• Baden
    16.3k
    what really is 'physical'? Is the brain physical?Wayfarer

    Yes, the term really only makes sense at the macro-level. In the quantum sphere, the physical is as spooky as idealism sounds to materialists. So, physicalist fundamentalists kind of want to have their cake and eat it too (an ironic possibility only available to them if they were sub-atomic particles).
  • Baden
    16.3k


    The fundamental reality of the physicalist boils down to, at the finest level, the mathematically inferred or imagined, not the empirically observable, and even the finest level of the empirically observable does not obey the rules on which the subtextual justification for physicalism rests, i.e. common sense interactions with wordly dry goods on a macro scale. Again, physicalists ride in on horses and expect to unproblematically ride out on unicorns. When questioned, they tell us unicorns are horses too, and so the equine world is united once more, and we can stop worrying about the ficititious animals of pesky dualists and idealists.

    It's all so tiresome.
  • ucarr
    1.5k


    ...whether we do harm to things or not should be more than feelings. Just because I feel disgust at something doesn't mean I should kill it. Just because something makes me happy doesn't mean I should embrace it. For me, it is a respect for its agency, the fact that despite all the odds that get thrown at every life, it has survived until now. Why should I harm or end it over something as trivial as just an emotion?Philosophim

    From the above I understand the theme of your response to my first of two main conjectures to be "difference." My counter-narrative to your theme is "continuity."

    So, your narrative propounds the discontinuity of extra-categorical modal difference whereas my counter-narrative propounds the continuity of intra-categorical intra-modal connectedness.

    Let me attempt to translate the above sentence into plain-spoken English: with your theme, a collection of things are grouped into separate categories, with the assumption there is no connectedness between the categories. As an example, consider a group of apples in one category and a group of oranges in another category.

    What you have done, I think, is equate feelings with apples for one of your categories and equate thoughts with oranges for another one of your categories.

    In my counter-narrative, I claim that feelings and thoughts belong to one category: cognition. The difference between these members of one category is by degree, and therefore not by category.

    To elaborate, to have a feeling about something means having thought about something with a relatively small amount of detail, or low resolution. On the other hand, to have a profound understanding about something means having reflected on something towards amassing a large amount of detail, or high resolution.

    When we compare low-resolution feelings with high-resolution thoughts, it’s like comparing a low-resolution digital image of something with a high-resolution version of the same image. That they are the same image establishes their mutual membership within one category: a specific image. The difference between them is not extra-categorical and modal, but rather intra-categorical and extensional.

    The fancy logical term for your theme of difference by category is “intentional:” the properties that something needs to have in order to be counted as a member of a specified category.

    Your theme argues that feelings and thoughts are intentionally disconnected; my theme argues that feelings and thought are intentionally connected.

    That your theme overstates the difference of feelings and thoughts by degree with respect to difference-as-disconnection is evidenced by:

    There are plenty of people in life I don't understand. And I'm sure there are plenty of people in life who don't understand me. Bonding often comes from like goals. Survival, or accomplishing a task together require a closeness and understanding of another person up to a point to get this done. It does not require me to understand exactly what another person is experiencing in life.Philosophim

    I assert this is an overstatement of the degree of difference_disconnection separating feelings from thoughts in terms of people understanding each other and moreover, it is therefore an overstatement of the degree of sameness_connection necessary for a human to know what it’s like to be a bat.

    As you say, you can bond with another human without knowing exactly what it’s like to be the other person. Nonetheless, to a degree, you do know what it’s like to be another person. And likewise, to a degree, you do know what it’s like to be a bat.

    Highly technical, very abstract thoughts about moral principles are directly connected to intuitive feelings about how we should treat other innocent beings. Without this direct connection, moral principles become empty and therefore meaningless.

    I assert there is no impenetrable membrane called what-it’s-like-to-be-an-individualized-self. It’s this mistaken belief that creates the hard problem. It's this mistaken belief that falsely divides subjective from objective. Clearly, the selfhood of the self is the object of that selfsame self's consciousness.

    I assert there is a reasonably accurate one-size-fits-all-what-it’s-like-to-be-selfhood, accessible to many if not all sentients, that supports the sympathy and morals essential to the peaceable animal kingdom and civilization.
  • Wayfarer
    22.4k
    It's all so tiresome.Baden

    Well, true, but I still think calling it out serves a purpose. I’m trying to get the point across that why it seems so obvious that only the physical can be real, is because of the way the problem has been set up in our culture. It is why when the question is asked ‘what alternative is there?’ the expectation is that the answer must necessarily entail something spooky. That’s why the task is to show how we got here. And actually I think that is very much what Chalmer’s essay was about in the first place.

