what really is 'physical'? Is the brain physical? — Wayfarer
...whether we do harm to things or not should be more than feelings. Just because I feel disgust at something doesn't mean I should kill it. Just because something makes me happy doesn't mean I should embrace it. For me, it is a respect for its agency, the fact that despite all the odds that get thrown at every life, it has survived until now. Why should I harm or end it over something as trivial as just an emotion? — Philosophim
There are plenty of people in life I don't understand. And I'm sure there are plenty of people in life who don't understand me. Bonding often comes from like goals. Survival, or accomplishing a task together require a closeness and understanding of another person up to a point to get this done. It does not require me to understand exactly what another person is experiencing in life. — Philosophim
It's all so tiresome. — Baden
he expectation is that the answer must necessarily entail something spooky. — Wayfarer
↪Philosophim I posted a response yesterday:
To say that mind is not reducible to physical constituents, is not to posit some ethereal substance or 'ghost in the machine' (if that is what 'soul' means to you)... — Wayfarer
Information would be a good candidate in our scientific age. 'Information is information, not matter or energy', said one of founders of computer science. 'No materialism which does not admit this can survive at the present day.' Why? Because the same information can be encoded in completely different material forms, and yet still retain its meaning. — Wayfarer
When I say that living organisms display attributes and characteristics that cannot be extracted from the laws of chemistry and physics alone, I'm pointing to the fact that organisms are fundamentally different from machines. Unlike machines, which serve purposes imposed on them from the outside, living organisms exhibit intrinsic agency and functional autonomy. — Wayfarer
This fundamental distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic purpose is key to understanding why organisms cannot be reduced to mere physical or chemical mechanisms. — Wayfarer
I’m trying to get the point across that why it seems so obvious that only the physical can be real, is because of the way the problem has been set up in our culture. It is why when the question is asked ‘what alternative is there?’ the expectation is that the answer must necessarily entail something spooky. — Wayfarer
If it is not a soul, what is it? — Philosophim
Knowledge only exists expressed in some medium to be interpreted by something else — Philosophim
Its an identity distinction, and there is nothing in the application of this distinction that notes that our functional autonomy is not physical. — Philosophim
Your challenge is to demonstrate the existence of something that is not matter and energy. — Philosophim
A printed page is just physical pattern.
Brains are involved encoding and decoding. — Mark Nyquist
If it is not a soul, what is it?
— Philosophim
A form of existence that is aware of itself. — Wayfarer
If you take a piece of information, be it a formula, a story, a recipe, or whatever, it can be translated between different media such as binary data, handwritten, engraved in brass and so on. The information remains the same while the material form is completely different. So the information is not material. — Wayfarer
Its an identity distinction, and there is nothing in the application of this distinction that notes that our functional autonomy is not physical.
— Philosophim
Nothing that can be described only in terms of physics exhibits those atttributes. Taking all of the known laws of physics, there is no way you could arrive at a functional description of an organism. — Wayfarer
Your challenge is to demonstrate the existence of something that is not matter and energy.
— Philosophim
Your arguments, tendentious though they may be. — Wayfarer
There are plenty of people in life I don't understand. And I'm sure there are plenty of people in life who don't understand me. Bonding often comes from like goals. Survival, or accomplishing a task together require a closeness and understanding of another person up to a point to get this done. It does not require me to understand exactly what another person is experiencing in life.
— Philosophim
I assert this is an overstatement of the degree of difference_disconnection separating feelings from thoughts in terms of people understanding each other and moreover, it is therefore an overstatement of the degree of sameness_connection necessary for a human to know what it’s like to be a bat. — ucarr
I assert there is no impenetrable membrane called what-it’s-like-to-be-an-individualized-self. It’s this mistaken belief that creates the hard problem. It's this mistaken belief that falsely divides subjective from objective. Clearly, the selfhood of the self is the object of that selfsame self's consciousness.
I assert there is a reasonably accurate one-size-fits-all-what-it’s-like-to-be-selfhood, accessible to many if not all sentients, that supports the sympathy and morals essential to the peaceable animal kingdom and civilization. — ucarr
If the brain is aware of itself, and the brain is matter and energy, then matter and energy in the right circumstances can be aware of itself. How is this inadequate? Is there evidence of some existence that is not matter and energy that is aware of itself that we know of? — Philosophim
If the brain is aware of itself, and the brain is matter and energy, then matter and energy in the right circumstances can be aware of itself. How is this inadequate? Is there evidence of some existence that is not matter and energy that is aware of itself that we know of?
— Philosophim
Because you could never arrive at an understanding of it through physics and chemistry, which is the analysis of matter and energy. — Wayfarer
You do understand that all you're arguing for - in fact, pretty well all you ever argue for - is what is called 'physicalist reductionism', don't you? — Wayfarer
In this framework, there is no need to posit non-physical substances or properties. — Wayfarer
what really is 'physical'? Is the brain physical?
— Wayfarer
Yes, the term really only makes sense at the macro-level. In the quantum sphere, the physical is as spooky as idealism sounds to materialists. — Baden
What is the form of Bach's first symphony? — Philosophim
You do understand that all you're arguing for - in fact, pretty well all you ever argue for - is what is called 'physicalist reductionism', don't you?
