The argument is valid but its first premise is false (or at least hasn't been proven to be true). — Michael
We say that prayers being answered is the effect, and God's existence is the cause of this effect. God's existence causes prayers to be answered. However, it's an inverse fallacy to say that if prayers are answered then God exists. — Metaphysician Undercover
So you are saying that your prayers might still be answered even if God does not exist? So that an atheist could be justified in praying? — Leontiskos
So you are saying that your prayers might still be answered even if God does not exist? So that an atheist could be justified in praying? — Leontiskos
None of that matters. Just assume that the premise is true. The conclusion is still (superficially) counterintuitive. — Michael
The issue concerns making sense of the argument's validity, not proving or disprove its soundness. — Michael
There are all sorts of hypothetical entities that could answer prayers; devils, angels, fairies, wizards, extremely advanced aliens, the universe branching into a new timeline in accordance to one's will, etc. There's no reason to believe that it can only be the working of some sort of monotheistic creator deity (and certainly no reason to believe that it can only be the working of a specific religion's deity). — Michael
The problem is that we never know for sure whether or not something other than A might bring about the occurrence of B. — Metaphysician Undercover
early 13c., preien, "ask earnestly, beg (someone)," also (c. 1300) in a religious sense, "pray to a god or saint," from Old French preier "to pray" (c. 900, Modern French prier), from Vulgar Latin *precare (also source of Italian pregare), from Latin precari "ask earnestly, beg, entreat," from *prex (plural preces, genitive precis) "prayer, request, entreaty," from PIE root *prek- "to ask, request, entreat."
From early 14c. as "to invite." The deferential parenthetical expression I pray you, "please, if you will," attested from late 14c. (from c. 1300 as I pray thee), was contracted to pray in 16c. Related: Prayed; praying. — Pray Etymology
If you write a letter to Mike Tyson asking him to punch you in the face, and the next day a random guy on the street punches you in the face, has your petition been granted? Would you still await a response from Tyson? — Leontiskos
And as such, prayer is not restricted to God, worship (latria) is. — Leontiskos
There's been a bunch of these around recently, so here's one that is actually valid...
If God does not exist, then it is false that if I pray, then my prayers will be answered. So I do not pray. Therefore God exists.
Attributed to Dorothy Eddington.
~G→~(P→A)
~P
G — Banno
So apparently if you didn't get a good look at the guy who hit you, you would just assume it was Tyson. I still don't see how you would write him a letter if you don't believe he exists. — Leontiskos
Only because, unlike the material conditional, the everyday sense allows that a conditional may be false even when its antecedent is false. — TonesInDeepFreeze
If your prayers are answered you assume it was God who did the answering. — Metaphysician Undercover
Fine by me. But if your logic teacher set parsing "If there is no god then your prayers will not be answered" into prop form, what would be the better choice? Which is why I thought it worth discussing. The creativity of the responses to this thread has been entertaining. :wink:I wouldn't assume that the everyday sense of "if then" in the problem has a truth table interpretation. — TonesInDeepFreeze
And you think that one should still pray even if God doesn't exist? — Leontiskos
The variable sharing principle says that no formula of the form A→B can be proven in a relevance logic if A and B do not have at least one propositional variable (sometimes called a proposition letter) in common and that no inference can be shown valid if the premises and conclusion do not share at least one propositional variable.
"If there is no God then it is not the case that if I pray then my prayers are answered" seems true. It seems true based on an everyday sense of "if then" by which a conditional may be false when its antecedent is false.
But the inference "If there is no God then it is not the case that if I pray then my prayers are answered, and I do not pray, therefore there is a God" is valid based on a different sense of "if then" by which a conditional is false if and only if its antecedent is true and its consequent is false. — TonesInDeepFreeze
I think it's more addressing that these mean different things:
1. ¬(P→A)
2. P→¬A — Michael
This does not belong in the lounge. This is a paradox that rest on a tricky difference between conditionals in language and conditionals in logic. — hypericin
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