers whose work does not explicitly refers to Continental Philosophers, but can be thought as Analytic Philosophers arrived at "Continental" conclusions. In Epistemology they are of course Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend (especially the latter, he has nothing in common with the teleology of contemporary analytic Philosophers such as Quine or Searle), Bas Van Fraassen (whose epistemology draws from the latter wittgenstein to form a "constructive empiricism" he also calls "hermeneutic") and the Communitarian epistemologist such as David Bloor and Martin Kusch (Kusch actually wrote his PhD dissertation under Jaakko Hintikka on the theme of Language in Husserl, Heidegger and Gadamer, and also devoted a book to Michel Foucault's Epistemolgy. His interests shifted towards a more standard analytic Philosophy in later years, but in his book "Knowledge by Agreement" he writes that his position is so strongly influenced by the likes of Gadamer and Habermas that he sees no opportunity to engage critically with their thoughts in the book). Hilary Putnam then has been a Reader of certain Continental Philosophers, such as Buber, Levinas and Habermas, and its later internal realism share some views with Rorty on the subjects of truth and knowledge. Michael Dummett has produced one of the most important researches in Analytic Philosophy by drawing its birth through a comparison of Frege's Philosophy and Husserl's phenomenology. Some Philosophers of Mind are actually rediscovering the works of phenomenologists such as Maurice Merleau-ponty on the subjects of perception (even though their understanding of these works is at least doubtful). Other lesser known Analytic philosophers have engaged with continental thoughts (Diego Marconi wrote his PhD dissertation under Sellars on Hegel's Logic, Stanley Cavell has written extensively on Heidegger, Jacques Bouveresse has compared philosophy of language of Hermeneutics with the latter Wittgenstein and with Speech Act theory)

In continental Philosophy the matter is a little more complex. Many continentals do not engage with the mainstream analytic thought, because it is viewed (quite arguably) as discovering platitudes already well known, or to have misguided aims (the desperate search for grounding beliefs and knowledge, described by Heidegger as the real problem of philosophy, this search, not the ground itself).
Many important continental Philosophers have nonetheless shown that they do indeed read analytic works: Jurgen Habermas has written extensively on Speech Acts, Putnam, Davidson, and has been one of the first to recognize the significance of Robert Brandom's works. Karl-Otto Apel has crafted a neo-kantian philosophy (sometimes called also neo-hermeneutics) by a thorough and careful reading and comparing the later Wittgenstein and Heidegger. Ernst Tugendhat book "Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die sprachanalytische Philosophie" can be considered one of the best works by a continental philosopher on the themes of Analytic Philosophy. Some Continental "Masters" have shown an acquaintance with analytic themes and authors; Gadamer remarked how the Hermeneutic he detailed in Wahrheit und Methode (1960) contains a great deal of concepts also found in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations.

Redefining so-called analytic philosophers who are interested in and/ or influenced by Hegel as being no longer analytic philosophers seems rather self-serving.

they represent a departure from ‘classic’ Analytic thought. — Joshs

Here you have an exceedingly vague category "'classic' analytic thought". I wonder why you placed the 'classic' under inverted commas.

Well, anyway. All this was in aid of investigating whether clarity really is a hallmark of (let's call it) Anglophone philosophy, or whether the "unclarity" of some Continental philosophers is only a matter of degree of difficulty. It's hard to generalize, of course, but my own experience has taught me to be wary of dismissing a philosopher because I find them unclear or difficult to understand. After multiple rereadings and consultation with related literature, if it's still unclear . . . OK, maybe they're driveling. But more often than not, patience is rewarded. And never underestimate the obstacles that translation poses.

I agree. The only "continental" I have failed to find anything of interest in is Derrida. There may be something there but I've tried to find it and remain convinced that if there is something of interest there it is probably not significant enough to warrant the effort I would need to put in in order to find it.

Unfortunately, I am always left with a really sour taste upon being handed anything that comes with a 'you have to wait until you click with it' type of disclaimer.
I find the relatively standard Continentals, all, plus Haabermas, who have been mentioned in the last page, not only unclear in terms of writing (i find that fairly easy to get through) but totally unclear as to what's actually being posited or 'argued for' in a lot of cases. Hegel being a pretty notable exception, I mainly just conclude that most of his more fundamental ideas are rubbish.

