Metaphysically necessary means that everything is contingent on it, which makes it omnipotent. A metaphysically necessary entity is non-contingent, which means it is eternal. Denying or disbelieving in those of those means rationally having the same attitude toward metaphysical necessity because they are mutually inclusive. — Hallucinogen

None of that is definitive of atheism. Atheism is the rejection of theism.
No sense in repeating ourselves. I think you’re missing a logical fallacy that you are making as indicated below. Im sure it has a name.

No, it is not just like that. The concept of a German Shepherd neither implies, nor is mutually inclusive with, your specific dog. — Hallucinogen

The logical fallacy you are making is just like that.
Obviously your intended point isnt going to be fallacious, you just committed the act while making your point.
Maybe its a poor analogy, thankfully what I said above (my previously quote and response in this message) applies regardless.
Youre just not talking about atheism.

There's literally nothing in that argument that goes any way towards suggesting that the first "necessary" thing is anything like what we would call a God. — flannel jesus

The OP presupposes that it's unnecessary to explain to people that metaphysical necessity is a property required of God. Acknowledging a necessary entity implies acknowledgement of something omnipotent and eternal, so contrary to your claim, necessary entities and God are very much alike.

Atheists aren't making the claim 'nothing is necessary', they're saying 'these deities in these books don't exist'. — flannel jesus

The descriptions of God offered by Abrahamic religions and Hinduism are all descriptions of a necessary entity. And atheism is more than what you've described it as, because it denies the existence of all God concepts, in connection to a specific religion or not.

you're confusing 'atheism' about personal gods with some other claim that atheists generally don't make. — flannel jesus

Denying the personal God concept is denying a necessary being, which is why atheists oppose the contingency argument and presuppositionalism, whenever they're presented. Most atheists understand that conceding the conclusion of the contingency argument signs them onto much of what is meant by theism.

Every case of atheism about a personal God is a case of atheism about a necessary being, because the definition of God is inclusive of metaphysical necessity:

God : the supreme or ultimate reality: — Merriam Webster

If it doesn't have metaphysical necessity, then it isn't supreme or ultimate. The same goes for any definition that mentions ruling nature, a creator, or being omnipotent.

Why use the word 'atheism' at all, instead of just saying 'not believing there is some necessary thing is a contradiction'?
Atheism isn't a general term for not believing something... — flannel jesus

Atheism is a term for not believing or denying some God concept, which is how I've used it. And that's how it's used in philosophy, since philosophers distinguish between local atheism (denial of/disbelief in some specific god) and global atheism.

This premise is patently false — Bob Ross

Why is it?

and is the denial, implicitly, that the concept of infinity is coherent. — Bob Ross

That's not implied by my premises.

you are getting this argument to work by denying that infinity, in principle, is internally coherent. — Bob Ross

Also no.

The fact that an infinite set has no last nor first element — Bob Ross

My argument addresses an infinite regress, not infinite sets in general.
An infinite series has a first term, but not a last term.

There's nothing internally incoherent with the idea of an infinite series of causal events — Bob Ross

I'm not arguing that there is. I'm arguing that there's a contradiction in the idea of an infinite regress of causal events.

:up: :up:

Atheism is the rejection of theism. — DingoJones

:Period. :100:

@Hallucingen's OP is nonsense.

The metaphysical problem with your scenario though, is that if past events are contingent on future events, then this either implies that the past event doesn't come into existence (because its future dependency doesn't exist) or it just does away with the idea of contingency. If the past event doesn't come into existence because it is contingent on some future event is in a "loop" with, then neither events exist and there is no loop. — Hallucinogen

The Cosmological Argument is that the Universe is only composed of contingent events, but as a contingent event is not a sufficient cause of itself, a necessary being must exist outside such a Universe.

This argument applies to a linear Universe, where future event B is contingent on past event A.

However, in a cyclic Universe, such as proposed by the Big Bounce, there is no past and future. Event B is contingent on event A, but event A was contingent on event B, meaning that event B is contingent upon itself.

In a linear Universe, as a contingent event is not a sufficient cause of itself, there must be a necessary cause outside the contingent event itself, such as a God.

However, in a cyclic world, as an event is not contingent on anything outside of itself, an event is a sufficient cause to itself and needs no necessary cause outside of itself, such as a God.

IE, in a cyclic Universe, as a future event is not contingent on a past event, the existence of a future event is not dependent on the existence of a past event.