    Splendid unicorn analogy, by the way. :up:
  • Baden
    16.3k
    he expectation is that the answer must necessarily entail something spooky.Wayfarer

    I won't develop the point here as we're drifting off-topic, but what's considered spooky for the physicalists are just the metaphysical assumptions that are not theirs, and there are at least a couple of big ones that are no less "spooky" than those of their major opponents.
  • Philosophim
    2.6k
    ↪Philosophim I posted a response yesterday:
    To say that mind is not reducible to physical constituents, is not to posit some ethereal substance or 'ghost in the machine' (if that is what 'soul' means to you)...
    Wayfarer

    Yes, I understood that was how you believed I was approaching this. But that doesn't answer how you are approaching this. If it is not a soul, what is it? How Is it different than just a descriptor of personal subjective experiences we all try to hash out with each other?

    Information would be a good candidate in our scientific age. 'Information is information, not matter or energy', said one of founders of computer science. 'No materialism which does not admit this can survive at the present day.' Why? Because the same information can be encoded in completely different material forms, and yet still retain its meaning.Wayfarer

    I'm sure they're a great programmer, but not a great epistemologist. I've noted this in the past, but I'll repeat it again. Knowledge only exists expressed in some medium to be interpreted by something else. He's noting information as 'a Platonic form'. What is the form of Bach's first symphony? Does it exist out there as something ethereal, expressed in something other than matter or energy? Maybe it does, but it would have be expressed in that third unknown type of reality.

    Otherwise Bach's first symphony can be expressed as information on paper, bits, pictures, and the instruments its played on. Every time its played, that is a unique expression and interpretation of the symphony. Our brain is matter and energy, so too are those concepts. Without a brain to think of them, they are gone.

    I think the issue we have as people, and why this idea of the immaterial keeps coming back up, is because we shortcut a lot of concepts to be manageable in day to day life. We have a very active imagination, and are able to cut out the solid reality undergirding those concepts when we get excited at trying to apply them outside of our minds. We get excited at a concept that seems logical in our head, it excites us, and so we want to believe its real. This is great if it is then used as an impetus for exploration, careful application, and the willingness to amend it as tests come back with failures or unforeseen consequences. But if we start to elevate the concepts themselves of applicable testing, we fall into an illusion of holding something true, when it does not deserve it.

    When I say that living organisms display attributes and characteristics that cannot be extracted from the laws of chemistry and physics alone, I'm pointing to the fact that organisms are fundamentally different from machines. Unlike machines, which serve purposes imposed on them from the outside, living organisms exhibit intrinsic agency and functional autonomy.Wayfarer

    That's simply because we don't program most machines to be this way. I think you're confusing the fact that we design machines, and we don't often design them with intrinsic agency and functional autonomy.
    If we want to program something with limited internal agency, we can. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hCmrMOzx5VA
    We set AI to have goals, and to learn over repeated attempts. While the game is a simple example, we use it to teach machines as well.

    Now you might think we're different, but we're really not by much. We have emotions and internal processes that drive us don't we? If you're hungry enough, you'll eat. Gotta pee? You find a way to do that. A child pees wherever until they learn just like a brand new AI that has basic functionality. And that's all a physical process. Noting that we have agency is not the same as demonstrating why that agency is separate from our physical brain.

    This fundamental distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic purpose is key to understanding why organisms cannot be reduced to mere physical or chemical mechanisms.Wayfarer

    Its an identity distinction, and there is nothing in the application of this distinction that notes that our functional autonomy is not physical. Just because you can have the idea that its somehow separate, does not mean you've demonstrated that this idea works when applied. Can you show how human autonomy can exist apart from the brain? That's the real question here.

    I’m trying to get the point across that why it seems so obvious that only the physical can be real, is because of the way the problem has been set up in our culture. It is why when the question is asked ‘what alternative is there?’ the expectation is that the answer must necessarily entail something spooky.Wayfarer

    I'm asking the question, "What alternative is there?" and not expecting it to be spooky from you in particular. Your challenge is to demonstrate the existence of something that is not matter and energy. Saying, "I don't think matter and energy explains everything" is not enough.
  • Wayfarer
    22.4k
    If it is not a soul, what is it?Philosophim

    A form of existence that is aware of itself.

    Knowledge only exists expressed in some medium to be interpreted by something elsePhilosophim

    Well, for a start that is not true, because we all know many things that are never expressed.

    If you take a piece of information, be it a formula, a story, a recipe, or whatever, it can be translated between different media such as binary data, handwritten, engraved in brass and so on. The information remains the same while the material form is completely different. So the information is not material.

    Its an identity distinction, and there is nothing in the application of this distinction that notes that our functional autonomy is not physical.Philosophim

    Nothing that can be described only in terms of physics exhibits those atttributes. Taking all of the known laws of physics, there is no way you could arrive at a functional description of an organism.

    Your challenge is to demonstrate the existence of something that is not matter and energy.Philosophim

    Your arguments, tendentious though they may be.
  • Mark Nyquist
    774

    You really do believe information exists outside a physical form?
    A piece of information?

    A non-physical that exists with no physically supporting mechanism?

    And all the various media have interactions with brains as a common denominator. The 'piece of information' doesn't move supernaturally from media to media but brains always guide the process.
    It really is a chain of physical events in all cases of information transfer.

    A printed page is just physical pattern.
    Brains are involved encoding and decoding.
    Just identify brains as supporting non-physical content in the process and things work fine with no mystery elements like unsupported "information".

