Why be such a dick? — Apokrisis
And in humans, both would have then have the extra feature of being linguistically structured. — apokrisis
Well, humans have a whole bunch of neurons that think very fast like a computer, and well, he or she is doing it very, very fast, in parallel, and well it's definitely superhuman, and very complicated. — Rich
Humans are superhuman? Isn't that contradictory? — Metaphysician Undercover
Is the unconscious a myth? Or a real and potent component of the psyche where words and memories are stored waiting to invade waking life?
Per Freud and Lacan, word similarity is something the unconscious plays with. Do you pay attention to Freudian slips as a window on the depths of the psyche?
Is the unconscious a myth? — Mongrel
A rational man's unconscious is irrational, an emotional man's unconscious is calculating. And of course they are both women! — unenlightened
In the Grimms' version of the tale, the woodcutter's wife is the children's biological mother and the blame for abandoning them is shared between both her and the woodcutter himself. In later editions, some slight revisions were made: the wife became the children's stepmother, the woodcutter opposes her scheme to abandon the children and religious references are made. The sequence where the swan helps them across the river is also an addition to later editions.[3] — Wikipedia: Hansel and Gretel
I don't see how the unconscious could be linguistically structured. — Metaphysician Undercover
Emotions and feelings arise from the unconscious which we cannot put words to. — Metaphysician Undercover
Furthermore, when we think using words it is always a conscious effort. If we try to put words to the subconscious, in an effort to structure it, we must bring it into the conscious mind, so that it is no longer the subconscious which is being structured. — Metaphysician Undercover
The whole brain is involved and the effort is divided between habit and attention. Attention forms a generalised intent (that being the novel part), habit puts that into words (that being routine skill), and then attention can sign off on the final utterance - or at least come up with hasty self-correction having spotted something wrong with the way the words just came out. — apokrisis
You are making a category error in trying to make attention the efficient cause of a final cause. — apokrisis
A clear intention comes to be in focus because all the background chatter of the brain is being suppressed or restrained. The intent thus pops into view as the efficient cause (supposedly) of the voluntary or controlled behaviour that ensues. And the effort being talked about is the effort of repressing all the possibilities that might have been to allow some particular "best fit" state of mind become fully actualised. — apokrisis
So to control interactions with the world, we do have to learn what to do. But mostly that becomes learning to suppress the randomness of all the things we shouldn't do. — apokrisis
I think the unconscious is an unknown known, and one neurologist's woo is as flakey as his brother's. — unenlightened
Intentionality resides wholly with the ego. — Posty McPostface
Talk about attention is talk about a general faculty. Talk about intentions is talk about particular states.
Now I am trying to get away from such a mundanely mechanical framing of the debate myself. But if we have to talk in those terms, then you can see how you are confusing apples and oranges. Or the general and the particular. — apokrisis
Intentions have to form via attentional mechanism. And then having formed as particular states of attention, they can act as constraints on further attentional acts. — apokrisis
So you've got yourself into some pointless spiral in trying to prove attentional machinery is under voluntary control and never subject to involuntary trigger. But that machinery obviously has to switch efficiently between two modes of attending - either pursuing a plan or getting a new plan started. — apokrisis
Inasmuch as attention has an intentional (voluntary, noticeable, controllable, conscious) aspect, and an unintentional (involuntary, unnoticeable, uncontrollable, semi-conscious) aspect, it is unsuitable even as a metaphor for consciousness. It could just as easily serve as a metaphor for semi-consciousness. — Galuchat
Inasmuch as attention has an intentional (voluntary, noticeable, controllable, conscious) aspect, and an unintentional (involuntary, unnoticeable, uncontrollable, semi-conscious) aspect, it is unsuitable even as a metaphor for consciousness. It could just as easily serve as a metaphor for semi-consciousness. — Galuchat
In case you didn't notice, I'm talking about the general thing, intention, not particular intentions. — Metaphysician Undercover
Of course I cannot really name the general intention from which the particulars are derived, or else it would no longer be general, it would be something specific, named. But I can describe them in general ways, like the feelings of anxiety, anticipation, discomfort, etc., which all seem to exist in forms which attract my attention. — Metaphysician Undercover
It's funny to hear you bringing up semi consciousness again as if it is a term with any relevance here. But maybe you can explain what you mean in neuro terms rather than as some handwaving metaphor, like a volume button being turned down low or something. — Apokrisis
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.