What do you mean by "existence" in P1.
— tim wood
The perceptual aggregate, all observables across space and time. — Hallucinogen

So the existing is existence? That's incoherent. Can you do better?

"Series" is an abstract term; do you mean the Universe is an abstract term?
— tim wood
The objects within the universe are the terms and the functions/natural laws of the universe can be abstracted as the formula of a series. — Hallucinogen

At best this is a conceptual template, meaning that your arguments apply (at best) only to your concepts.

What is a series of entities?
— tim wood
By entity, I mean the dictionary definition, and by series, I mean a sequence of transformations in space or in abstraction.
What is a series of events?
— tim wood
By event, I mean a transformation of an object in space. — Hallucinogen

I find this definition of "entity": a thing with distinct and independent existence. By "series" and "sequence" do you mean ordered in some way, as perhaps before-after? By "transformation of an object in space" do you mean a change in an entity?

The discussion seems to be about an uncaused first cause, and that's an unbreakable oxymoron. As such you can only have it if you first grant it. But then you have proved exactly nothing. All this worked out millennia ago. If you're just working it out for yourself, some credit to you. But the argument has long been a dead letter.

[Y]our arguments apply (at best) only to your concepts [ ... ] The discussion seems to be about an uncaused first cause, and that's an unbreakable oxymoron. As such you can only have it if you first grant it. But then you [@Hallucinogen] have proved exactly nothing. All this worked out millennia ago. If you're just working it out for yourself, some credit to you. But the argument has long been a dead letter. — tim wood

:up: :up:

I suspect any dictionary will provide definitions I would find acceptable for starting a discussion — wonderer1

OK, then I stand by what I said earlier:

To deny theism is to deny a necessary entity, — Hallucinogen

That's based on dictionary definitions of "God" and "theism", along with the consideration that these discussions don't focus on the ontological status of polytheistic worldviews.

That's based on dictionary definitions of "God" and "theism" — Hallucinogen

The only being that exists in every possible world is the oxymoron.

In our previous exchange, you claimed your initial premise is justified "...by distinguishing events and observing entities..." — T Clark

I didn't actually say "justified". I said it's not an assumption, it's a description made possible by those distinctions and observations. If I were to explain the justification, I'd say it's because there's a correspondence between the series formula and the events being distinguished.

How many of those ((10^80)^80)^80 interactions have you observed? — T Clark

I don't know.

How many do you have to have observed for your premise to be justified? — T Clark

Just one.

given that all non-contingent entities are necessarily omnipotent and eternal — Hallucinogen

That's not a given. — Michael

Something's eternal if it isn't dependent on conditions. Contingency means to have a condtional dependency, so a non-contingent entity is eternal.
Something's omnipotent if everything stands in dependency to it. Everything in a contingent series is dependent on the non-contingent member of the series, so it is omnipotent.

The example of the Presidents explains what I mean in simple terms. — Michael

The example of the Presidents doesn't answer my question. The 1st President is contingent because it is an nth term of the universe, and it is necessary for there to be a 2nd President. It's just not metaphysically necessary.

You conflate "A is required for B" and "A is necessary". The former does not entail the latter. — Michael

If B is any nth term, then the former does entail the latter.

it's a description made possible by those distinctions and observations. — Hallucinogen

That's what justification means in this context - empirical evidence. You're just playing with words.

How many do you have to have observed for your premise to be justified?
— T Clark

Just one. — Hallucinogen

Sorry, no, that's not how it works. It's clear your premise is nothing but a "seems to me" proposition, i.e. an unjustified assumption.

That's what justification means in this context - empirical evidence. You're just playing with words. — T Clark

Justification doesn't solely consist of empirical evidence, why do you think that? It can consist solely of a priori axioms and rules of inference, or a combination of both, but never of only empirical evidence.

Sorry, no, that's not how it works — T Clark

Why not?

It's clear your premise is nothing but a "seems to me" proposition, — T Clark

You're resorting to straw-manning, because I never said that.

Nuff said.

You can be an atheist and not deny a non-contingent entity at all. — AmadeusD

Do you think you can be an atheist and believe in an omnipotent and eternal non-contingent entity? Because those properties are mutually inclusive with non-contingency.

