Ukraine cannot strike targets deep inside Russia without NATO ISR capabilities.

That's the problem here - NATO becoming a direct participant in the war by giving Ukraine the targeting data for its long-range strikes.

This would put two nuclear-armed powers in direct conflict with each other.

That's what the recent signaling is about.

The Kremlin keeps playing the nuclear card, because they know they have a much higher stake in this game than the West does.

Ukraine cannot strike targets deep inside Russia without NATO ISR capabilities.

That's the problem here - NATO becoming a direct participant in the war by giving Ukraine the targeting data for its long-range strikes.

This would put two nuclear-armed powers in direct conflict with each other.

That's what the recent signaling is about. — Tzeentch

This simply doesn't really matter.

Giving one party a weapon to then use on another party anyways makes you a party to how those weapons are used.

The status quo that weapon supply is not considered being a party to a conflict is only because they all like selling weapons. However, using this status quo as a loophole to then do critical damage to someone doesn't work. Even if your loophole "works" in terms of international law or whatever that simply isn't worth all that much.

No leader will go "ahhh, yeah, they got us, you see the loophole they used there, that they didn't technically strike us but gave the weapons to a proxy force so there's just nothing we can do".

Whether Ukraine needs NATO or not to technically use the weapons doesn't matter.

I honestly don't think it would be all that problematic for Ukraine to program the weapons themselves using their own spies, surveillance, literally google maps for targeting data. Critical infrastructure is not exactly difficult to find. The only difficulty is that the West would need to provide Ukraine the API interface needed to program the weapons which they don't provide precisely to be in control of what Ukraine uses the weapons for. If I had the API and documentation I would expect to be able to program one of these missiles to hit something like ... oh let's see ... let's say the Kremlin in about a day, week tops if there's some zany math going on to harmonize various sensor inputs. Probably there's some sophisticated simulation software the optimizes performance but I'm pretty sure a good approximation could be worked out by trial and error if we simply fired enough of these bad boys.

But whether it is or it isn't, if the only way to reestablish deterrence is striking a NATO base with a nuclear weapon, that's what Russia would do.

Obviously Russia would anyways claim exactly what you say, that NATO is supplying intelligence thus making them a party (which obviously NATO is doing generally speaking anyways so already a party to the conflict on that definition, also obviously already programming missiles to hit Russian targets "nearish" the front line anyways) but my point is NATO and Ukraine getting into some hair splitting loophole of who exactly is inputting what data into the missile doesn't actually change the situation.

The situation is that Russia and the West have currently an understanding that "what happens in Ukraine stays in Ukraine" but this understanding is founded on the West not going too far and instead letting Russia win. As it stands Russia is gaining territory, gaining people and resources, and so NATO support for Ukraine can be accounted for as a cost of doing business on the imperial profit and loss statement.

What the West is currently doing is playing a bit more footsy to signal to Ukraine to keep fighting because "maybe" they'll let Ukraine do some spite attacks and then they'll feel better (but still obviously lose) ... but they have cold feet this time as it may break the understanding they have with Russia to be cool.

We are in general agreement, but the West will be pushing the envelope because it knows Russia will get more risk averse the closer it gets to victory. Thus, the West could theoretically get away with more blatant belligerence. Russia on its part is signaling it will meet escalation with escalation.

Whether or not NATO is directly involved in the hostilities is not really an interesting practical question (obviously they are deeply involved), but it is an important legal question, and it's important for international perception which is something Russia does care about.

There's a world of difference between Russia being seen as reacting to the West, as oppossed to aggressing the West. This will be vitally important if it ever comes (God forbid) to nuclear escalation.

That's why I think these nuances are worth pointing out.

↪boethius We are in general agreement, but the West will be pushing the envelope because it knows Russia will get more risk averse the closer it gets to victory. Thus, the West could theoretically get away with more blatant belligerence. Russia on its part is signaling it will meet escalation with escalation. — Tzeentch

Yes, we're definitely in agreement, and as you point out the language being used is as part of a signalling exercise.

I just add clarification that the concrete reality doesn't actually matter lest someone get into a zany kindergarten level argument that Russia couldn't retaliate against NATO ... if Ukraine did it.

Obviously you're aware this sort of logic doesn't drive decisions.

Currently Russia doesn't retaliate against NATO because doing so would cause more problems than solve, but if NATO was attacking Russian critical infrastructure (directly, indirectly through Ukraine, with Ukraine programming the weapons or "advisors" or mercenaries or someone's hacker cousin) then the calculus obviously changes.

Completely agree with you that in this theatre there is likely a hard cap on escalation that is unlikely to be breached for the reason you point out that the great powers benefit from the status quo at the end of the day and they don't have an interest to nuke each other.

What's different in the middle-east right now is that Israel is not a great power that benefits from the geopolitical status quo as such, but rather benefits from the American empire and can "draw down" US imperial capital for their own purposes, which could honestly be mostly delusional prophecy fulfillment

A lot of the experts I think we both follow are discussing this pretty intensely right now of whether US is controlling Israel policy for US imperial interests, or Israel is controlling US policy for Israeli imperial interests, or even that it may appear Israel is driving policy at the moment but US imperialists wisely set things up this way decades ago to happen (to act as that cross-roads spoiler you've described, come-what-may style).

It's quite fascinating, but I feel there's just too much long term degradation of US prestige for what we see Israel doing to be some sort of cryptic US policy. General idea, sure, but no one concerned with US imperial interests would want to see a genocide in Gaza; They'd want to see what the US does: insane amounts of damage and suffering ... but aha! not quite genocide motherfuckers! Purposefully starving a population, for example, US imperialists simply view as beneath them (if people are eating while the US drops bombs on them, that doesn't bother them much, it's a sort of "why not?" attitude within the US war machine to people having basic food stuffs supplied by various humanitarian organizations; what we see Israel doing is I think too profoundly different to be driven by US imperialists; certainly enabled by zionists within the US administration, but this I think should be viewed as Israel effectively in control of US policy and not US imperialists, as such apart from being also zionists, view the extremes of zionism as somehow serving US foreign policy).

A lot of the experts I think we both follow are discussing this pretty intensely right now of whether US is controlling Israel policy for US imperial interests, or Israel is controlling US policy for Israeli imperial interests, or even that it may appear Israel is driving policy at the moment but US imperialists wisely set things up this way decades ago to happen (to act as that cross-roads spoiler you've described, come-what-may style).

It's quite fascinating, but I feel there's just too much long term degradation of US prestige for what we see Israel doing to be some sort of cryptic US policy. General idea, sure, but no one concerned with US imperial interests would want to see a genocide in Gaza; They'd want to see what the US does: insane amounts of damage and suffering ... but aha! not quite genocide motherfuckers! Purposefully starving a population, for example, US imperialists simply view as beneath them (if people are eating while the US drops bombs on them, that doesn't bother them much, it's a sort of "why not?" attitude within the US war machine to people having basic food stuffs supplied by various humanitarian organizations; what we see Israel doing is I think too profoundly different to be driven by US imperialists; certainly enabled by zionists within the US administration, but this I think should be viewed as Israel effectively in control of US policy and not US imperialists, as such apart from being also zionists, view the extremes of zionism as somehow serving US foreign policy). — boethius

Personally, I am reserving judgement on this issue, though I am leaning towards the US being in the driver's seat.