    Information and consciousness are both physically Instantiated non-physicals. It's the only possibility. Seems like a common theme with overlap between information as it exists and consciousness.
    Mostly a problem of definitions, boundaries and semantics at the fundamental level.....
  • Wayfarer
    22.4k
    A printed page is just physical pattern.
    Brains are involved encoding and decoding.
    Mark Nyquist

    No kidding. But the judgement that is involved in making that argument is not physical. If you want to arrive at any understanding of what 'physical' actually means, you need to exercise judgement - if this, then that; this must mean that; and so on. None of that is part of the curriculum or subject matter of physics as such. If you want to look for how brains encode those simple logical steps in neurophysiological terms, well, good luck with that. Because you'll already be using the very faculty that you're wanting to explain.
  • Mark Nyquist
    774

    Alright.
    I might tend to physicalism, but if you are saying our mental worlds are what drives thing... I do agree.
  • Philosophim
    2.6k
    If it is not a soul, what is it?
    — Philosophim

    A form of existence that is aware of itself.
    Wayfarer

    Thank you, this is a good answer. That's a theory, which is fine. If the brain is aware of itself, and the brain is matter and energy, then matter and energy in the right circumstances can be aware of itself. How is this inadequate? Is there evidence of some existence that is not matter and energy that is aware of itself that we know of?

    If you take a piece of information, be it a formula, a story, a recipe, or whatever, it can be translated between different media such as binary data, handwritten, engraved in brass and so on. The information remains the same while the material form is completely different. So the information is not material.Wayfarer

    You conceive of an identity that ties commonalities between these physical things together, while removing the physical aspects of them. The idea of an abstraction does not entail an actual abstraction that exists apart from matter and energy. Again, if you could show how information can exist apart from any matter or energy, try to do so.

    What you're doing is saying, "I can think of information as if its not tied to any physical medium, therefore information can exist not tied to any physical medium." Just like I can think of a unicorn that cannot be sensed or detected through its magic, but cannot prove such a thing exists. Please don't take this as belittling, I'm simply trying to give a clear example of the issue here. It is a very common mistake for us to assume because we can come up with a concept that seems logical and has nothing outright contradicting it in our head, that it is a viable reality outside of our head.

    So again, I can have an idea of Bach's first symphony, and we are going with the idea that ideas are matter and energy in the brain. I can have it expressed as notes on a page. I can have it expressed by the playing of a tuba. How does the information of Bach's first symphony exists apart from matter and energy? Can you point to it? How is this not a Platonic form with all the logical problems that it brings?

    Its an identity distinction, and there is nothing in the application of this distinction that notes that our functional autonomy is not physical.
    — Philosophim

    Nothing that can be described only in terms of physics exhibits those atttributes. Taking all of the known laws of physics, there is no way you could arrive at a functional description of an organism.
    Wayfarer

    Alright, then try to counter these points, because these points note that our autonomy is physical.

    1. Drugs that affect mood and decisions. A person getting cured of schizophrenia by medication for example.

    2. The removal of the brain or physical processes that result in life from the brain, and the inability of autonomy to persist.

    3. Brain damage resulting in differing behaviors and consciousness. For example:

    "In ‘split-brain’ patients, the corpus callosum has been surgically cut to alleviate intractable, severe epilepsy. One of the Nobel Prize-winning discoveries in neuroscience is that severing the corpus callosum leads to a curious phenomenon (Fig. 1): when an object is presented in the right visual field, the patient responds correctly verbally and with his/her right hand. However, when an object is presented in the left visual field the patient verbally states that he/she saw nothing, and identifies the object accurately with the left hand only (Gazzaniga et al., 1962; Gazzaniga, 1967; Sperry, 1968, 1984; Wolman, 2012). This is concordant with the human anatomy; the right hemisphere receives visual input from the left visual field and controls the left hand, and vice versa (Penfield and Boldrey, 1937; Cowey, 1979; Sakata and Taira, 1994). Moreover, the left hemisphere is generally the site of language processing (Ojemann et al., 1989; Cantalupo and Hopkins, 2001; Vigneau et al., 2006). Thus, severing the corpus callosum seems to cause each hemisphere to gain its own consciousness "

    https://academic.oup.com/brain/article/140/5/1231/2951052

    Your challenge is to demonstrate the existence of something that is not matter and energy.
    — Philosophim

    Your arguments, tendentious though they may be.
    Wayfarer

    This is not biased, nor even really my argument. If you're going to claim that something exists which is not physical, it is normal to point out any evidence for what it is, and/or why the claim that "X is physical" is unreasonable.
  • Philosophim
    2.6k
    There are plenty of people in life I don't understand. And I'm sure there are plenty of people in life who don't understand me. Bonding often comes from like goals. Survival, or accomplishing a task together require a closeness and understanding of another person up to a point to get this done. It does not require me to understand exactly what another person is experiencing in life.
    — Philosophim

    I assert this is an overstatement of the degree of difference_disconnection separating feelings from thoughts in terms of people understanding each other and moreover, it is therefore an overstatement of the degree of sameness_connection necessary for a human to know what it’s like to be a bat.
    ucarr

    That is because we are different people. Ucarr, I feel very little similarity in myself to other people. I know objectively that I am. But my feelings are worthless. I do not feel what some call "connections" with other people. If I listened to my feelings I would be a lone hermit, and perfectly content to do so. Fortunately, I understand that actions and consequences are far more important than feelings in life.