IN fact, my point about deism was exactly this. You can be atheist, but deist. — AmadeusD

Doesn't make sense. Atheism is the denial or lack of belief in the existence of God. Deism is belief in God that doesn't intervene. Not intervening isn't the same as not existing.

Atheism is, etymologically, and practically-speaking "best" understood as only non-assent to theistic doctrine — AmadeusD

That's agnosticism.

Sorry, no, that's not how it works. — T Clark

We haven't even gotten into "how it works".

, the only necessity in modal logic is logic itself.

• Banno (Jul 5, 2021)
• Banno (Jul 7, 2021)
• jorndoe (Jul 6, 2021)
• jorndoe (Jul 2, 2024)

:100:

Goodness, that goes back a bit. I'd quite forgotten that thread. And a whole section was missing from the OP - I fixed it.

Thanks.

Doesn't make sense. Atheism is the denial or lack of belief in the existence of God. Deism is belief in God that doesn't intervene — Hallucinogen

No, not quite. Deism is belief in a pervasive force of creation. Some resort to the Gaia version of this when they want to personalize it, but it has not personality, the way a 'God' does.\\\

That's agnosticism. — Hallucinogen

No. This has been gone over so many times, it's really disappointing that you're throwing this line out. Agnosticism is the position that we can't know whether or not God exists. Atheism is the abstinence from belief in a God or Gods. Atheism is more of a non-position. This might be why what you're saying makes little sense, as it may not applicable to the terms you're using.

Do you think you can be an atheist and believe in an omnipotent and eternal non-contingent entity? — Hallucinogen

If it's not a theistic one, then by the lack of definitional restriction, yes, you could. Seems highly unlikely, but sure. But, given your take on atheism and deism, it seems perhaps you want to define it out, on your terms. Fine. Doesn't work for me, in those terms.

Hallucinogen, the only necessity in modal logic is logic itself. — jorndoe

The argument I presented uses first-order logic, in which "contingent" and "necessary" are predicates.

I don't see why claims that are confined to modal logic would act as a constraint on what I'm able to prove. Philosophers have been talking about necessity before modal logic was formalized, so it's not obvious to me why your comment is contrary to my post. But assuming that we are limited to modal logic, and that it entails what you claim, do you mean to claim that only logical necessity exists but metaphysical necessity doesn't?

• Banno (Jul 5, 2021)
• Banno (Jul 7, 2021)
• jorndoe (Jul 6, 2021)
• jorndoe (Jul 2, 2024) — jorndoe

OK, so you're dumping the links to 4 comments in front of me. Am I supposed to read through each of them with the benefit of the doubt that they're truthful, and work out what it is in each that you think supports your reply to my argument?

Can't you just write out the reasons why you think the only necessity in modal logic is logic itself, and why this undermines the case I argued?

The main statement among those comments I'd dispute is this one:

Anyway, so, R3 is a possible world, a boring, barren, inert, lifeless world. No minds here, — jorndoe

I could just say that any possible world that is intelligible to us obeys the rules of cognition that our world obeys, so simply identifying anything intelligible about such hypothetical worlds entails they require mental structure. Hence, there's no possible worlds in which a grounding in mental structure isn't implied.

No, not quite. Deism is belief in a pervasive force of creation. Some resort to the Gaia version of this when they want to personalize it, but it has not personality, the way a 'God' does. — AmadeusD

The sources I found agree with the way I defined deism.

: a movement or system of thought advocating natural (see natural entry 1 sense 8b) religion, emphasizing morality, and in the 18th century denying the interference of the Creator with the laws of the universe — Merriam Webster

Belief in a god who created the universe but does not govern worldly events, does not answer prayers, and has no direct involvement in human affairs. — Oxford Reference

the belief in a single god who created the world but does not act to influence events: — Cambridge Dictionary

spawned “deism”, the idea that God set the initial conditions of the universe and then left it to play out on its own — Stanford Encyclopedia Philosophy

Wikipedia says a deist God is not necessarily impersonal.

Deism is the belief in the existence of God—often, but not necessarily, an impersonal and incomprehensible God who does not intervene in the universe after creating it, — Wikipedia

No. This has been gone over so many times, it's really disappointing that you're throwing this line out. Agnosticism is the position that we can't know whether or not God exists. — AmadeusD

Almost every source I've looked at gives both the definition I gave and the one you've given. Typically they say that an agnostic is someone who believes that ultimate reality/God is unknown or unknowable. So there's widespread ambiguity on whether it means one or the other or both.