The basic question is, could Israel be used to plunge the Middle-East into chaos once controlling it becomes unfeasible?

(That's ultimately why the US is interested in the Middle-East. Oil, yes, but more importantly it is a vital land corridor that connects several geopolitical rivals - plunging it into chaos would be enough to deny that connection)

And I think the answer is yes, especially considering Israel will be a nuclear-armed power that's conceivably fighting for its survival.


Conversely, if Israel is in the driver's seat it's entirely unclear to me what power base they would be deriving that position from.

AIPAC? Ok, then where does AIPAC get its power from? If the Israel lobby is capable of coercing the former hegemon, it must have some practical levers of power that can be discerned, and personally I have never seen a convincing argument to that end.


US prestige taking a hit is certainly a factor worth considering, but once global domination becomes an unfeasible goal, perhaps prestige starts to matter less. We also have to consider the US may be gearing up to play hardball with the rest of the world (thus throwing its reputation out of the window) to protect its hegemonic position.

Is it worth noting that no one has threatened North Korea, Iran, China with nuclear strikes or other attacks due to supplying Russia?
Doing so at present seems about as odd (or irresponsible perhaps) as Russia dishing out threats to Ukraine's supporters.
Periodically up'ing one's own stakes — or appearance of stakes — seems like a transparent strategy.
If the Kremlin is willing to start a nuclear war over a quarter of Ukraine, then we (the world, including Russians) already have a serious problem on our hands.
Then again, maybe things will change in one way or another.

Just about all nuclear posturing lately has come out of the Kremlin circle and North Korea. (2023Oct20, 2024Feb7) — Feb 29, 2024

Well, I guess ...

there's the North Korean wildcard. — Jul 15, 2024

Remember that now from last June, even officially North Korea and Russia have a mutual defense pact:

Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un signed the treaty Wednesday, during Putin’s visit to Pyongyang.

The treaty upgrades the countries' relationship to a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” It specifies that if either side goes to war after being invaded, “the other side shall provide military and other assistance with all means in its possession without delay,” according to a treaty text published Thursday by North Korean state media.

North Korea had a similar treaty with the Soviet Union, but Russia didn't have it until this year.

Or she didn’t say that because just a moron would have thought that buying time was an admission by Europeans that Minsk agreements were deceivingly meant to arm Ukraine in order to initiate/pursue a war against Russia. — neomac


That's literally what the expression "buying time" means. That's literally what the expression "buying time" means. It doesn't mean "coercive pressure as one component in a diplomatic strategy to establish a lasting ceasefire", which Merkel could have easily expressed that concept in her own words had she wanted to. — boethius

No, it literally doesn’t. The metaphoric locution “buying time” roughly refers to the purpose of delaying the moment of facing some issues, either in the hope those issues will disappear by themselves or in order to better prepare to cope with them. Out of context, the intention to be provocative or to dupe somebody is not inherent to the semantics of that locution AT ALL. So one has to take into account context to determine its contextual meaning. Here you go:

1) Let’s start reviewing the claim in its wider textual context:
ZEIT: Are you asking yourself whether the years of relative calm were also years of failure and whether you were not just a crisis manager but also partly the cause of crises?
Merkel: I wouldn't be a political person if I didn't deal with it. Let's take climate protection, where Germany has done a lot compared to other countries. But with regard to the topic itself, I admit that, measured against what the IPCC's International Climate Report says today, not enough has been done. Or let's look at my policy with regard to Russia and Ukraine. I have come to the conclusion that I made my decisions at the time in a way that I can still understand today. IT WAS AN ATTEMPT TO PREVENT EXACTLY SUCH A WAR. The fact that it didn't work doesn't mean that the attempts were wrong.
ZEIT: But you can find the way you acted in previous circumstances plausible and still consider it wrong today in view of the results.
Merkel: But that requires you to say what exactly the alternatives were at the time. I thought the discussion in 2008 about Ukraine and Georgia joining NATO was wrong. Neither did the countries have the necessary prerequisites for this, nor had the consequences of such a decision been fully considered, both with regard to Russia's actions against Georgia and Ukraine and to NATO and its mutual assistance rules. And the Minsk Agreement in 2014 was an attempt to give Ukraine time. [Editor's note: The Minsk Agreement refers to a series of agreements for the self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Luhansk, which had broken away from Ukraine under Russian influence. The aim was to gain time through a ceasefire in order to later achieve peace between Russia and Ukraine]. It also used this time to become stronger, as we can see today. The Ukraine of 2014/15 is not the Ukraine of today. As we saw in the battle for Debaltseve (a railway town in the Donbass, Donetsk Oblast, ed.) in early 2015, Putin could have easily overrun them. And I very much doubt that the NATO states could have done as much to help Ukraine then as they are doing today.

So in that interview, Merkel ADMITS that Minsk Agreements were an attempt to prevent such a war (as the note of the editor further confirms), however it failed. And even though it failed, it gave time to Ukraine to implement Minsk Agreements, and ALSO to get stronger “as we can see today”. NOWHERE Merkel is talking about Ukrainian victory or about the chances of Ukraine to resolve the conflict in military terms according to its maximalist expectations or cheerleading propaganda.

2) It is very far fetched to claim that Western Europeans, especially Germans or Merkel, were intentionally provoking Russia to a bigger war. For several reasons: (A) given the economic-political ties between Germany and Russia, Germany military unreadiness, and Germany ideological aversion to get dragged into wars and all its consequences (including a refugee crisis). (B) Westerners cornered Ukraine to sign Minsk Agreements which burdened more Ukraine than Russia, since not only Russia was not taken to be a co-belligerant but it was also granted a role of mediator pushing for an interpretation of the Agreements which for Ukrainians amounted to a capitulation to Russia. (C) Even though Minsk Agreements helped Ukraine restore its military forces which in 2014 were poorly equipped, undertrained, and unprepared for a Russian aggression and to partner with NATO (actually, a “decrepit” army: https://theconversation.com/in-2014-the-decrepit-ukrainian-army-hit-the-refresh-button-eight-years-later-its-paying-off-177881), in a moment where Russia had means and motives to pursue a military escalation after grabbing Crimea without much of a fight, STILL the West and especially Germany didn’t military support Ukraine as Ukraine expected, out of fear to provoke a military escalation from Russia. Indeed, the military aid was very much constrained, slow and far below expectations (since 2014, remember the issue over lethal vs non-lethal weapons up until 2018? Where non-lethal weapons means “defensive and designed to prevent further UAF [Ukrainian armed forces] fatalities and casualties” https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN07135/SN07135.pdf ), Germany was the most reluctant country to offer military aid to Ukraine also after the war started (https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2022-04-28/german-arms-deliveries-to-ukraine-spds-controversial-course). And again, Germany opposed NATO membership for Ukraine since 2008. (D) Merkel ADMITS that Minsk Agreements were “an attempt to prevent such a war” in the very same interview where you extrapolated the claim to defend herself most likely against criticisms about her having not done enough to support Ukraine (see the Guardian article you posted, see persisting complaints by Ukrainians about the Western support). That's why Merkel needed to stress it out that however questionable from the Ukrainian perspective still Minsk Agreements achieved something important for Ukraine, that otherwise wouldn't have been possible. And that's what she's trying to take credit for despite the criticisms.