    I am not trying to discount the fact that some aspects of consciousness can be similar. I'm just noting that similarity is not necessary for morality.

    I assert there is no impenetrable membrane called what-it’s-like-to-be-an-individualized-self. It’s this mistaken belief that creates the hard problem. It's this mistaken belief that falsely divides subjective from objective. Clearly, the selfhood of the self is the object of that selfsame self's consciousness.

    I assert there is a reasonably accurate one-size-fits-all-what-it’s-like-to-be-selfhood, accessible to many if not all sentients, that supports the sympathy and morals essential to the peaceable animal kingdom and civilization.
    ucarr

    This is a nice thought, but can we demonstrate this to be something known, or will it only remain a belief?
  • Wayfarer
    22.4k
    If the brain is aware of itself, and the brain is matter and energy, then matter and energy in the right circumstances can be aware of itself. How is this inadequate? Is there evidence of some existence that is not matter and energy that is aware of itself that we know of?Philosophim

    Because you could never arrive at an understanding of it through physics and chemistry, which is the analysis of matter and enegy. You do understand that all you're arguing for - in fact, pretty well all you ever argue for - is what is called 'physicalist reductionism', don't you? Physicalist reductionism is the view that everything that exists, including complex phenomena like consciousness and life, can ultimately be explained in terms of physical entities, such as matter and energy, and their interactions. It holds that all higher-level properties (such as mental states or biological functions) are reducible to, and can be fully understood by, the underlying physical processes described by the laws of physics and chemistry. In this framework, there is no need to posit non-physical substances or properties. That's basically your view, and you can stick with it, I'm done with debating it.
  • Philosophim
    2.6k
    If the brain is aware of itself, and the brain is matter and energy, then matter and energy in the right circumstances can be aware of itself. How is this inadequate? Is there evidence of some existence that is not matter and energy that is aware of itself that we know of?
    — Philosophim

    Because you could never arrive at an understanding of it through physics and chemistry, which is the analysis of matter and energy.
    Wayfarer

    Isn't the physics of a note an air vibration against a metal Tuba? Have we not made Bach's first symphony over the radio, which is essentially a physical radio wave that interacts with a radio, vibrations, and can be calculated through physics? This broad claim is not good enough Wayfarer, and doesn't actually answer the question. Not answering the question is the same as saying, "No". You need to demonstrate why example's I've given of matter and energy being aware of itself are false. I gave you three to tackle. If you choose not to tackle them, that's your call. But I have been more than fair in presenting what would be needed to help your point gain footing.

    You do understand that all you're arguing for - in fact, pretty well all you ever argue for - is what is called 'physicalist reductionism', don't you?Wayfarer

    It doesn't matter what its called. I just care about the logic. And we're not really talking about my viewpoints, but yours. I'm asking you to present evidence for your viewpoints that makes them a viable logical alternative to explore then what is commonly known today. If you cannot, then it is your viewpoints, not mine, that are circumspect.

    In this framework, there is no need to posit non-physical substances or properties.Wayfarer

    If there is no need to posit non-physical substances or properties, and this is a sound and logical position to hold, why should anyone hold anything else? I'm not married to it, but you're not presenting anything that shakes its foundations. If you're done, that's fine. But if you want to give it another stab, feel free.
  • Janus
    16.2k
    what really is 'physical'? Is the brain physical?
    — Wayfarer

    Yes, the term really only makes sense at the macro-level. In the quantum sphere, the physical is as spooky as idealism sounds to materialists.
    Baden

    This seems like a misunderstanding. Quantum phenomena have discernible, even measurable effects. That is what qualifies them as 'physical'. The seeming spookiness arises when we seek to apply macro physical concepts to micro phenomena.

    What is the form of Bach's first symphony?Philosophim

    As far as I know Bach composed no symphonies. Concertos yes.

    You do understand that all you're arguing for - in fact, pretty well all you ever argue for - is what is called 'physicalist reductionism', don't you?
    — Wayfarer

    It doesn't matter what its called. I just care about the logic. And we're not really talking about my viewpoints, but yours
    Philosophim

    When arguments fail tendentious categorization sets in. :roll:
  • Janus
    16.2k
    I assert there is no impenetrable membrane called what-it’s-like-to-be-an-individualized-self. It’s this mistaken belief that creates the hard problem. It's this mistaken belief that falsely divides subjective from objective. Clearly, the selfhood of the self is the object of that selfsame self's consciousness.

