Leon seems guilty of making a strong assertion in favor of the PNC being conclusive. — Cheshire
I could go along with your suggestion as a way-point, but not as a conclusion. If the argument is sound and the premises true, then if the conclusion is false something is amiss and must eventually be addressed.Logic is contractual discourse — Cheshire
I just go around assuming I'm wrong a lot. It's gotten less efficient with age and education but I'm always the one pleasantly surprised at the end. So, we have systems that allow for the occasional violation of the PNC or has a suitable alternative been found?I could go along with your suggestion as a way-point, but not as a conclusion. If the argument is sound and the premises true, then if the conclusion is false something is amiss and must eventually be addressed. — Banno
support
Leon seems guilty of making a strong assertion in favor of the PNC being conclusive
No, Leon. If you are going to use the claim to reject there being contradictory logics — Banno
Then perhaps I haven't followed your question.I'm not sure exactly how what you've quoted is supposed to address the question. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Again, true/correct is not my choice of terminology. A logic might be appropriate rather than true. Hence it depends on the interpretation given it. So, as i quoted, "Γ ⊨ φ is true iff whatever.. interpretation is given to the non-logical expressions in Γ and φ, if every member of Γ is true, then so is φ." For extensional logics, satisfaction will suffice....in virtue of what would true/correct logics be true/correct and false/incorrect ones not be? — Count Timothy von Icarus
I don't see it. It doesn't say "pluralism implies a contradiction, thus not-pluralism" but rather "if pluralism then not-PNC.*" How does this give priority to PNC? One might affirm pluralism here and just deny PNC. — Count Timothy von Icarus
So we end up with this:
The "true/correct logics" either contradict one another or they don't.
If they do, then the PNC has been destroyed.
If they don't, then we are no longer talking about logical pluralism. — Leontiskos
Pick your poison. Your thesis is that there are true/correct logics with nothing in common, such that we cannot call their similarity logic in a singular sense, and we cannot apply a rational aspect under which they are the same. — Leontiskos
They aren't logical without total adherence seems strong — Cheshire
The "true/correct logics" either contradict one another or they don't.
If they do, then the PNC has been destroyed.
If they don't, then we are no longer talking about logical pluralism. — Leontiskos
To be a law of logic, a principle must hold in complete generality
No principle holds in complete generality
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There are no laws of logic. — Gillian Russell
Have you stopped beating your wife yet? — Banno
it would turn this thread away form the mere bitch session it is becoming — Banno
Implied by stating it's violation is a destruction.Where do you find that claim, "They aren't logical without total adherence?" — Leontiskos
Can you answer the question? Do you agree with the argument? If you disagree then please explain which premise you oppose. — Leontiskos
But how we might deal with a case where, say, two logics over the same domain reach opposite conclusions remains an interesting question. — Banno
Implied by stating it's violation is a destruction. — Cheshire
I disagree with the first premise. They could have systematic disagree and remain consistent in there conclusions. Somehow, presumably. — Cheshire
I think we don't know that it can't. Things are certainly going to remain contradictory in many cases.Okay, so you think the PNC can be violated without being destroyed? — Leontiskos
Again, I would suggest focusing on the argument I gave, not some argument you are afraid I will give at some point in the future. — Leontiskos
When you choose to enguage with the articles cited, I'll be happy to join in. In the mean time, consider:Now you refuse to look at it. — Leontiskos
Loaded question fallacies are particularly effective at derailing rational debates because of their inflammatory nature - the recipient of the loaded question is compelled to defend themselves and may appear flustered or on the back foot. — Your logical fallacy is...
When you choose to enguage with the articles cited, I'll be happy to join in. — Banno
Let's look at the example that Russell gives:Anyhow, I would assume the default answer (the one Russell seems to assume as well) is that logics are correct if they are truth preserving, i e., true premises will lead to true conclusions. — Count Timothy von Icarus
But thenOne may indeed, according to the view, ask of the following argument:
(32) Gillian Russell is in Banff.
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I am in Banff.
as it is presented on the page, whether it is valid or not, and receive two different and equally correct answers. The first might say that the argument is valid, since its premise and conclusion are identical propositions and logical consequence is a reflexive relation, and the second might say (as we normally do) that the argument is not valid, since there are contexts of utterance with respect to which the sentence-character pair which is the premise is true, and the sentence-character pair which is the conclusion is false; a counter-example would be the context in which Kenny is the agent of the context. But this is not yet full-blown logical pluralism, since the only reason there were two answers to the
question was that it was unclear which argument the question was about. Once we disambiguated the question, there remained only the single answer — One true Logic?
One can think about it differently. If one simply stipulates that arguments are made up of sentences, syntactically construed, then one might say that there is a single argument which is unambiguously picked out in the question above, but that that argument is valid, or invalid, relative to different interpretations, or even, less platitudinously, the question of its validity depends on the depth
of the interpretation intended. Assign mere characters to the sentences, and it is possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false, so the argument is not valid. Assign propositions to them (relative to the context in which this paper was presented) and that is no longer possible, and so the argument is valid. That looks like a stripe of logical pluralism.
That looks like a stripe of logical pluralism.
Or does the truth and validity depend on the system being used? — Count Timothy von Icarus
1) Gillian is in Banf
2) I am Gillian
3) Therefore, I am in Banf — Count Timothy von Icarus
If I'm doing something dumb, it's okay to just say that. — Srap Tasmaner
And you might then think of the center of the circle as a projection of the center of the sphere. And it is, but it's entirely optional. That projection comes after we already have the circle. It's the canonical projection alright, but you could also project that point to any point on the plane, because this projection is just a thing you're doing ― the circle doesn't need it, isn't waiting for this projection, you see? — Srap Tasmaner
Ok, so you want a rational way to compare logical systems, an I think this is not the way to talk about the issue. I'll try again.
If it is the case that different "correct (truth preserving) logics" contradict one another, what exactly are they preserving? — Count Timothy von Icarus
Jack: I don't know. We know a member when we see one... except lots of people disagree about membership. — Count Timothy von Icarus
If it is the case that different "correct (truth preserving) logics" contradict one another, what exactly are they preserving? — Count Timothy von Icarus
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