Maybe i've not given it enough time - but it seems to me that "You just don't get it yet" is the underlying notion here, which also tends to come when you don't like th same music as someone else :P

it seems to me that "You just don't get it yet" is the underlying notion here — AmadeusD

Well, not quite. The response I and others are making is more like, "Keep trying." And the "keep trying" can take many forms, including asking another philosopher who admires Habermas (to pick one of your examples) to point out to you some critical sections, and/or a good commentary. Then there's this: If the Continentals are "totally unclear as to what's actually being posited or 'argued for'," then you need a very robust "theory of error" to explain how it's the case that thousands of skilled philosophers think otherwise, and spend a great deal of time discussing the ideas of Habermas et al. Yes, it's possible they're all just unintelligent, but that's not what I'd call a robust theory!

. . . And then there's Derrida. Like Janus, I've done my due diligence with him and have concluded that he's an extremely good rhetorician who discovered a "cool gig" and stuck with it. So, an exception to every rule . . . :smile:

↪Janus . . . And then there's Derrida. Like Janus, I've done my due diligence with him and have concluded that he's an extremely good rhetorician who discovered a "cool gig" and stuck with it. So, an exception to every — J

I have to disagree here. I’ve read and published on Derrida, and see his most substantive contribution to philosophy as recognizing where Heidegger stopped short of explicating the most radical implications of his own thinking. I think Heidegger is the most advance thinker of our era, and Derrida took his ideas a bit further, albeit only a little bit.

Fair enough, and of course the response of someone like you, who's clearly done his reading, makes me think I've still missed something with Derrida. This is a tall order, but if you had to name a single work by Derrida that shows him at his best, what would it be? If I haven't read it, I'll try to.

This is a tall order, but if you had to name a single work by Derrida that shows him at his best, what would it be? If I haven't read it, I'll try to. — J

Hmm, you might try his lecture course on Heidegger from the mid ‘60’s:
‘Heidegger: The Question of Being and History’

He keeps the play on language to a minimum here, opting instead for a straightforward exposition ( or as straightforward as he gets). His interviews are another way to avoid the rhetorical tricks. I recommend ‘Points’ and ‘Positions’, as well as the last part of Limited, Inc.

then you need a very robust "theory of error" to explain how it's the case that thousands of skilled philosophers think otherwise, — J

Not at all. Their output makes vaguely more sense - which is not enough to shift the burden on to me. They provide no access to clarity - it's usually fairly pained interpolation, from what I see. Trying to rescue nonsense. If my response to those philosophers is the same (and aligns with basic psychosocial habits, imported into this field) as my response to the fundamental writings, then I need explain nought, but that this(being the above psychosocial habits mentioned) explains it (for me, obviously). A lot of people thought Mein Kampf was a great book.

I'd also point out that there are the same number, if not more philosophers, on the side of perhaps not taking Continentals that seriously, for the reasons I've given. I'm unsure that rejection of a modern turn on a millennia old practice requires much explanation, beyond "Well, you're doing something else, now".

But this just pushes back the theory of error one step. So these philosophers are offering fairly pained interpolations, trying to rescue nonsense? But why? Why would they be doing this?

The comparison with Mein Kampf doesn’t really work, because we do have a good theory to explain why many people were fooled by that book. What explains a Habermas scholar being fooled by Habermas? Dumb? Perverse? Doesn’t really seem to fit. What, then?

What explains a Habermas scholar being fooled by Habermas? Dumb? Perverse? Doesn’t really seem to fit. What, then? — J

Indeed. Isn't it traditional to dismiss as nonsense ideas we don't understand or ideas which sit at odds with our own sense making intuitions? There are numerous writers and thinkers I find unappealing, on the basis of their prose or subject matter. I would never mistake this for nonsense, except perhaps that I can make 'no sense' of their work. In my experience, many people believe they must grasp the entire spectrum of philosophical ideas. If they don't, they often conclude that the work itself is flawed.