    I assert there is a reasonably accurate one-size-fits-all-what-it’s-like-to-be-selfhood, accessible to many if not all sentients, that supports the sympathy and morals essential to the peaceable animal kingdom and civilization.
    — ucarr

    This is a nice thought, but can we demonstrate this to be something known, or will it only remain a belief?
    Philosophim

    I would agree with ucarr that the basic sense of self is plausibly thought to be the same across species. Obviously this is not an empirically checkable assertion. It seems that almost nothing in philosophy is.
  • ucarr
    1.5k


    I assert there is a reasonably accurate one-size-fits-all-what-it’s-like-to-be-selfhood, accessible to many if not all sentients, that supports the sympathy and morals essential to the peaceable animal kingdom and civilization.ucarr

    This is a nice thought, but can we demonstrate this to be something known, or will it only remain a belief?Philosophim

    There are plenty of people in life I don't understand. And I'm sure there are plenty of people in life who don't understand me.Philosophim

    It is known by you what it's like to be a person.

    It is known that the transitive property can be configured with word arrangements that make valid statements: If a = b and c = b, then a = c. I can take this word arrangement and apply it to you: If Philosophim = person and Joe Blow = person, then Philosophim = Joe Blow (to the extent of the standard of measurement known as person).

    Survival, or accomplishing a task together require a closeness and understanding of another person up to a point to get this done.Philosophim

    Two persons understand each other to a limited degree because they share important attributes common to personhood.

    We share our stories because the bond of human identity allows us to walk a mile in each others' shoes. How much we relate to another person varies widely, but the connection rarely drops to zero.
  • Wayfarer
    22.4k
    The only point I will add, is that this claim from your first post:

    The idea that consciousness is caused by our physical brains is the easy problem. The hard problem is, "Will we ever know what it is like to BE a conscious individual that isn't ourselves".Philosophim

    Is factually incorrect. Chalmer’s argument is directed at the inadequacy of physical accounts to accurately capture first-person experience, yours or anyone else’s. You may not accept it, but it is what ‘the hard problem’ argument says, so your paraphrase of it is incorrect.
  • Wayfarer
    22.4k
    If the brain is aware of itself, and the brain is matter and energy, then matter and energy in the right circumstances can be aware of itself. How is this inadequate? Is there evidence of some existence that is not matter and energy that is aware of itself that we know of?
    — Philosophim

    Because you could never arrive at an understanding of it through physics and chemistry, which is the analysis of matter and energy.
    — Wayfarer

    Isn't the physics of a note an air vibration against a metal Tuba? Have we not made Bach's first symphony over the radio, which is essentially a physical radio wave that interacts with a radio, vibrations, and can be calculated through physics? This broad claim is not good enough Wayfarer, and doesn't actually answer the question. Not answering the question is the same as saying, "No". You need to demonstrate why example's I've given of matter and energy being aware of itself are false. I gave you three to tackle. If you choose not to tackle them, that's your call.
    Philosophim

    Against better judgement, I will tackle some of these arguments.

    Firstly, your response begs the question of whether and in what sense physical matter is conscious, or alternatively whether conscious beings are physical. You're assuming that a self-aware being can (1) be reduced to 'a brain', and (2) comprises only matter and energy. But whether these are true are the very things that need to be explained, hence, begging the question.

    As for the brain being aware of itself, that is another contested claim. Brains themselves aren't aware of anything unless they're embodied in a conscious being. Certainly conscious self-aware beings have brains (although there are some strange anomalies) but saying that 'brains are aware' is described in The Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience as 'the mereological fallacy', that is, attributing to an anatomical part something that can only be rightly attributed to the whole being.

    As to ' physics of a note an air vibration against a metal Tuba?', why only tubas, of all the instruments in the world? And so what? What does that prove? The fact that Bach’s music is transmitted through the radio also has precisely zero bearing. Yes, sound waves are physical, but your hearing of the music as music is not physical, for reasons outlined in Facing Up to the Probem of Consciousness, which you don't recognize.

    I have been more than fair in presenting what would be needed to help your point gain footing.Philosophim

    And I have answered them.
  • Patterner
    969

    FTR, Bach did not write any symphonies.
  • Philosophim
    2.6k
    I would agree with ucarr that the basic sense of self is plausibly thought to be the same across species. Obviously this is not an empirically checkable assertion. It seems that almost nothing in philosophy is.Janus

    I wouldn't say its plausible that the sense of self is the same across species. Even among humans, its known that people have different sense of selves. Did you know that some people cannot mentally visualize? When they close their eyes, all that's there is darkness. That would clearly be a different sense of self then someone who visualizes. Now compare that to a dog, a lizard, and a house fly who have different dna and brain compositions. I'm not saying they don't have a sense of self, but I don't think its plausible that they are the same.

    I would argue as well that poor philosophy is that which cannot be verified, or has no pathways to verify it. Good philosophy does, and eventually becomes part of science or is incorporated into culture.

    As far as I know Bach composed no symphonies. Concertos yes.Janus

    Ha ha! I only used Bach because I didn't want to type a longer name. :D Thanks, I'll stop using that example.

    FTR, Bach did not write any symphonies.Patterner

    See above.
  • Philosophim
    2.6k
    Two persons understand each other to a limited degree because they share important attributes common to personhood.