But I regard including "unknowable" in the definition to be problematic, because it means the definition of agnosticism about God now deviates from what the broader meaning of agnostic is. For example:

a person who is unwilling to commit to an opinion about something — Merriam Webster

2 a person who denies or doubts the possibility of ultimate knowledge in some area of study.
3 a person who holds neither of two opposing positions on a topic:
Socrates was an agnostic on the subject of immortality. — Dictionary.com

And the definition of agnostic that you're giving is a major commitment to knowing about reality. It states that reality cannot furnish knowledge or proof about its ultimate nature. That's a very shaky claim with complex entailments. As such, defining agnostic in that way makes it unlike how agnostic is used in the broader sense, to not have a commitment to some belief.

If it's not a theistic one, then by the lack of definitional restriction, yes, you could — AmadeusD

What I was asking you is if you think that belief in an omnipotent and eternal non-contingent entity is a theistic belief. So it sounds like you think some further critera is where the fault lines are between theism and atheism. Is that the belief that the necessary entity in question is omniscient as well as eternal and omnipotent?

Seems highly unlikely, but sure. — AmadeusD

Oh, but why? An omnipotent and eternal non-contingent entity is either inherently theistic or not, why would it be unlikely that an atheist would believe in such?

, the four links say about the same but worded differently (Banno's might be the most concise), the first line in my comment just gives a brief summary while expressing the non-ampliativity.

Some typical responses ...
"But God is the creator of any of the possible worlds", which departs from modal logic (and commits petitio principii anyway).
"But it's not logical necessity, it's metaphysical necessity", which roughly does the same by introducing a sufficiently vague/vacant phrase to head off to wherever (just about anywhere), whereas the logic is what we use to reason/deduce things.

A possible world is a self-consistent entirety; possible worlds, W, maintain standard logic.
• possibly p (holds for some consistent world): ◊p ⇔ ∃w∈W p
• necessarily p (holds for all consistent worlds): □p ⇔ ∀w∈W p
To round up the common subjunctive modalities, contingent and impossible can be set out from those.

All these worlds are yours - Except Europa ;)

intelligible — Hallucinogen

... and possible aren't the same; the latter is fairly concise above.

(As an aside, whatever "eternal" means, atemporal mind is incoherent (2022Nov11, 2024Sep22), atemporal living is nonsense.)

Oddly enough perhaps, "God is necessary" turns out to be a definition of "God", it's not an observation or a deduction, so "God" is now at the mercy of the definition if you will. (Also note, we're no longer talking down-to-Earth modalities like "water is necessary for the rain", "toddlers have to drink regularly", ...)

The etymology of 'agnostic' leads directly to the definition i gave "Not-knowledge". A-gnostic. I hear what you're saying, but these are attempts to use language to get past the problems I'm putting forward. You can disagree with these definitions, if you want to, and go on the merry-go-round a few more times. And I'm not even knocking that - but you want to make an argument. So let's get to it...

to knowing about reality. — Hallucinogen

to not knowing. It's not a commitment anymore than thinking you could know is. And that's, essentially, present in all other takes (deism, theism, atheism). So, can't really argue with the premise, but the idea that this somehow weakens the position is not right on my view.

s such, defining agnostic in that way makes it unlike how agnostic is used in the broader sense, to not have a commitment to some belief. — Hallucinogen

This is how Atheism is used in the 'broader sense'. This is quite well-established by the multitude of arguments about it between the leading theists and atheists from the late 90s to today. 'misuse' of the words, according to those who adopt them, is the central problem in discussions of this sort. I am trying my best to avoid the ambiguity you find to be helpful here. I realise several pages of several threads have gone over this in the last year, and I stand by my takes with full confidence there. The words need to be clear, and there is a clear, non-overlapping way to use them without ambiguity. The etymology would lend itself to those uses.

What I was asking you is — Hallucinogen

I answered what you asked. What you've said here is just a slightly more elaborate version of hte same question. Your conception of 'theism' is wrong, on my account, and doesn't capture what 'theism' represents. It would also capture deism. So, if hte entity you're talking about is something more akin to the 'New Age' conceptions - "the force of love", "the creative power of hte universe" etc... It is, definitionally, eternal and all-powerful, but is not at all theistic. So, there's no contradiction here that I'm able to ascertain.

