Why thank you :pray:

You're welcome.

(I've had a look around your recent essay - respect for putting the effort into an extended argument such as that, and taking the time to get the prose right. Good work. My cynical quips about speculative physics would be misplaced.)

I have to say, this is entirely intelligible to me and (linguistically) solves a problem I've had for some time - there are clearly non-physical objects of experience. — AmadeusD

"Objects of experience" or 'aspects of understanding or judgement'? Perhaps an example or two would be helpful.

Thank you Banno, means a lot. I don't claim that it conveys anything particularly earth-shattering but I was pleased with the writing style and with what I think is the novel idea in the title.

…..“that which is real its existence is given; a real thing cannot not exist (necessity)”
-Mww

Is this “real thing” the object which was given to the senses? — "Bob

Yes.

Why would it be necessary that a cup exists because we experience a cup? — Bob Ross

It is necessary that some thing exists, which becomes the experience of, in this case, cup.

I don’t see the necessity you are talking about here. — Bob Ross

The thing is necessary for human intelligence to have something to work with. If not the thing, then at least something not contained in any part of human intelligence, which is the same as being outside all parts of it, so why not just call it an appearance, in which case the thing is just shorthand for that which appears.
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The way we sense is prestructured (….) in a certain way to react to stimuli — Bob Ross

That just says what we sense with, is prestructured, which is true. Ears hear this way, eyes see this way, and so on. Science has a lot to say nowadays about the way we see, that wasn’t available in the times of traditional metaphysical theory. But even so, I suspect empirical science hasn’t much consideration for a priori ventures into the sublime.

Ehhhhh….until 1925 anyway, when scientists became philosophers once again, or at least were forced to think like one.
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Technically, though, the a priori structure of sensibility itself (…) resides in reason, insofar as the matter of sensation is transcendental.

I don’t see how it would be. Our neurons send the sensations to the brain; not vice-versa. — Bob Ross

Errrr….wha??? We don’t care what neurons do when talking about speculative transcendental architecture. You’re explicitly demanding neurons send the feeling of a mosquito bite, when the science legislating neural activity will only permit neurons to send quantitative electrochemical signals.
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I think we have good reasons to believe, e.g., that electrons exist. — Bob Ross

That was never a contention; believing in a thing is very far from knowledge of it.

Why not, though, just use ‘real’ and ‘existent’ interchangeably and note, instead, that not all the models and concepts we deploy to explain experience necessarily exist in reality (i.e., are not real)? — Bob Ross

The real and the existent are pretty much already interchangeable, and none of the concepts we deploy to explain experience exist in reality to begin with, so….what’s the point?
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If we can't sense it, can’t indicating an impossibility, how would we know it exists?

Through empirical tests with the help of self-reflective reason. — Bob Ross

Then it’s no longer impossible. Sensing an affirmative second-hand representation proves a possibility. Sensing changes in spectral lines proves that which changes state is possible, without sensing the electrons themselves.
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That’s an equivocation. (1) I wasn’t asking just about empirical knowledge…… — Bob Ross

Yes you were, you just didn’t know it. Because you’re talking sensing, the only knowledge you’re going to get from it, if you get any at all, is empirical.

your using the term ‘empirical’ to only strictly refer to what is sensed—that’s not what it usually means. — Bob Ross

That’s all it’s ever meant to me. I use empirical to describe a kind of knowledge, rather than a posteriori, which prescribes its ground or source.

What else does it refer to for you?
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I know that my car is in my garage even though no one is sensing it. For you, this is invalid knowledge. — Bob Ross

For me it’s unjustified to call it knowledge.

What do you really know, with respect to the car itself, when somebody tells you he put your car in the garage?
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……representing objects in space is a priori knowledge; which I thought you were denying because it is intuition. — Bob Ross

Representing objects in space is a priori; it is intuition, which isn’t knowledge.
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We are getting there — Bob Ross

Helps to keep foremost in mind here….we’re not talking about things you know, we’re talking about how you know things.