    We share our stories because the bond of human identity allows us to walk a mile in each others' shoes. How much we relate to another person varies widely, but the connection rarely drops to zero.
    ucarr

    Its a nice attitude Ucarr. Nothing wrong with holding that. :)
  • Patterner
    969

    Cool. At least we got one thing settled. :rofl:
  • Philosophim
    2.6k
    Is factually incorrect. Chalmer’s argument is directed at the inadequacy of physical accounts to accurately capture first-person experience, yours or anyone else’s.Wayfarer

    Didn't you and I already address this on your first response to me? My point was that the heart of why this was is because we cannot know what its like to be another subjective individual. However, I'm not sure I tackled why I say 'other'. Neurolink is a physical account of a first person experience to the person experiencing the link. Otherwise it wouldn't function. It it by the conscious willing of the individual that the link work. When they have a particular feeling, they can trigger the link. So we have a physical account and a subjective account. However, no one else can know what that feeling is like, only the person feeling it.

    Against better judgement, I will tackle some of these arguments.Wayfarer

    I don't understand why you feel this way. If you're going to argue your position convincingly to someone else, you need to be open to tackling them. Even if we disagree, the result of thinking about them may produce something else down the road for both of us.

    Firstly, your response begs the question of whether and in what sense physical matter is conscious, or alternatively whether conscious beings are physical. You're assuming that a self-aware being can (1) be reduced to 'a brain', and (2) comprises only matter and energy. But whether these are true are the very things that need to be explained, hence, begging the question.Wayfarer

    Not quite, but I might need to be more explicit about this. What I'm noting is that the standard model of science posits that the brain is the source of human consciousness, at least in terms of behavior. What I'm asking you is this, "What does this model fail to explain?" besides being able to objectively model personal subjective experience? Second, "What alternative can you present that explains it better, and has evidence of existing?"

    As for the brain being aware of itself, that is another contested claim. Brains themselves aren't aware of anything unless they're embodied in a conscious being. Certainly conscious self-aware beings have brains (although there are some strange anomalies) but saying that 'brains are aware' is described in The Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience as 'the mereological fallacy', that is, attributing to an anatomical part something that can only be rightly attributed to the whole being.Wayfarer

    I think we're cutting hairs in context here. My point is that consciousness comes from the brain, and the brain is composed of matter and energy. Therefore consciousness is a property of a physical object. Short hand for this I'm using the phrase, "Brains are aware", but if that phrase bothers you, the sentences above are the intention. Also, you'll have to explain this sentence to me a little more: "Brains themselves aren't aware of anything unless they're embodied in a conscious being." This is 'begging the question'. What is a conscious being that is not a brain? How does a brain embody a conscious being?

    What I do note is that we cannot know what its like to BE that consciousness, therefore we cannot objectively measure what its like to have a subjective experience as that physical matter. Which to me, opens up the question of how much matter and energy in the universe is conscious. Since we cannot know what its like to be other matter, and we only determine consciousness objectively by behavior, are there things we think aren't 'behavior', but are? But i digress and I hope you see the argument.

    As to ' physics of a note an air vibration against a metal Tuba?', why only tubas, of all the instruments in the world? And so what? What does that prove?Wayfarer

    To put a little levity in the conversation I hope. :) Pick any instrument of course.

    The fact that Bach’s music is transmitted through the radio also has precisely zero bearing. Yes, sound waves are physical, but your hearing of the music as music is not physical, for reasons outlined in Facing Up to the Probem of Consciousness, which you don't recognize.Wayfarer

    That would be 'interpretation of information'. Are you saying that if no one is around to hear the radio waves play, the information doesn't exist? The radio was the mechanical interpretation of the waves into the vibration of sound, showing a complete physical process of information, transmission, and interpretation. You seem to think that information can only matter if a human is involved. But if information can exist apart from matter and energy, how can this be?

    I have been more than fair in presenting what would be needed to help your point gain footing.
    — Philosophim

    And I have answered them.
    Wayfarer

    Some of them. You didn't answer my 3 points, which I was referring to here.

    Alright, then try to counter these points, because these points note that our autonomy is physical.

    1. Drugs that affect mood and decisions. A person getting cured of schizophrenia by medication for example.

    2. The removal of the brain or physical processes that result in life from the brain, and the inability of autonomy to persist.

    3. Brain damage resulting in differing behaviors and consciousness.
    Philosophim
  • Patterner
    969
    Is factually incorrect. Chalmer’s argument is directed at the inadequacy of physical accounts to accurately capture first-person experience, yours or anyone else’s.
    — Wayfarer

    Didn't you and I already address this on your first response to me? My point was that the heart of why this was is because we cannot know what its like to be another subjective individual.
    Philosophim
    You may have addressed it, but you are still using an inaccurate definition of the HPoC. As J pointed out early on:
    The hard problem is, "Will we ever know what it is like to BE a conscious individual that isn't ourselves".
    — Philosophim

    Just for the record, that isn't the standard way of stating the problem, and it isn't David Chalmers' way (he coined the phrase). You can listen to Chalmers describe it here: He defines the problem as "how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experiences in the mind." When we solve this problem (I do believe it's when, not if) we may or may not know "what it's like" to be someone else. That's a separate, though perhaps related, issue.
    J




    Alright, then try to counter these points, because these points note that our autonomy is physical.