3) In light of contextual considerations, it is very far fetched to claim that Western Europeans, especially Germans, were deceptive, because making Ukraine stronger to the point of being in condition to withstand a major Russian escalation WAS NOT EXCLUDED BY THE MINSK AGREEMENTS (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minsk_agreements#Text_of_the_protocol), and no she didn’t need to express herself otherwise to make that point clearer to those who ignored the actual content of the Minsk Agreements and the criticisms she was trying to defend herself from (like those coming from Ukrainians and Westerners invoking greater support to Ukraine). So Russian expectations about the “provocative” reconstruction of the Ukrainian army were not grounded on what was explicitly agreed upon. Besides, as you can read here in this report: “The Minsk Agreements: Not Legally Binding but a Political Commitment” (https://www.kas.de/documents/252038/4520172/The+Grand+Stalemate+of+the+Minsk+Agreements), so it was mostly left on Ukraine and Russia’s initiative to comply with such agreements. So no, Merkel did NOT admit any intention to be provocative or to dupe the Russians.

4) Whatever residual reason to pin “bad faith” on Western intentions (also independently from Merkel's declarations in that interview) in favor of Russian expectations can overwhelmingly be retorted against Russia because: first, conjecture for conjecture, it’s very hard to believe that a paranoiac despot, ex-KGB agent expert on disinformatia and historical revisionism, with a network of both Western (especially in Germany, given their economic and political ties) and Ukrainian covert agents could possibly be duped by Western intentions about the Minsk agreements. Putin was most likely aware in what predicament Western Europeans and Ukraine were, also considering the power relations between the US and Europe, and how he could exploit their hesitancy and “buying time” in his favour more easily than they could in their or in Ukraine’s favour. Indeed, their hesitation/reluctance could have been taken as a political pretext for escalation, as well as a convenient window of opportunity to push covert operations on the ground (including Russification of the region), AS HE ACTUALLY DID. Secondly, given the occupation of Crimea by Russian militia and the Russian arming/leading to support Ukrainian separatists’ armed conflict with Kiev, Russia was most likely violating previous agreements like the Budapest Memorandum, NATO-Russian foundation act and the United Nations Charter (among others). Third, while Russia was more accountable to comply with Minsk Agreements than Ukraine because (A) Russia was the unprovoked aggressor (differently from Israel wrt Hamas) and Ukraine the victim, (B) had greater military means than Ukraine, and (C) had vested interest to protract the conflict and compromise the Ukrainian territorial integrity and sovereignty (to compromise Ukraine’s chances of Westernisation), not only Russia didn’t do its part to preserve a cease-fire but it was arguably Ukraine the one that did more to comply with Minsk agreements (https://cepa.org/article/dont-let-russia-fool-you-about-the-minsk-agreements/). But if that’s the case then one doesn’t owe good faith to others for dealing with problems that those others created and protracted in bad faith .

Merkel would have known this faction in Ukraine that actually wants a bigger war with Russia existed and at the time she made her comments it seemed this factions view was validated. — boethius

It’s a convenient caricature to present Ukraine’s views as ”this faction in Ukraine that actually wants a bigger war with Russia”, what the Ukrainian leadership aimed to is to preserve territorial integrity and political sovereignty. One can question the methods in light of their chances too succeed. The point is that Ukrainians were/are fighting against Russian oppression, as much as Palestinians fight against Israeli oppression. The main difference is that the former was UNPROVOKED, since Ukraine didn’t attack Russia proper, as Hamas attacked Israel proper. And ultimately it’s inherently a national matter what Ukrainians are ready to do to defend their own territorial and political sovereignty.

Nowhere Merkel is talking about Ukrainian victory in that comment. That's your rhetoric manipulation. — neomac

She says "buying time" ... buying time for what? To become "stronger as we see today".
The far bigger war with Russia is at that time underway. By "strong" she is obviously implying "able to win on the battlefield”. — boethius

That may sound plausible in the hindsight, but when Putin invaded Ukraine in 2022, neither the West nor the US administrations were expecting Ukrainians to be able to resist as they did. When building up the Afghan security forces in 20 years, the US spent tens of billions more than they spent to rebuild the Ukrainian army since 2014 to 2022. When they were directly war fighting the Talibans in Afghanistan, the US spent hundreds of billions more than they spent in war fighting the Russians in Ukraine (https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2021-04-30qr-section2-funding.pdf). And yet when the Americans left Afghanistan, these Afghan military forces were unable to prevent the Taliban from taking control of the country in a matter of months after the US withdrawal.
So, without a deeper understanding of the situation (including Ukrainian motivations), it was not implausible that the Ukrainians could have collapsed in the same way vis-à-vis such a foe as the Russian army. Even less implausible given the political/military/intelligence/economic/demographic ties between Russia and Ukraine since the Soviet era. All the more if one were to believe Russian propaganda: Ukraine’s regime was the result of a Western coup, Russians and Ukrainians are one people, Ukrainians are just misled to self-destruction by a biiiiiig (or “tiny tiny tiny”? Which one sounds better? You tell me!) fraction of genocidal Nazis, Kiev will capitulate in matter of days or weeks, etc. This understandably elicited greater optimism and boosted moral because expectations about Ukrainian performance in an armed conflict with Russia were already pretty low (no matter how Western propaganda artificially amplified this sentiment).
Besides, roughly one month prior to Merkel’s interview, Gen. Mark Milley notoriously warned Ukraine and the West that despite Ukraine’s heroic success in driving the Russians from Kharkiv and Kherson, it would be “very difficult” to evict Russia’s army from the entire country by force. There might be an opening for political solutions, however: “You want to negotiate from a position of strength, Russia right now is on its back”. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eoxCo1mXzEE&t=6s).
So, NOTHING in admitting that the Ukrainian military forces became stronger, logically implies or “obviously” suggests that their strength was enough to resolve the Ukrainian territorial disputes with Russia via military means in a way that satisfied Ukraine. BTW this is a persisting issue of Western support to Ukraine, at least, from the Ukrainian perspective.