I think we have good reasons to believe, e.g., that electrons exist. — Bob Ross

They only have a tendency to exist. We know they don't have any determinate existence until they're measured. That is an implication of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. We also know that sub-atomic phenomena can behave as both waves and particles, and so are not really either one or the other, as those two forms of existence are incommensurable.

I am not following how we only know through contradictions (between our experiences and reality). I can imagine perfectly fine a person who infers correctly, without contradiction, that their conscious experience is representational; and then proceeds to correctly identify that there must be a thing-in-itself which excites the senses which, in turn, begins the process to construct the conscious experience which they are having. — Bob Ross

Lets break this down. First, remember at this point that there is a difference between having the idea of what a 'thing in itself' is, and whether its something that exists and is knowable. We also need to break down what we mean by 'knowable'.

This is why in my knowledge theory I broke down what knowledge is into two camps. Distinctive, and applicable. Distinctive is 'knowing the experience I have'. So if I have an experience of a 'goat'. That's the experience I know I had. Then there's applicable knowledge. "Was that actually a goat, or was it a sheep I misidentified?" "Distinctively I know the definition of a goat and a sheep. But was my belief that what I experienced was a goat, correct in reality? So I have the distinctive knowledge of 'experience' of identifying a goat, but not the applicable knowledge that the identification of a goat was of an actual goat.

Ok, now back to 'things in themselves'. As an identity, I can distinctively know what 'a thing in itself' is. "A thing in itself is a logical conclusion that there is something that I am observing, but can only observe it through the senses and brain interpretations. But because I can only know it through observations, I can never know it apart from the interpretation of those observations". How do I applicably know this? According to its definition, I cannot.

So what is applicably knowing? If I take a definition of a goat, and apply its properties to a creature without contradiction, and without it overlapping a separate identity I've created in my mind (like a sheep), then I applicably know that creature as a goat.

Of course, unknown to me, its a space alien. Its so good at disguise, that there is no way with my current capabilities that I can detect its a space alien. "The thing in itself" is a space alien, but I applicably know it as a goat. Now this first part is simply a primer to the next step, "I applicably know that this thing is a goat, but I can never applicably know if that's 'the thing in itself'.

If I can only know applicably through testing, observation, and a lack of contradiction, how do I applicably know of something apart from all sensation and interpretation? I would have to 'be' what I am trying to applicably know. Its like consciousness. I can observe that my friend is conscious by their actions. But do I know what its like to 'be' that friend? To know them as they are 'in themselves'?

Applicable knowledge is obtained from our interactions and interpretations of the world. We know a 'goat' by the fact that its not contradicted. If our 'goat' started flying and shooting laser beams from its eyes, our applicable knowledge would then be contradicted. But even if it did not, if it was really a space alien, we would only be able to applicably know it as a goat. "The thing in itself" is the conception of something which CANNOT be applicably known. Therefore it is entirely a logical conception that results from our understanding that 'we cannot be what we observe, so we can only known it from our outside observations of it'.

Can you cite something we could say is knowledge that did not require any experience to gain it?

The most basic example that comes to mind is mathematical knowledge. Your brain necessarily has to already know how to perform math to construct your conscious experience; and this is why mathematical propositions, in geometry, are applicable and accurate for experience: the axioms of geometry reside a priori in our brains — Bob Ross

This is incorrect. What we have is the ability to discretely experience, and over time, learn to conduct comparisons and quantities between them. A newborn does not come with the knowledge of 'addition', '1', or anything else. This is all learned over time through experience. What they have is the capacity to understand these relations, but by no means does this entail that there is some innate born knowledge.

For example, we applicably know math through 'base 10'. But math can be in any base. Base 2, or binary, is the math we use for logic circuits. Hexadecimal, or base 16, is used to calculate computer memory. Are we born with the innate knowledge of hexadecimal? Did you know when you were born that the number for base ten '11' is 'A' in Hexadecimal? Of course not. Just like you had to carefully be taught base ten, and basic math as a kid, you would need to have the experience of learning hexadecimal.