An omnipotent and eternal non-contingent entity is either inherently theistic or not, why would it be unlikely that an atheist would believe in such? — Hallucinogen

The bold doesn't bear on the non-bold here, at all, in any way. The reason an atheist is hardly taken to believe in a deistic God (of some kind - make it super-vague if that helps) is that an atheist is far more likely to be thinking rationally and wanting evidence instead of settling for an inference in comparison to a theist, or deist who (as I understand) must be making a rather large leap to their conclusion, no matter how far rationality got them. And that's all that can support deistic or theistic beliefs, imo (well, I say inference - I do also mean 'inference from intuition' or something similar - one's deeply-felt passions can infer something is hte case, but only infer on no other evidence).

the first line in my comment just gives a brief summary while expressing the non-ampliativity. — jorndoe

I don't understand how it shows that the argument in my OP is non-ampliative because it doesn't appear to address it.

"But God is the creator of any of the possible worlds", which departs from modal logic — jorndoe

But why is departing from modal logic an issue? I did ask this before.

(and commits petitio principii anyway) — jorndoe

Not necessarily, the example you've given doesn't make it clear what the reason for the claim is. You need more than just the claim itself to show that's the fallacy being committed. When that very claim is made on the basis of Aquinas' original argument, it commits no petitio principii.

"But it's not logical necessity, it's metaphysical necessity", which roughly does the same by introducing a sufficiently vague/vacant phrase — jorndoe

Why do you think it's vague? It's just the negation of contingent, which in the argument is the predicate of being dependent on conditions. What's vague about that?

whereas the logic is what we use to reason/deduce things. — jorndoe

The claim of metaphysical necessity is concluded on the basis of logic.

A possible world is a self-consistent entirety; — jorndoe

And "entirety" needs to include whatever it is that distributes over all possible worlds, which is what is metaphysically necessary.

intelligible — Hallucinogen

... and possible aren't the same — jorndoe

That was implied when I said

that any possible world that is intelligible to us — Hallucinogen

(As an aside, whatever "eternal" means, atemporal mind is incoherent (2022Nov11, 2024Sep22), atemporal living is nonsense.) — jorndoe

But your reasoning still isn't very explicit in the posts you're linking to. It appears you're saying intelligence is a process, which has to be temporal, and minds have intelligence, so minds are also temporal. Even if I were to agree with the premises I don't think it follows. Stuff in space is mathematical, but that doesn't mean mathematics is temporal. The set that contains the elements doesn't necessarily have the same properties the elements have.

"God is necessary" turns out to be a definition of "God", it's not an observation or a deduction, — jorndoe

The claim is that there's a necessary entity, and that's deduced in the argument. Whether or not you call it God is going to depend on other reasons.

Something's eternal if it isn't dependent on conditions. Contingency means to have a condtional dependency, so a non-contingent entity is eternal.
Something's omnipotent if everything stands in dependency to it. Everything in a contingent series is dependent on the non-contingent member of the series, so it is omnipotent. — Hallucinogen

Something is eternal if it exists forever. Something is omnipotent if it can do anything. The one does not entail the other. And neither entails nor is entailed by necessity.

And I also suspect there's more to your "necessary being" than just being eternal and omnipotent. Is it conscious with a will of its own? Or is it just some mindless thing that maintains and shapes the material world, perhaps the hypothetical single force that unites electromagnetism, the strong force, the weak force, and gravity? An atheist can accept this latter thing.

The example of the Presidents doesn't answer my question. The 1st President is contingent because it is an nth term of the universe, and it is necessary for there to be a 2nd President. It's just not metaphysically necessary. — Hallucinogen

A 2nd President does not entail that a 1st President is metaphysically necessary. A 2nd term of the universe does not entail that a 1st term of the universe is metaphysically necessary.

Perhaps the 1st term of the universe was an accident, and because of that accident there was also a 2nd term, a 3rd term, and so on. Those 2nd and 3rd terms do not retroactively entail that the 1st term wasn't an accident.

Something's eternal if it isn't dependent on conditions. — Hallucinogen

Something is eternal if it exists forever. — Michael

Something exists forever if it isn't dependent on conditions.

Something's omnipotent if everything stands in dependency to it. — Hallucinogen

Something is omnipotent if it can do anything. — Michael

Something can do anything if everything is dependent on it.