Otherwise her comments would make absolutely no sense: Minsk was to buy time for Ukraine to be strong ... but alas obviously not strong enough and therefore to ultimately be severely damaged by Russia and forced to sign unfavourable peace terms?! — boethius

Nobody knew back in 2014 what Putin would do in 2022 for certain. We should talk in terms of risks of escalation. The Ukrainian were confident that to mitigate such risks they needed to work on military deterrence with the help of the West. But Western collective support to build such deterrence couldn’t possibly have been granted, or even fully planned back then by individual Western politicians, other than in a form of a generic political commitment, and most certainly not with the same confidence Putin can establish/plan Russia’s foreign policies. The decision process in Western democracies is way more complicated than in authoritarian regimes both internally to individual countries, and externally among allied countries. And Russia can interfere with Western and Ukrainian decision making through infowar more easily than the other way around. So Western commitments to Ukraine could end up being more problematic and conditional in the backstage than on the stage when the West must show unity for propaganda reasons. This is consistent with the persistent disagreements between Ukrainians and Western allies on how to deter Russia.

You don't "buy time" to suffer the same consequences later, perhaps even worse, you "buy time" to prepare a more favorable outcome. Using a negotiation to "buy time" would be understood by anyone in diplomatic, legal, and/or political circles as the goal is to buy time to prepare for an escalation of the conflict and not buy time in order to implement the spirt of the agreement (which makes no sense: you do not "buy time" in signing an agreement with the intention of fulfilling the agreement, just not now but maybe later?! It's not how anyone speaks with even a cursory experience with this kind of discourse). — boethius

I argued that Minsk Agreement served both purposes: reach and preserve a cease-fire while at the same time making Ukrainian more military ready in case of Russian escalation. They are not inherently incompatible, and both purposes took time (also the implementation of Minsk agreements, since it had to go through the internal Ukrainian political process and was obstructed by Russia). What I deny is that Merkel admitted in that interview to act provocatively toward Russia or to dupe Russia. This is a caricature of what she said, based on pro-Russian biased assumptions.

Had Merkel actually thought Ukraine negotiated Minsk with the intention to avoid a bigger war and was therefore implementing Minsk with the goal of avoiding a bigger war, but that, alas, supplying arms to Ukraine as part of that diplomatic strategy didn't work but fortunately Ukraine is now better able to deal with Russian bad faith vis-a-vis Minsk, she would have said something along those lines — boethius

Indeed, she said “something” along those lines. That’s what I’m arguing.

To take two important domains: in the ABM and INF situation, the West could offer in a negotiation to assuage Russian concerns of nuclear first strike, even in mutual beneficial ways that aim to create a new non-proliferation treaty architecture that is favourable also to the US (vis-a-vis not only Russia but also other nuclear or would-be-nuclear powers); and in the economic sphere obviously the West could approve Nord Stream II that Russia spent some 10 billion dollars building. In direct bilateral negotiations Ukraine cannot offer either of these things as leverage, only in negotiations that involve (at the least) the US and Germany could ABM, INF and Nord Stream II be on the table. — boethius

Russia may very well have agreed to favourable terms for Ukraine in not only the Donbas but even Crimea could have changed status (some sort of strange quasi status is had been floated at the time), if Nord Stream II was approved and also some nuclear deescalation (or then at least avoiding further nuclear escalation) which presumably the West should also want. Obviously plenty of other issues such as NATO and so on. — boethius

Here is a question for you: since Europe wouldn’t need a defense system against an anti-Western authoritarian regime as Russia is, then another way to get rid of NATO/Western defense system against Russia would and have been for Russia to turn into a pro-Western democratic regime, respectful of other pro-Western countries’ sovereignty? Russia could be like France and the UK a sovereign and nuclear power within the West strategic alliance. Russia could use its resources to improve material and political standards of life in Russia for the good of the Russians, enjoy a peaceful life as ex-imperial nations with other Western nations (like France, Germany, Spain, Japan) and still expand its sphere of influence in a cooperative way with the West (e.g. in Africa and Middle East). So what’s wrong with these scenarios from Russian perspective?

While you think about it, here my objections to your claims:

1) Let me notice that the US made its efforts to act cooperatively with Russia after 2008 see the Obama administration’s “Russian reset” which, among others, comprised Obama’s decision to turn down Bush’s plans to station an anti-ballistic missile systems in Poland and the Czech Republic (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6720153.stm). And Vladimir Putin said the decision was "correct and brave". (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_reset). And there was even a dedicated channel to address whatever Russia’s security concerns about NATO after the collapse of the Soviet Union, as established by the 1997 Founding Act (https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm). Besides there were margins for security cooperation in other areas of the globe, e.g. in fighting terrorism and stabilising the Middle East (especially, under Bush’s administration). Yet things deteriorated during the following years on different issues because NEITHER party could help but interfering in whatever the other party saw as its sphere of influence (it’s again Obama the one who approved the plans for the defense systems installed in Romania and Poland). Russia’s concerns in foreign policies are the same ones the US has, and such concerns have little to do with specific/circumscribed territorial and economic claims. They have to do with hegemonic competition at large, starting with those areas of the globe which both Russia and the US see as their proxy spheres of influence like in Europe and in Middle East. Security maximizers are prone to stretch and clash whenever they see an opportunity for weakening their competitors. What makes the difference is their resources to pressure competitors and attract clients. In other words, when states compete for hegemony there is no inherent reason to take opportunities for cooperation as a railroad toward greater stability. Indeed, weaker competitors could grow bolder and empowered through cooperation (as it is the case of Russia, China and Iran) and turn more aggressive, especially if they have historical humiliations to redeem.

2) Russia’s security concerns about the defense systems installed in Romania and Poland, here is what Stoltenberg said in 2016 :
Nor does the system represent any threat to Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent. Geography and physics both make it impossible for the NATO system to shoot down Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles. The interceptors are too few in number, and either too far south or too close to Russia to do so.
We have made this clear to the Russian authorities time and again. Yet Russia has declined all NATO proposals for cooperation on missile defence, including the establishment of joint centres and a regime to ensure missile defence transparency. Moscow unilaterally terminated dialogue with NATO on this issue in 2013. Source: https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/opinions_130662.htm?selectedLocale=en
In other words, Russia cornered itself into a position of no dialogue with NATO about security in Europe. The point is that the US can do the same with Russia, and obviously for very compelling reasons: the security system in Europe concerns all European countries not just Ukraine nor primarily Ukraine. So if Russia is perceived as a threat by other Europeans countries, the US can’t just sacrifice European security for Ukrainian security. And if any unilateral defensive move/request from Westerners can be claimed to be hostile/provocative if it can’t be vetoed at convenience by Russia, the West can do the same.

3) One thing I do not understand in your argument is the following: if Russia fears these defence systems, how annexing south-east Ukraine will prevent that if the rest of Ukraine can still join NATO? And even if Russia turned the whole of Ukraine into a neutral/demilitarized/puppet state, still those defence systems could be deployed in the Baltic States and in Finland. How can Russia prevent that without invading/attacking those countries? Besides Russia likely deployed nuclear weapon systems bordering NATO countries (https://www.kyivpost.com/post/36982), so why Russia’s deterrence should be prioritised over Western deterrence?