— Wayfarer
It doesn't matter what its called. I just care about the logic. And we're not really talking about my viewpoints, but yours — Philosophim
I assert there is no impenetrable membrane called what-it’s-like-to-be-an-individualized-self. It’s this mistaken belief that creates the hard problem. It's this mistaken belief that falsely divides subjective from objective. Clearly, the selfhood of the self is the object of that selfsame self's consciousness.
I assert there is a reasonably accurate one-size-fits-all-what-it’s-like-to-be-selfhood, accessible to many if not all sentients, that supports the sympathy and morals essential to the peaceable animal kingdom and civilization.
— ucarr
This is a nice thought, but can we demonstrate this to be something known, or will it only remain a belief? — Philosophim
I assert there is a reasonably accurate one-size-fits-all-what-it’s-like-to-be-selfhood, accessible to many if not all sentients, that supports the sympathy and morals essential to the peaceable animal kingdom and civilization. — ucarr
This is a nice thought, but can we demonstrate this to be something known, or will it only remain a belief? — Philosophim
There are plenty of people in life I don't understand. And I'm sure there are plenty of people in life who don't understand me. — Philosophim
Survival, or accomplishing a task together require a closeness and understanding of another person up to a point to get this done. — Philosophim
The idea that consciousness is caused by our physical brains is the easy problem. The hard problem is, "Will we ever know what it is like to BE a conscious individual that isn't ourselves". — Philosophim
If the brain is aware of itself, and the brain is matter and energy, then matter and energy in the right circumstances can be aware of itself. How is this inadequate? Is there evidence of some existence that is not matter and energy that is aware of itself that we know of?
— Philosophim
Because you could never arrive at an understanding of it through physics and chemistry, which is the analysis of matter and energy.
— Wayfarer
Isn't the physics of a note an air vibration against a metal Tuba? Have we not made Bach's first symphony over the radio, which is essentially a physical radio wave that interacts with a radio, vibrations, and can be calculated through physics? This broad claim is not good enough Wayfarer, and doesn't actually answer the question. Not answering the question is the same as saying, "No". You need to demonstrate why example's I've given of matter and energy being aware of itself are false. I gave you three to tackle. If you choose not to tackle them, that's your call. — Philosophim
I have been more than fair in presenting what would be needed to help your point gain footing. — Philosophim
I would agree with ucarr that the basic sense of self is plausibly thought to be the same across species. Obviously this is not an empirically checkable assertion. It seems that almost nothing in philosophy is. — Janus
As far as I know Bach composed no symphonies. Concertos yes. — Janus
FTR, Bach did not write any symphonies. — Patterner
Two persons understand each other to a limited degree because they share important attributes common to personhood.
We share our stories because the bond of human identity allows us to walk a mile in each others' shoes. How much we relate to another person varies widely, but the connection rarely drops to zero. — ucarr
Is factually incorrect. Chalmer’s argument is directed at the inadequacy of physical accounts to accurately capture first-person experience, yours or anyone else’s. — Wayfarer
Against better judgement, I will tackle some of these arguments. — Wayfarer
Firstly, your response begs the question of whether and in what sense physical matter is conscious, or alternatively whether conscious beings are physical. You're assuming that a self-aware being can (1) be reduced to 'a brain', and (2) comprises only matter and energy. But whether these are true are the very things that need to be explained, hence, begging the question. — Wayfarer
As for the brain being aware of itself, that is another contested claim. Brains themselves aren't aware of anything unless they're embodied in a conscious being. Certainly conscious self-aware beings have brains (although there are some strange anomalies) but saying that 'brains are aware' is described in The Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience as 'the mereological fallacy', that is, attributing to an anatomical part something that can only be rightly attributed to the whole being. — Wayfarer
As to ' physics of a note an air vibration against a metal Tuba?', why only tubas, of all the instruments in the world? And so what? What does that prove? — Wayfarer
The fact that Bach’s music is transmitted through the radio also has precisely zero bearing. Yes, sound waves are physical, but your hearing of the music as music is not physical, for reasons outlined in Facing Up to the Probem of Consciousness, which you don't recognize. — Wayfarer
I have been more than fair in presenting what would be needed to help your point gain footing.
— Philosophim
And I have answered them. — Wayfarer
Alright, then try to counter these points, because these points note that our autonomy is physical.
1. Drugs that affect mood and decisions. A person getting cured of schizophrenia by medication for example.
2. The removal of the brain or physical processes that result in life from the brain, and the inability of autonomy to persist.
3. Brain damage resulting in differing behaviors and consciousness. — Philosophim
You may have addressed it, but you are still using an inaccurate definition of the HPoC. As J pointed out early on:Is factually incorrect. Chalmer’s argument is directed at the inadequacy of physical accounts to accurately capture first-person experience, yours or anyone else’s.
— Wayfarer
Didn't you and I already address this on your first response to me? My point was that the heart of why this was is because we cannot know what its like to be another subjective individual. — Philosophim
The hard problem is, "Will we ever know what it is like to BE a conscious individual that isn't ourselves".