    1. Drugs that affect mood and decisions. A person getting cured of schizophrenia by medication for example.

    2. The removal of the brain or physical processes that result in life from the brain, and the inability of autonomy to persist.

    3. Brain damage resulting in differing behaviors and consciousness.
    Philosophim
    These things change various aspects of how the brain works, and, therefore, what we subjectively experience. They don't address how it is that we subjectively experience them at all. That's the HPoC.
  • Philosophim
    2.6k
    You may have addressed it, but you are still using an inaccurate definition of the HPoC. As J pointed out early on:Patterner

    And I'll note again, the only reason we cannot figure out how physical processes give rise to the subjective experiences of the mind is because we have no way of objectively knowing what it is to hold that subjective experience, because you must BE that being having that subjective experience.

    It is NOT that we don't understand that the brain causes subjective experiences. We know portions of the brain that affect the different interpretation of sensations we have. We can stimulate areas of the brain and a person can say, "When you do that, I imagine a dog." What we cannot do is know what they are experiencing directly when they say, "I imagine a dog". When a patient takes a particular type of medication, they feel woozy. This is an objective fact. Do we know what its like for the patient to have the subjective experience they have when they say, "I feel woozy?" No. So we can never objectively note what 'woozy' is as a subjective experience, only an observed behavior. That's the crux of the hard problem.

    These things change various aspects of how the brain works, and, therefore, what we subjectively experience. They don't address how it is that we subjectively experience them at all. That's the HPoC.Patterner

    No, that's the easy problem.
    "For Chalmers, the easy problem is making progress in explaining cognitive functions and discovering how they arise from physical processes in the brain. The hard problem is accounting for why these functions are accompanied by conscious experience."

    https://www.jstor.org/stable/43853850#:~:text=For%20Chalmers%2C%20the%20easy%20problem,are%20accompanied%20by%20conscious%20experience.

    And why is it hard to find why these functions are accompanied by conscious experience? Because we cannot know what it is like to BE that other conscious experience. Consciousness as a behavior is simple to observe. Consciousness as a subjective experience can only be known by being that subjective experience.

    So when we give a drug that treats schizophrenia, we know that it works by behavior. We don't know what its like to be that person having schizophrenia, or what they are feeling as a subjective experience when they take the medicine. That's it.

    It is not in any way an implication that the brain is not the source of consciousness. It does not in any way negate the behavior based approach to consciuosness and mental health that has worked for decades. It does not negate the fact that the brain causes your subjective experiences. Its just noting that because we can never know what its like for another being to experience their own subjective experience, we cannot objectively match brain state "X, Y, Z" and say, "Whenever X, Y, Z is matched, all people will experience the exact same subjective sensation of wooziness." We might see they all have the same behavior, but we can never objectively know what each individuals subjective experience of 'woozy' is.
  • Baden
    16.3k
    This seems like a misunderstanding. Quantum phenomena have discernible, even measurable effects. That is what qualifies them as 'physical'. The seeming spookiness arises when we seek to apply macro physical concepts to micro phenomena.Janus

    Solid criticism. I should have reined myself in and been more precise and nuanced there.

    (I may reformulate the point in my new thread rather than here or I may leave it for now. Not sure yet.)
  • ucarr
    1.5k


    ...you are...using an inaccurate definition of the HPoC. As J pointed out early on...Patterner

    The hard problem is, "Will we ever know what it is like to BE a conscious individual that isn't ourselves"Philosophim

    Just for the record, that isn't the standard way of stating the problem and it isn't David Chalmers' way (he coined the phrase). You can listen to Chalmers describe it here: He defines the problem as "how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experiences in the mind."J

    And I'll note again, the only reason we cannot figure out how physical processes give rise to the subjective experiences of the mind is because we have no way of objectively knowing what it is to hold that subjective experience, because you must BE that being having that subjective experience.Philosophim

    I think your point above makes an important clarification: there's something about the native point of view of the sentient that obstructs, so far, our understanding how (or if) physical processes give rise to the subjective experience.

    ...we have no way of objectively knowing what it is to hold that subjective experience, because you must BE that being having that subjective experience.Philosophim

    As I understand you, you're implying that the subjectivity of the sentient is insuperable i.e., it is a container which has no exit. This claim, if true, leads us into the very complicated business of examining the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity.

    If it’s true that the subjectivity of the sentient is insuperable, that then calls into question the possibility of objectivity in general. If the sentient cannot know what it’s like to be beyond its own subjective being, then it follows that the sentient cannot know what it’s like for anything, other than itself, to be, whether a stone, a galaxy or another person.

    Well, if objectivity in general is in doubt, then, as you all know, that lands us right back into the territory of solipsism: how can I be sure what I perceive is existentially independent of my perception of it? Indeed, how can I have such knowledge if I’m forever locked inside of my subjectivity?