Now, it was presented by Western officials and media at the time that the reason to rebuke any Russian invitations to negotiate all the issues in play, a "new European security architecture" was that this was essentially as a favor to Ukraine in that the West wouldn't go "behind Ukraine's back" and negotiate things with the Russians. — boethius

I say all this not only because it is apropos but also Merkel would have known the purpose of US policy was to be provocative and not to try to reach a resolution with Russia. — boethius

Unless, Merkel would have known that the purpose of Russia’s was to be provocative and not to try to reach a resolution with the US, as it became blatant before the Russian invasion started:
The Russian leadership is demanding legally binding security guarantees from the US and NATO in two draft treaties. Key demands are, firstly, a commitment to refrain from undertaking any further Eastern enlargements of NATO, particularly with regard to Ukraine or other states within the region such as Georgia. This would entail withdrawing the prospect of membership offered at NATO’s Bucharest summit in 2008. Secondly, the Alliance should guarantee that it will not deploy any weaponry or military forces on the border with Russia. Thirdly, NATO should end its military cooperation with post-Soviet states and scale back its military forces to the 1997 level. This would mean no longer deploying military forces and weaponry in NATO countries that were not members of the Alliance in 1997. Moscow is therefore also demanding that NATO withdraw its multinational battlegroups from Poland and the Baltic states. Fourthly, the US should pull its nuclear weapons out of Europe and, fifthly, cease meddling in Russia’s internal affairs. Here, the Kremlin is referring to support for the so-called Colour Revolutions as part of a US democracy-building agenda.
Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has also made it clear that Moscow takes a critical view of any NATO accession by Finland and Sweden. The Russian leadership is thus extending its reach beyond the traditional post-Soviet sphere of influence and, by seeking to reduce NATO’s role in Europe, is striving for a dominant position in European security policy. Russia is no longer merely demanding a right of veto in all matters pertaining to European security, as called for in former President Dmitry Medvedev’s 2008 proposal for a treaty on a new European security architecture. Instead, THE AIM IS TO DRASTICALLY CURTAIL THE US’s ROLE IN EUROPE, to establish security guarantees for Moscow and to consolidate spheres of influence in Europe on a legally binding basis. Initial talks between the US and Russia on 10 January 2022 showed that such guarantees are unrealistic.
Source: https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/future-european-security-what-does-russia-want
BTW, anti-Americanism is also the reason why many, also in the West, and in this thread too (likely including you), take a pro-Russian stance. Even if Russia is evil, still it’s the US the Great Satan.

From an Italian newspaper:
Yaroslav Hrytsak: "Zelensky's popularity is at an all-time low because he doesn't tell us the truth. He treats us like children"

"the Ukrainian historian expresses strong criticism of the president: "He continues to repeat the heroic narrative of the first months, but no one here believes it anymore. He dreams of playing the role of the Ukrainian Churchill. He is more like Gorbachev: very popular at beginning of Perestroika, but then increasingly isolated; respected abroad, detested at home"

source: https://www.huffingtonpost.it/esteri/2024/10/08/news/hrytsak_la_popolarita_di_zelensky_e_ai_minimi_storici_perche_non_ci_dice_la_verita_ci_tratta_come_bambini-17370169/

Facing war in the Middle East and Ukraine the US looks feeble. But is it just an act? (The Guardian, 2024)

An interesting article that appeared in the Guardian (of all places) written by historian and writer Adam Tooze, echoing a sentiment that I have expressed in this thread pertaining to the nature of US actions in the current crises.

Tooze questions the surface-level appearance of the Biden administration as being incompetent, and instead hypothesizes that Biden's neocon administration is rolling out an elaborate strategy:

There is one school of thought that says the Biden administration is muddling through. It has no grand plan. It lacks the will or the means to discipline or direct either the Ukrainians or the Israelis. As a result, it is mainly focused on avoiding a third world war.

[...]

But what if that interpretation is too benign? What if it underestimates the intentionality on Washington’s part? What if key figures in the administration actually see this as a history-defining moment and an opportunity to reshape the balance of world power? What if what we are witnessing is the pivoting of the US to a deliberate and comprehensive revisionism by way of a strategy of tension? — Adam Tooze

And I agree with Tooze on various points.

I've made similar arguments pertaining to the crises in Ukraine and Israel - namely that Washington feigns weakness and reluctance, when in fact it is doubling down on all the policies that drive towards escalation in a way that suggests it is following a coherent strategy.

Countries outside the West have long understood this. These sentiments aren't exactly new. But what is interesting is the fact that a big Western media outlet would publish such an article.

Could it be that Europe is slowly starting to regain some of its geopolitical wits?

An interesting article that appeared in the Guardian (of all places) written by historian and writer Adam Tooze, echoing a sentiment that I have expressed in this thread pertaining to the nature of US actions in the current crises. — Tzeentch

I wouldn't say that. Tooze does not claim that the entire sequence of events is part of an elaborate long term US strategy. He acknowledges that in Ukraine and Israel, the US reacted to aggression. He also explicitly says that Russia miscalculated over Ukraine, assuming that the invasion would not cause the kind of reaction it did.

What he does argue is that the US is shaping it's response to these events deliberately and in concert with each other. This is a general assumption of competence with which it is hard to argue. The article is somewhat light on substance though. It offers few specific explanations for actions and no predictions.

If the US is revisionist, what can we expect the revised world order to look like? The article does not say unfortunately. Iran and Russia weakened seems like a safe assumption. But what's the significance for China, for example?

Personally, I am reserving judgement on this issue, though I am leaning towards the US being in the driver's seat.

The basic question is, could Israel be used to plunge the Middle-East into chaos once controlling it becomes unfeasible? — Tzeentch

Obviously you could use Israel for such a purpose as well as plenty other purposes which the US has and does.

However, the US has plenty of other ways of causing chaos in the Middle East. If it was just about causing chaos there are literally hundreds of pathways to chaos that don't involve paying such heavy prestige costs.

And even if you chose "have Israel attack people" as the pathway to chaos you simply wouldn't have them commit genocide in any rational plan.

Imagine all the same fighting, just no genocide: even better chaos! Without genocide you may actually be able to build a coalition to go fight Iran and have far less opposition to it at home as well.

Genocide not only solicits far higher resistance to your chaos machinations, but also causes massive cognitive dissonance within the US state apparatus itself, as "against-genocide" is a pretty core part of the US imperial proponent identity. "US is good because it defeated the Nazis who were committing genocide" is a pretty foundational plank of most pro-US-empire thinking.

Notwithstanding, the basic structure of Israel is near 100% imperial imposition by the British and then American empires and Israel is a sort of ersatz fractal copy of these empires

However, the argument that these particular recent events are not driven by some sort of plausibly objective US imperial policy is because nearly all the key decision makers in the US administration at the moment are zionists.

The US envoy to go negotiate with Lebanon is literally an Israeli military alumni! which is a massive indication that Zionists are running the show. Non-zionists US imperial custodians that are using Israel for their own purposes are extremely unlikely to do such a thing.