The one does not entail the other. — Michael

If everything contingent depends on it, then it isn't in a contingency relation to anything else, and it doesn't depend on conditions.

And neither entails nor is entailed by necessity. — Michael

My text that you're responding to disproves this, and simply giving synonyms for "eternal" and "omnipotent" isn't a rebuttal.

And I also suspect there's more to your "necessary being" than just being eternal and omnipotent. Is it conscious with a will of its own? — Michael

In my view it is, but my view doesn't change the fact that most God concepts are omnipotent and eternal.

An atheist can accept this latter thing. — Michael

They can, yet most atheists don't accept the contingency argument.

A 2nd President does not entail that a 1st President is metaphysically necessary. — Michael

Because a 1st President is contingent.

A 2nd term of the universe does not entail that a 1st term of the universe is metaphysically necessary. — Michael

That's false, a 1st term of the universe isn't contingent. And if you view "terms" as all being dependent on the series formula, then this isn't consequential as it means the series formula is non-contingent because it trivially redefines the formula as the 1st term.

Perhaps the 1st term of the universe was an accident — Michael

Accidents are contingent, so the non-contingent component of the series can't be an accident.

That's false, a 1st term of the universe isn't contingent. — Hallucinogen

You're begging the question. Here are two scenarios:

1. A 1st term is necessary. A 2nd and 3rd term follow.
2. A 1st term is contingent. A 2nd and 3rd term follow.

Given that a 2nd and 3rd term exist in both scenarios you cannot use the existence of a 2nd and 3rd term to prove that the 1st term is necessary. This is the fallacy that your argument commits.

In my view it is, but my view doesn't change the fact that most God concepts are omnipotent and eternal. — Hallucinogen

Even if some X is necessary and even if this X is "omnipotent" and eternal it does not follow that this X is God. You are introducing properties unrelated to your argument.

As an atheist I could accept that there is some impersonal force – e.g. the union of electromagnetism, the strong force, the weak force, and gravity – that necessarily exists. I could even accept that this impersonal force is "omnipotent" and eternal. But it ain't God.

Something can do anything if everything is dependent on it.

...

Something exists forever if it isn't dependent on conditions. — Hallucinogen

These are non sequiturs.

And you are, again, equivocating. That a 2nd term depends on a 1st term to have existed does not entail that the 1st term must still exist. A clock must have been made by a clockmaker, but the clock doesn't cease to exist after the clockmaker dies.

Your conclusion, that there is a God that necessarily exists, simply isn't proven by the claim that causation is not an infinite regress.

You're begging the question. Here are two scenarios: — Michael

No, I'm not. You're trying to equivocate between a series of presidents and the series of existence as a whole.

2. A 1st term is contingent. A 2nd and 3rd term follow. — Michael

Take another look at the argument in the OP. The 1st term of existence (which is being used synonymously with "the universe", i.e., reality as a whole) isn't contingent. Contingent means it's dependent on a condition prior to it; there isn't anything prior to what is first.

Given that a 2nd and 3rd term exist in both scenarios you cannot use the existence of a 2nd and 3rd term to prove that the 1st term is necessary. — Michael

Your second scenario is false because the first term isn't contingent when all entities are considered, only when entities within some partial context are, like a series of presidents.

Even if some X is necessary and even if this X is "omnipotent" and eternal it does not follow that this X is God. — Michael

I didn't say it does.

You are introducing properties unrelated to your argument. — Michael

It was you that introduced them, not me.

And I also suspect there's more to your "necessary being" than just being eternal and omnipotent. Is it conscious with a will of its own? — Michael

As an atheist I could accept that there is some impersonal force – e.g. the union of electromagnetism, the strong force, the weak force, and gravity – that necessarily exists. — Michael

Then you wouldn't be an atheist about a necessary entity and you wouldn't commit the contradiction.

No, I'm not. You're trying to equivocate between a series of presidents and the series of existence as a whole. — Hallucinogen

I am explaining that "if some A is the nth term then some B must have been the 1st term" does not entail "the 1st term necessarily exists (and is omnipotent)".

It doesn't make a difference what A and B are. The logic is a non sequitur whether we are talking about Presidential terms or "the series of existence as a whole".

Then you wouldn't be an atheist about a necessary entity and you wouldn't commit the contradiction. — Hallucinogen

You are misusing the term "atheist". An atheist is someone who believes that no deities exist.