there are good arguments for the involvement of us humans in the establishment of reality,
— T Clark

Such as? — Wayfarer

I first came to this realization through the Tao Te Ching. "The Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao." It has become a central part of my understanding of how the world works - reality is not objective, it is a mixture of an external non-human existence interacting with our human nature. Kant described something similar when he talked about aspects of reality, i.e. space and time, that we know a priori. Recently I've been reading Konrad Lorenz who connects Kant's a priori with evolution. He says that we have evolved to survive through an interaction between objective reality and our biological nature. In his understanding, human nature is a reflection of objective reality. I don't see it that way, but I think his understanding of the mechanism is correct. Here's a link to an article of his.

https://archive.org/details/KantsDoctrineOfTheAPrioriInTheLightOfContemporaryBiologyKonradLorenz

I have some other ideas about this too, but I haven't got them put together enough to go into them here.

Chomsky's criticism — Baden

But can't the same be said about talk of "the natural"? Is naturalism any less shifty than physicalism? — Leontiskos

To give a pertinent example, can Chomsky's mysterianism really be said to conform with naturalism?

-

Edit: This is perhaps a pithy way to phrase my objection: If the physicalist pivots to methodological physicalism, has he then solved the problem? Or is there something suspicious about trying to solve the problem in this way?

I have a number of friends who would, if pressed, probably deny that there's anything out there except the physical world. But nor would they claim that you can use the fundamental entities of physics to explain macro-phenomena like economic behavior. — J

I think there are a lot of people out there, probably mostly physical scientists, who do think psychology, sociology, and economics are nothing but physics.

Not necessarily. We can construct a sort of "best we can do right now" position that would go: "Sure, we have loads of unanswered questions about how physical realities interact, and how they can be causally effective. But at the end of the (scientific) day, I'm betting that the answers will still fail to reveal anything beyond the physical. We have to wait and see, but my money is on physicalism." — J

As I see it, this is not a "best we can do right now" issue. It's not a question of inadequate theory and technology, it's that it is not possible. Here's a link to one of my favorite papers - Anderson's "More is Different." Written in 1972, but it always gets brought up when this subject is discussed.

https://www.tkm.kit.edu/downloads/TKM1_2011_more_is_different_PWA.pdf

let's say like Richard Dawkins (who I would presume comes close to what Wayfarer means by a "scientism") and the metaphysics of someone like apokrisis (who whatever else you think of his ideas, is scientifically oriented in regards to his metaphysics), would be very different. — schopenhauer1

I've learned a lot about biosemiotics from Apokrisis (including that it exists!) and benefitted a lot from it, although I don't agree with his metaphysics. Biosemiotics on the whole is not materialist in orientation so I don’t see biosemiotics as ‘scientistic’ in the sense that Dawkins/Dennett neo-darwinist materialism is. (Notice, though, that even though C S Peirce is categorised as an idealist philosopher in most directories, Apokrisis will generally downplay his idealist side.)

If the physicalist pivots to methodological physicalism, has he then solved the problem? — Leontiskos

I'd vote yes. I think there are plenty of scientists who are to all intents physicalist as far as their work is concerned but agnostic or open-minded with respect to matters that can't be adjuticated by science.

I first came to this realization through the Tao Te Ching. "The Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao." It has become a central part of my understanding of how the world works - reality is not objective, it is a mixture of an external non-human existence interacting with our human nature. Kant described something similar. — T Clark

:100: It might interest you to know that Evan Thompson, co-author of The Blind Spot article, did a higher degree in Chinese philosophy and was one of the authors of The Embodied Mind. His approach is very much aligned with what you're saying here.

I'd vote yes. I think there are plenty of scientists who are to all intents physicalist as far as their work is concerned but agnostic or open-minded with respect to matters that can't be adjuticated by science. — Wayfarer

Well again, the definition of science comes into it.

If methodological naturalism means (temporarily) behaving as if naturalism is true, and if science is bound up with methodological naturalism, then to instruct someone to, "Behave as if you're doing science," amounts to the same thing. Yet the instruction, "Behave as if you're doing science," is useful in showing up the circularity of the argument in question.

And as far as your set of interests are concerned, I would say that methodological naturalism is little more than a stand-in for mechanistic natural philosophy. It asks us to behave as if mechanistic natural philosophy is true. But if mechanistic natural philosophy is false, then why would we behave as if it is true? This is one example of what I meant earlier when I said that for the non-naturalist methodological naturalism is irrational. Then the rejoinder says that science itself presupposes the scientist's behaving as if mechanistic natural philosophy is true. The obvious question is, "Why?" Why accept such a definition of science?