As for geometry, this also has to be learned. As a baby, you don't quite understand depth perception yet. It takes time. You grow and learn how the world works as a physical set of interactions. You have to be taught, or can learn through logic and observation, that "A squared + B squared = C squared" on a triangle. But all of these things have been rigorously proved over centuries through careful testing, observation, and application. None of this is known innately.

Mathematical propositions are valid in virtue of being grounded in how our brains cognize; and they are only valid for human experience. They are true, justified, beliefs about experience—not reality. — Bob Ross

They are valid in the fact they can be applicably known in reality. It is 'the logic of discrete experience'. But this must be experienced, tested, and learned to be applicably known. We can of course create what ever experience of math that we want distinctively. I can distinctively create a math in base Steve. Steve + Visit = Snacks for example. But this can only be applicably known if ever time Steve + Visit happens there always results in Snacks.

Perhaps that’s where the confusion was: the a priori knowledge we have is not knowledge about reality, but about how we cognize it. — Bob Ross

The ability to think is not generally prescribed as 'knowledge'. Just like the ability to 'move my limbs' doesn't mean I know 'how to move them to walk'. This is why I noted earlier we were very close on the definition of apriori. I agree that we have instincts, innate capacities, and 'our innate existence'. But none of that is 'knowledge'. Knowledge can only be obtained after some kind of experience. Even distinctive knowledge is the creation of an identity that we then remember. But we must first have an experience to identify because we can claim knowledge of it.

So what is a flower apart from any observation

I would say that we merely say that there is some thing which is exciting our senses, and of which we represent as what we normally perceive as a flower. — Bob Ross

Correct. But notice you've described how you know a flower purely through your representations and senses. What is a flower apart from that? What if the thing in itself that we're 'dividing' into a flower is really a few other things around the flower? What if the air two millimeters away from the flower is also part of the flower in 'the thing in itself' but we just don't interpret it that way? What if its a space alien? (I really like that example don't I?) What is it like to BE the flower? These are all things that are outside of our capacity to applicably know. This limit is a logical reminder that there are some things outside of our applicable knowledge. At that point, we induce if you recall. So a thing in itself is not a probability or a possibility. It is a cogent inapplicable plausibility. It is a concept that we can never applicably test, but one that pure reason cannot seem to do without.

And that's all the 'thing in itself' is. Its an unknowable outside of the mind existence.

Agreed; but that’s not a purely abstract thing, then. It is a concrete—unknown. — Bob Ross

It is purely an abstract thing that cannot be applicably known. Its plausible that it is a concrete thing. We know that we cannot applicably know it. And that's as far as we can go.

"Objects of experience" or 'aspects of understanding or judgement'? Perhaps an example or two would be helpful. — Janus

I suppose that just depends on what way you're comfortable presenting hte notion. I mean to say that there are things that exist outside of minds, and things that exist only within minds. Something like an 'intention' or numbers, or the complex network of inter-related memories and partial memories that create a specific state of mind... Things that can't be pointed to, in any way, basically. I think it's completely coherent to say that these things are real, in the way Banno uses the word a few posts ago, and that they do not 'exist' in the way something would want to exist while not being experienced by consciousness.

Please elaborate, as I am not following. Give me an example of where something is real but does not exist (if applicable); and where something exists but is not real (if applicable).

…..“that which is real its existence is given; a real thing cannot not exist (necessity)”
-Mww

Is this “real thing” the object which was given to the senses? — "Bob

Yes.

So a ‘real thing’ is real because its existence is given, and a ‘fake [viz., non-real] thing’ is an existence which is not given? How, then, do you distinguish from a fake thing which is does not exist, and one which does (but of which both are not given to the senses)?

It is necessary that some thing exists, which becomes the experience of, in this case, cup.

Agreed; but you are also saying that this necessary thing that is given not only exists but is real; which implies that a thing which exists but is not given is not real.