The general theme of causing more death and destruction in the middle-east is certainly on the to-do list of the CIA, but paying this high prestige costs simply doesn't make sense. Gaza has zero importance to the US empire as such, and you could have just as much fighting and chaos and just do some false flags to move things along while allowing food and water into the strip and refraining from bombing hospitals and schools. These war crimes and genocide in Gaza serve no US interest, they simply impose a cost that is super massively high for no benefit. Genocide in Gaza serves the purpose of getting rid of the Palestinians living there which is squarely and uniquely a Zionist interest.

The current situation is Israel drawing down US diplomatic capital (at an alarming rate if you're a non-Zionist US Imperialist) in order to commit genocide. There is zero return on investment to the US for this component of the violence.

And generally speaking Israel is not a critical US imperial asset, but mostly frustrates relations with far more important countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and the whole region is very much divided without the need for Israel. You only really need Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran to maintain a strategy of tension to prevent regional integration ... but you also have Afghanistan, Syria, Egypt, Libya, Iran, Pakistan and plenty non-state actors to boot!

Furthermore, if you consider all the US interventions in the Middle-East as the result of cold Imperial logic ... well Israel wasn't really needed in any of them: US invaded Afghanistan and Iraq without really needing Israel for anything to do that and when NATO wanted to bomb Libya into a failed state they just went ahead and commenced with the bombing. The one key "Imperial utility argument" Zionists made was guarding the flank of the Suez Canal ... that the US gave to Egypt anyways as that actually served the US Empire better.

It's also not the case that the US is somehow otherwise benefiting, such as being paid, to turn a blind eye to the genocide, such as the Saudis paying for a war against the Houthi's, but rather the US is paying Israel!

Imperial logic, aka. "Geopolitical strategy", is simply not as dominant a force as your studies have led you to believe.

For whom is it all for? Yes, there is an imperial strategy developed by professional bureaucrats that pretty much explicitly identify as humble custodians of the empire, and so what happens is in this framework, but they are not the primary beneficiaries of the empire, they just work for it. The primary beneficiaries, i.e the actual owners, of the empire do not have the same mindset but have their own personal objectives, usually to amass a lot of wealth: For example, massive wealth disparities and huge national debts are not good for imperial cohesion and finances ... so why do the rich get tax breaks and huge contracts paid by national debt? Because they run the show! If imperial maintenance and geopolitical strategy was a dominant factor determining policy then reckless Imperial finances wouldn't happen. The reason reckless imperial finances happen is because it transfers wealth from the empire to the effective owners of said empire and they happen to see that as a good thing.

For the case at hand, a large faction of the US imperial primary beneficiaries happen to be Zionists and so they are willing to convert Imperial capital to Zionist objectives. They may not be the majority dominant faction but they have prevented the formation of any anti-Zionist coalition from forming and so dominate policy through a plurality of power, at least when it comes to issues concerning Israel.

I've made similar arguments pertaining to the crises in Ukraine and Israel - namely that Washington feigns weakness and reluctance, when in fact it is doubling down on all the policies that drive towards escalation in a way that suggests it is following a coherent strategy. — Tzeentch

Agreed, the US is driving towards more escalation, but the strategy is not coherent.

As the RAND document recently discussed mentions: escalation in Ukraine only benefits US interests if Ukraine prevails, which is it extremely unlikely to. Ukraine losing would be a loss of prestige to the US and of course massive cost to Ukraine.

The Ukraine war benefits various US special interests in their short term profits as well as helping to protect the Biden family from the whole being bribed thing (best way to get rid of a political problem in a country is a force majeur giant war) and is also a general extension of neocon delusion.

There is zero "5D chess moves" happening.

The US is in classic imperial decline where the primary beneficiaries, mentioned above, are more concerned with drawing down imperial capital for their own purposes (aka. corruption) than they are in imperial maintenance.

Empires generally grow out of a solid political structure and culture based on hard, honest work and sacrifice for the common good and has developed various mechanisms to suppress corruption (as a small structure can obviously not prosper in corrupt conditions) in combination with an real or perceived external threat that can only be reasonably met (at least in this political structures thinking) with expansion. So Babylon v Persia, Rome v Carthage, Athens v Sparta, Mongols v China, England v France (and then Spain, and then Russia ... and then Germany ... twice), US v Japan and the Soviet Union, and so on. I simplify from memory but the basic pattern of imperial expansion is nearly always driven by fear of some enemy.

If there are economic fundamentals driving social integration then imperial expansion has a stable equilibrium around that economic integration and the empire transforms into what we would describe as a nation-state (such as ancient Egypt and China, which remain nation states today).

However, if the imperial expansion exceeds any economic justification and is simply extracting resources from a dominated periphery to a imperial core, then as soon as the political system is no longer under threat then the meritocratic system that built the system erodes and drawdown of imperial wealth for private interest commences. It is fear of being conquered that is a check on corruption and once that fear goes away then it is time to enjoy the fruits of imperial power.

Why this pattern is so common can be sourced to imperial exploitation (and what is necessary to maintain it) being incompatible with any sort of coherent theory of justice.

On the topic of Israel's genocide:

Arguably, ethnic cleansing and genocide are the only options the Israelis have left if they want to cling to their ethno-state ideal.

The fact that they are occupying millions of Palestinians makes them extremely vulnerable in a large-scale conflict since there is a good chance the Palestinian population would rise up and/or join in a partisan war.

That's the reason the US may tacitly approve of Israel's genocidal actions, since, if successful, it gets rid of a critical vulnerability of their Middle-Eastern proxy.

Of course, there is a cost to this as well. The question is how heavy that cost will be. It's entirely possible that we are overestimating the damage to US reputation and the consequences it has on the balance of power.

The idea that the US will somehow be 'punished' for supporting genocidal regimes may just be wishful thinking. Israel has been at this for decades, and it isn't the first genocidal regime that the US and allies have supported.


On the topic of geopolitical strategy:

The red thread throughout US Eurasian strategy today is the denial of land-based trade routes. The US wants Eurasian geopolitical rivals to be reliant on sea-based trade, since the US has an overwhelming advantage in naval power.

To deny a trade corridor, it is not always necessary for the US to control it directly or to completely deny it to the rival. Sowing chaos and conflict in these areas is often enough to stop trade from flowing.

In all the places that connect US geopolitical rivals to the rest of the world via land, we see long-standing US involvement, the most important ones being:

Eastern Europe, the Middle-East, the Caucasus and Central-Asia (Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan). Forever wars in these areas are perfectly suited for long-term denial of trade. Of course, the US does not want to fight these costly forever wars themselves - much better to let the Ukrainians, Europeans, Afghanis (etc.) and Israelis fight these wars for them.

Note that even a neutral actor like India had to suffer both of its land corridors (Pakistan and Bangladesh) falling under long-standing US influence.


Of course, in conjunction to this we see a very successful effort at the control/denial of sea-based trade as well, with the US and cronies completely boxing in China, and seeking to deprive Russia off its central position in the Black Sea.