2. Physicalism is unscientific.
The core metaphysical assumptions of most metaphysically naturalist / physicalist positions may be summarized as follows:

A. All known and all potentially knowable phenomena can be considered physical [Edited to properly distinguish vs materialism]
B. The universe is deterministic. [Correction: Only applies to some versions of physicalism, not most]
C. The universe is comprehensively and ultimately law-given and law-abiding.

None of these are falsifiable. They can better be described as articles of faith consistent with the observable universe, but not derivable from it.

This might seem obvious, but I'm not convinced it is to all physicalists.

3. Physicalism’s close association with methodological naturalism and the confusion there engendered risks denigrating the latter.

Methodological naturalism stands as a respectable framework for the employment of the scientific method. It has nothing necessarily to say about whether the universe contains supernatural elements or not, only that it may be investigated as if it were entirely natural. — Baden

It appears to me that you miss the point. Physicalism is a metaphysical theory, not a scientific theory. All coherent metaphysical theories are unfalsifiable. It's certainly reasonable to remain agnostic to metaphysical theories, but it's not UNreasonable to treat some metaphysical theory as a working hypothesis to see if it can account for everything we know about the world. Personally, I treat physicalism is the most reasonable default position- my working hypothesis, so I label myself a physicalist. I haven't encountered anything that isn't explainable from this framework, and it gives me a basis for discussions with supernaturalists (particularly theists). Metaphysical naturalism/physicalism is a counter to the epistemological problem posed by scientism, which is the belief that science and the scientific method are the best or only way to render truth about the world and reality. Here's an excerpt from an article exposing the flaw in scientism:

"... scientism...is either self-refuting or trivial. Take the first horn of this dilemma. The claim that scientism is true is not itself a scientific claim, not something that can be established using scientific methods. Indeed, that science is even a rational form of inquiry (let alone the only rational form of inquiry) is not something that can be established scientifically. For scientific inquiry itself rests on a number of philosophical assumptions: that there is an objective world external to the minds of scientists; that this world is governed by causal regularities; that the human intellect can uncover and accurately describe these regularities; and so forth. Since science presupposes these things, it cannot attempt to justify them without arguing in a circle. And if it cannot even establish that it is a reliable form of inquiry, it can hardly establish that it is the only reliable form. Both tasks would require “getting outside” science altogether and discovering from that extra-scientific vantage point that science conveys an accurate picture of reality—and in the case of scientism, that only science does so.-' source.

Metaphysical naturalism (or physicalism) fills in the gap that scientism leaves. Of course, it's not necessarily true, but it does defeat the claim (of some theists) that we "need" supernaturalism to account for aspects of the world.

It appears to me that you [@Baden] miss the point. Physicalism is a metaphysical theory, not a scientific theory. All coherent metaphysical theories are unfalsifiable. It's certainly reasonable to remain agnostic to metaphysical theories ... — Relativist

:100:

Metaphysical naturalism (or physicalism) fills in the gap that scientism leaves. Of course, it's not necessarily true, but it does defeat the claim (of some theists) that we "need" supernaturalism to account for aspects of the world.

:up: :up:

It appears to me that you miss the point. Physicalism is a metaphysical theory, not a scientific theory. All coherent metaphysical theories are unfalsifiable. It's certainly reasonable to remain agnostic to metaphysical theories, but it's not UNreasonable to treat some metaphysical theory as a working hypothesis to see if it can account for everything we know about the world. Personally, I treat physicalism is the most reasonable default position- my working hypothesis, so I label myself a physicalist. I haven't encountered anything that isn't explainable from this framework... — Relativist

I think you make fair points here, and you are giving my theoretical physicalist rejoinder flesh and blood, which is helpful. But it doesn't sound like you treat physicalism as unfalsifiable. In fact it seems like you believe physicalism would be falsified insofar as you encounter things which are not explainable within the physicalist framework. I think that's as it should be, and what it means is that metaphysical theories are not unfalsifiable. Metaphysical theories are just a bit harder to falsify insofar as they draw nearer to first principles and presuppositions.

But it doesn't sound like you treat physicalism as unfalsifiable. In fact it seems like you believe physicalism would be falsified insofar as you encounter things which are not explainable within the physicalist framework. — Leontiskos

Interesting observation - it is falsifiable in one sense. But I don't think it's falsifiable in the scientific sense:

"Falsifiability (or refutability) is a deductive standard of evaluation of scientific theories and hypotheses, introduced by the philosopher of science Karl Popper in his book The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1934). A theory or hypothesis is falsifiable if it can be logically contradicted by an empirical test."