You’re explicitly demanding neurons send the feeling of a mosquito bite, when the science legislating neural activity will only permit neurons to send quantitative electrochemical signals.

Those are the sensations, no? What, then, is a sensation?

Errrr….wha??? We don’t care what neurons do when talking about speculative transcendental architecture.

True, but the sensibility must have some pre-structured way of sensing before anything is intuited or cognized—i.e., without reason. Talking about neurons is just a nice analogy.

I think we have good reasons to believe, e.g., that electrons exist. — Bob Ross

That was never a contention; believing in a thing is very far from knowledge of it.

I think we have good reasons to know, e.g., that electrons exist.

The real and the existent are pretty much already interchangeable

Not at all under your view! The real is only a subset of existent things which are given or (perhaps) possibly given to the senses. I have no clue why we would assume that most, if not everything, can be sensed by our sensibility—viz., given to the senses.

Because you’re talking sensing, the only knowledge you’re going to get from it, if you get any at all, is empirical.
…
That’s all it’s ever meant to me. I use empirical to describe a kind of knowledge, rather than a posteriori, which prescribes its ground or source.

What else does it refer to for you?

But, then, you would have to deny any a priori knowledge; since we only know that empirically. That which is a posteriori is not the same as that which is empirical---don’t you think? E.g., I must use experience to extrapolate the a priori structure by which I experience, which is technically empirical, and yet it is not itself derived from what is given to the senses.

All knowledge starts with experience, but that does not mean all knowledge comes from experience—as Kant would say.

Even if you think the empirical is the same as what is a posteriori, then I think you still see my point: we can reason about our experience to know things which are not directly perceived.

For me it’s unjustified to call it knowledge.

What do you really know, with respect to the car itself, when somebody tells you he put your car in the garage?

I know it, because I have a true, justified belief. E.g., I just drove it into the garage, went inside, and now am being asked “is the car in the garage?” 5 seconds afterwards—yeah, I think I have a justified belief which is true (i.e., corresponds to reality).

If I take your position, then we have virtually no knowledge of anything. You don’t know you exist, that you brushed your teeth this morning (even though you remember doing it), etc. All knowledge ultimately is probabilistic and uncertain, except for maybe a small set of things (like logical axioms).

Representing objects in space is a priori; it is intuition, which isn’t knowledge.

What makes something a priori and knowledge, then? I know that “all bodies are extended” because of the way my brain represents objects a priori in space; and I know that “the shortest line between two points is the line drawn between them” because my brain <…>.

I think I may get what you are saying a bit, though. Are you noting that the act of synthesis in space that our brain does when intuiting is not itself knowledge, because there is not agent acquiring information but rather there is just a pre-structure for doing so, and that propositions that we (qua agents) know a priori because of that pre-structure (e.g., “all bodies are extended”)? I can get on board with that.

I am not familiar enough with quantum physics to comment back: I don't understand how to reconcile qp with practical life---it seems incoherent.

Lets break this down.

I appreciate the elaboration!

Firstly, “a priori” refers, within the context of transcendental investigations, as “that which is independent of any possible experience—viz., independent of empirical data”. “Knowledge” is just a justified, true belief (with truth being a version of correspondence theory) or, more generically, ~”having information which is accurate”. Knowledge a priori, then, is when one has a true, justified belief about something which was not derived from empirical data (but, rather, the means by which our representative faculties intuit and cognize that data). The proposition “all bodies are extended” is universally true for human experience and a priori because the way we experience is in space (necessarily); and so this is a priori known. Now, to your point, of which I concede, in order to acquire this a priori knowledge one must have the self-reflective cognitive abilities to reason about their experience transcendentally; and so a baby, I agree with you, necessarily does not have a priori knowledge even though they necessarily have an a priori means of experiencing and the a priori propositions are true of their experience as well (e.g., “all bodies are extended”). I was conflating, I think, that which is a priori with that which is a priori knowledge. E.g., intuition (necessarily) in space is a priori but is not knowledge, but some propositions are true a priori and are grounded in it (such as “the line drawn between two points is the shortest path” in geometry).