    So, we now see that the HPoC is another angle of view – a very complex and perhaps ultimately fruitful angle of view – focusing on the gnarly problem of the possibly inescapable self-enclosure of solipsism.

    It sounds strange, but, in my context here, when we claim to know the chemical composition/interactions of a rock, we’re also claiming to know “what it’s like to be that rock.”

    To be sure, knowing a rock by knowing its chemical composition/interactions is a much more simple phenomenon than knowing another person by knowing their consciousness, but the difference is a difference of degree, not a categorical difference.

    If we’re locked out of objectivity because of insuperable subjectivity, then we’re thrown all the way back to securing our beliefs on the basis of faith rather than on the basis of science.

    Existence precedes essence because science can only get started by assuming the existence of things prior to any possibility of analysis and its attendant logic and the subsequent scientific disciplines.

    Existentialism, which is centered on “existence precedes essence,” gives us a way forward with our database of scientific disciplines and their methodologies. We, as existentialists, can assert that we don’t really know the world beyond realistic-seeming narratives that, ultimately, in the absence of epistemological certainty, we hold as true on the basis of faith. Going forward from there, we try our best to have integrity as we hold faithful to our realistic-seeming narratives.
  • Patterner
    969
    It is NOT that we don't understand that the brain causes subjective experiences.Philosophim
    Yes and No. Yes, we know that it happens in the brain. No, we do not know HOW. That's the HPoC.


    And I'll note again, the only reason we cannot figure out how physical processes give rise to the subjective experiences of the mind is because we have no way of objectively knowing what it is to hold that subjective experience, because you must BE that being having that subjective experience.Philosophim
    I am the being having the subjective experience. That does not help me understand how it is achieved.


    These things change various aspects of how the brain works, and, therefore, what we subjectively experience. They don't address how it is that we subjectively experience them at all. That's the HPoC.
    — Patterner

    No, that's the easy problem.
    "For Chalmers, the easy problem is making progress in explaining cognitive functions and discovering how they arise from physical processes in the brain. The hard problem is accounting for why these functions are accompanied by conscious experience."
    Philosophim
    That quote explains it nicely. But you are misinterpreting it. Let me try this approach. This is from Darwin's Black Box, by Michael Behe. (Think what you want of his overall conclusions regarding a designer. But her knows the science.).


    Here is a brief overview of the biochemistry of vision. When light first strikes the retina, a photon interacts with a molecule called 11-cis-retinal, which rearranges within picoseconds to trans-retinal. The change in the shape of retinal forces a change in the shape of the protein, rhodopsin, to which the retinal is tightly bound. The protein's metamorphosis alters its behavior, making it stick to another protein called transducin. Before bumping into activated rhodopsin, transducin had tightly bound a small molecule called GDP. But when transducin interacts with activated rhodopsin, the GDP falls off and a molecule called GTP binds to transducin. (GTP is closely related to, but critically different from, GDP.)

    GTP-transducin-activated rhodopsin now binds to a protein called phosphodiesterase, located in the inner membrane of the cell. When attached to activated rhodopsin and its entourage, the phosphodiesterase acquires the ability to chemically cut a molecule called cGMP (a chemical relative of both GDP and GTP). Initially there are a lot of cGMP molecules in the cell, but the phosphodiesterase lowers its concentration, like a pulled plug lowers the water level in a bathtub.

    Another membrane protein that binds cGMP is called an ion channel. It acts as a gateway that regulates the number of sodium ions in the cell. Normally the ion channel allows sodium ions to flow into the cell, while a separate protein actively pumps them out again. The dual action of the ion channel and pump keeps the level of sodium ions in the cell within a narrow range. When the amount of cGMP is reduced because of cleavage by the phosphodiesterase, the ion channel closes, causing the cellular concentration of positively charged sodium ions to be reduced. This causes an imbalance of charge across the cell membrane which, finally, causes a current to be transmitted down the optic nerve to the brain. The result, when interpreted by the brain, is vision.
    — Michael Behe
    That is the Easy Problem. That is how we perceive a portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. There is TONS more detail in this, and we could go much further, mapping out how we can differentiated different frequencies within that portion of the spectrum. And how our perceptions are stored in the brain, and how that stored information can then be compared to future perceptions of that portion of the spectrum. And how we report on our perceptions.

    All of that is the Easy Problem. Not "easy" as in "a piece of cake." But easy as in we understand how to go about it.

    We do not know how to go about the HP. That's why it's named the Hard. Because we don't know. How is all of that subjectively experienced? People like Tse, Damasio, and Gazzaniga begin their books by saying we do not know. Koch just paid off his 25 year bet to Chalmers because we haven't figured it out. Physicist Brian Greene says there are no known properties of matter that even hint at such a thing. Why do I see red, rather than just perceive different frequencies, the way a robot with an electric eye might? Why do I feel pain, rather than just perceive damage to my body, the way a robot that's wrapped in a sensory web might? These things can, and do, take place without any subjective experience. How is the subjective experience accomplished in us?
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