And as far as your set of interests are concerned, I would say that methodological naturalism is little more than a stand-in for mechanistic natural philosophy. It asks us to behave as if mechanistic natural philosophy is true. But if mechanistic natural philosophy is false, then why would we behave as if it is true? — Leontiskos

I think mechanistic analogies of organic life and nature are on the wane, not least because of emergence of movements like biosemiosis, previously mentioned, which sees nature as more language-like than machine-like (although residual mechanistic analogies are still prevalent in molecular biology. I think it's always been rather an anachronism that quantum physics is also called 'quantum mechanics' as the goings on of sub-atomic phenomena have never seemed remotely 'mechanical'.) But I have no problem with the idea that natural philosophy is true within its range of application.

Speaking of 'range of applicability' I could mention a principle here that is articulated in Buddhist philosophy - that of the 'two truths'. This is associated with early Mahāyāna Buddhism, and is the view that there are two levels or domains of truth - saṃvṛtisatya, meaning conventional or relative, and paramārthasatya, meaning ultimate. In this schema, natural philosophy falls under the heading saṃvṛtisatya. This does not necessarily deprecate 'conventional' knowledge, which includes science, but situates it relative to the insight (jñāna) of the enlightened.

The Wikipedia entry says 'The conventional truth may be interpreted as "obscurative truth" or "that which obscures the true nature". Conventional truth would be the appearance that includes a duality of apprehender and apprehended, and objects perceived within that. Ultimate truth is free from the duality of apprehender and apprehended' (a clear reference to non-dualism which in the Buddhist form is 'advaya' to distinguish it from the Hindu 'advaita' ref).

This schema has an advantage over the rupture that is encountered in Western thought in the opposition between 'natural and supernatural' which is what lies behind the 'culture wars' over religion and science. It recognises the validity of conventional knowledge within its range of applicability, but at the same time makes explicit the essential dualism (e.g. self/other, mind/world), and hence the contingent nature, that characterises natural science, and that there is a real possibility of transcendental insight.

However, Western intellectual culture doesn't really have an equivalent to the Prajñāpāramitā (transcendental wisdom) which apprehends paramārthasatya, as that will generally be associated with religious revelation and be rejected on those grounds. It's part of the Western cultural predicament. But I still think it's worth considering this way of framing the issue in the context of the question in the OP.

Indeed, that science is even a rational form of inquiry (let alone the only rational form of inquiry) is not something that can be established scientifically. For scientific inquiry itself rests on a number of philosophical assumptions: that there is an objective world external to the minds of scientists; that this world is governed by causal regularities; that the human intellect can uncover and accurately describe these regularities; and so forth. Since science presupposes these things, it cannot attempt to justify them without arguing in a circle. And if it cannot even establish that it is a reliable form of inquiry, it can hardly establish that it is the only reliable form. — Relativist

I don't think this argument holds water. Or maybe it's nihilistic. To start, I don't think science is the only valid way of understanding the world. Is it valid? Yes, I think so. Is it rational? Yes, I think it is. What standard would we apply to determine rationality? Here's a first shot.

• It's a formal system of study with established and documented methodology.
• The assumptions and presuppositions underlying that methodology are understood and acknowledged.
• The results are documented.
• Procedures for data reporting, reduction, verification, and interpretation are included in the system methodology.
• The results can be compared with observations in the real world and predictions made before the study takes place.

As I indicated, that's just off the top of my head. Looking at this now, it strikes me this is really just a description of the scientific method. The position described in the quoted text is just Hume's problem of induction. It's always seemed obvious to me that the perfect refutation of that position is that induction works. Beyond that, it strikes me that if the scientific method is not rational, then there is no rational way of knowing the world.

- The West rejected the two-truth theory in the Medieval period, and I think it did so for good reason. Simplifying, some theologians at that time posited the idea that there are scientific truths and theological truths, and never the twain shall meet. The two kinds of truth were said to be unable to contradict each other by definition, because they are hermetically separated. I take it that such schizophrenic approaches are very bad, and that it is similar to ask the non-naturalistic scientist to "turn on" a belief in naturalism when he walks into the office and "turn it off" when he leaves. I don't think that sort of bifurcation makes any sense, metaphysically or psychologically.