Secondly, I recognize that you reject the JTB theory of knowledge; so let me try to address yours as it relates hereto.

This is why in my knowledge theory I broke down what knowledge is into two camps.

When we ask “what is knowledge?”, we are expecting an monistic answer—e.g., “it is <…>”—and not a plurastic answer—e.g., “it is <…> and <…>”. You are saying that knowledge doesn’t have one fundamental identity but, instead, is two separate irreducible ones—namely “applicable” and “distinctive”.

This immediately incites the question: “if A is knowledge and B is knowledge, then aren’t they inheriting the same type of knowledge and, if so, thereby the question of ‘what is knowledge?’ is still unanswered?”. That’s like me saying knowledge is a priori and a posteriori. Ok. But we are asking “what is knowledge?”; so how did that answer the question?

Of course, you probably have an answer to this that I don’t remember….it has been a while (;

Briefly, I will also say, that your schema doesn’t negate the possibility of a priori “knowledge” (in your sense of knowledge): it would be applicable knowledge, as the whole metaphysical endeavor of transcendental investigation would be applicable knowledge. The question becomes: “why don’t you think that we can apply a priori knowledge without contradiction and reasonably to the forms of experience (viz., the necessary preconditions for the possibility of experience) given that we both agree that our experience is representational?”.

For example, we applicably know math through 'base 10'. But math can be in any base. Base 2, or binary, is the math we use for logic circuits.

The fact that we can do math in different bases does not negate that the same mathematical operations are occurring, and that they are synthetical, a priori propositions.

The ability to think is not generally prescribed as 'knowledge'. Just like the ability to 'move my limbs' doesn't mean I know 'how to move them to walk'.

Correct. I was using the phrase too loosely.

It is purely an abstract thing that cannot be applicably known.

Ehhhh, then you cannot claim to know that there must be a thing-in-itself at all; or otherwise concede that you can know applicably, through experience, that if our experience is representational then there must be a thing-in-itself.

"The thing in itself" is a space alien

Then a thing-in-itself is not a concept which is purely logical—that was my only point on this note. It is referencing something concrete. @Mww is denying this, and I thought so were you.

Give me an example of where something is real but does not exist (if applicable); and where something exists but is not real (if applicable). — Bob Ross

What exists is what you can meaningfully encounter. But there are many things we take for granted as real which we can’t encounter and which don’t exist in that concrete sense. They are constituted as agreements, conventions, rules, and the like. Where do interest rates or exchange rates exist? Not in banks, or financial institutions. They are real even though we cannot encounter them in the sense we encounter existents. A contract is not just the piece of paper, but the meaning it conveys, likewise a national constitution or a penal code (adapted from here). Humans are embedded in a web of such meanings, which are every bit as real as the material objects we encounter but which are not existent in the sense that sensable objects are. We don't notice that, because that web of meanings lies beneath the threshold of conscious attention, unless we make the effort to bring it to awareness.

So these are factors in our cognitive life that are real but not phenomenally existent. As to things that exist but aren't real - well, fictional characters would fit the bill. We will both know who Bugs Bunny and Sherlock Holmes are, so we have a common reference point, but they're not real. Nowadays we're constantly bombarded by unreal imagery.

In actuality, conscious experience always comprises the synthesis of phenomenal existents - sensable objects - and the cognitive faculties which incorporate them into a web of meaning. That is what Kant was on to. But because of the natural extroversion of today's culture we tend to exagerrate the former and fail to notice the latter - we tend to think that only what is 'out there' is real, and fail to notice how much of what is 'out there' is really put there by our own minds.

Where do interest rates or exchange rates exist? Not in banks, or financial institutions. — Wayfarer

They consist in what the banks or financial institutions do. They consist in concrete actions. Failing their actualization they exist merely as ideas in peoples minds.