Finally, there is another element to US global strategy which involves stopping regional powers from rising. The theme here being: the US is unable to divert its attention to many powerful actors at the same time, so must work pre-emptively to keep potential regional powers weak.

Iraq was one such potential regional power. Iran is another. The US has been interested in curbing both of these nations since the end of WW2. This is of course where US and Israeli geopolitical strategy meet.

These countries are also somewhat unique is that they are both a potential regional powers (Iran already is a regional power) and they are located on a vital trade corridor.

This is especially problematic for the US, because destabilizing a regional power is much more difficult, which is why it now is using Israel. Israel is able to cause a lot of chaos with its intelligence aparatus, high-tech military and nuclear arsenal.

All indicators are that (unlike Iraq) Iran has slipped the window of a US intervention (mostly because Chinese pressure in the Pacific is keeping the US from being able to commit elsewhere in the world), so the US must now rely on harsher means to protect its interests.

Unfortunately I don't have the time right now to go through the long list of reasons why the genocide being some cryptic US plan is extremely unlikely.

To be clear, this is not because anyone important in US decision making has any problem with mass-death and genocide per se, and there are plenty of examples where the cost of senseless mass murder is indeed low as you point out.

But the basic framework that you may find worth considering is simply that few policies are actually explained by geopolitical strategy.

For example, if you really cared about geopolitics:

- you wouldn't give-up the draft
- you would have universal health-care (to have a healthy population to mobilize if need be, like Israel does)
- you would have free secondary education so as to self-produce your own intellectual class (like Israel does) and not rely on foreign intellectuals that can bring back your cutting edge expertise back to their country of origin legally or illegally (as China is happy to do)
- you wouldn't transfer all the means of production to communist China
- you wouldn't go into huge national debts
- you would keep strategically critical industries you invented, such as semiconductor manufacturing, on-shore and definitely wouldn't send all that stuff to Taiwan
- you wouldn't maintain a war on drugs that is turning one of you neighbours into a narco-state and creating a massive con and ex-con population that are sub-optimally contributing to society and unavailable for conscription
- you wouldn't poison your own population making them unfit for conscription
- most of all you would fight corruption inside your institutions like the plague as corruption leads to wasted recourses, treasonous rats, and general incompetence as well as inability to manage an actual crisis

You can easily understand the reasons for all such policies by envisioning a geopolitics game with options like "poison or don't poison your own population" and "give-up the draft or don't give up the draft" and "balance the budget or go into extreme debt" and the obvious consequences of such decisions over the long term (aka. obviously maintaining a healthy, educated population, with sound general finances, guarding jealously industrial capacity in particular at the cutting edge, and low corruption is going to provide an advantage in the geopolitics game).

So, how to explain America does none of that shit?

It's because geopolitics is not the priority. Geopolitics is there, some people are paid to think about it, sure, but it is not the driver of decision making.

What is? Transferring the wealth of the empire to the primary beneficiaries of the system through a network of corruption.

Mostly that wealth is just money but on occasion the real owners want something else and in this case it's cover to perpetrate a genocide.

The alternative just doesn't make any sense.

For example, the idea you mention that the US wants Israel to solve its proxies strategic weakness of Palestinians being in Gaza. First, how is this genocide doing that? Israel is going to have far more radicalized proxies on its borders from committing a genocide and not less. And second, solve that strategic weakness to do what exactly? Conquer the whole Middle-East in a giant US-Israeli war on everyone and then occupy the place forever? US was literally just occupying Afghanistan and Iraq for decades and that didn't really accomplish anything and they left ... so the idea here is the US actually wants to return and by doing it with Israel instead of literally all of NATO (which includes several countries 10x bigger than Israel) it's going to work out better somehow? It just makes no sense.

If the idea was to pave the way for the US to reenter the Middle East ... well then why give Afghanistan back to the Taliban in the first place? And how exactly is a genocide needed to achieve that? How is a genocide in Gaza going to enable the US to reinvade the Middle-East ... which there's no indication the US will do and completely unclear what exactly they'd be doing, trying to conquer Iran in a multi-year war that is likely to fail?

If it's just causing enough division and chaos to avoid land-trade-corridors, how has that not already been achieved? And again, why would a genocide be needed to achieve that?

Genocide in Gaza is simply not a US interest no matter how you look at it, it has only immense liabilities and no upside even from a super cynical point of view (for example the point of view where sacrificing hundreds of thousands of weapons while drip feeding them weapons to "calibrate" the fighting at "lose" all while telling them they're fighting for Western values and "whatever it takes" and "however long it takes" knowing those are lies, we can see the basic imperial logic of separating Russian resources from the European economy, maybe harming Russia; may not be the best Imperial moves but we can understand the motivations), and if the US was somehow in command all the fighting and chaos we've seen is completely 100% totally feasible to have without a genocide, bombing hospitals and schools systematically and so on.

Genocide in Gaza is a Zionist interest, not a US imperial interest. If there was something the US was getting (money or something) then maybe we could conclude that the US is trading cover for the genocide in order to get that said thing (such as money) but that's not the case. It's the US paying Israel hard cash to carry out the genocide that Israel wants to commit. And Israel is 100% dependent on the US so there is simply not a situation where the US would need to "give Israel a genocide" to get Israel to do something in return ... such as continue to be a source of tension in the Middle-East.

People have been studying and analyzing geopolitics for a long time, with a lot of focus on the US; if there was some US geopolitical advantage for carrying out a genocide in Gaza various analysts would have pointed it out. It hasn't been pointed out because it makes no sense and trying to make sense of it post-murderous-festum is grasping at straws to avoid the obvious conclusion that the US empire is thoroughly rotten and on it's way down, making lots of blunders mostly due to pervasive corruption, and not in some brilliant counter-stroke re-ascendency.

For example, the war in Ukraine at least fits some sort of Imperial logic as we've been discussing for hundred of pages. Maybe a big mistake, but the general Imperial ideas are easy to understand. What's also indisputable (when the actual facts are under consideration) is that the US drove this process to war and it's a deliberate policy decision by the US and at no point is somehow Ukraine driving US policy.

And what do we see? We easily find discussion of exactly this war that is happening in US policy analysis documents literally called "Extending Russia" as well neocons discussing conflict with Russia in one form or another for years and years. In addition there's years of anti-Russian propaganda, CIA and neocon fingerprints all over the place (including literally on cookies handed out in Maidan Square ... and also 12 CIA forward operating bases) and the list goes on.

With the genocide in Gaza there's none of that. There's no analysis of how Hamas is somehow standing in the way of critical US interests, most of all there's not "programming" of what comes next, everything is a surprise. It's just not the CIA way. If the CIA wanted to go to war with Hamas, Houthis, Hezbollah, Iran, we would have been talking about this for quite some time, the reasons would be clear, we'd have built up to it: Obama would not have signed the nuke deal and then Trump would not have been criticized by the mainstream media for backing out of it, and the logic and need to go to war with all of Israel's enemies would have been made clear and the drums of war would have been beating for quite some time and the march to war would be underway to thunderous applause and it would be clearly explained by Biden the need for these new wars.