- Sure, but Popper's criterion is very strict and seldom followed, given the way that it excludes the soft sciences. Physicalism is metaphysical, and it is also one possible paradigm for scientific inquiry. It is falsifiable in the way that any paradigm is falsifiable, but as you say, not as a theory of the hard sciences. Again, "Metaphysical theories are just a bit harder to falsify insofar as they draw nearer to first principles and presuppositions."

The point here is that the metaphysics involved in physicalism and the metaphysics that I would argue is present in methodological naturalism are adjudicable and non-arbitrary, and therefore they do not succumb to the critiques of metaphysics that many have leveraged. We don't need to be afraid of metaphysics, or believe that it represents some kind of unadjudicable free for all.

Simplifying, some theologians at that time posited the idea that there are scientific truths and theological truths, and never the twain shall meet. — Leontiskos

The Buddhist idea is not at all like that. With respect, I think this gives you a preconceived idea of what it means.

Metaphysical naturalism (or physicalism) fills in the gap that scientism leaves. — Relativist

What gap?

- I am very familiar with Buddhism on its own terms, and I was once a practitioner. It is surely not exactly the same, but the point here is that for the Western mind two-truth theories are either unnecessary or problematic. If the two domains in question do not interact, then it is unnecessary. If the two domains in question do interact, then a two-truth theory is a simplistic bandage on a rather difficult problem. I consider that route a temptation, not a promise. And the concept of methodological naturalism is always flirting with two-truth theories, so this is very relevant.

As to Buddhism, it is strongly influenced by a significantly dualistic ontology in a way that the West is not. I think the Buddhist theory is also wrong, but it is more complicated given the way that it fits more nicely into that organic dualistic ontology. Beyond that, Buddhism grows out of praxis and Western science grows out of theoria, and therefore these are very different animals (even though the West is now becoming preoccupied with a different praxis, namely a Baconian praxis).

If the two domains in question do not interact, then it is unnecessary. If the two domains in question do interact, then a two-truth theory is a simplistic bandage on a rather difficult problem. — Leontiskos

According to Buddhists, in reality, there are not two domains. Only from the perspective of the conventional domain is there considered to be a separate domain, that of the 'ultimate truth'. But in reality, that perceived division is a consequence of a dualistic outlook and the 'two truths' teaching is merely a 'skillful means' (upaya) intended to demonstrate the limitations of that mindset.

Buddhism grows out of praxis and Western science grows out of theoria, and therefore these are very different animals (even though the West is now becoming preoccupied with a different praxis, namely a Baconian praxis). — Leontiskos

I agree in some ways.

The Madhyamika ('Middle Way') has no doctrine of existence, ontology. This would be, according to him, to indulge in dogmatic speculation. To the Vedanta (Hindu) and Vijñanavada (Mind Only), the Madhyamika, with his purely epistemological approach and lack of a doctrine of reality, cannot but appear as nihilistic. The ‘no-doctrine’ attitude of the Madhyamika is construed by Vedanta and Vijñanavada as a ‘no-reality’ doctrine; they accuse the Madhyamika, unjustifiably, of denying the real altogether and as admitting a theory of appearance without any reality as its ground. In fact, the Madhyamika does not deny the real; he only denies doctrines about the real. For him, the real as transcendent to thought can be reached only by the denial of the determinations which systems of philosophy ascribe to it. — TRV Murti

But in the absence of 'the real as transcendent to thought', actual nihilism looms an ever-present threat.

- :up:

I don't think this argument holds water. — T Clark

The author's argument against scientism doesn't claim to show science is irrational, but rather that it's core principle (that the scientific method is the only way to render truth about the world and reality) cannot be established with the scientific method - which he asserts makes it self-defeating.

The author of the paper I linked is Ed Feser, a proponent of Thomist metaphysics (the theistic metaphysics developed by Thomas Aquinas). Feser is basically trying to claim is system is superior to scientism because it has no such gap. My point is that metaphysical naturalism provides a similarly complete metaphysical system, one in which science fits perfectly - with no gap.

The point here is that the metaphysics involved in physicalism and the metaphysics that I would argue is present in methodological naturalism are adjudicable and non-arbitrary, and therefore they do not succumb to the critiques of metaphysics that many have leveraged. We don't need to be afraid of metaphysics, or believe that it represents some kind of unadjudicable free for all. — Leontiskos

100% agree.

What gap? — Wayfarer

That the core principle of scientism (that the scientific method is the only way to render truth about the world and reality) cannot be established with the scientific method. This implies the core principle is an unjustified belief- that's the gap.