— Philosophim
Just for the record, that isn't the standard way of stating the problem, and it isn't David Chalmers' way (he coined the phrase). You can listen to Chalmers describe it here: He defines the problem as "how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experiences in the mind." When we solve this problem (I do believe it's when, not if) we may or may not know "what it's like" to be someone else. That's a separate, though perhaps related, issue. — J
These things change various aspects of how the brain works, and, therefore, what we subjectively experience. They don't address how it is that we subjectively experience them at all. That's the HPoC.Alright, then try to counter these points, because these points note that our autonomy is physical.
1. Drugs that affect mood and decisions. A person getting cured of schizophrenia by medication for example.
2. The removal of the brain or physical processes that result in life from the brain, and the inability of autonomy to persist.
3. Brain damage resulting in differing behaviors and consciousness. — Philosophim
You may have addressed it, but you are still using an inaccurate definition of the HPoC. As J pointed out early on: — Patterner
These things change various aspects of how the brain works, and, therefore, what we subjectively experience. They don't address how it is that we subjectively experience them at all. That's the HPoC. — Patterner
This seems like a misunderstanding. Quantum phenomena have discernible, even measurable effects. That is what qualifies them as 'physical'. The seeming spookiness arises when we seek to apply macro physical concepts to micro phenomena. — Janus
...you are...using an inaccurate definition of the HPoC. As J pointed out early on... — Patterner
The hard problem is, "Will we ever know what it is like to BE a conscious individual that isn't ourselves" — Philosophim
Just for the record, that isn't the standard way of stating the problem and it isn't David Chalmers' way (he coined the phrase). You can listen to Chalmers describe it here: He defines the problem as "how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experiences in the mind." — J
And I'll note again, the only reason we cannot figure out how physical processes give rise to the subjective experiences of the mind is because we have no way of objectively knowing what it is to hold that subjective experience, because you must BE that being having that subjective experience. — Philosophim
...we have no way of objectively knowing what it is to hold that subjective experience, because you must BE that being having that subjective experience. — Philosophim
Yes and No. Yes, we know that it happens in the brain. No, we do not know HOW. That's the HPoC.It is NOT that we don't understand that the brain causes subjective experiences. — Philosophim
I am the being having the subjective experience. That does not help me understand how it is achieved.And I'll note again, the only reason we cannot figure out how physical processes give rise to the subjective experiences of the mind is because we have no way of objectively knowing what it is to hold that subjective experience, because you must BE that being having that subjective experience. — Philosophim
That quote explains it nicely. But you are misinterpreting it. Let me try this approach. This is from Darwin's Black Box, by Michael Behe. (Think what you want of his overall conclusions regarding a designer. But her knows the science.).These things change various aspects of how the brain works, and, therefore, what we subjectively experience. They don't address how it is that we subjectively experience them at all. That's the HPoC.
— Patterner
No, that's the easy problem.
"For Chalmers, the easy problem is making progress in explaining cognitive functions and discovering how they arise from physical processes in the brain. The hard problem is accounting for why these functions are accompanied by conscious experience." — Philosophim
That is the Easy Problem. That is how we perceive a portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. There is TONS more detail in this, and we could go much further, mapping out how we can differentiated different frequencies within that portion of the spectrum. And how our perceptions are stored in the brain, and how that stored information can then be compared to future perceptions of that portion of the spectrum. And how we report on our perceptions.Here is a brief overview of the biochemistry of vision. When light first strikes the retina, a photon interacts with a molecule called 11-cis-retinal, which rearranges within picoseconds to trans-retinal. The change in the shape of retinal forces a change in the shape of the protein, rhodopsin, to which the retinal is tightly bound. The protein's metamorphosis alters its behavior, making it stick to another protein called transducin. Before bumping into activated rhodopsin, transducin had tightly bound a small molecule called GDP. But when transducin interacts with activated rhodopsin, the GDP falls off and a molecule called GTP binds to transducin. (GTP is closely related to, but critically different from, GDP.)
GTP-transducin-activated rhodopsin now binds to a protein called phosphodiesterase, located in the inner membrane of the cell. When attached to activated rhodopsin and its entourage, the phosphodiesterase acquires the ability to chemically cut a molecule called cGMP (a chemical relative of both GDP and GTP). Initially there are a lot of cGMP molecules in the cell, but the phosphodiesterase lowers its concentration, like a pulled plug lowers the water level in a bathtub.
Another membrane protein that binds cGMP is called an ion channel. It acts as a gateway that regulates the number of sodium ions in the cell. Normally the ion channel allows sodium ions to flow into the cell, while a separate protein actively pumps them out again. The dual action of the ion channel and pump keeps the level of sodium ions in the cell within a narrow range. When the amount of cGMP is reduced because of cleavage by the phosphodiesterase, the ion channel closes, causing the cellular concentration of positively charged sodium ions to be reduced. This causes an imbalance of charge across the cell membrane which, finally, causes a current to be transmitted down the optic nerve to the brain. The result, when interpreted by the brain, is vision. — Michael Behe
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