Also just a quick note that if my analysis is correct and Zelensky's days as a Western magical money faucet is in fact over, as it seems to be (certainly getting close), then a coup will be happening shortly.

Nearly a month has gone from the last commentary on this thread. It seems quite bleak for Ukraine at this time. As still a lot of things can happen, there are also worrisome signs that Trump team might want a similar peace deal like the Doha agreement in February 2020. It's very unlikely that Trump will truly pressure Russia, because that would totally go against everything he has communicated. The last thing the Trump voters would want is an escalation, further commitment and more money put into the war. When US Presidents (Obama, Trump) have promised to draw down something, that isn't the best negotiation stance to have with an enemy that can simply wait out and continue.

Hence I started a thread Why Americans lose wars as there are parallels to Afghanistan and the Vietnam war.

Of course, I may be wrong. And hopefully I would be wrong, actually...

Nearly a month has gone from the last commentary on this thread. — ssu

Events have resolved all the key issues of disagreement.

It seems quite bleak for Ukraine at this time. — ssu

It was bleak since rejecting negotiations and committing to a long war.

It's very unlikely that Trump will truly pressure Russia, because that would totally go against everything he has communicated. — ssu

Trump hasn't even said he's going to pressure Russia. Unless I've missed something, Tump has mostly just said he'll end the war.

When US Presidents (Obama, Trump) have promised to draw down something, that isn't the best negotiation stance to have with an enemy that can simply wait out and continue. — ssu

Well, that's assuming the US even cares about the results of these kinds of negotiations. Once the decision is made to get out of a war, what's there to negotiate from a US perspective? The rights of the people they're abandoning?

Hence I started a thread Why Americans lose wars as there are parallels to Afghanistan and the Vietnam war. — ssu

I'll add my thoughts when I have the time, but I think we agree on the basics.

Of course, I may be wrong. And hopefully I would be wrong, actually... — ssu

Doubtful you are wrong. Losing wars is where the money is.

And now Ukraine can send missiles into Russia.

Great.

I think this recent move by the US to allow Ukraine to use US arms to strike targets deep inside Russia blatantly shows their escalatory intentions.

At this point in time, Ukraine is lost and will soon be pressured to the negotiating table by Trump. Even though I understand that it will be a painful process for Ukraine, I consider it to be in Ukraine's best interest. The alternative is an even longer war with an even bleaker outlook, from which Ukraine stands to gain absolutely nothing.

The Biden administration is plainly trying to make such a process impossible by attempting to deteriorate and escalate the situation to a point where negotiations are no longer an option.

Washington desires war, and this is what they had envisioned since the start of the conflict in 2008, when they deliberately set out to violate Russian red lines - this is what I have argued for months, if not years by now.

Everyone can see that any further expansion of military aid to Ukraine at this point is too little too late, and won't change the situation on the battlefield.

Meanwhile, the Russians have been warning NATO about the seriousness with which they regard this particular escalation, saying that they would consider this move to put Russia directly at war with NATO - aka World War 3. This blatantly puts all of Europe into the crosshairs of Russian retaliation, and for what?

I think this recent move by the US to allow Ukraine to use US arms to strike targets deep inside Russia blatantly shows their escalatory intentions. — Tzeentch

11,000 to 100,000 North Korean soldiers muddies the political waters. These special ops troops infiltrate and assassinate.

Nevertheless, this madness must end at the negotiation table.

1000 days in. The Kremlin still hasn't gotten their way.

Frachon opines:

With Trump in the White House, Charles de Gaulle's prophecy is coming true: One day, the US will leave the Old Continent
^{— Alain Frachon · Le Monde · Nov 7, 2024}

Well, Ukraine didn't wait for long. First ATACMs attack on an ammo dump in Karachev. Which Putin says that NATO and the US are fighting Russia (While Trump insists that all the talk of Russia being a danger is "deepstater talk").

These limitations of use of weapons is similar thinking just like during the Vietnam war where the US made limitations for itself. How Joe Biden has been so afraid of Putin, when the other way around Russians haven't been afraid of him.

Cable lines cut in the Baltic Sea. Between Germany and Finland and also Sweden and Lithuanina, so it's that time of the year for some hybrid attacks.

Yeah it was very quick and as far as I know, not very effective.

Just not a good idea. But I believe we have different takes on this war.

Two nations are flaunting the fact that "their missiles" are hitting targets in Russia: the US and the UK.

What did they achieve?

Nothing, except for the fact that Putin has stated in September they would consider themselves to be at war with NATO if this were to transpire, with which he refered to their nuclear doctrine which undoubtedly prescribes that in the event of a war with another nuclear-armed power, Russian nukes should be ready 24/7 to deliver a 'second strike'.

How do Europeans sleep, knowing they're the playing chips with which the US and the UK are pursuing these types of escalations?

And now Ukraine can send missiles into Russia. — Manuel

They have been doing that for a while, albeit with more limited range.

At this point in time, Ukraine is lost and will soon be pressured to the negotiating table by Trump. Even though I understand that it will be a painful process for Ukraine, I consider it to be in Ukraine's best interest. The alternative is an even longer war with an even bleaker outlook, from which Ukraine stands to gain absolutely nothing. — Tzeentch

So is Ukraine "lost" or can they negotiate? Those two statements seem to contradict each other.

This is horrifying. Worse that many American and some Europeans think this is a good idea - not all of them to be clear.

I don't understand how people think this is good. We are standing at the precipice of annihilation.

How do Europeans sleep, knowing they're the playing chips with which the US and the UK are pursuing these types of escalations? — Tzeentch

People of the UK are Europeans, actually. :wink:

To have peace, simply prepare for war: Si vis pacem, parabellum. Deterrence stops Putin. Appeasement won't.

For example the Swedes sent all of the residents living in Sweden a booklet called "In case of crisis or war" just a few days ago. It is published in many languages and also English, which can be read here:

In case of crisis or war



It's very similar to what the Finnish government educates to it's citizens in the case of war or crisis. And an interesting booklet for the American prepper to view how Europeans think about preparedness. Sweden and Finland both have this thing called "total defense". What I like is that the Swedish government dedicated one page to pets that people have.

If you have pets

You are responsible for the care and wellbeing of
your pet in the event of crisis or war. Make sure you
have supplies at home to last at least a week.
In the event of an air raid, you may bring your pet to protective
structures like cellars, garages and metro stations. If you must leave
your pet at home – and it can manage free access to food – leave
additional food and water.

This is horrifying. Worse that many American and some Europeans think this is a good idea - not all of them to be clear.

I don't understand how people think this is good. We are standing at the precipice of annihilation. — Manuel

We stood at the precipice of annihilation during the Cuban missile crisis or on the few occasions when a detection error almost set off a nuclear exchange. The current situation doesn't seem remotely close to those situations.

Ukrainians have been killing russian soldiers and destroying russian installations using western weapons for years now. Russia could have used a nuclear weapon at any point, yet to what end?