The author's argument against scientism doesn't claim to show science is irrational, but rather that it's core principle (that the scientific method is the only way to render truth about the world and reality) cannot be established with the scientific method - which he asserts makes it self-defeating. — Relativist

He said more than that. He said science can not be shown to be a rational method of inquiry. My post was an attempt to refute that. We don't have to take this any further. I just thought his argument was sloppy and wanted to express my disagreement.

That the core principle of scientism (that the scientific method is the only way to render truth about the world and reality) cannot be established with the scientific method. This implies the core principle is an unjustified belief- that's the gap. — Relativist

Ah, I see. Somewhat similar to the fact that positivism fails according to the very criteria that it sets. Not a co-incidence. One of my lecturers used to compare positivism to the legendary uroborous, the snake that eats itself. ‘The hardest part’, he would say, with a mischievous grin, ‘is the last bite.’

My point is that metaphysical naturalism provides a similarly complete metaphysical system, one in which science fits perfectly - with no gap. — Relativist

But you would only say that, if you think that metaphysical naturalism is metaphysically sound, wouldn’t you? That metaphysical naturalism is capable of being all knowing?

It appears to me that you miss the point. Physicalism is a metaphysical theory, not a scientific theory. — Relativist

I've emphasized that and wondered why others don't seem to realize the import of that even in the text you quoted.

To succinctly reiterate the main thesis: physicalism is unnecessary and undesirable metaphysical baggage in relation to the scientific method; it tends towards vacuity in its broader forms and is highly problematic in its narrower forms. That's the locus around which my argument revolves.

Great OP. I tend to agree on most fronts so I will note the two places where I disagree.

First, "methodological naturalism," seems equally open to Hemple's Dilemma. If we discovered good empirical evidence for immaterial souls or ghosts, these would be considered "natural phenomena " Likewise, if a proper sort of magical ritual could reliably get spirits to manifest, this would also be considered natural, and so "methodological naturalism," would include seances.

"Naturalism" is probably best defined in terms of opposition to the "supernatural," but it's not readily obvious what this entails either. Sometimes "naturalism" is pulled out to imply that no concious intent or intentionality exists outside the "mind," but such a presupposition seems to go beyond method, and in any event wouldn't rule out mindless supernatural forces like karma. This problem seems particularly acute when it is extended into blanket presuppositions prohibiting teleology, etc.

The problem I see here is that it is actually quite difficult to disentangle intentionality and the intelligibility of the world. Moreover, many physicalists and naturalists will claim that certain aspects of nature are just uncaused "brute facts" (e.g. "why does Cosmic Inflation occur?" or "why was the starting entropy of the universe so low?"). But allowing "there is no explanation, it just is," seems every bit as open to abuse as "God did it and God's will is inscrutable." The key difference seems to be the reduce to the presence of some sort of intentionality being involved, things can "just be" but they cannot "just be" according to some will. I fail to see how this really makes a methodological difference though, either way we seem to allow for explanation to bottom out in the unintelligible and inscrutable.

Second, I object to the hard separation of "science" versus "philosophy." This is a relatively recent distinction and seems to me to have a lot of baggage associated with it (chiefly the dogmatic enforcement of the particular philosophy of the anti-metaphysical movement). I think it's an unhelpful distinction in general. Work in the "philosophy of physics," or "philosophy of biology," overlaps significantly with what physicists and biologists do, and theoretical science, particularly paradigm defining work, almost always involves a great deal of philosophical analysis.

Hence, I am not sure if I would necessarily criticize physicalism for being "unscientific." I think your point has merit though, in that physicalism very often ambiguously spreads itself across discrete fields (e.g. natural philosophy/physics and metaphysics), and uses this equivocation to advocate for its position.

Just looking at some of the replies, this has already come up. "Physicalism is metaphysics, not science," (e.g., ) of course presupposes that metaphysics is not a science (historically it was considered one) and that science is not philosophy (historically they were considered to overlap). I'd argue that the fire wall between these is illusory, and people routinely slide between them. This, to me, says the distinction is simply not a good one. We don't mistake botany for chemistry or psychology for physics in this way, and I'd argue that's because those distinctions are less ambiguous and arbitrary.

Just to add an example, you routinely see claims that it is "meaningless" to inquire as to the causes of the Big Bang. It's a brute fact, unopen to inquiry. The naturalistic tool kit fails here.

Of course, popular opinion in cosmology is now that a period of cosmic inflation lies prior to and is the source of the Big Bang. It was not meaningless to make such inquiries.

Such "brute fact" prohibitions on inquiry have a habit of dissolving whenever a better answer can be provided.

To the extent that "methodological naturalism," allows for such responses, it seems not far off from supernaturalism. What is the key difference? In one case we have the inscrutable and untinelligible "just happening," and in the other we posit some sort of mind, purpose, or moral force lying behind the inscrutable. But if we're going to say something is inscrutable, we might as well plead ignorance as to why it is, rather than make assertions as to its purpose or lack thereof.

What about the Original Post? Perhaps "methodological naturalism" is doublespeak for soft metaphysical naturalism, and physicalism really does deviate insofar as it is a form of hard metaphysical naturalism. On that view the problem is not that physicalism is metaphysical, but rather that it is too confident, too far out over its skies. The underlying issue is the difficulty or impossibility of adopting a thoroughgoing epistemological methodology without also adopting some form of metaphysical commitment. — Leontiskos

I think this is a good line of argument. I had thought of physicalism, also metaphorically, as kind of a snake pit where whenever one snake pops its head up and you cut it off, another one simply reappears in its place, reflecting the adaptive ability of physicalism to proliferate new versions of itself in response to new objections. This overall amorphism seems highly suspect in the context of scientifc endeavour. But then the question arises, as you and others have pointed out, is it really realistic to presume you can entirely rid yourself of that type of problem and "just do" science under the guidance of methodological naturalism or some other supposedly more neutral framework? Aren't there snakes everywhere? Aren't there metaphysical commitments inherent in making your job philosophically coherent as an enterprise?

I think to an extent there are. And an associated problem is even finding generally accepted definitions of the concepts in question, so that hard lines can be drawn. Perhaps the scientific method, methodological naturalism, metaphysical naturalism (including physicalism) can be placed on a kind of spectrum of increased commitment and perhaps even that modest enterprise has its complications. But I still think its useful to try to get out Occam's razor and try to do what we can, especially when one finds oneself defending science against ideological and metaphysical encroachment in general. Let's take the beam out of our own eyes first.

The alternative is a view of science which opens the door to the soft sciences, including theology. If the repeatability requirement is softened then interpersonal realities can be the subject of scientific study, because repeated interpersonal interactions do yield true and reliable knowledge, even though the repeatability is not as strict as that of the lab scientist who deals with a passive and subordinate substance. — Leontiskos

Here's another interesting line of approach. I had been thinking of the hard sciences, but most of my own background is in the soft sciences. And there's again a specturm to be considered. But qualitative studies do play a part in science and the soft sciences are absolutely drenched in philosophical commitments, particularly structuralist ones. Though, again, there is some kind of division envisioned between methodologies and metaphysics, it's very hard to see where that line really is. That's probably a conversation that's too broad for the scope of this thread, though I won't deny its relevancy.

(By the way, I'll try to keep up and respond to all the points raised with me. If I fall behind on this, I hope to catch up at some point. I do appreciate all the input).

I've learned a lot about biosemiotics from Apokrisis (including that it exists!) and benefitted a lot from it, although I don't agree with his metaphysics. Biosemiotics on the whole is not materialist in orientation so I don’t see biosemiotics as ‘scientistic’ in the sense that Dawkins/Dennett neo-darwinist materialism is. (Notice, though, that even though C S Peirce is categorised as an idealist philosopher in most directories, Apokrisis will generally downplay his idealist side.) — Wayfarer

Yes, I did notice that downplaying of idealism. The reason I bring up his philosophy is here we have an example of a scientifically-oriented philosophy that is not simply "scientism". Science is sifted through a sort of totalizing "information theory", which transcends and encapsulates it (and everything apparently). It does not appeal to supernatural, consciousness, or transcendental aspects of being (at least purposefully, but as you said, it is a kind of idealism at its root, based on a meta-logic, not a a traditional physicalist approach, though perhaps the "apeiron" with "symmetry-breaking" or whatnot might fall under a kind of very specific physicalism that follows a semiotic formula of Peirce, etc. etc.). But notice, like more traditional physicalist theories, there was no accounting for the terrain. It's all map. Whether you emphasize the arrangements of the physical or the physical substrates themselves (the form or the matter), none of that gets you closer to metaphysical questions regarding hard stuff, like consciousness. Clearly "being" a conscious entity and "describing" a conscious entity brings on a whole terrain of metaphysical questions about the nature of reality- what it means to "be".